GROWERS ASSOCIATION v. RODRIGUEZ (1976)

Plaintiff (Respondent) brought an unlawful detainer action in the Municipal Court (Ventura County). That Court entered judgment in favor of respondent. Defendants appealed to the Superior Court, Appellate Department, Ventura County, which affirmed the judgment. Pursuant to rule 63(a), California Rules of Court, the Appellate Department certified that the transfer of the matter to this court appeared necessary to settle important questions of law. We accepted the certification and granted a hearing. All parties agree that sole issues are correctly set forth in the Memorandum of Opinion written for the Superior Court, Appellate Department, Ventura County, by the Honorable Robert R. Willard, Presiding Judge thereof. In our view the well written opinion clearly and correctly defines the issue and applies the law. We therefore set forth that opinion in toto and adopt it as that of this court.

Respondent is a labor contractor who rents housing to its employees on a month-to-month basis. Appellant, as such a tenant, was given adequate notice of termination of his tenancy. When he refused to vacate, respondent brought an unlawful detainer action in the municipal court. In that action the trial court refused do receive evidence offered on two affirmative defenses. These defenses were that the tenancies had been terminated in retaliation for two things: (1) that appellant was on strike against respondent, and (2) that appellant was a plaintiff in a United States District Court action against respondent alleging violation of the Farm Labor Contractors Registration Act. (7 U.S.C. § 2041 et seq.)

Appellants have conceded that but for the affirmative defenses plaintiff would be entitled to judgment. The sole issues are whether the affirmative defenses of retaliation for striking and for filing the U.S. District Court lawsuit are cognizable in this action for unlawful detainer.

‘The basic teaching of Knowles, Lakeside, and the entire line of cases these decisions reflect, is that a defense normally permitted because it ‘arises out of the subject matter’ of the original suit is generally excluded is an unlawful detainer action if such defense is extrinsic to the narrow issue of possession, which the unlawful detainer procedure seeks speedily to resolve. Neither Knowles, Lakeside nor any other California decision, however, prohibits a tenant from interposing a defense which does directly relate to the issue of possession and which, if established, would result in the tenant's retention of the premises. The thrust of the Knowles' line of cases is basically to prevent tenants from frustrating the summary statutory remedy through introduction of extraneous matter; the decisions accomplish this objective by confining the unlawful detainer action to issues directly relevant to the ultimate question of possession.'1 (Green v. Superior Court [1974] 10 Cal.3d 616, 632, 111 Cal.Rptr. 704, 715, 517 P.2d 1168, 1179.)

As indicated in the Green decision, the availability of a defense is not determined by whether the defense is legal or equitable, but rather by whether it goes to the right of possession, as contrasted to some other issue arising out of the subject matter.

In this case, the specific issues are whether the alleged causes for the eviction (retaliation for striking and suing) bar what otherwise would be landlord's right to possession.

At least four California decisions require consideration.

In Abstract Inv. Co. v. Hutchison (1962) 204 Cal.App.2d 242, 22 Cal.Rptr. 309, it was determined that retaliatory eviction because of race would constitute state action in violation of the United States Constitution, and therefore should have been considered by the trial court as a defense to a claim of right to possession in an unlawful detainer action.

In Schweiger v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 507, 90 Cal.Rptr. 729, 476 P.2d 97 the Supreme Court held that indirect termination of tenancy in retaliation for the exercise by the tenant of statutory rights under Civil Code section 1942 to make necessary repairs at the landlord's expense, foreclosed the landlord's right to possession.

Green v. Superior Court (1974) 10 Cal.3d 616, 111 Cal.Rptr. 704, 517 P.2d 1168 held that failure to maintain the premises in habitable condition is a defense to unlawful detainer.

Union Oil Co. v. Chandler (1970) 4 Cal.App.3d 716, 84 Cal.Rptr. 756 stands for the proposition that alleged violation by the landlord of anti-trust laws relating to pricing of products sold from the leased premises does not bar his right to possession and is not a defense that can be considered in an action for unlawful detainer.

