HALL v. CHAMBERLAIN (1947)

Respondents brought this action to quiet title to real property in Ventura County. The appeal is from the judgment in their favor.

Respondents contend that the tax deed to the state and the deed to appellant Henry Chamberlain, upon which the latter's title rests, are both invalid and conveyed no title by reason of defects in the tax proceedings. They have raised no issue concerning certain steps in the proceedings and thereby admit that (1) the property was lawfully assessed; (2) the taxes were lawfully equalized; (3) the taxes were levied in the manner required by law; (4) the taxes levied for 1932–33 were not paid; (5) the tax sale to the state and the sale by the state were had at the times and places required by law; (6) the property was never redeemed from the tax sales; (7) no taxes were paid on account of or after the 1932 levy and prior to the deed by the state to appellant Chamberlain; (8) Robert Cooney was the tax collector of Ventura County at all times during the proceedings involved in this action.

Respondents maintain and the court found that certain steps in the tax proceedings leading up to the two deeds were invalid and conveyed no title.

Chronologically the facts are as follows: In 1932 the property was assessed for the taxes of 1932–33. The taxes were not paid and the property was sold to the state June 1, 1933. California Bank acquired the property by deed dated February 14, 1938, and recorded February 25, 1938. No taxes having been paid and redemption not having been made, the property was conveyed by the tax collector to the state by deed dated July 1, 1938, and recorded August 4, 1938. By deed dated July 9, 1943, and recorded August 14, 1943, California Bank conveyed the property to respondents. On January 25, 1944, the tax collector gave notice to the board of supervisors of his intention to sell, advertisement of the sale was published and on March 20, 1944, the property was sold to Chamberlain and a deed was issued to him bearing that date which was recorded on April 15, 1944.

Respondents rely on errors in the tax proceedings which prior to the adoption of the tax validation acts to which we shall later refer would have been fatal to the tax title. For example, they direct attention to cases holding that a sale of the property for a small amount, even one cent, more than actually due for taxes, penalties, and costs renders a tax deed void. See Hotchkiss v. Hansberger, 15 Cal.App. 603, 607, 115 P. 957; Warden v. Broome, 9 Cal.App. 172, 174, 98 P. 252; Miller v. Williams, 135 Cal. 183, 184, 67 P. 788; Hall v. Park Bank, 165 Cal. 356, 358, 132 P. 452. Also the failure to set forth in the deed the name of the person to whom the property was assessed spelled exactly as it appeared on the assessment roll has been held to invalidate the deed. Bruschi v. Cooper, 30 Cal.App. 682, 683, 159 P. 728; Henderson v. De Turk, 164 Cal. 296, 298, 128 P. 747; Biaggi v. Phillips, 50 Cal.App.2d 92, 99, 122 P.2d 619. Failure in other particulars to follow strictly the tax provisions of the code have been held the render the tax deed void and ineffective. Such irregularities and errors, and all others except as to jurisdictional matters required in order to satisfy the due process provisions of the federal and state Constitutions, have been rendered innocuous by the curative acts which will be considered later. Stats.1943, ch. 458, p. 1993; Stats.1945, ch. 1134, p. 2176.

1. The statute of limitations relating to the deed to the state. The deed is dated July 1, 1938, was acknowledged on July 28, and recorded on August 4, 1938. The complaint in this action was filed on August 9, 1944. Respondents are barred from attacking the validity of the deed from the tax collector to the state by reason of section 3521 of the Revenue and Taxation Code, which provides: ‘A proceeding based on an alleged invalidity or irregularity of any deed to the State for taxes or of any proceedings leading up to the deed can only be commenced within one year after the date of recording of the deed to the State in the county recorder's office or within one year after June 1, 1941, whichever is later.’ Respondents are not defendants in the action basing their defense on the alleged invalidity of the deed. Having commenced the action they are the moving parties in a proceeding attacking the deed for alleged irregularities in steps leading to its issuance. By reason of the limitation of said section 3521 the last date on which an action could have been commenced attacking the validity or regularity of the deed to the state was June 1, 1942. Therefore the deed and all proceedings leading up to its execution are deemed to be valid and regular and the state is deemed to have acquired a clear title to the property. Tannhauser v. Adams, 80 Cal.App.2d ——, 182 P.2d 280.

