CADWELL v. ANSCHUTZ (1935)

In this case the appellant makes two contentions: First, that as a matter of law the defendant was not guilty of negligence; second, that as a matter of law the plaintiff was guilty of negligence which contributed to her injuries.

An accident occurred at a time when the parties were driving their respective automobiles north from San Juan Capistrano on a public highway. The plaintiff was overtaking and attempting to pass the defendant's car while they were going at a speed of 30 or 35 miles per hour. The plaintiff saw a car coming from the opposite direction and attempted to get back into her former place in the line of traffic. At the same time the defendant turned his wheel so that his car would come closer to the center of the highway. There was a collision between the plaintiff's front right wheel and the defendant's left rear wheel.

It would serve no useful purpose to recite all the facts and circumstances in evidence, especially at this time when brevity in opinions is demanded as a cardinal virtue second only to clearness. Negligence becomes a question of law only where the facts are undisputed, and even then only where on those facts reasonable minds can draw but one conclusion.

In some details the evidence is conflicting. The circumstances demanded reciprocal duties on the part of both drivers. Both were guilty of negligence, in that they failed to comply with certain provisions of the California Vehicle Act (St. 1923, p. 517, as amended). In the trial court a jury found that the defendant was guilty of negligence proximately causing the injuries, and that the plaintiff was not guilty of negligence which contributed to her injuries. We are not inclined to say under all the facts and circumstances in evidence that as a question of law the defendant's negligence was not the proximate cause of the injury, and that as a matter of law the plaintiff was guilty of negligence which contributed thereto.

Judgment affirmed.

CRAIL, Justice.

We concur: STEPHENS, P. J.; WILLIS, Justice pro tem.