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Mellet STANGVIK, et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. SHILEY INCORPORATED, et al., Defendants and Respondents.
Jenny Mikaela Marie Therese Birgitta KARLSSON, et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. SHILEY INCORPORATED, et al., Defendants and Respondents.
OPINION
This is an appeal from a decision of the superior court granting the motions of defendants, Shiley Incorporated and Pfizer, Inc., to stay product liability/wrongful death actions under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. The actions below were brought by Swedish and Norwegian plaintiffs (“Appellants”) who allege their decedents were killed as a result of the failure of artificial heart valves manufactured in California by Shiley and Pfizer.
In January 1988, the trial court initially denied the motions based on Corrigan v. Bjork Shiley Corp. (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 166, 227 Cal.Rptr. 247. However, in the first appeal to this court, we disagreed with Corrigan and other appellate authority which followed a similar analysis, and directed the trial court to reconsider the motions to stay on appropriate terms and conditions. Thereafter, the court granted appellants' request to engage in discovery on inconvenient forum issues. Following discovery, and after extensive briefing and argument by counsel, the court issued a new order staying the actions subject to seven specified conditions.
Appellants contend the trial court erred by (1) holding that this court's prior opinion was the law of the case; (2) failing to follow this court's directive that it decide the motions pursuant to the approach adopted by the United States Supreme Court; and (3) abusing its discretion in finding California was an inconvenient forum.
I
Appellants are residents of Sweden and Norway who filed products liability/wrongful death actions against Shiley and Pfizer in the Orange County Superior Court. Shiley, a California corporation, and Pfizer, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in New York, manufacture heart valves for worldwide distribution. Two valves were sold in Scandinavia and implanted in two patients, one Swedish and the other Norwegian. After receiving treatment only in their home countries, the valves failed and both died in 1986. Appellants, the decedents' surviving heirs, retained California counsel, filed complaints alleging the valves were defective, and sought damages based on negligence, strict liability, breach of warranty, fraud, and loss of consortium. Karlsson's heirs also sought recovery based on negligent infliction of emotional distress.
Shiley and Pfizer moved to dismiss or stay the actions on the ground of forum non conveniens pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 410.30.1 They contended the matters should be pursued in Sweden and Norway, where appellants resided, the valves were marketed, decedents' medical care was provided, alleged fraudulent misrepresentations were made, and much pertinent evidence existed, including evidence of health care provision and the decedents' employment histories.
Shiley and Pfizer provided evidence from Scandinavian counsel concerning appellants' legal rights in their home countries. Appellants also retained Norwegian and Swedish attorneys, who submitted counter-declarations disputing the assertions of Shiley's and Pfizer's experts on the applicable law and available remedies.
The evidence indicated Norwegian and Swedish law would be applied in the respective forums, and that each forum might permit recovery under strict liability. The evidence conflicted as to whether recovery would be permitted on a fraud theory. Although punitive damages are not available in either jurisdiction, in Norway special damages are occasionally permitted upon proof of gross negligence or intent by the defendant. There was no indication plaintiffs' actions would be barred by any statute of limitations in either forum. Shiley and Pfizer offered to stipulate to submit to the jurisdiction of the appropriate forums, to comply with all discovery orders of the foreign court, to make up to ten employees designated by appellants available to testify at no cost to appellants, to exercise their best efforts to make key employees, whether past or present, reasonably available to testify in the foreign court, and to satisfy any judgments entered against them.
The motions were heard on January 8, 1988. The trial judge found the argument of Shiley and Pfizer persuasive, but said he was compelled to deny the motions under Corrigan v. Bjork Shiley Corp., supra, 182 Cal.App.3d 166, 227 Cal.Rptr. 247. Shiley and Pfizer petitioned this court for extraordinary relief, and we issued preemptory writs and directed the trial court to reconsider the motions in light of the opinion. As noted, prior to the rehearing the trial court permitted the parties to engage in additional discovery. That discovery confirmed that the most substantial evidence and important categories of witnesses were located in Scandinavia. For example, virtually all witnesses concerning the decedents' medical care and treatment, medical histories and loss of earnings, and witnesses to the familial impact of their deaths, are located in Scandinavia. Important documentary evidence concerning the decedents' medical histories and loss of earnings is also located there.
At the rehearing, appellants challenged the sufficiency of that evidence with newly-discovered facts: First, they claimed they had discovered there are over one million relevant documents and hundreds of important witnesses in California. Second, they asserted they had produced written commitments from each Scandinavian witness ensuring his or her availability to testify at a trial held in California. Third, they contended potential third-party liability of Scandinavians is no longer an issue in these cases.
Shiley and Pfizer produced the declarations of Swedish and Norwegian counsel indicating appellants can pursue the actions, without prolonged delay, in their home countries. This evidence contradicted testimony presented by appellants that Scandinavian tort law provides a less favorable forum and less appropriate remedies. Moreover, appellants challenged the sufficiency of their own legal system, noting the absence of contingent legal fees, the lack of original jurisdiction over other potential defendants and/or American component parts manufacturers, the need to translate documents into Swedish and Norwegian, and the alleged difficulty of enforcing a Scandinavian judgment in the United States. They contended litigating the cases in their own countries would present a financial hardship. However, Shiley and Pfizer produced evidence that Swedish and Norwegian courts routinely receive English-language documents into evidence without requiring translation. And, there was no credible evidence to support appellant's contention they would require the translation of more than one million documents to prove their cases.
After rehearing the motions, the court issued a statement of intended ruling ordering the actions stayed, subject to an “unconditional” agreement by Shiley and Pfizer to seven conditions: (1) Submission to jurisdiction in Sweden and Norway; (2) compliance with discovery orders of the Scandinavian court; (3) agreement to make past and present employees reasonably available to testify in Sweden and Norway at defendants' cost if so ordered within the discretion of the Scandinavian courts; (4) tolling of the statute of limitations during the pendency of the actions in California; (5) agreement to make documents in their possession in the United States available for inspection in Sweden and Norway, as required by Scandinavian law, at defendants' expense; (6) agreement that depositions in the United States might proceed under section 2029; and (7) agreement to pay any final judgments rendered in the Scandinavian actions. The court also retained jurisdiction to make such further orders as might become appropriate.
The court noted it reached its own conclusion as to the applicable facts, and did not interpret any part of this court's prior opinion to constitute findings of fact. In addition, the court indicated it weighed each of the factors presented by the evidence and argument, but that “[n]o factor has been given extraordinary significance over others․” The court found California was an inconvenient forum and that Sweden and Norway were adequate alternative forums for the resolution of the matters.