However, since both appellants and respondents have discussed alleged errors in the tax proceedings without reference to section 3521, we shall dispose of the objections raised by respondents to their validity.

2. Effect of the tax validation acts. In order that property upon which taxes had not been paid for many years could be rehabilitated and returned to the assessment rolls and pay its fair share of taxes levied for the support of the government, the legislature in 1943 passed a tax validation act, sections 1 and 2 of which read as follows:

‘Section 1. Every act and proceeding heretofore taken by any county, city and county or the officers thereof relative to the preparation, transmitting, computing, determining or fixing the budget or the tax rate or rates of any county or city and county, or to the assessment or equalization of property or to the levy of taxes thereon or to tax sales or certificates of tax sales, tax deeds or other conveyances resulting from such assessment, equalization and levy, are hereby confirmed, validated and declared legally effective, Sec. 2. (a) This act is limited to the correction of defects, irregularities and ministerial errors which the Legislature originally could have omitted from the statutory requirements of law under which the acts hereby confirmed, validated and declared legally effective were taken. (b) This act is limited to the validation of acts and proceedings to the extent to which the same can be effectuated under the State and Federal Constitutions.’ Stats.1943, ch. 458, p. 1993. This statute related only to taxes levied by a county or city and county.

In 1945 a similar act was passed, applicable to the tax proceedings of all taxing agencies and revenue districts including those covered by the 1943 act. Stats.1945, ch. 1134, p. 2176. These acts validated anything that the legislature could have dispensed with and any matter of procedure that it could have provided. Wall v. State, 73 Cal.App.2d 838, 844, 167 P.2d 740.

In discussing the validating acts the Supreme Court held in Miller v. McKenna, 23 Cal.2d 774, 781, 147 P.2d 531, that (1) the legislature has power to enact statutes to validate prior tax proceedings, (2) a proper validating act may be effective as to pending litigation, (3) a curative act may heal a fatally defective proceeding, except the omission of jurisdictional acts, that is, acts required by the due process provisions of the federal and state Constitutions. The failure to observe the requisites of due process cannot be cured by a validating statute. Irregularities or failure to comply with statutory requirements that could have been omitted in the first instance may be cured. It was held that among the jurisdictional essentials that cannot be cured are (1) a duly constituted taxing authority; (2) property to be taxed within the territorial jurisdiction of the taxing body; (3) property legally subject to the tax; (4) sufficient notice and opportunity for hearing to constitute compliance with due process. The manner of procedure after jurisdiction has been acquired and the mandates of due process are complied with is a matter within legislative discretion. Steps which may be dispensed with in the beginning or if required by statute and not performed or are done in an irregular manner may be waived by a curative act. The jurisdictional requisites for due process mentioned in the Miller case were all complied with in the instant case.

In Chambers v. Duvall, 26 Cal.2d 139, 156 P.2d 921, it was contended that the deed was invalid because (1) an excessive rate of taxation had been fixed; (2) the assessment roll failed to show the road district in which the land involved was located; (3) the amount stated in the delinquent list to be due was incorrect; (4) the published delinquent list constituted a separate folded section of the newspaper, and therefore a supplement rather than an integral part of the newspaper; (5) the deed was void on its face for the reason that it did not comply with section 3480 of the Revenue and Taxation Code. The court held (26 Cal.2d at page 143, 156 P.2d 921) that all the irregularities relied on by the defendants, including the claimed irregularity in the recitals in the deed, were such that the legislature could and did cure by the ratifying statute. None of the objections related to the absence of notice or any other element of due process affecting the rights of defendants.

