PEOPLE v. STRALLA (1939)

In an indictment returned by the grand jury of Los Angeles county, appellant and one Anthony Stralla were jointly charged with a violation of subdivision 2 of section 337a of the Penal Code, which section denounces as a crime the maintenance or occupancy of a “room * vessel, place * or inclosure” for the purpose of recording or registering bets on horse races. The indictment further alleged that said offense was committed “4 English miles oceanward from the end of the municipal pier. Said pier was and is in the City of Santa Monica, County of Los Angeles, State of California, and on a course or bearing South 45, West from said pier, from end of said pier”. The vessel referred to in the indictment was known as the ship “Rex”, which vessel possessed no motive power, either steam, Diesel or sail, and for some five or six years had been anchored at the point alleged in the indictment.

On September 26, 1938, the defendant Stralla alone was tried before a jury which, being unable to agree upon a verdict, was discharged, and the cause was dismissed as to defendant Stralla. On October 17, 1938, defendant Adams appeared in court and entered a plea of not guilty, following which, by stipulation and appropriate waiver of a jury trial, the cause was submitted to the court for decision, based upon all the evidence heard and adduced at the trial of the co-defendant, Stralla. Thereafter the court rendered its decision, finding the defendant Adams guilty of the offense charged in the indictment. Following the denial of a motion for a new trial, judgment was pronounced against defendant Adams, who prosecutes this appeal from both the judgment and the order denying his motion for a new trial.

The sole issue presented to us on this appeal is whether the superior court of Los Angeles county was possessed of jurisdiction. Therefore the question before us for solution is whether the ship “Rex”, upon which vessel appellant admittedly was receiving, recording and registering bets on horse races, is at its admitted place of anchorage within or without the boundaries of the state of California.

It is well settled that in solving the problem with which we are here confronted, the trial court was, and this court is, entitled to bring to our assistance so far as it may prove helpful our judicial notice of the political history of the world, as well as of whatever is established by law (sec. 1875, subds. 2 and 8, Code Civ.Proc.), which section is also authority for our power, in aid of our judicial notice, to have resort to appropriate books or documents of reference; while the case of Rogers v. Cady, 104 Cal. 288, 290, 38 P. 81, 43 Am.St.Rep. 100, upholds our right to inquire of others or to have recourse to any other source of information which we deem authentic.

In aid of our judicial notice of whatever is established by law, it is pertinent here to quote from article 21 of our state Constitution, as follows: “The boundary of the state of California shall be as follows: * thence running west and along said boundary line to the Pacific Ocean, and extending therein three English miles; thence running in a northwesterly direction and following the direction of the Pacific Coast to the forty-second degree of north latitude; *. Also, including all the islands, harbors, and bays along and adjacent to the coast.”

So far as applicable hereto, we may say that section 3927 of the Political Code declares that Los Angeles county is bounded on the north by Ventura county; on the south by Orange county; and on the west by the state line of California, which state line, as set forth in the constitutional provision, extends three English miles into the Pacific ocean; including also all islands, harbors and bays along and adjacent to the coast.

A map introduced in evidence at the trial discloses that the position of the ship “Rex” was landward from a straight line drawn between Point Dume and Point Vicente approximately eight miles; but approximately four miles seaward from the shore line of the city of Santa Monica in Los Angeles county, well beyond the “three-mile limit”; and that it was anchored upon the high seas if what has been denominated “Santa Monica Bay” is to be regarded as not within the territorial limits of the state of California. This map also discloses that the distance between Point Dume and Point Vicente is approximately 29.2 statute miles, and the distance from a line connecting these “headlands” shoreward is approximately 11.8 statute miles to the shore line of the city of Santa Monica.

