PEOPLE v. EDWARDS (1976)

OPINION

Ronald Newels Edwards appeals from the judgment entered after a jury convicted him, as an ex-felon, of possessing a concealable firearm in violation of Penal Code section 12021. His application for probation was denied, and he was sentenced to prison for the term prescribed by law.

In pronouncing judgment, the trial court made specific reference to the prior felony conviction. This finding was carried forward into the abstract of judgment, thus subjecting Edwards to the increased penalty provisions of Penal Code section 3204. The Attorney General concedes this was error. The prior conviction was an essential element of the crime charged (Pen.Code § 12021). Under these circumstances, the statutes providing for increased penalty for a prior conviction are not applicable (People v. Ford, 60 Cal.2d 772, 794, 36 Cal.Rptr. 620, 388 P.2d 892; People v. Perry, 42 Cal.App.3d 451, 460, 116 Cal.Rptr. 853).

The significant issue raised by the appeal is Edwards' contention that the trial court's summary denial of his application for probation without explanation or statement of reasons substantially impaired his right to judicial review to determine whether the action taken was arbitrary or capricious and an abuse of discretion. Although unsupported by direct precedent, the contention warrants serious consideration, for in similar contexts recent decisions of the Supreme Court and the Courts of Appeal have declared that decisions denying substantial benefits at the level where primary discretion lies must be supported by a statement of reasons.

The problem was most recently addressed by the Supreme Court in In re Podesto, 127 Cal.Rptr. 97, 544 P.2d 1297 (Filed January 27, 1976), where, under its supervisory authority over state criminal procedure, the court announced the rule ‘that trial courts in the future should render a brief statement of reasons in support of an order denying a motion for bail on appeal.’ In reaching its decision in Podesto, the Supreme Court reviewed several earlier cases which had dealt with the problem in other areas, stating:

‘On a number of occasions in recent years, this court has emphasized that meaningful judicial review is often impossible unless the reviewing court is apprised of the reasons behind a given decision. In In re Sturm (1974), 11 Cal.3d 258, 268–270, 113 Cal.Rptr. 361, 521 P.2d 97, for example, we concluded that the demands of procedural due process required the Adult Authority to support its decision denying a prisoner parole with a statement of reasons. Similarly, in Topanga Assn. for a Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles (1974), 11 Cal.3d 506, 513–518, 113 Cal.Rptr. 836, 522 P.2d 12, we concluded as a matter of statutory interpretation that written findings were necessary to permit meaningful review of quasi-judicial administrative decisions. And, most recently, in Juan T. v. Superior Court (1975), 49 Cal.App.3d 207, 210–211, 122 Cal.Rptr. 405, the Court of Appeal reached an analogous conclusion, holding that the juvenile court must ‘state its reasons [when it finds] that a minor is not a fit and proper subject for treatment under the juvenile court law.’ (See e. g., In re Bye (1974) 12 Cal.3d 96, 110, 115 Cal.Rptr. 382, 524 P.2d 854, and fn. 14; Kent v. United States (1966) 383 U.S. 541, 561, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84.)' (In re Alan E. Podesto, Crim.No. 18616, filed January 27, 1976.)

The court then noted three valuable purposes served by the requirement of articulated reasons to support a given decision.

‘In the first place, as we have noted, the statement of such reasons will frequently be essential to any meaningful review of the decision. Secondly, a requirement of articulated reasons acts as an inherent guard against the careless decision, insuring that the judge himself analyses the problem and recognizes the grounds for his decision. Finally, articulated reasons aid in preserving public confidence in the decision-making process 'by helping to persuade the parties [and the public] that . . . decision-making is careful, reasoned, and equitable.’ (Topanga Assn. for a Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 517, 113 Cal.Rptr. [836] at p. 842, 522 P.2d [12] at p. 18)' (In re Alan E. Podesto, at p. 107, 544 P.2d at p. 1307.)