In City of Compton v. Boland, 26 Cal.2d 310, 158 P.2d 397, it was claimed that the tax proceedings were void in that (1) the county tax levy was excessive resulting in an invalid tax; (2) the land was not included in the improvement bond assessment; (3) notices of delinquency contained incorrect amounts; (4) the sales were for amounts less than the correct amounts; (5) the words ‘penalties and costs' were omitted from the statement appended to the notice; (6) the lots were not sufficiently described in the delinquent tax list; (7) the tax deeds were void on their face because they did not state the fact and date of sale by the tax collector to the City of Compton; (8) notice was not mailed to the assessee and he did not receive notice. The court held that the asserted irregularities were healed by the curative act; that the requirements for the publication of delinquency and notice constituted a jurisdictional prerequisite, but the form and content of the notice are details that are subject to legislative or administrative discretion; that defects that are related to the mode of the exercise of the power are merely directory and may be made effective by a curative act. The court concluded that the following irregularities complained of were validated by the statute: (1) The statement of an incorrect amount in the notice of delinquency; (2) irregularity in the fixing of the budget and the tax rate; (3) the omission of the words ‘penalties and costs' from the statement appended to the delinquent notice; (4) an irregularity in the description of the property in the delinquent tax lists; (5) the irregularity in giving notice of sale; (6) failure to insert in the tax deed the items required by the code.

In Barrett v. Brown, 26 Cal.2d 328, 158 P.2d 567, it was objected that the delinquent tax lists were published in sections among various newspapers in the county. The court held that assuming that certain jurisdictional steps had been taken the details in the mode or manner of pursuing those steps may be changed by the legislature within constitutional bounds, and that any defectively pursued steps were cured by the validating act. The court stated that a notice of delinquency having been published in a newspaper of general circulstion, the property owner was not deprived of a constitutional right even though the notice was defective. It was also held that (1) alleged irregularities in the form and execution of affidavits, (2) an incorrect statement in the delinquent tax list of the amount of the least acceptable bid, and (3) the omission from the tax deed of recitals required by the code were cured by the 1943 validating act.

In Wall v. State of California, 73 Cal.App.2d 838, at page 843, 167 P.2d 740, several objections were made to the tax proceedings, those applicable to this action being (1) that there was a single tax deed made for all the parcels of land involved although they had been separately assessed, and (2) that the statement of penalties and costs in the delinquent tax list was erroneous in that it showed the amount of taxes due to be one cent less than the amount actually due. The court held that the curative acts validated anything that the legislature could have dispensed with or any manner of procedure for which the legislature could have provided, and that the alleged defects to which we have referred were healed.

The objections made by respondents in this action to the tax proceedings are the orthodox objections usually made to the validity of tax deeds, and, save for the validating acts, we would be compelled to hold that appellant Chamberlain did not acquire title to the property by reason of his tax deed. However, all the objections upon which respondents depend are anachronous as to any of the errors, omissions or irregularities that occurred prior to the effective dates of the validating acts.

3. Objections to the tax proceedings leading to the deed to the state. Respondents offer several objections to the deed to the state and to the proceedings leading to its execution.

(a) The description of the property. It is described in the assessment roll for 1932–33 as ‘Lot 1 Sec 28 1–S 20 7.48 Acs.’ Respondents contend that this description is insufficient to identify the property. The same description appears in the delinquent tax list published in 1933 and in the addenda to the delinquent list published in 1938. Such description is adequate. It identifies the property with sufficient certainty and from it the taxpayer could have ascertained ‘for what property he [was] assessed’ and that is all that is required. Smith v. Addiego, 54 Cal.App.2d 230, 242, 129 P.2d 953; San Francisco v. Pennie, 93 Cal. 465, 470, 29 P. 66; Biaggi v. Phillips, 50 Cal.App.2d 92, 98, 122 P.2d 619.