From a review of cases extending back many years, as well as from an examination of textbooks, it does not appear that jurists and text writers are agreed as to what are the rules as to dimension and configuration which, apart from other considerations, would lead to the conclusion that a body of water constitutes a bay; and, where such conclusion has been one of judicial determination, it would seem to be based upon the fact that the government, nation or state possessing the adjoining coasts has for varied periods of time exercised dominion over the body of water in question, or the political or legislative branch of the government has by appropriate act declared the particular body of water to be a bay, or otherwise part of the territory of the political entity asserting jurisdiction thereover.

Merely because an area of water constitutes an indentation between two headlands or points does not necessarily make such area a bay. United States v. Carrillo, D.C., 13 F.Supp. 121, 122. As we contemplate the Constitution of California together with the principles of international and other law, it seems to us that in determining whether any given area constitutes a “bay”, certain facts must appear, such as (1) that it is a semi-landlocked body of water; (2) that it affords shelter from prevailing adverse winds and swells, thereby affording reasonably safe anchorage for ships of commerce; (3) that it has an unquestioned historical background and designation as a “bay” or inland body of water; and, for the purpose of determining jurisdiction, a legislative declaration definitely fixing the right to assert such dominion over the area in question.

As to the first of these requisites, the rule of reason must be applied, for as was said in United States v. Carrillo, supra, “If the whole of the land bordering the Gulf of Mexico were under one sovereignty the whole of such vast sea could not well be considered as within such country's sovereignty.” And with equal force it could be said that a line might be drawn between two headlands along many sections of the Pacific coast, thus forming a body of water around which the land makes a curve, just as does the area between Point Dume and Point Vicente. But if this is the definition of a bay, it could be satisfied by the entire Southern California coast, with Point Conception and Point Loma as headlands. It follows, therefore, in the light of the facts as well as varied opinions, that recourse must be had to reason in order to determine whether the body of water in question is truly inland waters in a practical, as well as a historical and geographical sense, or whether it is merely a part of the open sea and what is known as an open roadstead.

Respondent relies upon the case of Ocean Industries, Inc., v. Superior Court, 200 Cal. 235, 252 P. 722, to sustain the claim that the area between Point Dume and Point Vicente constitutes the bay of Santa Monica. In our judgment, however, that case is not decisive of the question here involved, for there is a vital difference between the facts upon which the conclusion reached in that decision was based, and which determined that the entire bay of Monterey within its headlands and thence into the ocean for a distance of three nautical miles, was within the sovereignty of the state of California, and the facts presented to us herein. The distance between the headlands forming Monterey bay is approximately eighteen miles, while the distance between the headlands forming Santa Monica bay, so called, is twenty-nine miles. Although this difference may be regarded as merely a matter of degree, it does nevertheless offer some slight resistance to the contending argument of respondent, in effect, that the matter of degree is without limitation. Especially is this so when the difference is not nominal, but substantial.

It is also particularly important to note in the decision just mentioned that the fact is that Monterey bay consists of a body of water having headlands approximately eighteen miles apart, with receding shores, giving a total width of twenty-two miles inside the headlands, while in the case before us the so-called Santa Monica bay does not have a receding shore line back of the headlands that form the entrance to the “bay”. That is to say, Monterey bay, proper, is wider than the distance between its headlands. In the absence of such a condition, at least to some extent, where is the protection against adverse winds, storms and swells that would give to shipping and commerce that safety which a bay has always been regarded as supplying? That there was no protection from winds coming in directly from seaward, that is, from the sea toward the land, in the entire area between Point Dume and Point Vicente, was not controverted at the trial of the case now before us.

Historically speaking, it is true that the body of water between Point Dume and Point Vicente has been designated as a “bay”, but there is also creditable authority for the conclusion that the area in question is but an indentation of the shore line, or a bight, and consequently part of the high seas, and therefore without the territorial limits of the county of Los Angeles beyond the three-mile limit from the shore line. For example, the Encyclopedia Americana, volume 23, records the city of Monterey as being “on Monterey bay”; Oakland, California, “on the eastward side of San Francisco bay”; the city of San Francisco is characterized as being situated “between the Bay of San Francisco and the Pacific Ocean”; and the city of San Diego as being located “on San Diego bay”; while the cities of Santa Monica and Redondo Beach, which are located between Point Dume and Point Vicente, and with which area we are here concerned, are described as being “on the Pacific Ocean”, no reference being made to the existence of Santa Monica bay.

