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Orville Eugene GREENWELL, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. A.A. PIERCE, as Director, etc., Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Director of the Department of Motor Vehicles (director) appeals from a judgment granting plaintiff Orville Eugene Greenwell's petition for a peremptory writ of mandate. The writ commands the director to set aside an order of the Department of Motor Vehicles (department) suspending Greenwell's driver's license. The director contends that good cause exists to suspend Greenwell's license and that the department did not abuse its discretion in doing so. We agree and shall reverse the judgment.
Between June 23, 1983, and March 18, 1986, Greenwell accumulated eight traffic violation points under the point system set out in section 12810 of the Vehicle Code. (All statutory references to sections of an undesignated code are to the Vehicle Code.) As a result, the department notified Greenwell that his driver's license was suspended for six months.
Greenwell requested an administrative hearing. The hearing officer found that Greenwell was a negligent operator of a motor vehicle as defined in subdivision (a) of section 12810.5.1 Nonetheless, the department set aside the six-month suspension and placed Greenwell on probation for one year until June 19, 1987. Among the terms of probation Greenwell was required to “obey the provisions of the California Vehicle Code, all traffic regulations in this and other states, and remain free from traffic accident responsibility.” (Emphasis added.) Greenwell was advised of his right to seek judicial review of this action but he did not do so.2
On November 12, 1986, Greenwell was involved in a traffic accident. As a result, the department suspended his license for two months and extended his probation until November 11, 1987. Greenwell requested a hearing.
At the hearing Greenwell admitted he was responsible for the accident but maintained it was only a minor accident, involved no other vehicles, and resulted in minimal property damage. The hearing officer stated he was concerned with Greenwell's responsibility for the accident, not its relative severity. Based on Greenwell's admitted responsibility, the hearing officer upheld the department's suspension of his license. The department sustained the decision of the hearing officer on administrative review.
Greenwell petitioned the superior court for a writ of mandate ordering the department to set aside its order suspending his license. The court issued an alternative writ and a hearing was held. The trial court concluded the fact of the accident alone was not determinative and the department should have considered its seriousness. Judgment granting a peremptory writ of mandate was entered from which the director appeals.
The right to retain a driver's license is fundamental. In reviewing an administrative decision to suspend a driver's license, the trial court not only examines the record for errors of law, but also exercises its independent judgment on the evidence. (Berlinghieri v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1983) 33 Cal.3d 392, 398, 188 Cal.Rptr. 891, 657 P.2d 383; Smith v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 368, 373, 224 Cal.Rptr. 543.) When, as here, the facts are uncontradicted, the trial court's determination of their legal effect involves solely a question of law. In such cases appellate review of the trial court's ruling is an inquiry of law and the appellate court draws its own legal conclusions from the undisputed facts. (Swaby v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (1978) 85 Cal.App.3d 264, 269, 149 Cal.Rptr. 336, disapproved on other grounds in Pacific Legal Foundation v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (1981) 29 Cal.3d 101, 116, fn. 7, 172 Cal.Rptr. 194, 624 P.2d 244.)
Even though the right to retain a driver's license is fundamental, public safety demands regulation of drivers. Thus, the department is empowered to investigate to determine whether a licensee's right to drive should be suspended or revoked or whether terms and conditions of probation should be imposed. (§ 13800.)
“The suspension of a license because it has been established that the holder of the license is a negligent operator is supported by the same principles of public welfare as is the requirement for examination of operators before granting a license in the first instance. There is involved not the matter of the punishment of the operator, but the matter of the protection of the public from the dangers attendant upon unskillful or negligent operation of motor vehicles.” 3 (Johnson v. Depart. of Motor Vehicles (1960) 177 Cal.App.2d 440, 445, 2 Cal.Rptr. 235.)
The department has authority to terminate or modify an order of probation for “good cause.” (§ 14251.) Vehicle Code section 14252 provides: “The department upon receiving satisfactory evidence of a violation of any of the terms or conditions of probation imposed under this code, may withdraw the probationary license and order the suspension or revocation of the privilege to operate a motor vehicle.” The Department's discretion is very broad, though it may not act arbitrarily or capriciously, and its determination must be based upon the facts before it. (See People v. Angus (1980) 114 Cal.App.3d 973, 987, 171 Cal.Rptr. 5.)
A hearing to revoke or modify probation is a narrow inquiry focusing on whether the probationer violated the conditions of his probation and, if so, the portent of the violation upon future conduct. (See People v. Beaudrie (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 686, 691, 195 Cal.Rptr. 289.) The fact that Greenwell was at fault in a traffic accident is relevant to his future ability to exercise ordinary and reasonable care in operating a motor vehicle. Although the accident was a minor one, the department need not wait until Greenwell injures someone or causes substantial property damage to conclude that the hopes and expectations with which probation was extended have proved unfounded. Even a minor accident may reasonably indicate to the department that the probationer has not been rehabilitated as a driver and suspension of his license is required to protect the public safety.
Greenwell contends he was deprived of a fair hearing because the hearing officer did not consider how much he drives, his recent driving record, and the importance to him of a license to maintain his livelihood.
As to Greenwell's recent driving record, it was before the hearing officer when he considered modification of probation. Also the extent of his driving and the importance of a license to his livelihood were taken into consideration when Greenwell was placed on probation. Neither factor is relevant to his performance on probation.
We conclude that the department had good cause to modify the terms of probation by suspending Greenwell's license for a two-month period, and did not abuse its discretion in doing so. The trial court erred in finding to the contrary.
The judgment is reversed with directions to discharge the peremptory writ of mandate and enter judgment in favor of the director.
FOOTNOTES
1. Subdivision (a) of section 12810.5 provides: “Any person, including persons holding certificates pursuant to section 2512, 12517, 12519, 12519.5, 12521, 12523, 12804.1, or 12804.3 whose driving record shows a violation point count of four or more points in 12 months, six or more points in 24 months, or eight or more points in 36 months shall be prima facie presumed to be a negligent operator of a motor vehicle. In applying the provisions of this subdivision to a driver, the department shall give due consideration to the amount of use or mileage traveled in the operation of a motor vehicle.
2. In this proceeding Greenwell seeks to attack the department's determination that he is a negligent driver. That challenge is untimely and beyond the scope of this proceeding. (See People v. Hawkins (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 958, 968, 119 Cal.Rptr. 54.)
3. Both the department and Greenwell characterize the suspension of Greenwell's license as “punishment,” “discipline” and a “penalty.” However, as stated in Johnson, supra, 177 Cal.App.2d at p. 445, 2 Cal.Rptr. 235, the suspension of a negligent driver's license is not for the purpose of punishing the driver, but for the purpose of protecting the public.
PUGLIA, Presiding Justice.
BLEASE and MARLER, JJ., concur.
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Docket No: No. COO3015.
Decided: January 15, 1988
Court: Court of Appeal, Third District, California.
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