Shiley and Pfizer filed unconditional acceptances of the seven specified conditions. Appellants' request for a statement of decision was denied, and this appeal followed.
II
Initially, appellants contend the trial court erred in concluding this court's prior opinion constituted the law of the case. They argue the Supreme Court's depublication of our prior opinion rendered it “effectively vacated,” because “[a] depublication order establishes that the Supreme Court found the opinion erroneous, or to contain misstatements of law or poor legal reasoning.” The argument is contrary to the law.
California Rules of Court, rule 977(b)(1) provides that an unpublished opinion may be cited or relied upon “when the opinion is relevant under the doctrine[ ] of law of the case․” Thus, the fact that the Supreme Court depublished our prior opinion does not affect the status of the decision as the law of the case. (See People v. Rivera (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 494, 495, 203 Cal.Rptr. 722; Jutkowitz v. Bourns, Inc. (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 102, 106, 173 Cal.Rptr. 248.) This rule is also supported by the principal authorities relied upon by appellants. As former Justice Grodin has written, “[t]he only consequence of a depublication order is that the opinion is not published in the Official Reports, and is therefore not citable as precedent. [Fn. omitted.]” (Grodin, The Depublication Practice of the California Supreme Court (1984) 72 Cal.L.Rev. 514, 522–523; see also Note, Decertification of Appellate Opinions: The Need for Articulated Judicial Reasoning and Certain Precedent in California Law (1977) 50 So.Cal.L.Rev. 1181, 1186 [“Once decertified, the opinion becomes, in effect, an unpublished opinion, dispositive of the matter but, under rule 977, not citable in other legal proceedings.”] (Emphasis added).)
Appellants' reliance upon England v. Hospital of Good Samaritan (1939) 14 Cal.2d 791, 97 P.2d 813 and People v. Terry (1964) 61 Cal.2d 137, 37 Cal.Rptr. 605, 390 P.2d 381 is misplaced. As England and Terry note, a court is not absolutely precluded by the law of the case from reconsidering questions decided by an appellate court, where there are “exceptional circumstances,” such as an intervening change in the law. (England v. Hospital of Good Samaritan, supra, 14 Cal.2d at p. 795, 97 P.2d 813; People v. Terry, supra, 61 Cal.2d at p. 151, fn. 9, 37 Cal.Rptr. 605, 390 P.2d 381.) However, no such exceptional circumstances exist here.
To depart from the law of the case, there must be more than a disagreement with a prior appellate determination, and the trial court was not free to disregard this court's prior opinion. (See Clemente v. State of California (1985) 40 Cal.3d 202, 212, 219 Cal.Rptr. 445, 707 P.2d 818; People v. Shuey (1975) 13 Cal.3d 835, 841, 120 Cal.Rptr. 83, 533 P.2d 211; People v. Brown (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 957, 963, 238 Cal.Rptr. 697.)
III
Appellants contend the trial court committed reversible error by applying an improper standard in deciding the motions to stay or dismiss for forum non conveniens. We disagree.
California's forum non conveniens doctrine was established by judicial decision based on federal case law. (Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno (1981) 454 U.S. 235, 248, fn. 13, 102 S.Ct. 252, 262, fn. 13, 70 L.Ed.2d 419; Price v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co. (1954) 42 Cal.2d 577, 580–583, 268 P.2d 457.) Subsequently, it was codified in section 410.30, subdivision (a): “[W]hen a court upon motion of a party or itsown motion finds that in the interest of substantial justice an action should be heard in a forum outside this state, the court shall stay or dismiss the action in whole or in part on any conditions that may be just.”
The purpose of the forum non conveniens doctrine is to permit the court to determine the most convenient forum for the trial of a lawsuit: “The principle of forum non conveniens is simply that a court may resist imposition upon its jurisdiction even when jurisdiction is authorized by the letter of a general venue statute․” (Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert (1947) 330 U.S. 501, 507, 67 S.Ct. 839, 842, 91 L.Ed. 1055.) A variety of factors have been identified to assist the court in its consideration of whether to apply the doctrine. (Id. at pp. 508–509, 67 S.Ct. at p. 843; Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Superior Court (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 105, 112–115, 90 Cal.Rptr. 461.) However, to assure the doctrine's underlying goal of determining the most convenient forum is achieved, two corollary principles have been established: First, the application of relevant factors must remain flexible; it is inappropriate to either identify instances where the doctrine always does or does not apply, or to give undue emphasis to any one factor. (See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, supra, 454 U.S. at pp. 249–250, 102 S.Ct. at pp. 262–263; Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Manatt, Phelps, Rothenberg & Tunney (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 1424, 1435–1436, 249 Cal.Rptr. 559.) Second, substantial deference must be accorded to the trial court's exercise of its discretion in deciding a motion to stay or dismiss for forum non conveniens. (Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, supra, 454 U.S. at p. 257, 102 S.Ct. at pp. 266–267; Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Manatt, Phelps, Rothenberg & Tunney, supra, 202 Cal.App.3d at p. 1436, 249 Cal.Rptr. 559.)
The trial court recognized this court's prior opinion was based, in large part, upon the leading federal authority on forum non conveniens, Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, supra, 454 U.S. 235, 102 S.Ct. 252. In Piper, Scottish heirs sued American aircraft and propeller manufacturers in the United States for damages for the wrongful deaths of Scottish victims of a plane crash in Scotland. The defendants moved to dismiss the action on forum non conveniens grounds. The United States District Court granted the motion, but the court of appeals reversed, basing its decision to reverse on two alternative grounds: First, the court held the plaintiffs' choice of forum deserved substantial weight, even though they were foreign citizens. Second, it held that a forum non conveniens dismissal is never appropriate where the law of the alternative forum is less favorable to the plaintiff. (Id. at p. 243, 102 S.Ct. at p. 259.) The United States Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, reinstated the district court's ruling, and held that a foreign plaintiff's choice of forum is entitled to less deferrence than that of a resident plaintiff (Id. at pp. 255–256, 102 S.Ct. at pp. 265–266) and that “[t]he possibility of a change in substantive law should ordinarily not be given conclusive or even substantial weight in the forum non conveniens inquiry.” (Id. at p. 247, 102 S.Ct. at p. 261.)