We have also referred to the discussion on the floor of the United States Senate on May 8, 9 and 12, 1896, when that body had under consideration a proposal to create a board of engineers for the purpose of selecting a proper location for a deep sea harbor at Santa Monica or San Pedro. During this senatorial discussion many master mariners who had sailed the Pacific ocean and who were familiar thereby with California coastal points were quoted with reference to the comparative advantages and disadvantages of the San Pedro and Santa Monica locations respectively. Among these quotations we find many of which the following are typical: “Santa Monica has a constant westerly swell, with very poor holding ground.” “Santa Monica has poor holding ground and but little shelter. I dragged my anchors in Santa Monica bay and was forced to go back to San Pedro bay for protection.” Another master mariner said, “In 1876 in Santa Monica bay I came near losing the schooner Hayes, a new vessel. Had all my lines out, and also many lines furnished by the company, and barely escaped destruction.” Another master mariner of long and varied experience on the Pacific coast said, “Santa Monica is an open ocean and no shelter. * Santa Monica is exposed to all quarters of the compass, and the undertow there is severe on the ship's ground tackle.” One of the senators from California, speaking on the resolution before the senate, said:

“You will observe upon the photograph of the Santa Monica shore, which is upon the background, the real character of that so-called bay. It is nothing but an open roadstead; there is a twelve-mile indentation, and it must be between thirty and forty miles from Vicente to Dume, and looking from the shore out to the ocean the exposure is absolute; the waves roll in, as appearing upon the photograph, comparatively uninterrupted. There is but slight evidence of an actual bay in this case. *”

Of particular interest are the expressions made to the Senate by Professor George Davidson who had charge of the Coast and Geodetic survey on the Pacific coast for forty years. He said: “During the hydrographic survey of Santa Monica Bay from Point Vicente to Point Dume by the coast survey, the officer commanding the surveying vessel reported that when at anchor in the vicinity of Santa Monica, with a strong westerly breeze blowing, and the inshore eddy current running to the northward along the shore, the vessel rode to the current, and her rolling in the swell falling directly on shore was so large and disagreeable that the vessel had to weigh anchor and seek a more comfortable berth.”

The United States Department of Commerce, in its rules adopted to prevent collisions of vessels, defines the boundary lines of the high seas. These rules designate certain harbors or bays as “inland waters”, and upon such waters the “inland rules of the road” prevail, while upon waters not within the lines prescribed in the aforesaid rules as “inland waters” the international rules applicable to vessels upon the high seas apply. On the Pacific ocean, so far as it adjoins the California coast line, only San Francisco harbor, San Pedro bay and San Diego harbor are designated as “inland waters”. Therefore it is at once manifest that the United States Department of Commerce regards the so-called Santa Monica bay, or that area between Point Dume and Point Vicente, as part of the high seas.

In the United States Coast Pilot (Pacific coast), issued by the Department of Commerce, we find the following significant language: “Anchorage, affording shelter from the severe northwesterly winds of summer, may be had in a number of places along the coast. In southeast and southwest weather there are few places where shelter may be had; San Diego bay, Los Angeles harbor, the lee side of the islands off the southern coast, and Monterey bay are the only places south of San Francisco bay *” (italics added); thereby eliminating the area with which we are here concerned, in the judgment of the United States Department of Commerce, as affording protection from certain severe winds.

It is also noteworthy that in the case of Muchenberger v. City of Santa Monica, 206 Cal. 635, 275 P. 803, 804, the trial court found that “the boundary of the city of Santa Monica on the west is a line three miles westerly of the line of the mean high tide of the Pacific Ocean”; and in speaking of the findings in this case the Supreme Court observed: “Not only does the evidence appear to support the findings, but the trial judge made a personal inspection of the water front, which we must assume further convinced him of the correctness of his views.”

