PEOPLE v. PROCTOR (1962)

A jury tried defendant on his plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, and found him sane. Defendant has appealed from the judgment which followed.

By an information, defendant was charged with four counts of violation of section 476a of the Penal Code (wilfully drawing checks on bank accounts with the knowledge that they contained insufficient funds). When he was brought before the superior court for arraignment August 11, 1960, the court expressed a doubt as to his sanity. Criminal proceedings were suspended, and two alienists were appointed to examine defendant for the purpose of determining his present sanity, pursuant to section 1368 of the Penal Code. A hearing followed, and the court found defendant ‘presently insane’ and ordered him committed to Atascadero State Hospital. Some nine months later the Superintendent of Atascadero State Hospital, acting pursuant to section 1372 of the Penal Code, certified defendant as ‘now sane’ and the sheriff returned him to Stanislaus County for trial.

On May 29, 1961, defendant was arraigned upon the information charging him with the four counts referred to above. He was represented by the deputy public defender, and pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity. Three alienists were appointed to examine defendant for the purpose of testifying at the trial on his plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. The matter was set for trial on June 23, 1961, but on June 22 defendant moved to enter the additional plea of not guilty. The court continued the trial, and ordered the motion set for hearing June 26. The motion was then heard, and denied.

Following a jury trial upon the sole issue of defendant's sanity at the time the alleged offenses were committed, a verdict was returned finding defendant sane. Defendant was sentenced, and committed to the State Prison on each of the four counts.

Defendant alleges that the court erred by denying his motion to enter the additional plea of not guilty. When arraigned, defendant was represented by counsel, but even so, the judge took pains to explain the nature of the dual plea of not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. The import of the single plea of not guilty by reason of insanity was particularly stressed. After explaining the matter twice, the court asked defendant whether he understood the proceedings. He replied that he did and, with his counsel's consent, personally entered the single plea of not guilty by reason of insanity.

As the trial judge has not presided at the arraignment, he ordered a complete transcript of the proceedings for his use in considering the motion to enter the plea of not guilty. The transcript differed from defendant's version of the proceedings, so the court read the transcript in open court. Defendant presented no evidence and no compelling reason to support his motion. Since permission to change a plea is a matter of discretion which is vested in the trial court (People v. Burkett, 118 Cal.App.2d 204, 257 P.2d 745; People v. Morgan, 9 Cal.App.2d 612, 50 P.2d 1061), an abuse of discretion must be shown. Defendant was given a fair hearing, he failed to substantiate his stated reasons for change of plea, and we can find no error or abuse of discretion in the denial of the motion.

Defendant assigns as error the questioning by the trial judge of the psychiatrist who testified on behalf of the People. Two of the court-appointed psychiatrists were called by the defense, and both testified that defendant was insane at the time of trial as well as when the crimes were committed. These two doctors testified specifically that defendant did not have the mental capacity to understand and to know right from wrong. The third court-appointed psychiatrist appeared as a witness on behalf of the People, and testified that at the time of trial defendant was suffering from mental disability ‘of a considerable degree.’ He testified, however, that at the time the checks were written defendant ‘was capable of knowing that they were wrong.’

Defense counsel commenced his cross-examination of the People's psychiatrist by endeavoring to elicit testimony concerning the nature of the acts committed. The trial judge took over at this point and interjected a series of questions. Defendant takes exception to these questions. Before quoting from the record, it is important to have in mind the rule for determining sanity on the trial of a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. It is concisely stated in People v. Rittger, 54 Cal.2d 720, at page 731, 7 Cal.Rptr. 901, at page 907, 355 P.2d 645, at page 651, as follows:

‘* * * a person is, in law, incapable of crime if ‘at the time the accused committed the act he was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of his act or, if he did know it, that he did not know that he was doing what was wrong.’' (Emphasis added.)

The court questioned the psychiatrist as follows:

‘THE COURT: Now, by that you mean to say that purposeful and meaningful, would you say that that's what you mean, that he planned this?

‘THE WITNESS: Yes.

‘THE COURT: That's what you mean?

‘THE WITNESS: Yes.

‘THE COURT: Well, can a crazy person plan to do things?

‘THE WITNESS: Well, there are many mentally ill people who are legally capable of carrying out acts of this type and would be held——

‘THE COURT: (Interrupting) Well, what I'm trying to get at, Doctor, I'm trying to clarify in my own mind, because if I'm in error, I'd like to have you elucidate. Because a person is a maniac, for example, to the extent of being a maniac, that doesn't preclude him from planning to do a certain thing, from what he's doing and what he intends to do?

