PEOPLE v. WOLFF (1963)

The defendant, a boy of the age of 15 years, was accused of the murder of his mother. The death occurred on May 15, 1961. The only plea of the defendant was that he was not guilty by reason of insanity. (See Pen.Code, § 1026.) In a trial by jury, he was found to have been sane at the time of the homicide. It was stipulated by the People and the defendant that the matter of the degree of the offense would be submitted to the trial judge for determination on the basis of the evidence received on the issue of sanity and the contents of the probation report; the crime was determined to be murder of the first degree. The defendant was sentenced to be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for the term of his natural life; the trial judge recommended that he be placed in a hospital for the criminally insane. The defendant has appealed from the judgment and from the order denying his motion for a new trial.

Three contentions are made on this appeal. The first is that, as a matter of law, the defendant was insane at the time of the commission of the offense. It is also asserted that the court erred in its instructions to the jury. Finally, it is contended that the court improperly determined the degree of the offense.

Evidence which should be particularly noted in the consideration of the first contention will be stated. About 9:20 o'clock on the morning of May 15, 1961, the defendant came into the headquarters of the Glendale Police Department and stated that he had something which he wished to report. In response to an officer's inquiry, he said, ‘I just killed my mother with an axe handle.’ Police officers went to the boy's home and found the body of his mother. A considerable amount of blood was on her face and her hair was matted with blood. She appeared to have ‘been beaten quite badly.’ An axe handle was found on the kitchen floor; there appeared to be blood on it. A portion of the autopsy report which was read to the jury pursuant to stipulation contained the opinion that death was caused by asphyxiation resulting from strangulation.

Later in the morning a conversation between the defendant and Officer Hamilton occurred in the presence of a stenographic reporter who thereafter transcribed the conversation. Therein the defendant said that he had obtained the axe handle from the garage on or about the preceding Friday or Saturday and had placed it under the mattress of his bed. He described conduct on his part which occurred about 10 o'clock on Sunday night, May 14, as follows: ‘I picked up the handle. She [the defendant's mother] was in the dining room sitting down. I walked into the hall and raised it and then she turned around and said, ‘What is that?’ I said, ‘Nothing,’ and went into my room and hid it again and went to bed.' On the next morning he ate the breakfast which his mother had prepared for him. The events which then happened were related by the defendant as follows: ‘* * * Then I went to the kitchen where she was standing facing the sink and washing the dishes. I hit her as she turned. * * * On the back of her head. * * * Q. Did you use all of your force? A. No. Q. Did you consider at the time that one blow would render her unconscious or kill her? A. I wasn't sure. I was hoping it would render her unconscious. Q. Was it your thought at this time to kill her? A. I am not sure of that. Probably kill her I think. Q. You say you struck her once then? A. Once, and then she turned around. Then I think I hit her again. She turned around screaming. I think I hit her twice more. She fell to the ground and because she was screaming I put my hand over her mouth. * * * I started choking her * * *. She moved over by the stove. She just laid still and she was breathing, breathing heavily and I said, ‘I shouldn't be doing this,’ not those words but something to that effect, and I laid down beside her because she was there on the floor. * * * She got up and started running to the dining room. I caught her in the dining room. We struggled and there was where I choked her. * * * I think after she was dead I did make the comment to her, ‘God loves you, He loves me, you love me, Dad, I love you, and my Dad’—and it is a circle, sort of, ‘and it is horrible, you have done all of this and then I come along and destroy it.’ * * * Q. Approximately how many blows do you think did you strike her with the handle? A. About six. * * * Q. Some of the blows where the axe handle could have struck her in the face? A. Yes.'

Another portion of the defendant's statement was as follows: ‘Q. And when you were talking to Detective Stenberg you knew the wrongfulness of killing your mother? A. I knew it was wrong but I wasn't thinking of it. I knew it was wrong but I wasn't thinking, but I didn't elaborate on it.¹ * * * Q. Well, didn't you feel that you would be prosecuted for the wrongfulness of this action? A. I was aware of it but not thinking of it. * * *’ He further said that he ‘didn't get along’ with his mother.