From a consideration of the facts, it is obvious that whether such area, namely, so-called Santa Monica bay, should be regarded as a bay within the meaning of the Constitution and thus included within the territorial limits of the state, is a matter which can easily give rise to honest differences of opinion. In that connection it is significant that there has been no legislative action by which the body of water lying between Point Dume and Point Vicente ever was included within the territorial limits of the state of California or the county of Los Angeles, nor are we able to discover any legislative declaration or other official exercise of dominion by or through which this state assumed jurisdiction over the so-called Santa Monica bay waters beyond the three-mile limit. In this regard it is well to note that the Supreme Court in Ocean Industries, Inc., v. Superior Court, supra, places considerable stress upon the legislative action in connection with Monterey bay (page 244 of the decision, 252 P. page 725) when, after commenting upon the ambiguities of the Act of 1850 determining the boundaries of Monterey county, the court says:

“The state Legislature apparently had discovered this hiatus when it came to adopt the provisions of the Political Code in 1872, since, while it left the boundary of the county of Santa Cruz substantially unchanged on its oceanward side (Pol.Code, § 3952), it changed the boundary description of the county of Monterey so as to make it read: ‘Beginning in the Pacific Ocean at the southwest corner of Santa Cruz,’ etc., to the place of beginning. Pol.Code, § 3935. The entire bay of Monterey within its headlands and thence into the ocean for a distance of three nautical miles was thus, we think, definitely placed within the sovereignty of the state of California, and within the boundaries and jurisdiction respectively of the counties of Santa Cruz and Monterey.”

In thus determining the status of Monterey bay, the Supreme Court was merely interpreting an act of the legislative branch of the government by which dominion was asserted by the state over the waters of the bay which were placed within the boundaries of Monterey and Santa Cruz counties by section 3935 of the Political Code. In other words, the foregoing opinion of the Supreme Court determined that the boundaries of Monterey county as fixed by the Political Code section included Monterey bay. In the case of the Santa Monica area, there is an entire absence of such legislation. In fact, when adopting section 3927 of the Political Code, fixing the boundaries of the county of Los Angeles, it was provided that Los Angeles county is bounded on the west by the “state line of California”, and the westerly state line of California is declared in article 21 of our state Constitution to extend three English miles into the Pacific ocean, including also all islands, harbors and bays along and adjacent to the coast. But for courts, under the guise of judicial construction, to establish jurisdiction for the state over such a wide ocean area as Santa Monica bay, so-called, is, to say the least, of doubtful judicial propriety. It requires no stimulant to the imagination to contemplate possible events occurring within such area, the supervision and control of which could be more expeditiously, economically and successfully effected by the federal government, which may account for the failure of the legislative branch of the government to assume dominion over the area here in question. There are many and varied considerations, including that of sound public policy, involved in a matter such as this. And it should be emphasized that the rights and interests of the Federal government, of commerce, industry, navigation, fisheries, policing, and those connected therewith are all without representation in the proceeding now before us. And it is impossible in the instant proceeding to give consideration to either likely contingencies. In a legislative hearing, however, upon the question of fixing territorial limits of the state, each and all of these several interests, including the Federal government, could be represented and could participate.

The constitutional structure at which we as a nation have been nourished has separated and divided governmental functions into three branches—executive, judicial and legislative—each intradependent upon the other, it is true, like the sides of a triangle, but each independent, nevertheless, of the other, and each without authority to encroach upon the prerogatives of the other. In keeping with that governmental set-up, it is proper that in pending controversies of doubtful questions, such as fixing territorial limits and defining the boundary lines of political subdivisions which are undecided, they must be met by the political or legislative department of the government. As was said of such questions by the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which judicial circuit embraces the state of California, in the case of Whitelaw v. United States, 75 F. 513, 518, “They are beyond the sphere of judicial cognizance,” and “if a wrong has been done, the power of redress is with congress, not with the judiciary.” The duty of courts is to construe and give effect to the expression of the legislative will and not to usurp the power of the legislature under the guise of judicial decisions. The establishment of political boundaries rests primarily with the legislative and not the judicial branch of the government.

