REEVES v. VALLOW (1939)

This is an appeal by the defendant from a judgment of $25,000, against him, as administrator of the estate of John Fletcher Kratzer, deceased, in favor of the respondent Clara Reeves, for services which it is alleged were rendered for the deceased by the respondent from May 1, 1928, until the death of Kratzer on March 7, 1936.

The complaint alleges:

“That on the first day of May, 1928, John Fletcher Kratzer, now deceased, moved into the home of plaintiff and thereafter constantly lived with plaintiff either at her home or at a later time at 1726 Taft Avenue, Hollywood, California, until his death.

“That on or about the said first day of May, 1928, the said John Fletcher Kratzer requested the plaintiff to care for him, assist him in his business and act as a companion and nurse to him and told plaintiff that if she would work for him in such capacity as long as he lived, he would richly compensate her for her labors.

“That thereafter in the year 1931, the said John Fletcher Kratzer told defendant that he would give her $20,000.00 for her efforts, the same to be payable upon his death and out of his estate, and that he would further pay her the sum of $100.00 per month from the date of his death until distribution of said $20,000; that pursuant to said agreement the said John Fletcher Kratzer did execute his last will and testament, a copy of which, marked Ex. ‘A’ is hereunto annexed, which was duly subscribed, published and declared to be his last will and testament, in the presence of two witnesses;

“That plaintiff is informed and believes and upon that ground alleges that said will executed in 1931, has been either lost or destroyed, but that the witnesses to said will are still living.

“That thereafter in the year 1935, the said John Fletcher Kratzer promised and agreed to deliver to plaintiff, in addition to the $20,000.00 theretofore agreed upon, a home of the value of $10,500.

“That relying upon the promise of the said John Fletcher Kratzer, plaintiff accepted his offer and commenced her work under said offer on the first day of May, 1928, and did work continuously for the said John Fletcher Kratzer until his death on March 7, 1936. That the reasonable value of said services was and is the sum of $30,500, no part of which has been paid.”

It is further alleged that plaintiff filed a creditor's claim with the administrator and that ten days having elapsed since the presentation of such claim, plaintiff elected to consider said claim rejected.

It is contended by appellant: (1) That the complaint fails to state a cause of action; (2) that the statute of limitations bars plaintiff's recovery for more than two years' services; (3) that the court erred in excluding evidence offered by defendant and in admitting improper evidence offered by plaintiff; (4) that the court erred in the giving and refusing of certain instructions; (5) that the verdict and judgment are against the evidence; (6) that the verdict and judgment are excessive and as a matter of law are a result of passion and prejudice; (7) that the misconduct of the trial judge was prejudicial.

At the outset it should be emphasized that if plaintiff can recover at all such recovery can be had only upon an action in quantum meruit. Long v. Rumsey, 12 Cal.2d 334, 84 P.2d 146. In the Long case the court declared: “The alleged oral contract to compensate the respondent by leaving her the entire estate upon the death of the Frickes is unenforceable * and a recovery, if any, must be based upon the theory of quantum meruit.” Long v. Rumsey, supra, 12 Cal.2d page 341, 84 P.2d at page 149.

Referring to appellant's first contention above mentioned, it appears to be well settled that a complaint based upon quantum meruit, is sufficient when set forth in the form of a common count, as against either a general or a special demurrer. 27 Cal.Jur., p. 219. The complaint herein apparently seeks to base plaintiff's cause of action upon an express oral agreement; nevertheless, whether intentionally or accidentally, it does in fact allege in substance the requirements of the common count and hence was good as against appellant's objection in that regard. In an action upon quantum meruit manifestly recovery may be had in the absence of an express oral agreement. It is true that in the trial of such an action evidence of an express oral agreement is relevant, not, however, because the cause of action is based thereon but because such evidence tends to establish the fact that the services in question were not gratuitous. Quantum meruit requires proof that the alleged services were performed and accepted; that the accepter received the benefits thereof without payment therefor. Such a state of facts being proven it then becomes material to prove the value of such services, for which, when established, the law implies a promise to pay.

Referring to appellant's third contention, namely, that the court erred in excluding evidence offered by defendant, it is urged, among other claims in that regard, that the ruling of the trial court in sustaining an objection to the introduction in evidence of a copy of decedent's will as originally alleged in plaintiff's complaint, was highly prejudicial. At the beginning of the trial the court granted plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint by striking therefrom the allegation, “* that pursuant to said agreement the said John Fletcher Kratzer did execute his last will and testament, a copy of which, marked Ex. ‘A’ is hereunto annexed, which was duly subscribed, published and declared to be his last will and testament, in the presence of two witnesses.” The alleged will referred to as “Ex. A” and dated December, 1931, contained the following provisions: “Eighth: I bequeath to Clara Reeves of Hollywood, California, the sum of Twenty thousand ($20,000.00) Dollars. Until said devisee receives said bequest, I bequeath to her the sum of One Hundred ($100.00) Dollars per month which said monthly sum shall not be deducted from her bequest, except that should partial distribution be made to her, then the monthly payment, above provided, shall be reduced pro rata.” “I have been residing with Clara Reeves and all sums due her are paid except for the current month.”

The complaint was verified by the plaintiff and although the portion thereof sought to be introduced was stricken, nevertheless it remained in effect a declaration against interest and was therefore admissible. Among other things the trial court sustained objections to the introduction by appellant and defendant of evidence of the records of plaintiff's bank account and of decedent's bank account, also evidence of certain transactions between plaintiff and the deceased, in connection with which it is contended by appellant that plaintiff was compensated. Without going into further detail with regard to the extent to which defendant was limited in defending on the theory of payment, and as well on the value of the alleged services, it is sufficient to note that the above rulings were vital, and the evidence excluded thereby was essentially important for a jury's consideration in such an action.

It is unnecessary to give attention to the other above-mentioned contentions of appellant, but such inattention is not to be understood as indicating that they are without merit.

The judgment is reversed.

DORAN, Justice.

We concur: YORK, P.J.; WHITE, J.