HECKLEY v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF OAKLAND UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT (1959)

In January 1955 appellant, a fully accredited school teacher, applied to respondent school district for a position as teacher in one of the Oakland elementary schools for the spring semester of the 1954–1955 school year. She was offered assignments to several different schools in the district which involved teaching a full day, that is, both morning and afternoon sessions. She stated that she preferred a position where she would have a morning session only. Appellant was thereupon employed by the district and assigned to teach the morning kindergarten class at the Willow Manor School. Her session began at 9:00 o'clock A.M. and finished at 12:00 o'clock noon. The fact that appellant fully performed the duties assigned her is not questioned by respondents.

Appellant was paid $934.26—that sum being one-half of one-half of the district's regular annual salary schedule—on the basis that she taught only one-half a school day (morning session) for one-half a school year (spring semester). Appellant claimed that her morning session constituted a full day's teaching under the statutes hereinafter to be discussed and that she was entitled to be paid one-half (spring semester) the minimum annual salary of $3,400 fixed by section 13842 of the Education Code. Appellant petitioned the lower court for a writ of mandate directing respondents to pay appellant the sum of $765.74, that being the difference between the amount actually paid her and one-half the statutory minimum of $3,400. Appellant was denied a writ and this appeal followed.

The first paragraph of section 6 of Art. IX of the California Constitution reads: ‘Each person, other than a substitute employee, employed by a school district as a teacher or in any other position requiring certification qualifications shall be paid a salary which shall be at the rate of an annual salary of not less than twenty-four hundred dollars ($2,400) for a person serving full time, as defined by law.’

At the times here involved section 13842 of the Education Code read: ‘The governing board of each school district shall pay to each person employed in a day school of the district for full time in a position requiring certification qualifications and serving under other than an emergency or provisional credential an annual salary of not less than three thousand four hundred dollars ($3,400).

‘The governing board of each school district shall pay to each person employed for less than full time in a position requiring certification qualifications and serving under other than an emergency or provisional credential an annual salary of not less than an amount which bears the same ratio to three thousand four hundred dollars ($3,400) as the time required of the person bears to the time required of a person employed full time.

“Full time' means not less than the minimum school day for each day the schools of the district are maintained during the school year.

‘The provisions of this section shall not be construed as applying to substitute employees of a school district.’

Section 6813 of the Education Code reads: ‘The minimum school day for pupils of kindergartens is 180 minutes, inclusive of recesses except that if a school district maintains two kindergarten classes on the same day which are taught by the same teacher, the minimum school day for each of such classes shall be 130 minutes inclusive of recesses.’

Appellant's contention is basically this: The Constitutional provision leaves the definition of the term ‘full time’ to the Legislature; the Legislature has, in section 13842 defined ‘full time’ to mean not less than the minimum school day, and in section 6813 fixed the minimum school day for kindergarten pupils at 180 minutes; therefore appellant, by teaching kindergarten 180 minutes per day, qualifies as a full time teacher.

Respondents on the other hand call attention to section 6802 of the Education Code reading: ‘The governing board of each school district shall, subject to the provisions of this chapter, fix the length of the school day for the several grades and classes of the schools maintained by the district.’ He then directs our attention to the fact that the governing board of respondent district had established a full school day for teachers within the district as extending from 8:45 a. m. to 3:30 p. m. and for half time teachers as extending from 8:45 a. m. to 12:00 noon.

We have concluded that appellant's contention is correct.

As we have seen, section 13842 provides that “Full time' means not less than the minimum school day * * *' To put it the other way, this provision states that a minimum school day constitutes full time employment. The section, paraphrased, therefore provides that every certificated employee who is employed for a minimum school day is a full time employee and as such is entitled to a minimum annual salary of $3,400.^*

Respondents state, as we have above noted, that the governing board of respondent district has fixed the length of the school day within the district at 8:45 a. m. to 3:30 p. m. They then contend that a teacher within the district must put in the full school day in order to qualify as a full time teacher. That contention is out of harmony with section 13842. That section provides, as we have already seen, that whoever works not less than the minimum school day is a full time employee. And we have also seen that a minimum school day for kindergarten is 180 minutes.

Respondents' contention overlooks the following basic factors. The state furnishes financial aid to the various school districts throughout the state. The amount of such aid is dependent in large part upon the average daily attendance of pupils within the district. (Education, Code, Div. 3, Ch. 15.) Section 6814 of the Education Code provides that ‘A day of attendance in a kindergarten is 180 minutes of attendance.’ Therefore, a teacher who has taught a kindergarten class for 180 minutes in one day has qualified her district for state financial aid for one full school day. The state has also seen fit to establish a policy that no teacher who teaches a minimum school day shall be paid less than $3,400 annually. Respondents would, if their contention were to be sustained, find themselves in the inconsistent position of classifying appellant as a full time teacher for the purpose of receiving state aid, and classifying her as a part time teacher for the purpose of fixing her salary.

It is true, of course, that appellant, whether wittingly or unwittingly, negotiated a contract with respondent district that is much more favorable than the contracts of those who are required to teach both morning and afternoon sessions. However, that is no reason for denying her her statutory right to a full minimum salary. Moreover, within the bounds of reasonableness appellant's superiors could have assigned other professional duties to her over and above her kindergarten class. McGrath v. Burkhard, 131 Cal.App.2d 367, 280 P.2d 864; 26 Op.Atty.Gen. 27. Further, respondent district could have refused to contract for appellant's services at all, except on the basis that she would teach both morning and afternoon sessions.

Respondents' contention that section 6813, quoted above, sets the minimum school day for pupils rather than for teachers is without merit. In fact, the section strongly suggests the converse to be true, for it provides for an 180 minute day for a one class kindergarten and only 130 minutes for each class where there are two classes taught by the same teacher. The shorter session, where there are two classes served by one teacher is clearly for the teacher's benefit, and not the pupils'.

The judgment is reversed with directions to the lower court to issue its peremptory writ of mandate directing respondent Board of Education of the Oakland Unified School District and respondent members of said board, to issue, or cause to be issued, the warrant of said district, payable to appellant, in the sum of $765.74.

FOOTNOTES

FOOTNOTE.  It is not disputed that the $3,400 minimum salary provision of section 13842, rather than the $2,400 minimum salary provision of the Constitution, prevailed.

O'DONNELL, Justice pro tem.

DOOLING, Acting P. J., and DRAPER, J., concur.