Under Piper, a local plaintiff's choice of his or her home forum is presumed reasonable and convenient. However the presumption does not exist for a foreign plaintiff. To hold otherwise would reduce the doctrine of forum non conveniens to a “guarantee that the plaintiff would be able to select the law that will govern the case.” (Id. at p. 256, fn. 24, 102 S.Ct. at p. 266, fn. 24.) Moreover, the court cautioned against permitting foreign plaintiffs to proceed with litigation in the United States simply because a more favorable recovery was likely. It held such a rule would be detrimental to our judicial system: “The American courts, which are already extremely attractive to foreign plaintiffs, would become even more attractive. The flow of litigation into the United States would increase and further congest already crowded courts.” (Id. at p. 252, 102 S.Ct. at p. 264.)
As to the possible change in substantive law, the Piper court reasoned that if undue weight was placed on the respective merits or demerits of the substantive law to be applied, the inconvenience factor would generally be overriden by a choice of forum offering the plaintiff greater potential recovery. (Id. at pp. 249–250, 102 S.Ct. at pp. 262–263.) Not only would the judiciary's flexibility in these matters be reduced, but courts would be forced to engage in an onerous choice of law analysis, and the decision to proceed or dismiss would turn not on the issue of convenience, but on speculation as to the quality and quantity of the remedies available in a given forum. (Id. at p. 251, 102 S.Ct. at p. 263.) Nevertheless, the court noted the choice of law factor could be considered “if the remedy provided by the alternative forum is so clearly inadequate or unsatisfactory that it is no remedy at all․” (Id. at p. 254, 102 S.Ct. at p. 265.) While the court recognized the legitimate concern of United States citizens to ensure the safety of products and the “additional deterrence [that] might be obtained if [the defendants] were tried in the United States ․” (id. at p. 260, 102 S.Ct. at p. 268), this deterrence factor should not be overstated. “[T]he incremental deterrence that would be gained ․ in an American court is likely to be insignificant.” The American interest must be sufficient “to justify the enormous commitment of judicial time and resources that would inevitably be required if the case were to be tried here.” (Id. at pp. 260–261, 102 S.Ct. at pp. 268–269.)
The court then analyzed the remaining “public and private interest factors,” and concluded the district court's application of them to the facts was reasonable. (Id. at pp. 257–261, 102 S.Ct. at pp. 266–269.) Private interest factors include: (1) relative ease of access to sources of proof; (2) availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling witnesses and the cost of obtaining willing witnesses; (3) possibility of viewing the premises, if appropriate; and, in general, (4) all other practical problems that make trial easy, expeditious and inexpensive. (Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert (1947) 330 U.S. 501, 508, 67 S.Ct. 839, 843, 91 L.Ed. 1055.) Public interest factors include: (1) avoiding added administrative difficulties of courts with congested calendars; (2) avoiding the imposition of jury duty upon people of a community who have no relationship to the litigation; (3) promoting the interest in having localized controversies decided at home; and (4) avoiding conflict of laws problems and ensuring that a case is tried by a court that is at home with the governing law. (Id. at pp. 508–509, 67 S.Ct. at p. 843.) The list is not exhaustive, however, and each case must turn on its facts. (Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, supra, 454 U.S. at pp. 249–250, 102 S.Ct. at pp. 262–263.)
In Piper, the private interests included the relative ease of access to sources of proof and the ability to implead third parties. The Supreme Court held the evidence supported the district court's finding that those factors justified dismissal of the action. (Id. at pp. 257–259, 102 S.Ct. at pp. 266–268.) Discussing public interest factors, such as which forum's law would apply to the action and the relative strength of each forum's interest in the litigation, the court noted it did not matter which law would be applied because all other public interest factors favored trial in Scotland. (Id. at p. 260, 102 S.Ct. at p. 268.) The court noted a preference for “having localized controversies decided at home” (Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, supra, 330 U.S. at p. 509, 67 S.Ct. at p. 843), and acknowledged Scotland's “very strong interest” in the litigation. The only American factor was that of deterrence of the manufacture of defective products. (Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, supra, 454 U.S. at p. 260, 102 S.Ct. at p. 268.) However, that interest was “simply not sufficient to justify the enormous commitment of judicial time and resources that would inevitably be required if the case were to be tried here.” (Id. at p. 261, 102 S.Ct. at p. 268.)
The Piper analysis represents a thoughtful attempt to strike a balance between conflicting policy interests of various jurisdictions and the need to fairly apportion limited judicial resources. It does not attempt to promote one forum over another based upon a perceived superiority of one forum's tort law or available remedies. Moreover, we reemphasize that a foreign plaintiff's choice of forum is not entitled to great deference. (Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, supra, 454 U.S. at pp. 255–256, 102 S.Ct. at pp. 265–266; see also Archibald v. Cinerama Hotels (1976) 15 Cal.3d 853, 860, 126 Cal.Rptr. 811, 544 P.2d 947; In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster (2d Cir.1987) 809 F.2d 195, 202; Bergquist v. Medtronic, Inc. (Minn.1986) 379 N.W.2d 508, 513; Nai–Chao v. Boeing Co. (N.D.Cal.1982) 555 F.Supp. 9, 14.)
Shiley and Pfizer, as the moving party, bore the burden of proof. However, appellants' claim that “Piper held that dismissal is a ‘drastic measure’ available only where the plaintiffs' choice of forum imposes a heavy burden on the defendant or the court ․,” is not true. Piper never referred to a forum non conveniens dismissal as a “drastic remedy.” As for the “heavy burden,” the court merely noted that “dismissal will ordinarily be appropriate where trial in the plaintiff's chosen forum imposes a heavy burden on the defendant or the court, and where the plaintiff is unable to offer any specific reasons of convenience supporting his choice.” (Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, supra, 454 U.S. at p. 249, 102 S.Ct. at p. 262.) Piper declined to “lay down a rigid rule to govern discretion, and ․ ‘[e]ach case turns on its facts.’ If central emphasis were placed on any one factor, the forum non conveniens doctrine would lose much of the very flexibility that makes it so valuable.” (Id. at pp. 249–250, 102 S.Ct. at pp. 262–263.)
Nevertheless, certain courts in this state have rejected the Piper analysis. (See, e.g., Corrigan v. Bjork Shiley Corp., supra, 182 Cal.App.3d 166, 227 Cal.Rptr. 247; Holmes v. Syntex Laboratories, Inc. (1984) 156 Cal.App.3d 372, 202 Cal.Rptr. 773.) For reasons we now discuss, we disagree with those decisions.