In Stanton v. Hotchkiss, 157 Cal. 652, 108 P. 864, one parcel of property was described as a fractional part of ‘sec. 23–16–15.’ This was held (157 Cal. at page 655, 108 P. 864) to designate section 23, township 16 south, range 15 east, Mt. Diablo Base and Meridian. It is conceded that the land in question in this action is in Ventura County. The courts take judicial notice of government surveys of the public lands. It is the invariable rule to follow the number of the section with the description of the township and the latter is followed by the description of the range. Stanton v. Hotckiss, supra, 157 Cal. at page 655, 108 P. 864. We take judicial notice (1) that San Bernardino Base and Meridian is the only base and meridian for townships and ranges in Ventura County; (2) that ‘1–S' means ‘Township 1 South;’ (3) that all ranges in Ventura County are west of San Bernardino meridian, and hence ‘20’ must mean ‘Range 20 West.’ The description derived from the letters and figures used by the taxing officials is Lot 1 in Section 28, Township 1 South, Range 20 West, San Bernardino Base and Meridian, in Ventura County, California, which is conceded to be the correct legal description of the property involved in this action.

(b) Miscellaneous objections. Respondents contend that the proceedings upon which the deed to the state is based are defective for other reasons: (1) The land was owned by Pan American Bank of California but was assessed to ‘Bank, Pan American of California,’ and the same designation of the name appeared in the delinquent tax list; (2) in the addenda to the delinquent tax list published in 1938 the description of the property and the name of the assessee were the same as in the delinquent list for 1932–33, and were incorrect for the reasons above stated; (3) the addenda did not set forth the amount for which the property had been sold to the state as required by section 3817d of the Political Code which was in effect at the date of the publication of the delinquent list. These alleged errors were validated by the curative acts. It was so held in the cases cited in our previous discussion.

Another alleged defect is that the total amount to taxes, assessments, penalties and costs due and a lien on the property was stated in the delinquent list for 1932–33 to be $56.46, which was the amount for which the property was required by law to be sold, but the addenda to the delinquent list for 1938 contained a statement ‘least amount accepted at sale’ and the amount was stated to be $58.46, which was $2 in excess of the amount for which the property was sold in 1933. This objection is likewise within the provisions of the validating acts. Chambers v. Duvall, 26 Cal.2d 139, 156 P.2d 921; City of Compton v. Boland, 26 Cal.2d 310, 314, 158 P.2d 397; Barrett v. Brown, 26 Cal.2d 328, 332, 158 P.2d 567.

Some of the errors mentioned by respondents have been held in decisions rendered prior to 1943 to be fatal and to render a tax deed void. Those decisions need not be cited nor discussed since they have no effect on this action for two reasons: (1) All the foregoing objections are to the deed to the state and to the proceedings leading up to its execution. The adoption of section 3521 of the Revenue and Taxation Code above quoted placing a limitation on the time for commencing actions to invalidate such deed is a bar to respondents' attack on the deed in question since, as we have pointed out, this action was not commenced within the time limited by that section. (2) None of the errors is in regard to a matter required in order to satisfy due process and the failure to perform any of the acts referred to by respondents or to perform them in the manner prescribed by the statute is not fatal to the proceedings and does not render the deed invalid. No one of the matters of which respondents complain is a necessary step in due process. If the legislature had failed to require any one of the acts mentioned the proceedings had and taken by the taxing authorities would have been sufficient to tax the property and to authorize its sale for nonpayment of the tax.

4. Effect of the deed from the county tax collector to the state. The deed contains all recitals required by section 3785 of the Political Code then in force to be made in a deed from the tax collector to the state. That section remained in force as amended in 1911 until superseded by section 3513 of the Revenue and Taxation Code when that code was adopted in 1939.

(a) Respondents contend that the deed is void because several parcels of real property were conveyed by the same deed, although they had been separately assessed and so appeared in the delinquent list. They cite in support of their contention Sterling Realty Co. v. Relfe, 21 Cal.2d 164, 130 P.2d 410, 412, which concerned a sale under a city ordinance that required the issuance of a certificate of sale ‘for each sale.’ Several lots were included in one certificate, the total amount of all sales was stated, and the amount of the sale of each separate lot was not set forth. Such is not our problem here.

Section 3771a of the Political Code, Stats. 1921, ch. 117, p. 109, provides in subdivision (2) that if no sale is had under the provisions of said section then the property shall be deeded to the state. There is nothing in that section or in any other provision of the statute to which our attention has been called requiring a separate deed for each parcel conveyed to the state. A deed conveying several parcels was sustained in Wall v. State, 73 Cal.App.2d 838, 843, 167 P.2d 740. The court held that the error, if any, was cured by the validating acts.