Respondent's contention that a reversal of this judgment would be “a judicial cession of a very valuable part of the state” cannot be upheld. No question of cession is here involved, for the reason that the state has not by any legislative or other enactment asserted dominion beyond the three-mile limit over the body of water here under consideration. When and where, as in the case at bar, the desirability, practicability, and necessity of including a certain area within the state boundaries is open to question, and the determination of that question obviously must be based on a consideration of many matters and principles which, from the very nature of things, a court in a single action cannot take into account, it is for the legislative and not the judicial branch of the government to decide that question in the first instance. So far as the area here under consideration is concerned, unless and until the legislature by affirmative action establishes a different boundary, the westerly territorial limit of the state must be held to be the Pacific ocean and extending therein three English miles. This being so, the trial court was without jurisdiction and the judgment is therefore void.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment and the order by which the defendant's motion for a new trial was denied are, and each of them is, reversed, and the cause remanded with directions to the court below to dismiss the indictment.

I dissent. The Constitution of the state of California has definitely fixed the western boundary of the state, and the legislature has declared the boundary of the county of Los Angeles on the west to be the said western boundary of the state between certain lines. The Constitution fixed the western boundary of California as extending into the Pacific ocean “three English miles; thence running in a northwesterly direction and following the direction of the Pacific Coast, to the forty-second degree of north latitude; *. Also all the islands, harbors, and bays along and adjacent to the coast.” Section 1, art. 12, Const. of 1849. The present Constitution has changed this last clause to read: “Also, including all the islands, harbors, and bays along and adjacent to the coast.” Section 1, art. 21, Const. of 1879. In 1827, before the boundary of the state of California had been fixed, it was commonly conceded that the bay of Santa Monica was a bay, and it should therefore be assumed that the legislature intended to include it within the westerly boundary of the county of Los Angeles, as it should also be assumed that the people of the state intended to include it within the westerly boundary of the state.

In the instant case, it was necessarily left to the determination of the court whether the crime charged was committed in the county of Los Angeles, and because the position of the vessel here in question was well within the headlands of the bay of Santa Monica, the trial court decided that such crime was committed within the said county.

It was the opinion of several of the justices of the Supreme Court in the case of Ex parte Keil, 85 Cal. 309, 24 P. 742, that the channel between Santa Catalina island and the mainland was wholly within the United States and, therefore, within the state of California. We do not have to determine whether or not the westerly boundary of the state extends to a point three English miles seaward from San Clemente and Santa Catalina islands (as I so believe), or whether it also extends in a line outside of and including the Santa Barbara islands and San Nicolas island. That question is not before this court, unless the court determines that Santa Monica bay is not one of the bays referred to in the Constitution, supra. However, we do have to determine whether or not the decision of the trial court that the ship in question was in the county of Los Angeles when it was located in the bay of Santa Monica is binding upon this court.

The various definitions of the word “bay” to which we have been referred bear out the fact that the physical and geographical position of the said vessel in Santa Monica bay was well within the confines of a “bay” indenting the coast line of the state of California. To say the least, it is an indentation in the shore line, and there is no authority for any limitation of either the width or depth of a bay, excepting only as limited by the definition of a “gulf”. That Santa Monica bay was for many years used as a harbor for ocean-going vessels cannot be disputed. All of the available coast and geodetic survey maps issued by the Department of Commerce of the United States delineating that portion of the westerly coast of California within Los Angeles county show the bay of Santa Monica and name it as such bay. The fact that the city of Santa Monica in defining its boundaries fixed its westerly boundary line as a line three miles westerly of the line of mean high tide of the Pacific ocean cannot affect the case before this court. It cannot be claimed that the city of Santa Monica can limit the westerly boundary of Los Angeles county as fixed by section 3927 of the Political Code. The same is true as to the limits of most fish and game districts to three miles from certain shores, because these districts do not have to include all of the state waters unless the legislature decides it best so to do.