IV
In Holmes v. Syntex Laboratories, Inc., supra, 156 Cal.App.3d 372, 202 Cal.Rptr. 773, British plaintiffs sued in California for injuries resulting from oral contraceptives manufactured by a Delaware corporation which had its principal place of business in California. The lower court dismissed the actions on forum non conveniens grounds, but the Court of Appeal reversed. The Holmes court decided two factors were to be given great deferrence in the analytical process under California law: the plaintiff's choice of forum and the availability of a suitable alternative forum. (Id. at pp. 378–382, 202 Cal.Rptr. 773.) Viewing Piper as a departure from California law on these “two crucial points,” the Holmes court refused to follow it. (Id. at p. 382, 202 Cal.Rptr. 773.) It found the British forum unsuitable because British law did not recognize a cause of action for strict products liability, and its negligence law in this area was inadequate. (Id. at pp. 384–387, 202 Cal.Rptr. 773.)
However, Holmes 's conclusion as to the weight to be given a foreign plaintiff's choice of forum is suspect in light of Archibald v. Cinerama Hotels, supra, 15 Cal.3d 853, 126 Cal.Rptr. 811, 544 P.2d 947, an opinion Holmes cites but does not attempt to reconcile or distinguish. In Archibald, the California Supreme Court noted a foreign plaintiff's choice of forum is not entitled to particular deference in deciding whether to dismiss an action on forum non conveniens grounds. (Id. at p. 859, fn. 6, 126 Cal.Rptr. 811, 544 P.2d 947.)
In analyzing the availability of a suitable alternative forum, Holmes focused on the choice of law issue. (Holmes v. Syntex Laboratories, Inc., supra, 156 Cal.App.3d at pp. 383–387, 202 Cal.Rptr. 773.) The court relied upon several other Court of Appeal decisions in support of its conclusion on the suitability issue. (See e.g., Dendy v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc. (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 457, 187 Cal.Rptr. 95; Hemmelgarn v. Boeing Co. (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 576, 165 Cal.Rptr. 190; International Harvester Co. v. Superior Court (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 652, 157 Cal.Rptr. 324; Brown v. Clorox Co. (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 306, 128 Cal.Rptr. 385; Chavarria v. Superior Court (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 1073, 115 Cal.Rptr. 549; Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Superior Court, supra, 12 Cal.App.3d 105, 90 Cal.Rptr. 461.) The reliance is unpersuasive, however, because each of the cases, except Dendy, predates Piper. And, apart from Brown (see fn. 5, infra ), all are more consistent with Piper than with Holmes.2
Two years later, Holmes was followed by Corrigan v. Bjork Shiley Corp., supra, 182 Cal.App.3d 166, 227 Cal.Rptr. 247, a case which is virtually indistinguishable from the present appeal. In Corrigan, Australian plaintiffs sued Shiley in California for wrongful death, allegedly caused by a defective heart valve after surgery performed by Australian doctors in an Australian hospital. Plaintiffs asserted causes of action for products liability, negligence, strict liability and breach of warranty. (Id. at p. 171, 227 Cal.Rptr. 247.) Shiley's forum non conveniens motion to stay the action was granted by the trial court, but the Court of Appeal reversed.
Like Holmes, the Corrigan court focused on the two factors emphasized in the Judicial Council's comment to section 410.30. However, the comment was written prior to Piper and Archibald. Moreover, Corrigan itself recognized that a foreign plaintiff's choice of forum is not entitled to the deference accorded a resident and that a foreign plaintiff's choice “cannot dominate our decision.” (Ibid.)
Corrigan then focused on the Judicial Council's comment that dismissal of a California lawsuit should not be ordered unless the plaintiff has “ ‘a “suitable” alternative forum.’ ” (Corrigan v. Bjork Shiley Corp., supra, 182 Cal.App.3d at p. 176, 227 Cal.Rptr. 247.) On this issue, Corrigan emphasized the choice of law question and the defendant's relationship with California. It resolved the latter issue in favor of the plaintiffs, simply because Shiley was incorporated in California and manufactured the allegedly defective product here. (Id. at pp. 180–182, 227 Cal.Rptr. 247.) However, effective September 22, 1986, only months after Corrigan appeared, the Legislature amended section 410.30 in an emergency measure to add, “[t]he domicile or residence in this state of any party to the action shall not preclude the court from staying or dismissing the action.” 3 Thus, a defendant's choice to incorporate or do business in California, without more, is no longer a significant factor in the balancing process.4 The plain meaning of the 1986 amendment was to reverse the holdings of cases which formerly held that the residence of the litigants was a determining factor in a dismissal or stay on forum non conveniens grounds. (See Northrop Corp. v. American Motorists Ins. Co. (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 1553, 1562, 270 Cal.Rptr. 233, petn. for review filed July 16, 1990; Delfosse v. C.A.C.I., Inc.—Federal (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 683, 688, 267 Cal.Rptr. 224.)
As the Court of Appeal noted in Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Manatt, Phelps, Rothenberg & Tunney, supra, 202 Cal.App.3d 1424, 249 Cal.Rptr. 559, the legislative intent of the amendment was “to broaden, rather than limit, inconvenient forum stays or dismissals in noncontract cases” (id. at p. 1432, 249 Cal.Rptr. 559) such that “ ‘the application [of forum non conveniens] should turn on consideration of justice, fairness, and convenience and not solely on the residence of one of the parties.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 1434, 249 Cal.Rptr. 559.)
In contrast to Piper, where the United States Supreme Court found minimal “incremental” value in forcing manufacturers to be amenable to suit in the United States (Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, supra, 454 U.S. at p. 260, 102 S.Ct. at p. 268), Corrigan placed heavy reliance on the deterrence factor and on California's policy of regulating products manufactured in this state by means of the strict liability doctrine. We disagree and decline to follow Corrigan 's emphasis on this factor, preferring Piper's incremental deterrence analysis.5 We have noted our disagreement with Holmes 's emphasis on the substantive law issue. And, contrary to its holding, Corrigan itself declined to follow Holmes on this issue: “Under California law, the purpose of comparing the differences in conflict of law rules and the differences in substantive law which will be applied, once the choice of law has been made in each alternative forum, is not simply to decide which forum would provide the most advantageous law from the viewpoint of the plaintiff. To the extent Holmes explicitly or implicitly directs otherwise, we decline to follow it.” (Corrigan v. Bjork Shiley Corp., supra, 182 Cal.App.3d at p. 178, 227 Cal.Rptr. 247.)
Moreover, Corrigan added that California's “choice of law doctrine reveals a respect for the law of foreign jurisdictions which does not seek to weigh the worth of the social policy reflected in the laws of the respective forums, but instead focuses on which forum's governmental interest will be the more impaired if its law is not applied.” (Id. at p. 179, 227 Cal.Rptr. 247.)
