MARTIN v. MARTIN (1969)

This is an appeal from two orders. The first, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 675b, cancelled that portion of an interlocutory divorce decree directing defendant, Robert I. Martin, the former husband of plaintiff, Maxine Martin Henley, to make a monthly payment to her of $500.00 for the remainder of her natural life.¹ In the second order the trial court refused to vacate this order of cancellation.

Appellant's position on this appeal may be summarized as follows. While the cancellation proceedings were pending in 1966 the referee corrected Martin's 1964 discharge in bankruptcy for clerical error nunc pro tunc to exclude expressly from the discharge his aforesaid obligation to Mrs. Henley on the ground that these payments were alimony and support payments² and were, therefore, nondischargeable in bankruptcy under section 17(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Act (11 U.S.C. § 35(a)(2)). This correction order of the referee, which has since been affirmed by the local federal district court but which is currently under appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (No. 22957), is binding upon all California courts either as a matter of collateral estoppel or as a matter of full faith and credit.³

This position of appellant is untenable. The bankruptcy court determines exclusively the right to discharge. (See In re Mirkus (2d Cir.1923) 289 F. 732, 733; 1 Collier, Bankruptcy (14th ed. 1968) § 1402, p. 1263; Moore, Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in Bankruptcy (1958) 68 Yale L.J. 1, 23; contra, Gorczyca v. Stanoch (1941) 308 Ill.App. 235, 31 N.E.2d 403, 404–405; Doyle v. Hollister (City Ct.1942) 39 N.Y.S.2d 124, 126; 8 Remington, Bankruptcy (1955) § 3261, p. 99.) But normally it may not predetermine or otherwise affect the result of subsequent litigation in state courts regarding the effect of a discharge upon a particular debt.⁴ In other words it may determine, as it did here, the dischargeability issue in a stay proceeding solely for the purpose of that proceeding, but such determination is binding upon the parties to such proceeding only until the discharge is granted. As previously indicated, this event occurred in this case in 1964. Beyond that point its determination, whether incorporated or not into the discharge, should be without legal effect. (See Teubert v. Kessler (3d Cir. 1924) 296 F. 472, 473–474; In re Devereaux (2d Cir.1935) 76 F.2d 522, 523; In re Armour (7th Cir.1951) 186 F.2d 503, 504; 1 Collier, idem, § 11.04, p. 1150, § 14.62, p. 1442, § 17.28, pp. 1723–27.) This being so, the appeal is without merit.

Both orders are affirmed. Pursuant to Rule 26(a) of the California Rules of Court respondent shall recover his costs on this appeal with the exception of those incurred for the preparation of the Clerk's Transcript.

FOOTNOTES

1.  The decree's specification of the natural life of defendant is patently a mistake. The decree approves the property settlement agreement and recites that the monthly payment ordered is pursuant to it. But the agreement expressly provides that this monthly payment is to be made ‘during the remainder of the natural life of the said wife.’

2.  This conclusion is surprising in view of the fact that in the uncontested divorce proceeding between the parties (1) she did not ask for alimony in her complaint; (2) the integrated property settlement agreement drawn by her counsel identified the $500.00 monthly payment as a property payment; and (3) the interlocutory divorce decree itself identified such payment ‘as consideration for and part of the division of community property.’

3.  Appellant also contends that this obligation of defendant to plaintiff was not a provable debt under section 63(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Act (11 U.S.C. § 103(a)(8)). This contention is without merit. As indicated in footnote 1, the divorce decree directed that the $500.00 monthly payments from defendant to plaintiff were to continue during her natural life. Consequently, the present value of this. obligation can be quite accurately estimated by reference to standard life expectancy tables.

4.  The only exception to this general rule is that the bankruptcy court may in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction enjoin subsequent proceedings in a state court when such proceedings do not adequately protect the bankrupt. (See Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 54 S.Ct. 695, 78 L.Ed. 1230; Hilton Credit Corporation v. Jaggli (9th Cir. 1966) 366 F.2d 793–794; 1 Collier, idem, § 2.62 [5]. pp. 341–49, § 17.28, pp. 1727–31.)

COBEY, Associate Justice.

FORD, P. J., and SCHWEITZER, J., concur.