As heretofore stated, it is not necessary for this court to fix or determine the extreme extent of the boundaries of either the state of California or the county of Los Angeles. They have heretofore been established by section 1 of article 21 of the Constitution and section 3927 of the Political Code. But, when it is alleged that a crime has been committed in Los Angeles county, and the question is thereafter raised on appeal from a conviction of said crime as to whether or not the acts complained of took place within the boundaries of Los Angeles county, it then becomes the duty of this court to determine whether or not such acts were committed within such boundaries in order to decide whether or not the trial court had jurisdiction to try the defendant for the commission of the alleged crime.

The crime here involved was committed practically in the center of Santa Monica bay, and miles within the headlands thereof. Therefore, in my opinion, it was committed within the boundaries of the county of Los Angeles, for the reason that it was committed in one of the bays included within the westerly boundary line of the state of California, as fixed by the constitution, which boundary line was followed by the legislature in fixing the westerly boundary line of Los Angeles county.

The historical authority for the belief that Santa Monica bay is a bay, as defined by the constitution, supra, can be gathered from hundreds of sources, only a few of which I will here refer to:

Quoting from Ingersoll's Century History of Santa Monica Bay Cities, at page 121: “The Bay of Santa Monica extends along the coast from Point Vicente, latitude 33° 40′, to Point Dume, latitude 34°, a distance of 17 miles north by west. The coast line of the bay makes an inward sweep which is some ten miles deep at its extreme point, in the neighborhood of Port Los Angeles, * (p. 122:) The first explorer of the California coast, Cabrillo, after spending six days in San Diego harbor which he named San Miguel, sailed along a ‘mountainous coast overhung with smoke’, landed at Catalina, to which he gave the name of Victoria, then anchored in a bay which he called ‘Bahia de Fumos' (Bay of Smoke), San Pedro Bay, and on October 9, 1542, he dropped anchor in an ‘ensenada’ or bight which is generally granted to have been Santa Monica Bay. *” (p. 124:) The name Santa Monica is legendary. Two Spanish soldiers on furlough came upon two sparkling springs near the ocean and after refreshing themselves with the water and while absorbed in viewing the scenery, “One of them said: ‘What shall we call this spot, brother?’ Straightway came the answer: ‘We will call it Santa Monica for the springs resemble the tears the good Saint Monica shed for her erring son.’ * Whether we accept the legend or not, the bay and the region were certainly named for the good Santa Monica whose day in the calendar was May 4th. The name does not seem to appear upon record until the petition for the grant known as San Vicente y Santa Monica was made by Don Francisco Sepulveda and Augustin Machado in 1827.”

Practically the same account appears in Charles Sumner Warren's History of Southern California, while a slightly different version of the so-called legend appears in the California Blue book for 1932 at page 520: “Tradition has it that a group of Spanish soldiers discovered two springs with water so pure and transparent that they were called ‘The tears of Santa Monica’ for the mother of Saint Augustine who grieved over her son's lack of faith in his youth. It is also said that Santa Monica (for ‘Saint Monica’) was named after the bay when a portion of the old San Vicente Rancho was purchased in 1875 for the purpose of laying out town lots.”