We agree with these observations, but not with Corrigan 's application of them to its own facts. Having made the observations, Corrigan proceeded to virtually affirm the notion that an alternative forum's failure to recognize a particular remedy or element of damage is the equivalent of denial of a suitable forum. Corrigan praised California's tort system as one providing “ ‘full compensation’ ” via strict liability (id. at p. 180, 227 Cal.Rptr. 247), while describing Australia's system as “circumscribed.” (Id. at p. 179, 227 Cal.Rptr. 247.) 6 For these reasons, we believe both Holmes and Corrigan paid too much homage to the choice of law question. Encouragement of the importation of foreign causes of action unfairly burdens taxpayers and other litigants. (Accord Bergquist v. Medtronic Inc., supra, 379 N.W.2d 508, 512.) It may also threaten to involuntarily exile some of our leading businesses and high technology manufacturers to jurisdictions where they will not generally be required to defend lawsuits involving extra-territorial injuries.
Finally, we believe Corrigan and Holmes unnecessarily depart from Piper 's analysis and find no support in the roots of the forum non conveniens doctrine. The Judicial Council comment to section 410.30 states in part: “[T]he action will not be dismissed unless a suitable alternative forum is available to the plaintiff [citations]. Because of [this] factor, the suit will be entertained, no matter how inappropriate the forum may be, if the defendant cannot be subjected to jurisdiction in other states. The same will be true if plaintiff's cause of action would elsewhere be barred by the statute of limitations, unless the court is willing to accept the defendant's stipulation that he will not raise this defense in the second state [citations].” (Judicial Council of Cal.Com., 14 West's Ann.Code Civ.Proc. (1973 ed.) § 410.30, pp. 492–493.) “Suitable” does not mean “identical.” An alternative forum must be open to the plaintiff, and the defendant must be amenable to jurisdiction. But nothing in the legislative history implies that plaintiffs, irrespective of their nationality, residence, or the situs of the alleged injury, are automatically entitled to the benefits of California law and its legal system.
Earlier Court of Appeal opinions support our conclusion that, since policy trade-offs are inherent in the forum non conveniens question, the status of the plaintiffs as nonresidents weighs heavily in the decision to grant the motion. (See, e.g., Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Superior Court, supra, 12 Cal.App.3d at pp. 111–112, 90 Cal.Rptr. 461.) Although there may be advantages to appellants in bringing suit here, and notwithstanding California's regulatory interest in the efficacy of sophisticated medical devices manufactured in this state, the decedents' home countries have the strongest interest in entertaining the present disputes. Appellants' decedents consented to the operation and implantation of the valves in Scandinavia. The devices were sold, implanted, and allegedly malfunctioned in Scandinavia. Everyone involved in those activities, according to the record, is Scandinavian. Most, if not all, the alleged fraudulent misrepresentations were made in Scandinavia. The deaths occurred there. Under the Piper analysis, California's interest pales by comparison. (Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, supra, 454 U.S. at pp. 260–261, 102 S.Ct. at pp. 268–269.)
Our determination is supported by the recent opinion in Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Manatt, Phelps, Rothenberg & Tunney, supra, 202 Cal.App.3d 1424, 249 Cal.Rptr. 559. There, a Dutch bank filed a legal malpractice action in California against its London and California attorneys. The California attorneys cross-complained against their London colleagues for indemnity. The British barristers sought dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds. The California attorneys opposed the motion, arguing as residents of this state seeking affirmative relief in a cross-complaint, their choice of a local forum should not be disturbed. The Court of Appeal rejected the argument for reasons pertinent to our analysis. First, as discussed above, the court noted the recent amendment to section 410.30 reflects the Legislature's intention to give less weight to the California domicile or residence of any party to the action. (Id. at pp. 1431–1434, 249 Cal.Rptr. 559.) Second, the California attorneys' claims could proceed without prolonged delay in the foreign court, and most of the evidence, documents and witnesses needed to defend against those claims were in England. (Id. at pp. 1436–1437, 249 Cal.Rptr. 559.) Finally, the court noted that while forcing the California lawyers to litigate in England might be a burden “it is also one that is a logical consequence of a voluntary act. [The California law firm] willingly accepted the legal employment offered by [the British cross-defendants] to provide assistance in ․ what was essentially an English financial transaction.” (Id. at p. 1438, 249 Cal.Rptr. 559.) Here, appellants are in much the same position, notwithstanding the allegation of fraud, since their decedents consented to the operation and implantation of heart valves in their home countries.
For these reasons, we directed the trial court to reconsider its denial of the motions of Shiley and Pfizer, and observed that Shiley and Pfizer were willing to stipulate to certain conditions should the court grant their motions. We indicated abatement of the actions, rather than dismissal, would ensure the court retained jurisdiction to enforce any stipulations ultimately achieved and that appellants would, in fact, have alternative forums for the resolution of the instant matters. (Cf. In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, supra, 809 F.2d at pp. 203, 206.) We noted that if the trial court determined the stipulations offered by Pfizer and Shiley were inadequate to the purpose, it should include any additional conditions it deemed just, or simply deny the motions. (Id. at pp. 205–206; § 410.30.) The issue now presented is whether the court properly followed our directive. We conclude it did.
V
The trial court noted this court's prior opinion was binding as to appellants' cases. And, we conclude that in deciding California is an inconvenient forum for the trial of these actions, and that Sweden and Norway are appropriate and adequate alternative forums, the court correctly applied the approach mandated by this court's prior opinion. The court did not, as argued by appellants, view the prior opinion “as establishing a per se definition of suitable alternative forum which precluded consideration of facts which Piper would find essential in a suitable alternative forum analysis․” On the contrary, the court properly considered the array of factors relevant to a determination of the forum non conveniens motions.
Appellants contend that had the court followed Piper, it could only have concluded these actions should proceed in California. The argument is based exclusively on Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard (1988) 486 U.S. 517, 108 S.Ct. 1945, 100 L.Ed.2d 517, a decision rendered by the United States Supreme Court subsequent to this court's prior opinion. Appellants contend Van Cauwenberghe established a new forum non conveniens doctrine mandating that a court focus on the locus of the defendants' alleged culpable conduct. It did not.