From these cases we learn that retaliatory eviction will not be enforced by unlawful detainer judgments if the retaliation is for exercise of a constitutional right or for exercise of a statutory right created for the protection of tenants, but that unlawful detainer is not barred by motives which do not relate to constitutional rights or statutory rights of tenants.

As indicated in respondent's brief, there is no constitutionally protected right to strike. (City of L. A. v. L. A. Bldg. & Const. Trades Counsel [1949] 94 Cal.App.2d 36, 210 P.2d 305; Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Bass (D.C.Ky.1971) 328 F.Supp. 732.)

There is no allegation that the retaliation was for the exercise of either speech or assembly. The organizing unit to which the defendant allegedly belonged had been formed for over a year, and negotiations had gone on between that bargaining unit and the plaintiff.

In addition, defendant signed a conditional license, attached as exhibit ‘A’ to the complaint. At paragraph 3 of that document the defendant agreed that upon the termination of his employment, for any reason, or upon a work stoppage, his right to occupy the premises would terminate and that he would forthwith vacate the premises. This was a condition of his tenancy. The existence of this clause did not curtail the defendant's ability to strike since not all persons employed through S.P. Growers lived in company housing. The housing was not supplied as a condition of employment but as a convenience to employees.

Defendant also alleges that the bringing of the unlawful detainer action was in retaliation for his prosecution of an action under the Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act, as amended. That affirmative defense reads:

‘The defendant in this action is a named plaintiff in EL COMITE DE CAMPESIONS DE S P GROWERS ASSOCIATION ET AL. VS. S P GROWERS ASSOCIATION, EL AL., CIVIL ACTION No. 75 895 DWW, United States District Court for the Central District of California, filed March 12, 1975. S P GROWERS ASSOCIATION is prosecuting this unlawful detainer action in retaliation against the tenant for exercising his right to seek civil relief pursuant to the Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act Amendments of 1974. Public Law 93–518 (Dec. 7, 1974).’

The text of the pertinent section (7 U.S.C.A. § 2050b) reads as follows:

‘(a) No person shall intimidate, threaten, restrain, coerce, blacklist, discharge, or in any manner discriminate against any migrant worker because such worker has, with just cause, filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related to this chapter or has testified or is about to testify in any such proceedings or because of the exercise, with just cause, by such worker on behalf of himself or others of any right or protection afforded by this chapter.

‘(b) Any worker who believes, with just cause, that he has been discriminated against by any person in violation of this section may, within one hundred eighty days after such violation occurs, file a complaint with the Secretary alleging such discrimination. Upon receipt of such complaint, the Secretary shall cause such investigation to be made as he deems appropriate. If upon such investigation, the Secretary determines that the provisions of this section have been violated, he shall bring an action in any appropriate United States district court against such person. In any such action, the United States district courts shall have jurisdiction, for cause shown, to restrain violation of subsection (a) of this section and order all appropriate relief including rehiring or reinstatement of the worker, with back pay, or damages.’ (7 U.S.C.A. § 2050b.)

The federal court action is not one which relates directly to the issue of possession and would not, if it were established, result in defendant's retention of the premises. This affirmative defense is analogous to the one raised in Union Oil Co. v. Chandler (1970) 4 Cal.App.3d 716, 84 Cal.Rptr. 756. In that case the defendant alleged that the eviction was in retaliation for his refusal to participate in price fixing violations with the plaintiff. He offered to prove that the eviction was a violation of federal statutes relating to antitrust laws and the Cartwright Act. The court refused to allow him to prove this defense stating that,

‘Absent any constitutional proscriptions, we see no basis for extending the exception to the general rule prohibiting affirmative defenses in an unlawful detainer action to include defenses such as those alleged here which are extrinsic to the facts upon which the right to terminate rests.’ (Union Oil Co. v. Chandler, supra, at 726, 84 Cal.Rptr. at 763.)

The court further acknowledged that the refusal to allow the raising of this affirmative defense did not preclude the defendant from other remedies.

‘If Union has in fact violated the federal antitrust laws or the Cartwright Act, Chandler has an adequate remedy at law which he may enforce in the proper forum.

