PEOPLE v. MITCHELL (1945)

This is an appeal from an order dismissing an information filed against defendant charging the commission of the crime of involuntary manslaughter, alleged to have been committed contrary to the provisions of subdivision 2 of section 192 of the Penal Code, on the ground that the evidence produced at the preliminary examination was not sufficient to justify holding the defendant for trial.

The evidence at the preliminary examination is not before us, appellant having substituted the statement of facts given by counsel for defendant at the time of making the motion to dismiss the information. It is agreed that this is a fair and complete summary of all the evidence taken before the committing magistrate.

The accident happened on Twelfth Avenue near the intersection of Park Boulevar and Russ Street in the city of San Diego. The trial judge, it was assumed, was familiar with that locality so the statement of counsel contains no accurate description of its physical aspects. The members of the court are also familiar with the locality and we will draw on our own knowledge for such description.

The portion of Park Boulevard with which we are concerned runs in a general northerly and southerly direction across Balboa Park. As it approaches the United States Naval Hospital main buildings from the north it makes a broad curve to the west which returns into a slight curve to the east and joins the north end of Twelfth Avenue at Russ Street. The grade of Park Boulevard descends to the south commencing near the hospital. A street car track runs along the east side of the Boulevard, crosses Russ Street and proceeds south on Twelfth Avenue. Both Park Boulevard and Twelfth Avenue are main thoroughfares and at times carry considerable vehicular traffic. There is a 25-mile an hour speed limit sign on the west side of Park Boulevard about 180 feet north of the north line of Russ Street.

Defendant was driving an automobile south on Park Boulevard with Harvey Anderson riding with him. Anderson died of injuries received in the accident.

Counsel for defendant described the accident as follows:

‘There was a street car stopped to discharge or take on passengers here at some place north of (on) Twelfth Street (indicating), just north of A Street, I take it, and the defendant was coming at a high rate of speed down here (indicating) according to evidence, and feeling that he could not avoid striking the people who were getting on or off the car at the time, and that he could not stop in time, he attempted to swerve to the left of the street car and was not able to do it, and he caught the left rear corner of the street car which threw his automobile out of control and he came to rest against a telephone pole which was broken off over here on this side of the street (indicating).’

Charles T. Brooks, a police officer, testified at the preliminary examination. Counsel thus summarized and quoted from his testimony:

‘He found the street car. He says this: ‘The rear of the street car at the point contact was made between the car and the street car, was approximately eighty-one feet south of the south line of Russ. Prior to this point running up to the end of the street car was approximately twenty-seven feet of centrifugal skid’—showing an application of the brakes about twenty-seven feet before the collision—‘leading from the point of impact to where the car was setting was approximately fifty-one feet of centrifugal skid’. In other words, there was a skid mark fifty-one feet after the contract with the street car and twenty-seven feet before. At the point where the car was resting, a support pole which supports the trolley lines for the street car, was broken off at the base. Also an ornamental light standard which was alongside the support pole, was badly damaged.'

Two Waves were walking west on Russ Street and observed the accident. One of them testified concerning the speed of the automobile: ‘We thought it was going very rapidly, and in my opinion about seventy.’ The other testified that it was traveling ‘very fast’ and as it rounded the curve on Park Boulevard it was riding on its left wheels with its right wheels off the pavement.

The question presented is whether this evidence was sufficient to justify the committing magistrate in holding defendant to answer in the superior court.

Subdivision 2 of section 192 of the Penal Code defines involuntary manslaughter as the unlawful killing of a human being ‘in the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to felony; or in the commission of a lawful act which might produce death, in an unlawful manner, or without due caution and circumspection.’

In a preliminary examination it is not necessary that a defendant be proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in order to support an order holding him to answer. It is sufficient if it appears that a public offense has been committed ‘and there is sufficient cause to believe the defendant guilty thereof.’ Sec. 872, Penal Code; People v. O'Brien, 37 Cal.App.2d 708, 100 P.2d 367. As was said in People v. Fisk, 32 Cal.App.2d 26, 89 P.2d 142, 144:

‘There is a great difference between the legal requirements with regard to what evidence is necessary to justify the order of a magistrate in holding a defendant to answer in the superior court, and that which is necessary to support a judgment of ‘Guilty’. The doctrine of reasonable doubt applies to the latter, whereas but slight evidence is sufficient to justify the former.'

Without further discussion it should be obvious that the evidence as summarized, if accepted as true, would support the conclusion, if drawn, that the crime charged had been committed by the defendant. It follows that the committing magistrate was fully justified in holding defendant to answer in the superior court.

The order dismissing the information is reversed and the cause is remanded to the superior court for trial.

MARKS, Justice.

BARNARD, P. J., and GRIFFIN, J., concur.