Officer Hamilton also stated that the defendant told him he had made a list of seven girls, none of whom he knew personally, with whom he planned to have sexual intercourse. The officer then testified on cross-examination as follows: ‘Q. Didn't he tell you that the reason he had to kill his mother was in order that he could have sexual intercourse with one or more of these seven girls * * *? A. Not those exact words, but in effect.² * * * Q. And didn't he say, tell you at one time in these conversations that he had thought of knocking out his aunt who had an automobile, so he could take the automobile and pick these girls up on the street? A. Yes, * * *’ The defendant further stated that he had never had a date with a girl.

On the redirect examination of Officer Hamilton with respect to the transcribed statement, the following testimony was given: ‘Q. Would you read the question that was asked? A. ‘QUESTION BY W. R. STENBERG: Do you know the wrongfulness of killing your mother?’ Q. What was the answer that was given to you? A. The answer: ‘I did. I was thinking of it. I was aware of it.’ That is the part that he scratched out. Q. All right. You were not present when the answer was scratched out, is that right? A. No, I was not. Q. The writing in there, ‘I knew it was wrong but I wasn't thinking of it,’ that was not made in your presence, is that correct? A. No, sir. Q. That was not part of the conversation that you had? A. That is right.'³

The first witness called on behalf of the defendant was J. M. Nielsen, M. D., a physician and surgeon specializing in neurology and psychiatry. He had been appointed by the superior court to examine the defendant pursuant to the provisions of section 1027 of the Penal Code. The defendant told Dr. Nielsen that he had planned the attack on his mother for several days. In the witness' opinion the defendant was suffering from schizophrenia. When asked how schizophrenia was manifested in the defendant's case, Dr. Nielsen said: ‘* * * there is a complete disassociation between intellect and emotion with a perfectly clear intellect and without any emotion whatsoever concerning horrible things.’ Further testimony of Dr. Nielsen was: ‘Q. What is the effect of a clear-cut split between the intellect and emotions? A. Well, the effect is just what we have been going over here, that he can analyze a situation very clearly intellectually, even think of planning his defense and yet not be concerned about the terrible thing he has done, no emotional reaction. There was never even a quiver of the voice or anything. Q. Now does this splitting of the personality affect the person such as Ronald maintaining contact with reality? A. Well, explain contact with reality. Q. Did you mean during the period of outbursts? A. Yes. He knew what he was doing after all. He studied his mother to see whether she was dead when she wasn't, he went ahead and finished it.’ The witness expressed the opinion that at the time the defendant killed his mother he was ‘legally insane,’ but ‘only for a short period of time.’ His opinion would not be changed by the fact that the defendant was able to remember what had occurred. Between his outbursts, the boy was ‘legally sane.’ The witness further testified that the ‘schizophrenia is permanent but the outbursts are only episodic and they may be very far between.’

On cross-examination, Dr. Nielsen testified in part as follows: ‘Q. But there was nothing to stop him from thinking about whether the act was right or wrong if he stopped and bothered to think about it at the time? A. No. That is right. Q. He could have and did appreciate what he did, isn't that right? A. That is right. Q. Then there wasn't any question in your mind there, Doctor, that he knew what he did was wrong? A. There was no question.’ On redirect examination his testimony was in part is follows: ‘Q. * * * What did you say as to Ronald's ability to know right from wrong or distinguish right from wrong during the time of an outburst? A. Well, he knows the difference but he is driven by that impulse and pays no attention to the intellectual knowledge. * * * Q. Doctor, during the period of outburst does the patient know what he is doing: does a person know in terms of right and wrong what he is doing at that particular time? A. I don't want to answer that for every case but in this case, yes.’

The defendant also called as a witness Daryl D. Smith, M. D., phychiatrist, who had been appointed by the court to examine the defendant pursuant to the provisions of section 1027 of the Penal Code. The witness testified that ‘the defendant suffers from a schizophrenic reaction and the symptoms are mainly of the paranoic kind.’ In his opinion, the defendant was ‘legally insane’ at the time he killed his mother. Further testimony by the witness was: ‘Q. Did you form an opinion as to whether or not Ronald Dennis Wolff was capable of appreciating the nature and quality of the act that he did at the time that he killed his mother? A. Yes, I felt that he was not able to appreciate the nature and consequences.’

