AUGUSTUS v. Aaron Shaffer, Defendant and Respondent. (1961)

On April 8, 1956, the driver of a Buick and the driver of a Hudson each negligently operated his car in such a manner that the driver of a Cadillac was injured. The latter, with the assistance of a jury, obtained a judgment, entered April 7, 1958, against the two joint tort-feasors, awarding him, the Cadillac driver, $11,592.20. The driver of the Hudson appealed; the judgment was affirmed (Augustus v. Shaffer, 1959, 171 Cal.App.2d 160, 340 P.2d 37), and the Hudson driver, Aaron Shaffer, the respondent on this appeal, having completely satisfied the judgment, in the fall of 1959, moved for a judgment of contribution against his co-defendant, the Buick driver, Cecil Compton Bean. This motion was granted, and a judgment was entered decreeing that defendant Aaron Shaffer recover $5,796.10 from his co-defendant Cecil Compton Bean. It is from this judgment that the last named defendant has appealed.

But for the provisions of sections 875–880, added to the Code of Civil Procedure in 1957, defendant Shaffer would have had no recourse against his co-defendant, for as stated in Smith v. Fall River J. U. High School Dist., 1934, 1 Cal.2d 331, 334, 34 P.2d 994, 996: ‘It is well settled in this state that there is no right of contribution between joint tort-feasors whose concurrent negligence has made them jointly liable in damages. Adams v. White Bus Line, 184 Cal 710, 195 P. 389.’ As late as April, 1960 we find it stated: ‘Prior to January §, 1958, the law in California was the common-law rule that there was no right of contribution between joint tortfeasors.’ Alisal Sanitary Dist. v. Kennedy, 1960, 180 Cal.App.2d 69, 4 Cal.Rptr. 379, 382. The appealing defendant contends that the 1957 legislation, which ‘adds California to the growing list of states which permit, to a greater or lesser degree, contribution among joint tort-feasors' (32 State Bar Journal 553), fails to be of aid to his successful co-defendant because of the restrictive provision of section 880: ‘This title shall become effective as to causes of action accruing on or after January 1, 1958.’ The sole question in this case is, does the 1957 legislation give the successful co-defendant a right that but for the legislation he would not have had? We have concluded that it does.

The original cause of action, in this case ‘accrued’ in 1956, it is true. For meaning of ‘accrued’ see Maguire v. Hibernia S. & L. Soc., 1944, 23 Cal.2d 719, 733, 146 P.2d 673, 680, 151 A.L.R. 1062 and Van Hook v. So. Cal. Waiters Alliance, 1958, 158 Cal.App.2d 556, 565, 323 P.2d 212, 217. But the cause of action that there accrued was not one with which sections 875–880 were at all concerned. It was a cause of action for damages resulting from the negligence of the defendants. As to such a cause of action sections 875–880 were never intended to become effective. The sections deal with the subject of contribution between joint tort-feasors, and give a cause of action, where none existed before, between the defendants. At the earliest, that cause of action, in this case, accrued April 7, 1958, when the judgment that made them judgment debtors was entered. That was after ‘This title,’ sections 875–880, became effective.

This interpretation gives the section a prospective, not a retrospective, effect. Our conclusion is in harmony with that expressed in Hudson v. Hutchason, 1959, 171 Cal.App.2d Supp. 869, 340 P.2d 756.

The appeal from the order granting the motion for judgment of contribution is dismissed. The judgment for contribution is affirmed.

BISHOP. Justice pro tem.

SHINN, P. J., and FORD, J., concur.