‘With respect to the federal antitrust laws, we observe that, in any event, the state courts have no jurisdiction to construe or enforce the federal antitrust law.’ (Union Oil Co. v. Chandler, supra, at 726, 84 Cal.Rptr. at 763.)

The statute directly confers the exclusive right to construe and enforce this federal statute on the Federal District Court and the Secretary of Labor. (7 U.S.C.A. § 2050b[b].) Further, it gives the Federal District Court the right to grant any relief, including injunction on a state court action, if it appears necessary to protect violation of this section. (7 U.S.C.A. § 2050b [b].) The defendant's relief is complete within this statute, and it would be inappropriate for a state court to allow such a defense to be raised in an unlawful detainer action.

Leaving the jurisdiction for the interpretation and enforcement of federal statutes within the federal court is a judicially recognized attempt to balance the equities between summary procedures and possible statutory violations. As the court said in Union Oil Co. v. Chandler, 4 Cal.App.3d 716, at 726, 84 Cal.Rptr. 756, at 763,

‘When we weigh the complex and protracted nature of antitrust cases in the light of the adequate remedies and damages afforded an aggrieved party in such cases against the interest in preserving the summary nature of an unlawful detainer action, we believe the latter to be of paramount importance. The interest of doing substantial justice in the unlawful detainer action which exists where the basis of eviction is racial discrimination is not present where the motivation for the eviction finds its roots in an antitrust violation. In the latter case substantial justice is more efficaciously achieved in the separate actions which are readily available to the aggrieved party.’

In our opinion, both of the motives alleged to be retaliatory are extrinsic to the right of possession.

The judgment is affirmed.

I dissent.

I agree with the majority that the tenancy of a migrant-worker tenant may be terminated when the worker goes on strike and that it is no defense to unlawful detainer that possession of premises has been sought because of a strike. Here, defendants had the right to strike, but plaintiff had the right to reserve its migrant-worker housing for persons who are working. Both rights may be exercised.

I disagree with the majority's rejection of the defense of retaliatory dispossession of a migrant-worker tenant who has complained under the Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act (7 U.S.C. § 2041 ff.). That Act, as amended in 1974, proscribes discrimination in any manner against a migrant worker who has instituted a complaint for relief under the Act. (§ 2050b.) Its prohibition is specific:

‘(a) No person shall intimidate, threaten, restrain, coerce, blacklist, discharge, or in any manner discriminate against any migrant worker because such worker has, with just cause, filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related to this chapter . . .’

Defendants' pleadings allege that their dispossession from plaintiff's premises was sought in retaliation for their exercise of rights as migrant workers under the Act. These allegations, if proved, amount to a specific violation of federal law.