A third psychiatrist called by the defendant was George Maculans, M. D. As staff psychiatrist for the California Youth Authority, Dr. Maculans had examined the defendant in July 1961. The boy was suffering from a chronic mental illness known as a schizophrenic reaction. In the witness' opinion the defendant was ‘legally insane’ at the time he killed his mother; he was unable to judge the quality and nature of his actions and could not distinguish between right and wrong with respect thereto.

Blake Skrdla, M. D., a physician specializing in the field of psychiatry, was called as a witness by the defendant. Under appointment by the juvenile court he examined the defendant a week after the homicide. Later he was appointed by the superior court to examine the boy and did so on October 11, 1961. He reached the conclusion that the defendant was mentally ill, the illness being ‘a schizophrenic reaction, chronic, undifferentiated type.’ The witness expressed his opinion as to the defendant's sanity at the time he killed his mother as follows: ‘I felt that he was laboring under sufficient mental defection at that time, that he was not capable of appreciating the quality and nature of his act.’ But he was of the opinion that ‘he probably did know the difference between right and wrong.’ However, on redirect examination the witness, in response to a question as to whether the defendant was able to distinguish right from wrong at the time he killed his mother, stated as follows: ‘I suspect, in view of the way schizophrenic personalities react under certain stresses, that may have been an automatic act in which at the moment he may have had no recognition of whether it was right or wrong but was compelled to carry it out.’ He stated that he thought the defendant was ‘legally insane’ at the time of the act. On recross examination, the following testimony was given: ‘Q. All right, you have related both on your original direct examination and on cross examination that in retrospect you were of the opinion that the defendant knew the difference between right and wrong at the time of the commission of the offense, and you remember that? A. I believe I said in retrospect I felt that Ronald, after the act, knew that he had committed something that was wrong, otherwise he wouldn't have gone to the police. Q. You are relating now, then, that it was only after the act that Ronald knew the difference between right and wrong? A. Yes. I think that at the time of the act he was so under the control of his emotions and distraught that he probably didn't know right from wrong.’

On a trial of the issue raised by the plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, the defendant has the burden of proving his insanity by a preponderance of the evidence. (People v. Monk, 56 Cal.2d 288, 297, 14 Cal.Rptr. 633, 363 P.2d 865; People v. Daugherty, 40 Cal.2d 876, 900–901, 256 P.2d 911.) As stated in People v. Miller, 171 Cal. 649, at page 652, 154 P. 468, at page 470 with respect to the term ‘preponderance of the evidence’: ‘The term simply means what it says, viz: That the evidence on one side outweighs, preponderates over, is more than, the evidence on the other side, not necessarily in number of witnesses or quantity, but in its effect on those to whom it is addressed.’

The criterion which the trier of fact must follow is stated in People v. Brock, 57 Cal.2d 644, at page 648, 21 Cal.Rptr. 560, at page 562, 371 P.2d 296, at page 298: ‘It is of course undisputed that a trial upon a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity involves only the M'Naughton [M'Naghten] test, i. e., that a person is, in law, incapable of crime if ‘at the time the accused committed the act he was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of his act or, if he did know it, that he did not know that he was doing what was wrong.’ [Citations.] This test considers the sanity of a defendant at the time the offense was committed.'⁴

In the case presently before the court each psychiatrist expressed the opinion that the defendant had been suffering for some time from a mental illness in the nature of schizophrenia. Dr. Nielsen testified that while the schizophrenia was permanent, the ‘outbursts' were only episodic and that between such ‘outbursts' the defendant was ‘legally sane.’ All of the expert witnesses were of the opinion that under the test of insanity stated hereinabove, the defendant was insane at the time of the homicide. However, as heretofore noted, there was some variation in the testimony of the witnesses as to the basis for the ultimate opinion of insanity.