(b) Another alleged error in the deed is that $2720.52 is set forth as the total for which all parcels described in the deed were sold. The amount for which each separate parcel was sold appears opposite the description of such parcel. This is a sufficient compliance with the statute.

When one of the several parcels of land contained in the deed is redeemed the requirement that the redemption shall be noted on the record of the deed may be complied with and the law will be satisfied by an appropriate notation on the record that such parcel has been redeemed, referring to it by description. That is just what was done in connection with the deed involved in this action. A photostatic copy of the record of the deed in the county recorder's office is in evidence. Several parcels were redeemed and the recorder made marginal entries setting forth the fact and the date of redemption and the description of each parcel redeemed. A notation appears on the margin of the record that the property which is the subject of this action was sold to Henry Chamberlain on March 20, 1944, for $100.

The statutory requirements for the cancellation of double assessments and those relating to deeds issued for property erroneously assessed may be fulfilled in a similar manner by the making of marginal entries on the record stating that the deed has been cancelled as to the property described in such entry and the reason therefor.

(c) It is objected that the property was incorrectly and insufficiently described in the deed. This is the same objection as that made to the description in the assessment roll and has been disposed of in our previous discussion of the tax proceedings.

(d) It is contended that the deed is deficient in that the name of the assessee recited in the deed is not the same as the name appearing on the assessment roll. Incorrect recitals in the deed and failure to state therein all items specified by the code are matters that might have been dispensed with by the legislature and the errors are cured by the validating acts. Chambers v. Duvall, 26 Cal.2d 139, 143, 156 P.2d 921; Barrett v. Brown, 26 Cal.2d 328, 332, 158 P.2d 567.

The deed to the state was valid and conveyed to it ‘the absolute title to the property free of incumbrances, except’ liens for district taxes, special assessments and certain easements and water rights. Pol.Code, sec. 3787; Rev. and Tax.Code, sec. 3520; Mercury Herald Co. v. Moore, 22 Cal.2d 269, 273, 138 P.2d 673, 147 A.L.R. 1111; Helvey v. Bank of America, 43 Cal.App.2d 532, 537, 111 P.2d 390. The former owner had no title to or interest in the property after the execution of the deed to the state—only a right to redeem within the time and in the manner prescribed by law, a right which was not exercised.

Section 3786 of the Political Code, superseded in 1939 by section 3517 of the Revenue and Taxation Code, provides that such deed is prima facie evidence that: (a) The property was assessed as required by law. (b) The property was equalized as required by law. (c) The taxes were levied in accordance with law. (d) The taxes were sold as prescribed by law. (f) The property was not redeemed. (g) The person who executed the deed was the proper officer. Section 3517 of the Revenue and Taxation Code contains the following that was not in the Political Code: ‘(h) That the amount for which the property was sold was legally a lien on the real property.’ There is no evidence in the record contradicting any of the facts of which the deed is prima facie evidence.

Section 3787 of the Political Code, superseded by section 3518 of the Revenue and Taxation Code, provides that such deed is conclusive evidence, except against actual fraud, of the regularity of all other proceedings from the assessment of the assessor to the execution of the deed, both inclusive. No claim of fraud is made in connection with the deed in question.

It was within the power of the legislature to make the deed prima facie evidence of certain steps in the tax proceedings and conslusive as to others. The sections above referred to are not in violation of the Constitution. Rollins v. Wright, 93 Cal. 395, 397, 29 P. 58; Clarke v. Mead, 102 Cal. 516, 519, 36 P. 862; Tilton v. Russek, 171 Cal. 731, 734, 154 P. 860.

5. Proceedings after the deed to the state. In considering this phase of the case it must be borne in mind at the outset (1) that as stated in the last preceding paragraph the state became the absolute owner of the property, subject only to certain tax and assessment liens, through the deed from the tax collector; (2) that by reason of the deed the owner of the property forfeited all right in it except the privilege of redeeming before the state disposed of it (Mercury Herald case, supra, and cases cited, Helvery case, supra); (3) that when this action was commenced by respondents an attack upon that deed was barred by the statute. Rev. & Tex. Code, sec. 3521.