The issue then becomes whether the violation of law claimed as a defense under the pleadings sufficiently relates to the tenancy to become justiciable in an unlawful detainer action. The relationship between the claimed violation of law and the disputed tenancy has been held sufficient where the tenant's dispossession is sought for reasons of racial discrimination, and in such instances the claim that the dispossession is racially-motivated pleads an affirmative defense that may be litigated in unlawful detainer. (Abstract Investment Co. v. Hutchinson, 204 Cal.App.2d 242, 22 Cal.Rptr. 309; Prendergast v. Snyder, 64 Cal.2d 877, 50 Cal.Rptr. 903, 413 P.2d 847.) On the other hand, the relationship of the claimed violation of law to the disputed tenancy has been held insufficient in the instance of antitrust violations, and a defense that the tenant is being dispossessed in order to restrain trade and fix prices is not justiciable in unlawful detainer. (Union Oil Co. v. Chandler, 4 Cal.App.3d 716, 84 Cal.Rptr. 756.) At bench, the claim of litigant discrimination—i.e., retaliatory dispossession of a tenant because he filed a federal complaint as a migrant worker—seems more nearly akin to racial discrimination than to antitrust violation. True enough, something more than defendants' rights as tenants are involved, and normally special defenses in unlawful detainer are restricted to matters directly relating to the tenancy. But here defendants possess the dual capacity of tenant and migrant worker, and the one is an appendage of the other. Their two capacities are inseparably intertwined, and, because of this retaliation against them in one capacity for their actions in their other capacity amounts to unlawful discrimination within the meaning of the Act. Since the disputed tenancy is an outgrowth of migrant-worker status, I conclude that the claim of migrant-worker discrimination is justiciable in unlawful detainer. As the court said in Schweiger v. Superior Court, 3 Cal.3d 507, 90 Cal.Rptr. 729, 476 P.2d 97, ‘In recognizing a defense against retaliatory eviction, we do not pursue a wholly uncharted course. An equitable limitation on the punitive power of landlords to evict their tenants was recognized in Abstract Investment Co v. Hutchinson (1962) 204 Cal.App.2d 242, 22 Cal.Rptr. 309. . . . Undeniably, as the real party in interest insists, Abstract Investment is distinguishable on its facts: it recognized a constitutional defense to a summary eviction, rather than a defense based on statutory rights. Nevertheless, it is difficult to rationalize a result in which a tenant's statutory rights are deemed so inconsequential as to permit him to be evicted because he opts for their exercise. The same interest in ‘substantial justice’ protected in Abstract Investment demands that a landlord be prevented from invoking judicial assistance to punish a tenant by eviction because the tenant sought to exercise rights expressly granted by statute. And the right not to be deprived in court of home and shelter because of the exercise of statutory rights is a ‘broad equitable principle’ as deserving of protection as the right to equal protection under the law. Thus, the sound reasoning of Abstract Investment, which imposes an equitable limitation on the punitive power of landlords to evict their tenants, applies with persuasive force to the instant action to prohibit eviction in retaliation against the exercise of statutory rights.' (At pp. 513–515, 90 Cal.Rptr. at p. 733, 476 P.2d at p. 101.)

Plaintiff argues that under the Act federal forums have been created for the redress of such discrimination, both an administrative forum with the Secretary of Labor (§ 2050b) and a judicial forum in the federal district court (§ 2050a). This is correct, but absent some statutory grant to a federal forum of exclusive jurisdiction to vindicate a particular federal right, state courts are required equally with federal courts to enforce such rights. (U.S.Const., art. VI, 2; Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc. (1969) 396 U.S. 229, 238, 90 S.Ct. 400, 24 L.Ed.2d 386; Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney (1962) 368 U.S. 502, 508, 82 S.Ct. 519, 7 L.Ed.2d 483.) Additionally, state courts must remain alert to the possibility of their exploitation by litigants seeking to use their facilities to effect a violation of federal law. On this basis, too, I conclude that the defense of litigant discrimination should be recognized in unlawful detainer. (Cf. Shelley v. Kraemer (1948) 334 U.S. 1, 68 S.Ct. 836, 92 L.Ed. 1161; Gomillion v. Lightfoot (1960) 364 U.S. 339, 81 S.Ct. 125, 5 L.Ed.2d 110.)

Undoubtedly, claims of racial or litigant discrimination are easy to make and hard to rebut, and full plenary resolution of all such claims in unlawful detainer could erode the latter's value as a summary possessory action. But intelligent use of the mechanism of summary judgment can avert this danger. If the claim of litigant discrimination has little basis in fact (in the language of the Act lacks ‘just cause’) or if plaintiff demonstrates a legitimate motivation for its possessory action (for example, the existence of a strike), then the special defense of litigant discrimination should be summarily rejected, and the unlawful detainer action allowed to proceed in the usual fashion.

In short, I believe the trial court was required to consider, at least summarily, the defense of litigant discrimination, and for its failure to do so I would reverse the judgment.

FOOTNOTES

1.  Knowles v. Robinson (1963) 60 Cal.2d 620, 36 Cal.Rptr. 33, 387 P.2d 833; Lakeside Pack Assn. v. Keithly (1941) 43 Cal.App.2d 418, 110 P.2d 1055.

BEACH, Associate Justice.

COMPTON, J., concurs.