We approach the problem presented here by determining whether the same valuable interests outlined in Podesto would be served by requiring trial courts to support orders denying probation by a statement of reasons. Unquestionably trial courts are vested with a wide discretion in determining whether to grant or deny probation. But, as stated in People v. Wade, 53 Cal.2d 322, 1 Cal.Rptr. 683, 348 P.2d 116, at page 338, 1 Cal.Rptr. at p. 694, 348 P.2d at p. 127:

‘. . . that discretion may not be exercised in an arbitrary or capricious manner. It must be impartial, guided by ‘fixed legal principles, to be exercised in conformity with the spirit of the law.’ (People v. Jones, 87 Cal.App. 482, 493–499, 262 P. 361. . . . )'

More recently the Supreme Court has said (quoting from an earlier decision by the Court of Appeal):

“It is well established in the law that the severity of the sentence and the placing of defendant on probation rest in the sound discretion of the trial court. [Par.] The term [judicial discretion] implies absence of arbitrary determination, capricious disposition or whimsical thinking. It imports the exercise of discriminating judgment within the bounds of reason. . . .” (In re Cortez, 6 Cal.3d 78, 85, 98 Cal.Rptr. 307, 311, 490 P.2d 819, 823.)

(See also People v. Giminez, 14 Cal.3d 68, 72.)

It follows that an order denying an application for probation is subject to limited judicial review to determine whether the decision was arbitrarily or capriciously reached or was based upon wholly irrational considerations (see People v. Giminez, supra, 14 Cal.3d 68, 72, 120 Cal.Rptr. 577, 534 P.2d 65). Just as in the Podesto context, this right of limited review may be frustrated when a trial court summarily denies probation and gives no indication of what motivated its decision. That tactic not only deprives the defendant of the ability to make the required showing if the decision was arbitrarily reached (see People v. Giminez, supra, 14 Cal.3d 68, 72, 120 Cal.Rptr. 577, 534 P.2d 65), but also frequently makes impossible meaningful review by an appellate court (see In re Alan E. Podesto, supra, 127 Cal.Rptr. p. 107, 544 P.2d p. 1037).

The grant of primary discretion carries with it the corresponding assignment of primary responsibility. When an appellate court is required to search the record to locate a possible, undisclosed basis to support the exercise of trial court discretion involving an important decision, neither discretion nor responsibility are practiced at the contemplated judicial level. All this would be eliminated in the area under consideration if trial judges would simply and forthrightly explain their reasons for denying applications for probation.

While a statement of reasons to support an order denying probation would facilitate judicial review, the procedure would not enlarge the existing limited scope of that review. Absent a clear showing that the decision was arbitrary or irrational, the trial court's determination should not be set aside on review.

Equally important with the facilitation of limited judicial review, the requiring of articulated reasons to support an order denying an application for probation would act ‘as an inherent guard against the careless decision’ and would insure ‘that the judge himself analyses the problem and recognizes the grounds for his decision.’ (In re Alan E. Podesto, supra, at p. 107, 544 P.2d at p. 1307.) In considering whether to grant or deny probation, and in performing the duty to sentence a defendant which follows if probation is denied, a trial judge exercises the ultimate of his judicial authority. Such a significant decision deserves more than pro forma consideration. Requiring the articulation of reasons for the decision will tend to insure that due and adequate consideration of the application is in fact given and will greatly contribute to the rationality of the ultimate conclusion reached.

The record in Edwards' case provides a classic example of the need for such a statement. From beginning to end, the probation hearing and the proceeding culminating in his sentence to prison are transcribed in slightly less than two pages of the reporter's transcript. Recorded within this short space are the initial calling of the case, defense counsel's announcement of his presence and representation, some colloquy between the judge and the probation officer which resulted in the court's obtaining a copy of the probation report, a statement indicating that the probation officer had recommended probation conditioned upon Edwards serving ninety days in local custody, summary denial of probation by the court, arraignment for judgment by the clerk and pronouncement of judgment by the court.¹

No one seriously concerned with the administration of justice can read this record and not be disturbed by it. If the trial judge reflected at all upon Edward's application for probation, the record fails to show it. While the record of the proceedings may not demonstrate that the decision to deny probation was arbitrarily reached, it does give rise to the implication that the judge acted without rational consideration. If valid reasons existed in the trial judge's mind for denying Edwards' probation, a brief recitation of those reasons at the time of the proceedings would have dispelled that implication. As it stands, the record gives no indication the judge himself analyzed the problem and recognized the grounds for his decision (In re Alan E. Podesto, supra, at p. 107, 544 P.2d 1307).