Respondents contend nevertheless that several errors occurred intermediate the deed to the state and the sale to appellant Chamberlain that render the latter's title void.

(a) On January 25, 1944, the tax collector transmitted a notice to the board of supervisors stating that ‘pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 529 of the political code, Stats.1939,’ he submitted an application for an order of the board to sell at public auction ‘Yerba Buena Lot 1 Sec. 28–1 s–20 7.48 acs.’ for the minimum price of $50 plus costs of sale. The alleged errors in the notice are three in number: (1) That it is insufficient in that there is and was no Chapter 529 of the Political Code. This was a clerical error of no importance in the validity of the tax proceedings. The notice refers to statutes of 1939. Chapter 529 of the statutes of that year (p. 1917) adds a chapter to the Political Code relating to the sale of tax deeded lands. Obviously by the reference to chapter 529 and to the statutes of 1939 the tax collector intended to refer to those provisions which constituted his authorization to sell. Such notice by the tax collector to the board of supervisors was not jurisdictional and was not a step required by due process. The legislature might have dispensed with such notice or it might have provided some other method of procedure. The tax collector was proceeding by authority of law and his failure to designate the provisions of the statute under which he was proceeding is an error healed by the validating acts as completely as errors in the amount of the sale and in failing to follow the code provisions concerning the delinquent list. See Barrett v. Brown, 26 Cal.2d 328, 158 P.2d 567. (2) That the minimum price for which the property was to be sold was stated to be $50, an amount less than that due for taxes, penalties, interest and costs. The statement of the amount likewise was not important and was not required in order to satisfy due process. If the legislature had not required a statement of the amount for which the property would be sold the proceedings would have been sufficient to support the sale. The state was the owner of the land by virtue of the deed of 1938, and like any other owner of property could dispose of it in any manner it chose. The state, which is the party interested in the disposition of its property, has offered no objection to the manner of its sale. Respondents cannot complain since their title had been lost in 1938. Inasmuch as the state need not have required the tax collector to include in his notice a statement of the minimum amount for which the property would be sold, an error in omitting such statement or in stating an incorrect amount is validated by the curative acts. Barrett v. Brown, supra; City of Compton v. Boland, 26 Cal.2d 310, 314, 158 P.2d 397; Wall v. State, 73 Cal.App.2d 838, 167 P.2d 740. (3) That the addition of ‘Yerba Buena’ to the description invalidated the proceedings, since the description in the notice was different from that in the assessment roll and in the delinquent tax lists. We take judicial notice that in the government survey there is only one section numbred 28 in each township, and that there is only one Lot 1 in any section. Consequently the land described in the tax collector's notice to the board of supervisors is the same as that described in the assessment roll, in the delinquent tax lists, and in all other previous proceedings. Furthermore, it appears from the assessment rolls in evidence that the property was in the Yerba Buena school district. The description used by the tax collector is not different from that contained in the previous tax proceedings but merely identifies the land as being in that district.

The tax collector did not, as contended by respondents, proceed on his own initiative or without legal authority in selling the property. He was authorized by law to sell, but he failed in some nonjurisdictional particulars to proceed as laid down in the code. Since the state owned the property and could have adopted other means of selling it, and since it is offering no objection to the proceedings or to the failure to follow the statutes minutely, we conclude that it sanctioned the sale as made. The state's own validating act healed all the error to which we have referred.

(b) It is further objected that (1) the tax collector did not transmit to the board of supervisors a notice of his intention to sell as provided in section 3698 of the Revenue and Taxation Code, and (2) the board of supervisors did not transmit to the tax collector a certified copy of its resolution authorizing the sale within five days or at any other time as required by section 3699. The first criticism is disposed of by the evidence, and by respondent's admission as well, that the notice was in fact transmitted by the tax collector although they assert that it was insufficient for the reasons above discussed. As we have already pointed out the transmission of such notice need not have been required by the legislature and its absence or any error in it has been validated. Concerning the second point, the transmission of a copy of the resolution to the tax collector was likewise not jurisdictional. Since the legislature might have dispensed with it, the failure to forward it is within the terms of the validating acts. The board of supervisors did adopt a resolution authorizing the tax collector to sell. Since the authority was adequately given, although such resolution might have been dispensed with by the legislature, the transmission of the resolution to the tax collector was an immaterial omission. Notice to the board of intention to sell and the transmission of a copy of the board's resolution are of no greater importance than giving notice of sale to the assessee, which is next discussed.