Quoting from Guinn's Historical and Biographical Record of Southern California, printed in 1902, at page 139: “The Los Angeles and Independence Railway Company was incorporated in January, 1875. The purpose of the company was to build a railroad beginning at Santa Monica and passing through Los Angeles and San Bernardino, and from there by way of Cajon Pass to Independence, Inyo county. * A long wharf was built at Santa Monica and ocean steamers stopped there for passengers and freight. * (p. 141:) Early in 1875, Senator John Percival Jones of Nevada, and Col. R.S. Baker subdivided a portion of the Rancho San Vicente lying on the mesa adjoining the Bay of Santa Monica. The town was named after the bay and on July 16, 1875, a great sale of lots was held at the townsite. * Santa Monica was becoming a shipping point of great importance. Then a financial blight struck the fortunes of Senator Jones. The railroad was sold to the Southern Pacific Railroad; the wharf was pulled down and the town fell into a decline. * (p. 143:) The Southern Pacific Company in 1891 built a long wharf in the bay of Santa Monica at Port Los Angeles.” With reference to this “long wharf”, Ingersoll (supra, at p. 200) says: “The Southern Pacific Wharf constructed at Port Los Angeles was completed July 14, 1893 and was 4,700 feet from the shore * and undoubtedly cost a million dollars.”

When the question of a free harbor came up, Collis P. Huntington, then the president of the Southern Pacific Company, used all his powerful influence in congress to secure an appropriation for the harbor at Port Los Angeles. During the first session of the 54th Congress, on May 8, 1896, Senator Stephen M. White of Los Angeles offered an amendment to the river and harbor appropriation bill in connection with the deep-water harbor at Port Los Angeles in Santa Monica bay, California, and talked upon the amendment for several days. The argument of Senator White was not as to whether Santa Monica bay was a bay or even a harbor, but only as to which of the two bays, Santa Monica or San Pedro, would make the better harbor; therefore, his argument can only be considered here as being directed to that question, although he repeatedly referred to Santa Monica bay as a bay, in his speech before the Senate more than twenty times. During this argument, there was presented for filing the report of the board of engineers of the United States army, countersigned by Brigadier–General Thomas Lincoln Casey, chief of engineers, with maps appended thereto, with reference to the proposed deep-sea harbor to be located at San Pedro bay or at Santa Monica bay. This report consists of twenty-five pages describing and comparing the two bays as to topography, hydrography and meteorological conditions, etc., in which report reference is made to “Santa Monica bay” at least thirty-five times. (U.S. House Executive Document No. 41, dated December 6, 1892.)

The fact that the constitution of this state in defining the westerly boundary of California uses the general term “running in a northwesterly direction and following the direction of the Pacific Coast”, and then provides, “Also, including all the islands, harbors, and bays along and adjacent to the coast”, would indicate that the People in adopting both of the constitutions hereinbefore referred to, must have intended to include within said boundary Santa Monica bay, and all of the bodies of water then known as bays, as well as all of the waters lying between the islands adjacent to the coast. It would be hypercritical to say that by this general term it was intended to indicate that only the contour line or the meander line of the coast of California should be exactly followed. The description of the westerly boundary of the State of California specifically mentions the islands of Santa Catalina and San Clemente. Section 3927, Pol.Code. It has since been finally determined that they are both islands along and adjacent to the coast and that they were part of the territory ceded by Mexico to the United States, and that therefore they were and are a part of the county of Los Angeles. Ex parte Keil, supra.

Therefore, when the Constitution was adopted by the People of the State of California, they must have had in mind the fact that Santa Monica bay was a bay; consequently, it was and is one of the bays referred to therein. This is true, even though some supertechnical definitions of a bay might not exactly define the bay of Santa Monica as a bay. Such intention is manifested by reason of the well-known characterization of Santa Monica bay as a bay, as far back as 1827. That it was a bay was never questioned, and when San Pedro bay became its rival for the location of a deep-sea harbor in the early nineteen hundreds, it was then only a question as to which bay was the better one upon which to spend many millions of dollars in landlocking a harbor for Los Angeles city. (All italics added.)

In my opinion, the judgment and order of the trial court appealed from should be affirmed.

WHITE, Justice.

I concur: DORAN, J.