Van Cauwenberghe dealt with whether an order denying a forum non conveniens motion is immediately appealable under 28 U.S.C. section 1291. In a brief discussion of the forum non conveniens doctrine, Justice Marshall, the author of Piper, reaffirmed the Piper analysis. (Id. at pp. 528–529, 108 S.Ct. at pp. 1952–1953.) Contrary to appellants' assertion, the Supreme Court did not pronounce a new rule of law with respect to forum non conveniens. It certainly did not pronounce a rule that the court must focus on the “locus of the alleged culpable conduct.” (Id. at p. 528, 108 S.Ct. at p. 1953.) 7 Rather, the court used the “locus” factor as one example of why the forum analysis is not completely separate from the merits of the action. The court never suggested any one factor in the analysis is entitled to special prominence over another. Thus, the case is consistent with this court's prior opinion and with the trial court's decision.
Appellants attempt to avoid the Piper analysis by citing several decisions denying forum non conveniens dismissals. (See Kontoulas v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc. (4th Cir.1984) 745 F.2d 312; Friends For All Children v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. (D.C.Cir.1983) 717 F.2d 602; Hodson v. A.H. Robins Co. (4th Cir.1983) 715 F.2d 142; Carlenstolpe v. Merck & Co., Inc. (S.D.N.Y.1986) 638 F.Supp. 901.) The reliance is misplaced. Each of those cases concerned a dismissal, rather than, as here, a stay order where the lower court retained jurisdiction to insure compliance with any conditions. (See Archibald v. Cinerama Hotels, supra, 15 Cal.3d at pp. 857–858, 126 Cal.Rptr. 811, 544 P.2d 947.)
While appellate courts are hesitant to reverse denials of motions based on forum non conveniens, a dismissal on such grounds would probably also be affirmed. (See Carlenstolpe v. Merck & Co., Inc., (2d Cir.1987) 819 F.2d 33, 35; Kontoulas v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., supra, 745 F.2d at p. 314; Hodson v. A.H. Robins Co., supra, 715 F.2d at p. 144.) The court's wide discretion to evaluate the factors and to grant or deny a motion on the grounds of forum non conveniens is evidenced by Friends For All Children v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., supra, 717 F.2d 602, a case clearly distinguishable from the instant one. Friends For All Children arose out of the crash of an American-built aircraft being employed, at the authorization of President Ford, to evacuate Vietnamese children en route to adoptive homes during the fall of South Vietnam. The court emphasized the unique and compelling interest of American courts due to our extensive involvement in the operation, and held the matter should be tried in the United States. (Id. at p. 609.)
We do not hold, and we did not previously direct the trial court to find, that the application of Piper 's analysis always mandates trial in a foreign forum. As has been held in numerous post-Piper decisions, the Supreme Court's forum non conveniens approach remains the most appropriate attempt to strike a balance between conflicting policy interests of various jurisdictions and the need to fairly apportion limited judicial resources. (See Sibaja v. Dow Chemical Co. (11th Cir.1985) 757 F.2d 1215, 1217, fn. 4; Ahmed v. Boeing Co. (1st Cir.1983) 720 F.2d 224, 225–226; Cheng v. Boeing Co. (9th Cir.1983) 708 F.2d 1406, 1409; Vaz Borralho v. Keydril Co. (5th Cir.1983) 696 F.2d 379, 391; Chhawchharia v. Boeing Co. (S.D.N.Y.1987) 657 F.Supp. 1157, 1159; Rubenstein v. Piper Aircraft Corp. (S.D.Fla.1984) 587 F.Supp. 460, 461; Zaludek v. Atwood Oceanics Intern (S.D.Tex.1982) 553 F.Supp. 955, 957–958; Abiaad v. General Motors Corp. (E.D.Pa.1982) 538 F.Supp. 537, 539–541, 544.)
Finally, appellants attempt to distinguish Bergquist v. Medtronic Inc., supra, 379 N.W.2d 508 and Fraizer v. St. Jude Medical, Inc. (D.Minn.1985), 609 F.Supp. 1129, arguing that in those cases the ruling on forum non conveniens turned on the potential issue of third-party liability. However, nothing in Bergquist indicates the issue of third-party liability was the primary, or even a significant, factor in the court's decision. (Bergquist v. Medtronic Inc., supra, at pp. 510, 513, fn. 6.) And, while Fraizer did note the defendant's inability to implead third-parties, the court also emphasized that the key public and private interest factors, including the unavailability of medical records and medical personnel who were located in Sweden, mandated dismissal. (Fraizer v. St. Jude Medical, Inc., supra, at pp. 1131–1132.)
In summary, the record indicates the trial court followed our directive. The court was bound to comply with the forum non conveniens analysis set forth in Piper and its progeny, and it did so. The remaining question is whether, in so doing, the court abused its discretion.
VI
Appellants concede that if the trial court followed the legally proper analysis (and we hold it did) its ruling must be reviewed under the substantial evidence test. If substantial evidence supports the finding that California is an inconvenient forum, the decision to stay the actions must be affirmed. The decision “may be reversed only when there has been a clear abuse of discretion; where the court has considered all relevant public and private interest factors, and where its balancing of these factors is reasonable, [the] decision deserves substantial deference. [Citations.]” (Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, supra, 454 U.S. at p. 257, 102 S.Ct. at p. 266.) However, appellants contend there was no substantial evidence to support the ruling, that the court failed to make a “ ‘qualitative analysis' ” to determine the most convenient forum, and that the court surrendered to the “ ‘subconscious bias' ” that allegedly accompanies a forum decision made by the court that will have to try the case if the motion is denied. Again, we disagree.
At the outset, appellants improperly rely upon Hurtado v. Statewide Home Loan Co. (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 1019, 1025, 213 Cal.Rptr. 712 for the proposition that substantial deference to the trial court's findings is not required because the entire record is before this court. However, the Supreme Court has expressly overruled Hurtado to the extent it suggests a lower court's factual determinations are entitled to less deference where they are based on written declarations and evidence, as distinguished from oral testimony. (Shamblin v. Brattain (1988) 44 Cal.3d 474, 479, fn. 4, 243 Cal.Rptr. 902, 749 P.2d 339.) Accordingly, we may only reverse the trial court if its ruling was “unsupported by substantial evidence under apposite law. [Citations.]” (Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Manatt, Phelps, Rothenberg & Tunney, supra, 202 Cal.App.3d at p. 1431, 249 Cal.Rptr. 559.)
First, appellants assert the court failed to consider all relevant factors in its forum non conveniens analysis. Specifically, they complain the court failed to address the private interest factors under Piper. However, the record indicates those were raised and argued in the trial court, with Shiley and Pfizer contending the most substantial evidence and important categories of witnesses were located in Scandinavia. Appellants themselves relied heavily on the private interest factors in their argument. And, as noted previously, the court emphasized it weighed each of the factors presented by the parties' evidence and argument.8
As to the private interest factors, there was evidence that virtually all witnesses to the decedents' medical care and treatment, medical histories and loss of earnings, and witnesses to the familial impacts of their deaths, are located in Scandinavia. Important documentary evidence concerning the decedents' medical histories and loss of earnings is also located there.
