PRICKETT v. ROYAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED (1961)

The issue on this appeal is sharply drawn and simply stated: Was the trial court warranted in concluding that the damages to plaintiffs' house were occasioned by ‘normal settling,’ within the meaning of those words, expressly made an exception to the risks insured against by the defendant? We find that the evidence supported the trial court's determination, that the damages were so occasioned, and are affirming the judgment that denied plaintiffs any recovery.

The house, that is now plaintiffs, was erected some time before they acquired it, and the insurance that covered it was placed before it became theirs. The plaintiff husband described the building as being ‘* * * about 2100 feet of house, concrete slab foundation, concrete walls on the sides * * *.’ In a report received in evidence by agreement of counsel, this added description of the house, and its damaged condition, appears: ‘The residence is one story in height, and consists of masonry exterior walls and wood roof. The building, which is located about 10 feet from the top of a 1:1 slope to the north, is supported on exterior wall footings founded roughly 18 inches below grade. The western wing of the building, especially the west masonry wall, has settled considerably in comparison with the remainder of the building, and the portions of the structure immediately adjacent to the west wall have been badly damaged. At the time of our inspection, the north and south ends of the west wall had settled approximately 12 and 6 inches, respectively, in relation to the east wall of the house. Also, several wide cracks in the building walls in the westerly section were noticed both inside and outside of the house.’ With the exception of one word, to be noted, this summary from plaintiffs' (appellants') opening brief is a satisfactory statement: ‘The evidence establishes without contradiction that the portion of the dwelling which collapsed was constructed on artificially filled ground, and that the depth of the fill was in excess of thirty feet at the approximate point of greatest displacement. It is also uncontradicted that the filled earth was probably not properly compacted, and that settling of the character which occurred was in fact inevitable because of this circumstance.’ The word ‘collapse’ is a stronger word than the evidence would have required the trial court to use had it made findings on the facts upon which its ultimate findings of fact were based. That is to say, the trial court no doubt determined that the northwest corner, which was over a fill some thirty-five feet in depth, ‘settled’ rather than ‘collapsed.’

The insurance policy, under which plaintiffs seek recovery, had this express provisio: ‘This Coverage Group Does Not Insure Against Loss—A. By termites or other insects; deterioration; smoke from agricultural smudging or industrial operation; rust, wet or dry rot; mould; mechanical breakdown; normal settling, shrinkage, or expansion of foundations, walls, floors, or ceilings;”

As we have seen, the damage to plaintiffs' property was caused by its foundation walls settling. The question before us narrows to this: Was the settling normal? But one case dealing with the use of these words in an insurance policy has been discovered, by counsel or by us; the case of A. D. B. Realty Corp. v. Orient Ins. Co., 1960, 235 S.C. 467, 112 S.E.2d 400. As its facts differ from ours—a tight sealing paint job caused damaging expansion under variations of temperature—we are not citing this case from a sister state as an authority for our decision, but we do find this statement in its opinion of interest: ‘It is not unreasonable to infer that the damage was caused by normal expansion. While no case has been cited by counsel, nor have we found any, construing an exclusion clause similar to the one involved in this case, we think it is clear that the extent of the damage is not conclusive as to coverage. It may be extensive and yet be caused by expansion or contraction normally to be expected. * * *.’ A. D. B. Realty Corp. v. Orient Ins. Co., supra, 1960, 235 S.C. 467, 477, 112 S.E.2d 400, 405.

The definitions of ‘normal’ found in the Standard Dictionary of the English language gives the meaning in which the word is used in the policy that the defendant issued: ‘according to an established law or principle; regular or natural.’ So understood it is clear that a settling that would be normal in one situation would be quite abnormal in another. If a house that was built with well seasoned lumber, on a concrete foundation that rested on an outcropping of rock, settled as much as plaintiffs' did it could not be said to be a normal settling. On the other hand, had it been erected on a mud sill, resting on a quagmire, frozen deep at the time of construction, its subsequent collapse, after a thaw, would be quite normal. Plaintiffs' situation falls between these two extremes. Their masonry foundation rested, at the northwest corner, on a man-made fill, not compacted. Had it been undermined by a diverted stream of water, the resulting collapse of the foundation would have been ‘normal,’ as distinguished from a ‘miracle,’ but the catastrophe would have been brought about by the unnatural, not to be expected, arrival of the hydraulic force of the stream. A man-made fill, on the other hand, settles slowly, or more rapidly, depending upon its condition and situation, but naturally, according to established physical laws. Under the proof before the trial court, its conclusion that the settling was normal had ample support.

The judgment is affirmed.

BISHOP, Justice pro tem.

SHINN, P. J., and FORD, J., concur.