(c) Complaint is made that the tax collector did not send a notice of the intended sale to the assessee of the property as prescribed in section 3701 of the Revenue and Taxation Code. The tax collector made an affidavit that the property was assessed to ‘Calif. Bank-Real Est. Dept.’ on the assessment roll for 1938–39, that there did not appear on the assessment roll an address for the assessee, and that he did not know its address. The assessee's address did in fact appear on the assessment roll in connection with its name. No reason has been advanced for and we are not now concerned with the making of an affidavit contrary to the facts shown by the record. The only question is whether a failure to send a notice of the intended sale to the assessee was a lethal error.

The state had absolute title to the land by reason of its deed. Pol.Code, sec. 3787; Rev. & Tax.Code, sec. 3520. Respondents and their predecessors in the title had no interest in the property except an offer enabling them to regain title by redeeming from the sale, which offer the state could revoke at any time before redemption was made. Mercury Herald Co. v. Moore, 22 Cal.2d 269, 273, 138 P.2d 673, 147 A.L.R. 1111. The offer was revoked by the sale and there was no constitutional obligation on the part of the state or of the tax collector as its representative to give any notice whatsoever to the assessee prior to the sale except by publication of the delinquent list and notice of intended sale. Since respondents do not contend that the notice was not published at the times and in the manner required by law, it will be presumed that official duty has been regularly performed. Code Civ.Proc. § 1963, subd. 15. The publication of the notice is all that the taxpayer is entitled to and when published as required by the code provisions ‘he has been accorded the full measure of his constitutional right in that respect.’ Merchants Trust Co. v. Wright, 161 Cal. 149, 151, 118 P. 517, 518; Bank of Lemoore v. Fulgham, 151 Cal. 234, 240, 90 P. 936; Fox v. Wright, 152 Cal. 59, 63, 91 P. 1005; Tannhauser v. Adams, 80 Cal.App.2d ——, 182 P.2d 280.

A taxpayer has no vested right in the method adopted by the state for the disposition of its tax deeded lands, and the right of redemption is not a property right. Mercury Herald Co. v. Moore, supra; Helvey v. Bank of America, 43 Cal.App.2d 532, 537, 111 P.2d 390. Since the mailing of notice to the assessee was not required in order to satisfy the constitutional demand for due process and might have been dispensed with by the legislature, and since the notice was published as required by law, the failure to mail it was an error that was validated by the curative acts and did not render the sale to appellant Chamberlain void.

(d) The failure to insert items in the deed that are specified by the code is also cured by the validating acts. Chambers v. Duvall, 26 Cal.2d 139, 142, 156 P.2d 921; City of Compton v. Boland, 26 Cal.2d 310, 317, 158 P.2d 397; Barrett v. Brown, 26 Cal.2d 328, 332, 158 P.2d 567.

6. Respondents' claim of vested rights. Respondents contend that they must succeed in this action by reason of their asserted vested rights. The deed to the state was executed July 1, 1938. It was stipulated that California Bank acquired the record title to the property by deed dated February 14, 1938, and recorded February 25, 1938, and that it made a grant deed to respondents dated July 9, 1943, and recorded August 14, 1943. The validating act of 1943 became effective on August 4 of that year. Respondents maintain (1) that the deed to the bank having been executed prior to the deed to the state and prior to the validating act the title of the bank was superior to that of the state; (2) that the bank obtained a vested right that was not lost through the deed to the state and that its vested right was conveyed to respondents; (3) that respondents having acquired the record title by a deed dated prior to the effective date of the validating act their title was not affected by it.