There was support of a substantial nature in the record for the conclusion that at the time of the homicide the defendant knew the nature and quality of his act and that what he was doing was wrong. In addition to the fact that shortly after the event he went to the police headquarters to report that he had killed his mother, there were the statements which the defendant made to the police and the inferences which could reasonably be drawn therefrom. Since the evidence of such conduct and statements was sufficient to sustain a conclusion contrary to that expressed by the psychiatrists, there was a conflict in the evidence on the issue of insanity. (See People v. Harmon, 110 Cal.App.2d 545, 553, 243 P.2d 15; People v. Fraters, 146 Cal.App.2d 305, 306, 303 P.2d 588.)⁵ While the jurors might have reasonably reconciled all of the evidence in such a manner as to reach a determination that the defendant's contention on the issue of insanity was sound, they were not required to do so in the exercise of their function as triers of fact. (See People v. Rittger, 54 Cal.2d 720, 731, 7 Cal.Rptr. 901, 355 P.2d 645.) The weight to be given to the testimony of the medical experts was a matter for the determination of the jury, (People v. Cole, 47 Cal.2d 99, 105, 301 P.2d 854, 56 A.L.R.2d 1435; People v. Berry, 44 Cal.2d 426, 432, 282 P.2d 861; People v. Williams, 151 Cal.App.2d 173, 187, 311 P.2d 117; People v. Denningham, 82 Cal.App.2d 117, 119–120, 185 P.2d 614; Pen.Code, § 1127b; see McCoid, Opinion Evidence and Expert Witnesses (1955) 2 U.C.L.A.L.Rev. 356, 366.) The governing law is succinctly stated in Feguer v. United States, 8 Cir., 302 F.2d 214, at page 242: ‘Of course it is the jury, and not the court or the expert witness, which must decide the ultimate issue of insanity here. And the jury was free to reject the testimony of * * * these experts.’ (See Also 32 C.J.S. Evidence § 569.)

In view of the evidence in the present case, the fact that all of the expert witnesses concluded that, under the M'Naghten test, the defendant was insane at the time of the homicide did not preclude a contrary determination by the jury. The law has placed upon the trier of fact the responsibility of making the ultimate decision on that issue. The province of the experts is not to make that decision but, rather, to aid the trier of fact in resolving the question presented. (See Dusky v. United States, 8 Cir., 295 F.2d 743, 754, 756, 758; Bowker v. State Alaska, 373 P.2d 500, 501–502; State V. Quilling, 363 Mo. 1016, 256 S.W.2d 751, 752–753; State v. Scelfo, 58 N.J.Super. 472, 156 A.2d 714, 716–717; State v. Moore, 42 N.M. 135, 76 P.2d 19, 34; Boyd v. State, 207 Ga. 567, 63 S.E.2d 394, 397; Note (1959) 5 Wayne L.Rev. 344, 346.)⁶ Even though a conclusion contrary to that reached by the jury in this case might, upon this review, seem to be the more reasonable, this court cannot interfere with that determination since if finds substantial support in the record. (See People v. Daugherty, supra, 40 Cal.2d 876, 885, 256 P.2d 911.)

Another contention of the defendant will now be considered. The court instructed the jury that under the law the defendant was presumed to be sane and that the effect of that presumption was to place on the defendant the burden of proving insanity by a preponderance of the evidence. The jurors were also told that proof that the defendant, before the time when the crime in question was committed, was afflicted with permanent insanity, as distinguished from temporary or transient insanity, would dispel the presumption of sanity and raise a presumption that defendant's insanity continued to exist until the time of the commission of the crime. (See People v. Baker, 42 cal.2d 550, 564–565, 268 P.2d 705.) Based upon the testimony of the psychiatrists, who examined the defendant after the homicide, that he was suffering from a chronic mental illness in the nature of schizophrenia, the argument is made that the jury was instructed as to ‘conflicting presumptions' and that the jurors were thereby confused. If is asserted that because of the chronic nature of the mental illness ‘the presumption of sanity was dispelled and no statement of such presumption of sanity by the court was proper.’

In considering the defendant's argument it is to be again noted that Dr. Nielsen expressed the opinion that between his outbursts the boy was ‘legally sane.’ But on this appeal it is not necessary to determine whether the jury was bound to find that before the killing the boy was afflicted with a mental illness of such a nature that the presumption of sanity was dispelled (see Weihofen, Mental Disorder as a Criminal Defense (1954) p. 234) because in any event it has not been shown that prejudice was suffered by the defendant. The reasoning of People v. Berry, supra, 44 Cal.2d 426, at pages 432–433, 282 P.2d 861, at page 865, is applicable: ‘Defendant next contends that the trial court gave confusing instructions to the jury on the sanity issue. The jury was instructed that defendant was presumed sane, and that he had the burden of proving his insanity at the time of the assault. There was evidence that defendant was suffering from schizophrenia some months before the assault. Accordingly, the court instructed that a condition once shown to have existed is presumed to continue until the contrary is proved; and therefore if the jury should find that at some time prior to the commission of the assault, defendant was suffering from some form of insanity, then it would be presumed that he was suffering from such form of insanity when he committed the assault. Considering these instructions on the sanity issue as a whole in the light of the record, People v. Chessman, 38 Cal.2d 166, 182–183, 238 P.2d 1001; People v. Hess, 104 Cal.App.2d 642, 684, 234 P.2d 65, and reasonably interpreting them as complementing one another, People v. Rhoades, 93 Cal.App.2d 448, 451, 209 P.2d 33, it is clear that they properly stated the applicable law and furnish no basis for assuming that the jury was caused any confusion thereby.’ It is to be further noted that in the present case the jury was instructed as follows: ‘The court has endeavored to give you instructions embodying all rules of law that may become necessary in guiding you to a just and lawful verdict. The applicability of some of these instructions will depend upon the conclusions you reach as to what the facts are. As to any such instruction, the fact that it has been given must not be taken as indicating an opinion of the court that the instruction will be necessary or as to what the facts are. If an instruction applies only to a state of facts which you find does not exist, you will disregard the instruction.’

A claim of error is based on the refusal of the court to give to the jury an instruction relating to the burden of proof on the issue of insanity which is set forth in the footnote.⁷ However, the jury was instructed as follows: ‘A preponderance of evidence is such evidence as, when weighed with that opposed to it, has more convincing force, and from which it results that the greater probability of truth lies therein.’ Since the subject matter was fairly and correctly covered by the instruction given, there was no error. (People v. Latona, 2 Cal.2d 714, 727, 43 P.2d 260; People v. Pugh, 137 Cal.App.2d 226, 236, 289 P.2d 826.)

As our Supreme Court has stated, if the M'Naghten test of criminal responsibility is to be changed or superseded, the task is one for the Legislature and not the courts. (People v. Darling, 58 A.C. 14, 21–22, 22 Cal.Rptr. 484, 372 P.2d 316; People v. Rittger, supra, 54 Cal.2d 720, 732, 7 Cal.Rptr. 901, 355 P.2d 645; People v. Nash, 52 Cal.2d 36, 48–50, 338 P.2d 416; People v. Berry, supra, 44 Cal.2d 426, 433, 282 P.2d 861.) The application of the rule in the present case did not result in the violation of any constitutional right of the defendant. (See Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 800–801, 72 S.Ct. 1002, 96 L.Ed. 1302; Voss v. United States, 8 Cir., 259 F.2d 699, 702–703; Commonwealth v. Novak, 395 Pa. 199, 150 A.2d 102, 108.)

The defendant contends that the trial court was in error in determining the offense to be murder of the first degree rather than of the second degree. That issue was submitted to the trial judge for decision on the basis of the evidence received with respect to the issue raised by the plea of not guilty by reason of insanity and the contents of the report of the probation officer. The homicide in the present case could be murder of the first degree only if the evidence was sufficient to sustain a determination that it was deliberate and premeditated. (See People v. Bender, 27 Cal.2d 164, 182, 163 P.2d 8.) The degree of the crime was not part of the corpus delicti and in this case could be proved by the defendant's own statements. (People v. Cooper, 53 Cal.2d 755, 765, 3 Cal.Rptr. 148, 349 P.2d 964.) Inferences of willfulness, deliberation and premeditation are supported by the defendant's own description, embodied in his statements to the police officers, of the killing and of the events which preceded it. (See People v. Rittger, supra, 54 Cal.2d 720, 730, 7 Cal.Rptr. 901, 355 P.2d 645.) Since there was substantial evidence in support of the determination of the trial court as to the degree of the offense, this court is not free to interfere with that determination. (People v. Cartier, 54 Cal.2d 300, 306, 5 Cal.Rptr. 573, 353 P.2d 53.)

