PEOPLE v. EASLEY (1988)

Following a jury trial, Charles Easley was convicted of burglary of an inhabited dwelling house (Pen.Code, § 459), with findings he had four prior convictions of a serious felony within the meaning of Penal Code section 667, subdivision (a).

He appeals and contends:  (1) The court committed reversible error by unduly restricting his right to voir dire prospective jurors as to racial bias or prejudice;

Appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence.   Therefore it will suffice to state that, between approximately 11:30 p.m. on February 16, 1986, and 2:40 a.m. on February 17, 1986, Yolanda Simmons' Los Angeles County residence was burglarized.   Ms. Simmons telephoned the police at approximately 2:45 a.m.

About a half hour later appellant was discovered by City of Los Angeles police officers two and a half blocks away walking on Manchester Boulevard carrying Ms. Simmon's fox jacket and several packages of frozen meat.   Appellant explained his possession of the jacket and meat by claiming to have found them lying near the sidewalk on Manchester Boulevard.   The police also discovered, in addition to the pair of socks appellant was wearing on his feet, a man's sock in his pocket and its twin down the street.   He claimed to have been using the sock in his pocket to keep his hand warm while carrying the defrosting meat.   He also told the officers he had been to a friend's and pointed back down Manchester Boulevard.   He did not disclose to the officers his friend's name and address.

The police found most of the property removed from Ms. Simmons' residence strewn about on the ground in Ms. Simmons' backyard and the backyard of a neighbor about four doors away in the direction of Manchester Boulevard.   A diamond watch worth $3,000 and a diamond and ruby bracelet worth $2,000 were never recovered.

In defense, appellant claimed he did not burglarize the residence and asserted his friend Paul Mitchell had given him a ride to see Cindy Williams who lived on Truxton Avenue near Manchester Boulevard.   He claimed when Mitchell dropped him off, Ms. Williams was not at home and, while he was walking home from Williams' residence, he found the fox jacket and the meat abandoned near the sidewalk on Manchester Boulevard.   He took the socks off his feet and used them to protect his hands from the cold as he carried the frozen meat.

Paul Mitchell corroborated appellant's testimony insofar as he testified he dropped appellant off to visit a friend between 2:00 and 2:30 a.m. that morning near Sepulveda and Manchester Boulevards.

RESTRICTION OF VOIR DIRE

The contention the court committed reversible error by unduly restricting appellant's right to voir dire prospective jurors as to racial bias or prejudice is unavailing.

During voir dire of the jury, defense asked one of the prospective jurors these three questions:  (1) “Why do you think there are so few black professional golfers?”  (2) “Why do you feel there are so few black presidents of large corporations?” and (3) “Why has there never been a black governor of California?”   The court refused to permit counsel to so question the juror and then, after the third question, ordered counsel to discontinue that line of questioning.   Defense counsel told the court the decision in the Wells case (People v. Wells (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 721, 197 Cal.Rptr. 163) allowed him such inquiry and the court repeated its order counsel discontinue the line of questioning.

Later in relation to a Wheeler motion made by appellant (People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748), the court commented that at least three members of the jury were minorities and at least three members of the jury were from the “black community.” ¹

 The decision in People v. Williams (1981) 29 Cal.3d 392, 174 Cal.Rptr. 317, 628 P.2d 869, sets forth the standard of review for complaints the trial court impermissively restricted voir dire.   Counsel is allowed to ask questions reasonably designed to assist in the intelligent exercise of peremptory challenges.   However, the trial court has considerable discretion to contain voir dire within reasonable limits.   Trial courts “need not and should not permit the inordinately extensive and unfocused questioning ․ [but] ․ counsel should at least be allowed to inquire into ‘matters concerning which either the local community or the population at large is commonly known to harbor strong feelings that may stop short of presumptive bias in law yet significantly skew deliberations in fact.’  (Citation omitted.)”  (Id. at p. 408, 174 Cal.Rptr. 317, 628 P.2d 869.)

Appellant asserts the court should follow the decision in People v. Wells, supra, 149 Cal.App.3d 721, 723–727, 197 Cal.Rptr. 163, and reverse his conviction.   In Wells, a black defendant was charged with kidnapping and killing a white woman.   The trial court prevented defense counsel from asking three questions of the prospective jurors.   The proposed questions in Wells were almost identical to those posed here.

The Wells opinion cited with approval People v. Williams, supra, 29 Cal.3d 392, 174 Cal.Rptr. 317, 628 P.2d 869, as follows:  “The Williams court left intact ‘the considerable discretion of the trial court to contain voir dire within reasonable limits.’   The Williams court noted that ‘the court need allow only reasonable questions—although it cannot exclude questions proper in scope, it is free to require that they be phrased in neutral, nonargumentative form.   On the other hand, a question fairly phrased and legitimately directed at obtaining knowledge for the intelligent exercise of peremptory challenges may not be excluded merely because of its additional tendency to indoctrinate or educate the jury.’ ”  (People v. Wells, supra, 149 Cal.App.3d at p. 726, 197 Cal.Rptr. 163;  original italics.)

Although the Wells opinion recognizes the “considerable discretion” of the trial court in containing voir dire it nevertheless ruled the trial court had abused its discretion in precluding the three questions.   We must respectfully disagree.   We believe a trial court could find such questions unreasonable.   Reasons why so few minorities might or might not have advanced in specified professions does not necessarily inquire into the “background and attitude of the jurors” and the questions can lead to speculative, even argumentative responses that could be disruptive in the voir dire process while not determining a prospective juror's attitude regarding racial prejudice.

 A trial court abuses its discretion by refusing to allow an inquiry which bears a substantial likelihood of uncovering jury bias.   Appellant is not entitled to a reversal unless he can establish the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow a proposed question during voir dire and the abuse of discretion results in prejudice, or unless he can show he has been denied his constitutional right to secure an impartial jury.  (Ristaino v. Ross (1976) 424 U.S. 589, 595, 96 S.Ct. 1017, 1021, 47 L.Ed.2d 258;  People v. Williams, supra, at p. 412, 174 Cal.Rptr. 317, 628 P.2d 869.)   The Wells decision has the effect of undermining the “considerable discretion” vested in the trial court “to contain voir dire within reasonable limits” (People v. Williams, supra, 29 Cal.3d, at p. 408, 174 Cal.Rptr. 317, 628 P.2d 869) in that it requires the court to permit defense counsel to ask the three questions presented here or risk a reversal, regardless of whether or not counsel establishes racial prejudice is relevant to the issues in the case.

 We find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in refusing to permit appellant the right to ask the three inquiries in question.

The judgment is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

FOOTNOTE.  

1.   The record discloses appellant is a black man.   The record does not disclose the race of the victim.

HASTINGS,*** Associate Justice. FN*** Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal serving as a senior judge by order of the Chairperson of the Judicial Council.

ASHBY, Acting P.J., and BOREN, J., concur.