The bank took title subject to all unpaid taxes and to the tax sale. Taxes had been delinquent for more than four years when the bank received its deed and none were paid prior to the Chamberlain deed. A conveyance by one person to another does not cancel the tax lien. The bank's title did not supersede the claim of the state, and the deed from the bank to respondents gave the latter no greater title than that held by the bank. They took the title subject to all unpaid taxes, tax sales and tax deeds.

Respondents' title is not strengthened by the fact that the deed to the bank and the deed from the bank to respondents antedated the effective date of the validating act of 1943. (1) Respondents obtained no better right than the bank possessed—a title subject to the tax lien. (2) A person cannot by reason of his ownership of property prior to the levy of the tax escape from the operation of the validating statute by claiming a vested right that cannot be taken by retroactive legislation. Mais v. Poinsettia Land Co., 71 Cal.App.2d 347, 349, 162 P.2d 925. (3) Since a validating statute that becomes effective pending litigation will act retroactively to cure defects in the proceedings that are relied on to defeat the tax deed (Miller v. McKenna, 23 Cal.2d 774, 781, 147 P.2d 531), similar irregularities are no less subject to validation although title may be transferred by one person to another. See Southern Service Co., Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 15 Cal.2d 1, 12, 97 P.2d 963, holding that the legislature may constitutionally withdraw the right to a refund of an illegal tax and cut off the remedy sought in pending actions. It would indeed be a novel method of defeating a tax deed if a sale and conveyance of the record title could be held to create a vested right paramount ot the tax title. (4) Whatever else may be said concerning respondents' alleged vested rights they cannot be enforced by reason of the fact, as we have pointed out, that the deed to the state conveyed the absolute title, subject to assessment liens, and that this action which is an attack on the deed is barred by section 3521 of the Revenue and Taxation Code. (5) The legislature has full control over the sale of property belonging to the state and may regulate or change at any time the method of its disposition (South San Joaquin Irr. Dist. v. Neumiller, 2 Cal.2d 485, 489, 42 P.2d 64) and may make retroactive changes in the method of redemption. Mercury Herald Co. v. Moore, 22 Cal.2d 269, 274, 138 P.2d 673, 147 A.L.R. 1111. (6) The taxpayer has no vested right in the method of procedure for redemption of property sold for taxes. The power to prescribe the procedure is vested in the legislature and it may change the method as it chooses. The right to redeem is not a vested interest in the property. Helvery v. Bank of America, 43 Cal.App.2d 532, 537, 111 P.2d 390; South San Joaquin case, supra. (7) The relationship of sovereign and taxpayer is not founded on nor does it create contractual rights. Southern Service Co., Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 15 Cal.2d 1, 11, 97 P.2d 963; Mercury Herald Co. v. Moore, supra, 22 Cal.2d at page 272, 138 P.2d 673, 147 A.L.R. 1111.

7. Error in rejecting deeds as evidence. After the deeds to the state and to appellant Chamberlain were received in evidence counsel for respondents moved to strike them from the record and the motion was taken under advisement. The court's written opinion directing judgment for plaintiffs contained an order granting the motion to strike but it was not entered in the minutes. Though the order is not in the record the motion will be considered as having been granted. Since the deeds are valid and are supported by valid tax proceedings they constituted evidence of Chamberlain's title and it was error to strike them from the record.

It is unnecessary to restate the alleged irregularities which respondents contend invalidated the deeds. The case may be summed up in one sentence: All jurisdictional requirements of due process were fulfilled and all errors and irregularities in the proceedings were cured by the validating acts, since every particular in which the statutory provisions were departed from was a matter nonessential to due process which the legislature might have omitted or for which it might have provided other methods of procedure.

The judgment is reversed with directions (1) to receive the deeds in evidence upon a retrial of the action, (2) to make and file findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with this opinion and (3) to enter judgment denying relief to plaintiffs and quieting title in defendant Henry Chamberlain against the claims of plaintiffs.

WILSON, Justice.

MOORE, P. J., concurs. McCOMB, J., deeming himself disqualified, takes no part in this decision.