Appellants claimed there are over one million relevant documents and hundreds of important witnesses in California. They asserted they obtained written commitments from each Scandinavian witness ensuring his or her availability to testify at a trial held in California. And, they contended potential third-party liability of Scandinavians is no longer an issue in these cases.
In addition, following the briefing of this matter, we granted appellants leave to produce evidence discovered following an investigation and congressional hearing conducted by the United States House of Representatives Sub–Committee on Oversight and Investigations. We have considered this newly-discovered documentary evidence, bearing on conduct engaged in by employees of Shiley and Pfizer, and on the ability to ensure the presence of important witnesses in California, and it does not alter our conclusion that substantial evidence, as detailed above, supports the finding that these cases will be more conveniently tried in Scandinavia.9
The court determined, after consideration of all the facts, that Sweden and Norway present adequate alternative forums for the trial of these matters. The declarations of Swedish and Norwegian counsel indicate appellants can pursue the actions, without prolonged delay, in their home countries. This evidence contradicted the testimony presented by appellants that Scandinavian tort law provides a less favorable forum and less appropriate remedies. Moreover, appellants' challenge to the sufficiency or desirability of their own legal system did not mandate the denial of the instant motions. The absence of contingent legal fees, lack of original jurisdiction over other potential defendants and/or American component parts manufacturers, the need to translate documents into Swedish and Norwegian, and the alleged difficulty of enforcing a judgment in Scandinavia do not mandate trial in this forum. Similarly, the alleged financial hardship of litigating the cases in their own countries is not a compelling concern in a forum non conveniens analysis.
Moreover, Shiley and Pfizer produced evidence that Swedish and Norwegian courts routinely receive English language documents into evidence without requiring translation. And, there was no credible evidence to support appellants' contention they would require the translation of more than one million documents to prove their cases. In any event, if we were to hold that the problem of translating relevant evidence into English is a determining factor, application of the forum non conveniens doctrine in complex cases would be limited to those where the alternative forum was in an English speaking country.
Appellants' reliance on Macedo v. Boeing Co. (7th Cir.1982) 693 F.2d 683, 690 is misplaced. In Macedo the court analyzed the financial burden that would be imposed on American plaintiffs if forced to litigate an action in Portugal. The case was thus remanded with directions to consider the financial impact of forcing American plaintiffs to litigate in a foreign forum. (Id. at p. 691; see also Dowling v. Richardson–Merrell, Inc. (6th Cir.1984) 727 F.2d 608, 616.) We reemphasize that, under Piper, a foreign plaintiff's choice of forum is not entitled to the deference given to an American plaintiff. (Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, supra, 454 U.S. at p. 255, 102 S.Ct. at p. 265.)
Shiley and Pfizer also produced testimony from their Scandinavian legal experts indicating that, contrary to appellants' contention that their cases would be subject to prolonged delays in their own countries, the cases should proceed to trial in Scandinavia in less than two years. And, the stipulation by Shiley and Pfizer to consent to jurisdiction and to satisfy any judgment is sufficient to overcome appellants' objections on those grounds. (Macedo v. Boeing Co., supra, 693 F.2d at p. 687; Agyenkwa v. American Motors Corp., (E.D.N.Y.1985) 622 F.Supp. 242, 244–245.)
Appellants note numerous documents and potential witnesses concerning the design and manufacture of the heart valves, and at least one component manufacturer, are located in California. But those facts do not mandate denial of the motions to stay. In Piper, the Supreme Court recognized that records concerning the design, manufacture and testing of the propeller and plane were in the United States, but nevertheless reinstated a dismissal order which did not even require production of the documents in the alternative forum. (Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, supra, 454 U.S. at pp. 257–258, 102 S.Ct. at pp. 266–267.)
Finally, appellants contend the inability of Shiley and Pfizer to identify third-party witnesses in Scandinavia mandates denial of the motions. The argument is contrary to the law.
In discovery, Shiley and Pfizer identified categories of potential Scandinavian witnesses—including, for example, witnesses on the impact of the deaths on the families, the decedents' earnings and life expectancies, the medical care and histories—and that is sufficient at this stage of the proceeding. In Piper, the court of appeals suggested defendants must submit affidavits identifying the witnesses they would call and identifying the testimony those witnesses would give if trial were held in the alternative forum. The Supreme Court disagreed, stating “[s]uch detail is not necessary. [Defendants] have moved for dismissal precisely because many crucial witnesses are located beyond the reach of compulsory process, and thus are difficult to identify or interview. Requiring extensive investigation would defeat the purpose of their motion.” (Id. at p. 258, 102 S.Ct. at p. 267; accord Dowling v. Richardson–Merrell, Inc., supra, 727 F.2d at pp. 614–615.)
As to public interest factors, the trial court weighed the relative interests of the alternative jurisdictions in the subject matter of the litigation. In particular, the court analyzed California's interest in avoiding undue congestion of its courts from foreign causes of action and in ensuring the competitive standing of its resident businesses, the need to pay proper respect and deference to the laws and policy decisions of foreign governments, and the regulatory and deterrent interests with respect to products manufactured in this state. The evidence indicated that, inasmuch as the heart valves were sold, implanted and allegedly malfunctioned in the decedent's home countries, Sweden and Norway have the dominant interest in this litigation. In considering the public interest factors mandated under Piper, the focus is on which jurisdiction has the greater interest in the subject matter of the dispute and, hence, should more properly bear the burden of entertaining the litigation. (Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, supra, 454 U.S. at pp. 260–261, 102 S.Ct. at p. 268; see also Abiaad v. General Motors Corp., supra, 538 F.Supp. at p. 543; Nai–Chao v. Boeing Co., supra, 555 F.Supp. at p. 19; Dowling v. Richardson–Merrell, Inc., supra, 727 F.2d at p. 615.)
Here, the evidence also supported the conclusion that trials in California of these cases brought by foreign plaintiffs would unduly burden the court. Appellants contend it would not and indeed argue court congestion alone is not a legitimate consideration in the analysis. As noted, however, appellants assert they may introduce up to one million documents into evidence and may call over 400 witnesses. In addition, the evidence indicated that, as of May 1989, there were 108 actions by foreign plaintiffs against Shiley pending in California superior courts. The public interest in avoiding undue court congestion and preventing such a burden from the trial of foreign causes of action is an important factor in a forum non conveniens analysis and was properly considered by the court. (See Gulf Oil Co. v. Gilbert, supra, 330 U.S. at pp. 508–509, 67 S.Ct. at p. 843; Price v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co., supra, 42 Cal.2d at pp. 583–584, 268 P.2d 457.)
