MIDWAY SCHOOL DIST OF KERN COUNTY v. GRIFFEATH (1946)

This is an action brought by the Midway School District of Kern County to determine its right to dismiss Glenn A. Griffeath who had attained status as a permanent employee of the district.

Griffeath had been employed for twenty years as a teacher in the district and had rendered very satisfactory service. Up to September 27, 1944, he had been energetic, cooperative and willing and at times had performed more than the usual duties required of him.

On the afternoon of September 27, 1944, he desired to hunt deer in Nevada. Knowing this would not be a ground for temporary leave of absence he left the following note on the desk of the principal:

‘On account of coming illness I find it necessary to be absent from school the rest of the week. My lesson plans are on my desk. Will try to be back Monday but will probably be absent again on Wednesday until the next Monday as I will probably enter the hospital under Dr. Johnson for observation.’

He did not return until October 6, 1944, his earlier return having been prevented by a severe snowstorm. He was called before the principal and he admitted he had been hunting. His attitude was not cooperative but was rather defiant. He was called before the school board and assumed the same attitude.

It is true he was suffering from hives and claimed he feared he was suffering from either cancer or appendicitis, but his ailments were not sufficient to keep him from going on a long hunting trip into the mountains of a neighboring state. He was not sufficiently disabled to prevent him from performing his duties as a teacher. He had made no arrangements for going into a hospital or for examination or treatment by a physician before going on the trip.

After hearing Griffeath and seeing his uncompromising attitude the school board passed a resolution for his dismissal. Griffeath refused to resign and demanded a court hearing. This proceeding followed and after a trial the trial judge found that Griffeath could not be dismissed by the school board.

Appellants attack the judgment on several grounds. They argue that the evidence shows conclusively that Griffeath wilfully violated the rules by absenting himself from his duties without lawful reasons; that he was rather defiant when called before the principal and again when called before the school board; that he was guilty of dishonesty, or at best duplicity, in writing the quoted note and conveying the false impression that his absense was due to sickness rather than a desire to pursue his own pleasures. We agree with counsel for appellants that the evidence fully establishes these derelictions of duty on the part of Griffeath.

It is further argued that it having been established that Griffeath was proved guilty of unprofessional conduct and dishonesty (Sec. 13521, Education Code) the trial court should have permitted the school board to dismiss Griffeath; that the final act of dismissal rested with the school board and that the court could only review the proceedings before that board to determine whether it had exceeded its juristion in deciding to dismiss Griffeath.

We cannot agree with this argument under the law as it exists today. Section 13529 of the Education Code provides in effect that after having been served with notice of the board's intention to dismiss him, an employee may demand a hearing; that the board may then rescind its action or file a complaint in the superior court ‘setting forth the charges against the employee and asking that the court inquire into the charges and determine whether or not the charges are true, and if true, whether or not they constitute sufficient grounds for the dismissal of the employee, under the provisions of this code, and for judgment pursuant to its findings.’

After a hearing the court must enter judgment which ‘shall determine whether or not the governing board may dismiss the employee.’ Sec. 13551, Education Code. The school board must act in accordance with the judgment and may not dismiss the employee unless the judgment permits it to do so. Sec. 13552, Education Code. Thus the discretion formerly vested in the board to act on the evidence taken after charges are filed against a permanent employee is now vested in the superior court and the board is required to follow its directions.

This is the view of the law taken in Board of Education v. Mulcahy, 50 Cal.App.2d 418, 123 P.2d 114, 116, where it is said:

‘As is said in Board of Education v. Ballou, 21 Cal.App.2d 52, 55, 68 P.2d 389, 391: ‘The Legislature in 1935 by amending the School Code brought about very significant changes in the procedure for dismissing permanent teachers for cause. Administrative school officials were deprived of the power to dismiss permannet teachers for cause and it was made necessary for the governing board, in order to bring about a dismissal, to file a complaint in the superior court ‘asking that the court inquire into such charges and determine whether or not such charges are true, and if true, whether or not they constitute sufficient grounds for the dismissal of such employee, under the provisions of this code, and for judgment pursuant to its findings.’ The Legislature has placed upon the judges the duty of determining whether a teacher should be dismissed when charges such as incompetency are filed. A duty essentially administrative has been withdrawn from administrative officials and imposed upon officials exercising judicial functions.'

‘That a judicial determination as to the competency of a teacher against whom charges are made may be interpolated between the initial charge and the final order of dismissal is supported by both reason and authority. It is both fair and logical that the existence of proper grounds should be judicially determined before a teacher may be deprived of her right to tenure.’

It may be true that the judgment of the superior court may not be final and conclusive in all cases. There may be cases in which the fitness of the permanent teacher to continue teaching in a school are so clearly established that it would be a breach of judicial discretion not to enter judgment permitting his dismissal. Under the present state of the law we take it to be the duty of an appellate court to reverse a judgment of the superior court where a breach of discretion is shown on the part of the superior court in rendering judgment in cases of this kind.

While the evidence in this case clearly would have supported a judgment permitting the board to dismiss Griffeath, we cannot regard the judgment as a breach of discretion. It is true that the conduct of Griffeath was reprehensible, especially in attempting to deceive the board as to the condition of his health and the purpose of his absence. Still in view of the long and faithful service rendered to the school district, and his single breach of ethics and strict honesty, it might be reasonable to conclude that dismissal was too severe a penalty to be imposed upon him. Where reasonable minds might differ as to the conclusions to be drawn from evidence we cannot substitute our judgment for that of the trial court as discretion in the case is vested by law in that court and not in us. By so holding we do not wish to be understood as condoning or in any manner approving the conduct of Griffeath.

Appellant urges that the trial court failed to find on material issues and that the judgment should be reversed for that reason.

While the pleadings presented other issues, only two were principally covered in the evidence, (1) Griffeath deserting his duties without leave, and (2) dishonesty in misrepresenting the reason for his absence. While the findings could have been much improved, we believe they are sufficient and that they resolve both questions against Griffeath. The conclusion that these derelictions did not constitute sufficient ground for dismissal is sufficiently stated.

The judgment is affirmed.

MARKS, Justice.

BARNARD, P. J., and GRIFFIN, J., concur.