Finally, we conclude that requiring a statement of reasons to support an order denying an application for probation would impose no substantial burden on the trial courts, and would perform a salutary service in preserving the integrity of and confidence in the judicial process. Tn a felony case a decision denying probation in most instances results in a sentence to prison. Before that drastic intrusion upon an individual's liberty is imposed, principles of fundamental fairness require that he be told why less drastic alternatives are not feasible under the circumstances.²

By its very nature the criminal justice system is constantly confronted by individuals who have transgressed against the rules of society. But societal transgression provides no excuse for arbitrary retaliation. Despite such transgressions the system must deal fairly and reasonably with those who come before it if it is to maintain its own integrity and preserve public confidence in its performance. Procedures which fall short of this goal are harmful to the system itself as well as to the individual defendant.

Many trial judges do follow the practice of explaining their reasons for denying probation. For the reasons stated above, we conclude the trial courts in the future should support the denial of an application for probation with a brief statement of reasons. While we intend this decision to be given general effect only after it becomes final, considerations of fairness convince us that Edwards should have the benefit of it. We should not have to search the record to divine what motivated the trial court's decision. Absent a statement of reasons, we are unable to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the application for probation.

The judgment of conviction is affirmed insofar as it adjudicated defendant's guilt; the case is reversed as to sentence only and remanded to the trial court with directions to reconsider defendant's application for probation in light of this opinion.

APPENDIX

‘THE COURT; People versus Edwards. Mr. Johnson?

‘MR. JOHNSON: That's ready, your Honor.

Rodney Johnson representing Ronald Edwards who is present in custody.

‘THE COURT: Do you have a copy of your report? We can't find the original.

‘THE PROBATION OFFICER: Your Honor, I have an extra copy I can pull out.

‘THE COURT: For the record, I have read and considered the report of the Probation Department which recommends ninety days.

‘MR. JOHNSON: Yes, your Honor. I must say I concur with the evaluation and recommendation of the Probation Department in this matter.

‘THE COURT: I am surprised at the recommendation, Mr. Probation Officer. Do you want to explain it?

‘THE PROBATION OFFICER: In what reference, your Honor?

‘THE COURT: It seems very lenient.

‘THE PROBATION OFFICER: I agree, I think it is lenient. However, our records indicate we did work with this man for several years, and there are some positive things about him. At the same time, there are some negative things about him. And although he completed his last period of probation satisfactorily, he didn't get the record expunged. I think it was primarily because of just ignoring the procedure on it, to give him notice on it. With that information, your Honor, that's the basis—it is out [sic] conclusion in this offense here—I am aware, your Honor, you are more familiar with this offense since it went to trial; however, I am kind of not that fully informed as to the facts of this offense as you may be.

‘THE COURT: Do you have anything to add?

‘MR. JOHNSON: No, your Honor.

‘THE COURT: The application for probation will be denied.

‘Mr. Clerk.

‘THE CLERK: Mr. Edwards, in an Information filed in this Court you were charged with violation of section 12021 of the Penal Code, to which you entered a plea of not guilty. You were tried by a jury and found guilty. In addition, the jury found the alleged prior to be true.

‘Probation having been denied, is there any legal cause why judgment should not now be pronounced upon you?

‘THE DEFENDANT: No.

‘THE COURT: Defendant will be committed to State Prison to serve the term prescribed by law. The Court is taking into consideration the prior felony conviction.’

FOOTNOTES

1.  The transcript of the proceedings is attached as an appendix to this decision.

2.  Certainly the trial judge is not bound to follow a probation officer's recommendation that probation be granted. However, when a judge decides to deny probation, contrary to the probation officer's recommendation, considerations of fairness to the defendant make an explanation of the decision even more imperative.

AULT, Associate Justice.