The trial court conditioned its granting of the motions upon a thorough and comprehensive stipulation by Shiley and Pfizer designed to protect appellants' interests. In imposing rigid conditions upon Shiley and Pfizer, and in obtaining their unconditional acceptance of those conditions, the court has done all that is legally required to ensure a fair forum. The purpose of the imposition of conditions is to ensure reasonable access to evidence, not to impose American or California procedural requirements on foreign courts. (See Degnan & Kane, The Exercise of Jurisdiction Over and Enforcement of Judgments Against Alien Defendants (1988) 39 Hastings L.J. 799, 828–829.) We find no error in the court's ruling.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in its entirety. Respondents Shiley and Pfizer shall recover their costs on appeal.
FOOTNOTES
1. All statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise specified.
2. For example, in Chavarria, a forum non conveniens stay was affirmed because the court determined the alternative forum would apply California law, and it made no sense to permit nonresidents to litigate the dispute in this state. (Chavarria v. Superior Court, supra, 40 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1076–1077, 115 Cal.Rptr. 549.) In International Harvester, the court upheld the denial of a motion to stay prosecution of a cross-complaint in a wrongful death action where the main action had been litigated in California and settled while an appeal was pending. The court determined the “burden upon the California judicial system incident to continuation of the proceedings on the cross-complaint ․ [was] not unfair or disproportionate” under the circumstances. (International Harvestor Co. v. Superior Court, supra, 95 Cal.App.3d at p. 661, 157 Cal.Rptr. 324.) In Dendy, the court also affirmed a stay. Moreover, that case involved a hotel fire in Nevada with hundreds of victims, not a product manufactured in California, and the court had no occasion to discuss Piper. Finally, both Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Superior Court, supra, 12 Cal.App.3d at p. 112, 90 Cal.Rptr. 461 and Hemmelgarn v. Boeing Co., supra, 106 Cal.App.3d at p. 585, 165 Cal.Rptr. 190 held the prospect of a greater recovery in California may not be considered in a forum non conveniens analysis.
3. This addition, as well as another unrelated paragraph, is effective only until January 1, 1992. Unless the Legislature acts before that date, the statute will revert to its pre-September 1986 wording.
4. Brown v. Clorox Co., supra, 56 Cal.App.3d 306, 128 Cal.Rptr. 385, a pre-Piper decision relied upon by appellants, is particularly suspect in light of the amendment. In Brown, a Washington resident was injured when he swallowed drain cleaner manufactured by the Indiana subsidiary of a firm which was incorporated in Ohio on the date of the accident, but which subsequently reincorporated in California. Noting that the plaintiff was willing to undertake the burden of bringing his witnesses to California and that this state recognized punitive damages while Washington did not, the court based its decision primarily on the defendant's residency in California: “Basically, we have here a plaintiff filing a lawsuit in this state against companies incorporated in this state who maintain their principal place of business here, and, it is claimed, so conduct themselves in this state so as to cause injury to others in another state. Under these circumstances, we conclude that it was an abuse of discretion to stay these proceedings on the ground of forum non conveniens.” (Id. at pp. 313–314, 128 Cal.Rptr. 385.)
5. Under certain circumstances not present in this case, California's public policy might be significant in a forum non conveniens analysis. For example, where a product is manufactured or marketed in direct violation of California substantive law or strong public policy, different considerations would apply.
6. In fact, whether strict liability would be available in these cases appears to be an open question. In Brown v. Superior Court (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1049, 245 Cal.Rptr. 412, 751 P.2d 470, the California Supreme Court determined the disadvantages of inhibiting significant medical research outweighed the competing policy of regulating California manufacturers' production of prescription drugs by imposing strict liability for defectively designed products: “If drug manufacturers were subject to strict liability, they might be reluctant to undertake research programs to develop some pharmaceuticals that would prove beneficial or to distribute others that are available to be marketed, because of the fear of large adverse monetary judgments. Further, the additional expense of insuring against such liability—assuming insurance would be available—and of research programs to reveal possible dangers not detectable by available scientific methods could place the cost of medication beyond the reach of those who need it most.” (Id. at p. 1063, 245 Cal.Rptr. 412, 751 P.2d 470.) Although Brown dealt with the manufacture of prescription drugs, the policy may also be applied in the case of manufacturers of advanced medical innovations, such as prosthetic heart devices and their components. Accordingly, to the extent the policy to regulate has given way to the desire to promote a healthy climate for advances in medical research, it would be in conflict with Corrigan 's analysis.
7. During the hearing in the trial court, appellants' counsel conceded his “locus” argument was “not a determinative factor.”
8. While not alleging error in this regard, appellants complain that the trial court refused to issue a formal statement of decision following its ruling. However, the statement of intended ruling set forth the court's rationale in sufficient detail. Furthermore, the law is clear that a statement of decision under section 632 is not required upon decision of a motion. (Maria P. v. Riles (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281, 1294, 240 Cal.Rptr. 872, 743 P.2d 932; see also People v. Landlords Professional Services, Inc. (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 68, 70, 223 Cal.Rptr. 483; Lavine v. Hospital of the Good Samaritan (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 1019, 1026, 215 Cal.Rptr. 708.)
9. The newly-discovered evidence consists of the following: (1) A telex from Dr. Bjork, Shiley's chief clinical investigator, to officers of Shiley, which allegedly establishes Bjork believed the defects in the valves were the result of inadequate design and manufacture in California; (2) a telex from Bjork to Shiley's chief product engineer, with marginal notes from Shiley's then-president, noting Bjork is to be contacted in an “attempt to settle him down & convince him we're doing everything possible ․”; and (3) a declaration, with supporting documentation, from appellants' attorneys' investigator, indicating Bjork may have ownership or part ownership of a house in Rancho Mirage, California, and, therefore may spend at least some time in the Palm Springs area each year. This evidence, while new, is cumulative of the other evidence submitted by appellants in support of their contentions that the culpable conduct occurred in California, and that there is no concern that Bjork is a potential third-party defendant beyond the process powers of the California courts.
MOORE, Acting Presiding Justice.
SONENSHINE and CROSBY, JJ., concur.
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Docket No: No. G008426.
Decided: September 13, 1990
Court: Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 3, California.
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