The appeal from the order denying the motion for a new trial is dismissed (see Pen.Code, § 1237); the judgment is affirmed.

I would reverse the judgment on the ground that it is not supported by substantial evidence. The differences among the four psychiatrists are not such as to impeach their unanimity of the critical question. There is nothing in the evidence which conflicts with the facts upon which these independently employed doctors based their opinions. The jury simply adopted its own opinion as to the significance of those facts, disregarding the results of scientific study. A murder conviction should rest on something more substantial than this. (Cf. In re Dennis, 51 Cal.2d 666, 335 P.2d 657; In re Perkins, 165 Cal.App.2d 73, 331 P.2d 712.)

FOOTNOTES

1.  The written statement which was received in evidence is as follows at this point (the words stricken from the transeribed statement by the defendant being indicated and the words added thereto in his handwriting being italicized): ‘Q. (Det. W. R. Stenberg) You knew the wrongfulness of killing your mother? A. I knew it was wrong but I wasn't thinking of it. Q. You were aware of the wrongfulness. Also had you thought what might happen to you? A. That is a question. No. Q. Your thought has been in your mind for three weeks of killing her? A. Two (2) weeks, or of just knocking her out.’ With respect to the first question and answer just quoted. Officer Hamilton testified as follows: ‘Q. Now, there is a scratch-out there. Do you have any independent recollection as to whether or not—what the scratched-out answer was, what the answer was that you received to that question? A. Yes. Q. What is your recollection? A. He stated that he was thinking of it but he didn't elaborate on it. I don't recall the exact words. Q. Looking at the transcription, does that refresh your recollection as to the exact words? A. Yes, sir. Q. What were the exact words? A. ‘I was thinking of it but I wasn't aware of it.’'

2.  In the course of the statement which was transcribed the following question and answer appear (the words stricken from the transcribed statement by the defendant being indicated and the words added thereto in his handwriting being italicized): ‘Q. Can you give a reason or purpose for this act of killing your mother? Have you thought out why you wanted to hurt her? A. There is the reason that we didn't get along. There is also the reason of sexual intercourse with one of these other girls, and I had to get her out of the way. I didn't want to hurt her at all.’

3.  See footnote 1 to this opinion.

4.  In the instructions to the jury insanity was defined as follows: ‘Insanity, as the word is used in these instructions, means a diseased and deranged condition of mind which renders a person incapable of knowing or understanding the nature and quality of his act, or unable to distinguish right from wrong in relation to that act.’ (See People v. Richardson, 192 Cal.App.2d 166, 172, 13 Cal.Rptr. 321.)

5.  In both the Harmon and the Fraters opinions People v. Chamberlain, 7 Cal.2d 257, 60 P.2d 299 (disapproved in In re Dennis, 51 Cal.2d 666, 674, 335 P.2d 657) is eited. However, disregarding the portion of each opinion which is based on the Chamberlain case, the reasoning of the Harmon and Fraters cases is applicable in the present case.

6.  In Bowker v. State, 373 P.2d 500, at pages 501–502, the Supreme Court of Alaska stated: ‘We shall not adopt a rule which would treat medical testimony as conclusive merely because it is not disputed by other medical testimony. The jury should be free to make an independant analysis of the facts on which the expert's opinion rests, and thus exercise their historic function of passing on the credibility of the witness. If we were to follow Douglas [Douglas v. United States, 99 U.S.App.D.C. 232, 239 F.2d 52] and accede to defendant's argument that the jury was not competent to pass on her mental condition because of Dr. Cheatham's testimony, we would be transferring the jury's function to the psychiatrist and substituting a trial by experts for a trial by jury.’

7.  ‘The law does not require demonstration or that degree of proof which, excluding all possibility of error, produces absolute certainty, for such degree of proof is rarely possible. It is proper to find that a party has succeeded in carrying his burden of proof on an issue of fact, if the evidence favoring his side of the question is more convincing than that tending to support the contrary side, and if it causes the jurors to believe that on that issue the probability of truth favors that party.’

FORD, Justice.

SHINN, P. J., concurs.