BIGGE CRANE RENTAL CO v. COUNTY OF ALAMEDA (1971)

Appellant, Bigge Crane Rental Co., a corporation, commenced this action against respondent, County of Alameda, to recover ad valorem property taxes assessed and paid against several truck cranes owned by appellant. Judgment was entered in favor of the county, following a non-jury trial. Bigge appeals from the judgment.

Each of Bigge's truck cranes is a self-propelled device, capable of moving under its own power upon a highway from one construction job to another. The truck cranes, when not under lease, are stored on Bigge's private property in Alameda County. In each instance when the truck cranes use the streets or highways, they travel under the authorization of Department of Motor Vehicles trip permits. (Veh.Code § 9258.)

On June 30, 1967, the Assessor of Alameda County assessed 18 truck cranes possessed by Bigge. Under protest, Bigge paid the taxes levied. On November 14, 1967, the Alameda County Board of Supervisors decided that only eight of the cranes had a taxable situs within the county and ordered a refund of the taxes paid on the remaining ten cranes.

On October 17, 1967, the Assessor of Alameda County levied an escape assessment against two truck cranes possessed by Bigge. After Bigge's protest was heard, the Assessment Appeals Board of Alameda County found that only one truck crane had a taxable situs within Alameda County.

None of the truck cranes assessed have been registered with the Department of Motor Vehicles. No licenses were issued nor were license fees paid during the periods for which the personal property taxes were assessed.

We have not been able to find a case, and the parties have not cited any, that has decided whether a motor vehicle, that has not been registered with the Department of Motor Vehicles and is using trip permits issued pursuant to Vehicle Code section 9258, is subject to ad valorem taxes assessed by the county.

There is a constitutional mandate that all property, with exceptions not here applicable, be taxed in proportion to its value. (Cal.Const., Art. XIII, § 1.) The only statute available which would exempt Bigge's truck cranes from the Alameda County ad valorem tax is Revenue and Taxation Code section 10758, which provides: ‘The license fee imposed under this part is in lieu of all taxes according to value levied for state or local purposes on vehicles of a type subject to registration under the Vehicle Code whether or not the vehicles are registered under the Vehicle Code.’ (Emphasis added.)

It should be noted that the section refers to ‘vehicles of a type subject to registration’, not just vehicles that are registered.

Thus the basic issue raised on appeal is whether appellant's vehicles are subject to registration under the California Vehicle Code.

Any vehicle driven upon the highways is subject to registration. (Veh.Code § 4000.) There is no doubt that truck cranes are vehicles. Moreover, there is no doubt that Bigge's truck cranes were driven upon the highways. Clearly, Bigge's truck cranes were vehicles subject to registration, within the meaning of the Vehicle Code.

Statute imposes a license fee ‘for the privilege of operating upon the public highways in this state any vehicle of a type which is subject to registration under the Vehicle Code.’ (Rev. & Tax.Code § 10751.) As noted earlier, this license fee ‘is in lieu of all taxes according to value levied for state or local purposes on vehicles of a type subject to registration under the Vehicle Code whether or not the vehicles are registered under the Vehicle Code.’ (Rev. & Tax.Code § 10758.)

Because Bigge's truck cranes were vehicles ‘of a type which are subject to registration under the Vehicle Code,’ Bigge was liable for the license fees, unless there is some statute exempting it from liability. The fact that Bigge may not have paid those license fees to the state would be immaterial to the theoretical liability of Bigge.

Since the license fees are imposed for the privilege of using the state's highways (Ingels v. Riley, 5 Cal.2d 154, 159–160, 53 P.2d 939), if those highways are not used, the fees need not be paid. (Yosemite Park & Curry Co. v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 177 Cal.App.2d 448, 2 Cal.Rptr. 431; 41 Ops.Atty.Gen. 129, 133.) Yet this exemption from the license fees would not apply to Bigge, for it is undisputed that Bigge's truck cranes did use the state's highways.

Respondent claims that Bigge was exempted from the license fees because Vehicle Code section 4003 exempted Bigge's truck cranes from registration. Vehicle Code section 4003 provides:

‘A permit as described in Section 9258 may be issued by the department for operating: (a) A vehicle while being moved or operated unladen for one continuous trip from a place within this State to another place either within or without this State or from a place without this State to a place within this State.

‘The department may issue a quantity of permits under this subsection in booklet form upon payment of the proper fee for each permit contained in said booklet. Each permit shall be valid for only one vehicle and for only one continuous trip, and only after a copy describing the vehicle has been forwarded to the department. Such permit shall be posted upon the windshield or other prominent place upon a vehicle and shall identify the vehicle to which it is affixed. When so affixed, such permit shall serve in lieu of California registration.’

The respondent's claim is correct to the extent that section 4003 of the Vehicle Code, if complied with, can exempt a vehicle from registration. The vehicle, however, must be one subject to registration or there would be no necessity for the Vehicle Code to provide for a procedure in lieu of registration. As the vehicle is subject to registration, it comes within the provisions of section 10758 of the Revenue and Taxation Code. Because the license fees are, in essence, ad valorem property taxes, the Legislature has, by section 10758, prohibited duplicate ad valorem property taxes. The appellant's vehicles thus are not subject to the Alameda County ad valorem property taxes.

The judgment is reversed and the matter remanded to the trial court to enter judgment for the appellant in accordance with this opinion.

CALDECOTT, Associate Justice.

DRAPER, P. J., and HAROLD C. BROWN, J., concur.