CHAMBERS v. DUVALL ET AL (1944)

This is an action to quiet title. The plaintiff claims title to certain land in San Diego County by virtue of a tax deed issued to him on July 29, 1941, by the tax collector of San Diego County following a sale at public auction pursuant to the provisions of section 3476 of the Revenue and Taxation Code, St. 1939, p. 1325, which sale was held on July 2, 1941.

At the trial the plaintiff rested his entire case on this tax deed and produced no other evidence except in rebuttal to certain of the defendants' evidence on a point which is not material to this discussion. The Court found that the plaintiff was not the owner of this property; that his tax deed is void on its face and ineffective to vest title in him; that the amount expended by him for said tax title and in connection therewith was $124.78; that he was entitled to be reimbursed in this amount; and that said amount had been paid into court by the defendants for him. A judgment was thereupon entered decreeing that the plaintiff has no title to or interest in the property, and enjoining him from asserting any such title or interest. From this judgment the plaintiff has appealed.

It is well settled that a plaintiff may not recover in a quiet title action where his only evidence of title is a tax deed which is insufficient under the statutes by virtue of which it was issued. Swann v. Carson, 56 Cal.App.2d 502, 132 P.2d 863; Henderson v. De Turk, 164 Cal. 296, 128 P. 747; Carter v. Chevalier, 100 Cal.App. 567, 280 P. 706.

The appellant contends that the tax deed here in question substantially conforms to all requirements of law at the time it was issued and that it was prima facie evidence of the regularity and sufficiency of all prior proceedings.

While this deed was issued following a sale pursuant to the provisions of section 3476 of the Revenue and Taxation Code it follows the form provided in the old Political Code section 3785b and sets forth only the facts suggested by that form. Under former section 3786 of the Political Code a deed in that form was made primary evidence that the property had been sold as prescribed by law. Both of these sections of the Political Code were repealed as of February 1, 1941, before the sale here in question took place. Sec. 50002, Revenue and Taxation Code, St. 1939, p. 1373. At the time of this sale section 3479 of the Revenue and Taxation Code, St. 1939, p. 1325, provided for the execution of a deed following a sale held pursuant to section 3476 of that code, and section 3480 of that code, St. 1939, p. 1326, provided that such a deed, in addition to the usual provisions, should set forth certain specified facts. These requirements differed in a number of respects from those formerly applicable to such a deed when sections 3785b and 3786 of the Political Code were in effect.

One of the most important of these changes is that whereas formerly such a deed was not required to set forth any statement that the property had been sold to the state and the deed itself was primary evidence of such fact, section 3480 of the Revenue and Taxation Code requires such a deed to set forth “(a) The year of sale to the State.” This requirement necessarily includes the fact that the property has been sold to the state. Both the fact that a sale to the state has taken place and the date thereof are extremely important as affecting subsequent procedure in connection with tax delinquent property. Section 3481 of the Revenue and Taxation Code, St. 1939, p. 1326, then provides that a deed containing the recitals required by section 3480 is evidence of the same facts as a deed to the state. Not only is section 3481 not effective for this purpose unless the deed contains the recitals required by section 3480 but section 3513, St. 1939, p. 1326, covering a deed to the state, requires similar recitals and section 3517, St. 1939, p. 1327, makes a deed containing those recitals prima facie evidence that the property has been sold as prescribed by law.

The deed here in question contains no statement of the year the property was sold to the state and no statement of any kind to the effect that it had ever been sold to the state. On the other hand, following the form prescribed by section 3785b of the Political Code, it recited that this real property was duly assessed for taxation in the year 1935 to Jas. A. Duvall and that it was thereafter, on the second day of July, duly sold to L. C. Chambers by the tax collector for the nonpayment of delinquent taxes which had been legally levied in the year 1935 and were a lien upon said real property.

The change thus brought about by requiring the setting forth of the year of sale to the state in such a deed, in place of the former requirement, cannot be held to be an immaterial change, and it cannot be held that the setting forth of the fact that the property was assessed for taxation in a different year is a substantial compliance with the requirement that the year of sale to the state be set forth in the deed. It does not necessarily follow from the fact that property was assessed in a certain year that it was sold to the state the following year, or even that it was ever sold to the state, properly or otherwise. The legislature had the right and power to fix the conditions under which property deeded to the state for the nonpayment of taxes might be sold and conveyed to third parties. There are good reasons for requiring such a deed to recite the fact that the property was actually sold to the state and the year when this occurred. For example, this requirement might occasionally avoid an injustice by preventing a sale to third parties when, as a matter of fact, through some oversight the property had never been sold to the state. In the absence of such a recital in the deed, and under the law in force at the time this deed was issued, the fact that the property had been properly sold to the state cannot be presumed in favor of the validity of the deed. In effect, these statutes very specifically provided that instead of presuming a sale to the state from the issuance of such a deed that fact must be set forth in the deed itself. The deed here in question failed to conform to this requirement either substantially or at all, the appellant failed to meet the burden of proof resting upon him, and the trial court correctly held that the deed was ineffective to vest title to the property in him.

In a number of other respects the deed here in question failed to comply with the requirements of section 3480 of the Revenue and Taxation Code and failed to set out certain facts as there required. With respect to these other matters it is argued that the recitals contained in this deed were so similar to those required by that section as to constitute a substantial compliance therewith. Because of the importance we attach to the matter above discussed, we refrain from any detailed discussion of these variances although they emphasize the fact that the deed in question does not comply with the statutes in force at the time the deed was issued. It clearly appears, not only that an old form was used, but that no attempt was made to comply with the new statutes.

The appellant further contends that the law in force at the time the property was originally sold to the state governs the form of such a deed rather than the law in force at the time the property is sold to a third party, and that this deed was therefore entirely sufficient and proper. In support thereof, cases are cited in which it was held that the law existing at the time of the sale to the state regulated the right of redemption and affected certain proceedings dependent upon that sale. It may be observed that this general rule has been considerably modified, to say the least, by more recent decisions. Bray v. Jones, 20 Cal.2d 858, 129 P.2d 357; Campbell v. Woolner, 57 Cal.App.2d 511, 134 P.2d 822; Smith v. Addiego, 54 Cal.App.2d 230, 129 P.2d 953; Mercury Herald Co. v. Moore, 22 Cal.2d 269, 138 P.2d 673, 147 A.L.R. 1111. Moreover, we are here concerned with the rights of a third party who first enters the picture as the purchaser at an auction sale held by the state or on its behalf. The state may, and does, fix the conditions upon which such property will be thus sold and the purchaser must bid it in, if at all, upon the conditions fixed by the statutes. Insofar as this matter is concerned, the law in effect on July 2, 1941, when this sale was held, is controlling. At that time the only law in effect governing this matter was section 3480 and related sections of the Revenue and Taxation Code, and the deed in question fails to conform to the requirements then in force.

The respondents also contend that even if this tax deed were held sufficient as a prima facie showing of title, the proceedings upon which it was based were irregular and void for a number of reasons which are extensively argued. Under the views above expressed it is unnecessary to consider these other points.

The judgment is affirmed.

BARNARD, Presiding Justice.

MARKS and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur.