PEOPLE v. ONE HARLEY DAVIDSON MOTORCYCLE MOTOR NO 32VL1807 (1935)

This is an appeal from a judgment rendered in a proceeding commenced under section 15 of St. 1929, p. 388, as amended by chapter 253, p. 788, Statutes of 1933. A notice was filed with the county clerk of the city and county of San Francisco, July 19, 1934. Dudley Perkins filed an answer August 6, 1934. In that answer, among other things, he alleged that he was the conditional vendor of the motorcycle, as shown by a conditional sales contract, a copy of which he pleaded. Continuing he alleged that said contract was made in good faith after he had made a reasonable investigation of the responsibility, character and reputation of George Lee, the vendee named in said contract. He further alleged that said contract was made without any knowledge that the motor vehicle was to be used in the illegal transportation of any of the drugs named in section 1 of the statute. Having laid the foundation for the proof of the foregoing facts, Dudley Perkins alleged that the balance due him under his contract was equal to and in excess of the value of the motorcycle. The trial court rendered a judgment in favor of the defendant. As no findings are contained in the record we presume, in support of the judgment, that findings were waived. We must also presume that the court found all issues against the plaintiff. The plaintiff has appealed from the entire judgment. At this time the plaintiff contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the judgment. In that connection the plaintiff contends the evidence introduced at the trial did not show that before entering into the sales contract Dudley Perkins made a reasonable investigation of the responsibility, character, and reputation of George Lee. We think the point may not be sustained.

While the showing made by the claimant Dudley Perkins was not very convincing, we cannot say as a matter of law it was insufficient. As to what, in any given case, will amount to a reasonable investigation depends on the facts of that particular case. Such facts are addressed, in the first instance, to the trier of the facts. In the instant case they were addressed to the trial court. By its judgment it has made the implied finding that Dudley Perkins did make a reasonable investigation of the responsibility, character and reputation of his vendee. Unless we are prepared to say as a matter of law that such finding was an abuse of discretion we may not disturb the judgment. We are not at all inclined to state that in the instant case there was an abuse of discretion. The sale under attack covered a secondhand motorcycle of comparatively small value. The sale was made to a Chinese lad residing in “Chinatown” in San Francisco. The vendor required the vendee to execute the ordinary conditional sales contract on which were inserted the names of three apparently reputable Chinese business men and their addresses. Among them was one claimed by the vendee to be his employer. Before accepting the contract the vendor caused his assistant to go to the employer and verify the fact of the employment. Having done so the conditional sales contract was then executed. It is safe to say that many similar sales are made without the exercise of an equally reasonable degree of care.

The plaintiff contends: “That it was the intention of the legislature to require the investigation to be in reference to the purchaser's moral responsibility, character, and reputation is clearly shown by the type of statute in which the forfeiture provisions are contained.” (Plaintiff's italics.) The error in this contention rests in the confusion of two classes: (1) Vendors of narcotics, and (2) vendors of motor vehicles. The statute in its title and in all of its parts regulates the first class. It does not and, under article 4, section 24, of the Constitution, it could not also purport to regulate the second class.

It is again asserted that the trial court erred in ordering the motor vehicle returned to the conditional vendor instead of ordering the motor vehicle sold. In other words, it is claimed that the evidence was insufficient to support the return order. The evidence on the subject we think was entirely sufficient. The sales price was $224.45. Fifty dollars was paid down. The exact value of the machine was not testified to by anybody. It was a secondhand motorcycle. At times expert evidence is introduced to supplement the general information of the jury regarding values. Regarding those articles in general use that expert evidence is not absolutely necessary. The jury may take into consideration its general knowledge on the subject. In the instant case, although no jury was present, we think the trial court, sitting without a jury, was at liberty to follow the same practice. Cederberg v. Robison, 100 Cal. 93, 96, 97, 34 P. 625; Jones on Ev., §§ 363 and 387; 22 C. J. 573 and 585.

We find no error in the record.

The judgment is affirmed.

STURTEVANT, Justice.

We concur: NOURSE, P. J.; SPENCE, J.