‘THE WITNESS: Well, this would depend on how disturbed he was, or how much——

‘THE COURT: (Interrupting) Well, I——

‘THE WITNESS: Yes.

‘THE COURT: (Continuing)—realize that, but could that happen?

‘THE WITNESS: Yes.

‘THE COURT: Regardless of how disturbed he was, could he be insane and yet plan and intend to do what he did and still come within the category of being sane? (Emphasis added.)

‘THE WITNESS: Well, the term insane, of course, is a legal term, and if he was actually insane, I would—I would have to question whether or not he could purposely plan.

‘THE COURT: Well, then, using your definition of legally insane, and to put it a step further, say a crazy maniac, that wouldn't preclude that man from planning and intending to do a certain act, would it?

‘THE WITNESS: Not necessarily.

‘THE COURT: Yes. Thank you.’

The questions directed to the expert witness by the court omitted knowledge of right from wrong. Emphasis upon formulating a purpose or the ability to plan the crime, imprinted upon the minds of the jurors this standard as the test of sanity, to the exclusion of the ability to distinguish right from wrong. The only witnesses other than the psychiatrists were the persons who cashed the checks. Being lay witnesses they could not express their opinions concerning defendant's understanding or knowledge of right from wrong. The substance of their testimony was that defendant appeared to understand what he was doing. This, of course, satisfied the test of legal sanity inadvertently expressed by the questions of the trial judge.

It is well settled that a trial judge may quite properly examine witnesses. (People v. Rigney, 55 Cal.2d 236, 243, 10 Cal.Rptr. 625, 359 P.2d 23.) And as one would expect, it has been held that incorrect or erroneous statements made by a trial judge are not grounds for reversal if the evidence of guilt is clear and if it does not appear that they contributed to an unjust result. (People v. Van Wie, 72 Cal.App.2d 227, 164 P.2d 290.) Here, however, the evidence that defendant was sane was open to serious doubt. Of the three psychiatrists appointed by the court, two found him insane at all times pertinent to the case, that is, at the time of trial and at the time the offenses were committed. The third doctor was by no means adamant in his testimony that defendant was sane at the time the acts were committed, and voluntarily stated that at the time of trial defendant's mental condition was seriously impaired.

Respondent cites People v. Corrigan, 48 Cal.2d 551, 556, 310 P.2d 953, 955, holding that ‘a judge's examination of a witness may not be assigned as error on appeal where no objection was made when the questioning occurred.’ Since the public defender who represented appellant in the trial court made no objection to the questions when the judge asked them, respondent argues that the rule of Corrigan must apply. An analysis of Corrigan and the cases cited therein, discloses that the questions involved were alleged to indicate bias or prejudice on the part of the trial judge, or an attempt by him to cast doubt on the credibility of a witness. In this case the questions asked by the trial judge embodied an incomplete statement of the law in that the test for determining the sanity of a defendant in a criminal action was only partially stated. Insofar as the right to appeal is concerned, we can see no valid distinction between a question by a trial judge that imparts an erroneous impression of the law, and his giving of an erroneous instruction at the end of the trial. Such an instruction may be attacked on appeal whether or not objection was made in the trial court. We see no reason for requiring an objection as the basis for an appeal from a question by a trial judge which is alleged to constitute an error in law. Thus we do not believe the rule of Corrigan is applicable here.

Under the circumstances shown in the evidence, it is not only possible but quite probable that the questions asked by the trial judge weighed heavily against defendant. They might well have determined the outcome of the case. We believe the observation in Davis v. Pezel, 131 Cal.App. 46, at page 50, 20 P.2d 982, at page 984, that ‘Whatever loose street criticism is current, it is nevertheless a very fortunate fact that citizens impaneled as jurors look up to and respect the person and opinions of judges presiding,’ still obtains in California. Therefore when the questions posed by the trial judge fell short of a complete statement of the law governing criminal insanity, there is a reasonable probability that the jury gave greater weight to the questions asked by him than those asked by the attorneys. The very fact that there is such a probability prevents us from speculating on whether or not the jury based its verdict upon the questions asked by the trial judge and the answers thereto. It is enough that there is a reasonable likelihood that the incomplete test used in the questions influenced the jury's determination of a very close question.

The judgment is reversed.

STONE, Justice.

CONLEY, P. J., concurs. BROWN, J., deeming himself disqualified, did not participate. Rehearing denied; BROWN, J., not participating.