COMMERCIAL CLEANING CORPORATION v. ALLIED CHEMICAL COMPANY (1988)

FACTUAL SUMMARY

In January 1982 the U.S.S. Bainbridge was docked at the 32nd Street Naval Station in San Diego Harbor.   At that time general repairs on the Bainbridge were being performed under a prime contract with Southwest Marine Corp. (Southwest).  Western Marine Refrigeration (Western) was the air conditioning system repair and cleaning subcontractor;  Western in turn hired Commercial Cleaning Corporation (Commercial) to perform a “freon flush” of the ship's air conditioning unit.   The freon was supplied by Allied Corporation (Allied).¹

On January 25, 1982, an employee of Commercial was pumping freon gas into the ship's air conditioning system.   As a result freon entered a passageway leading to the air conditioning room.   Two seamen, Stuard L. Fields and Joseph A. Durr, entered the passageway three floors above the air conditioning room, were overcome by the gas and eventually died.

Fields left a widow, a nine-month old daughter and a three-year-old stepdaughter.   Durr was survived by his wife, a 15–month–old son and 3–month–old daughter.

On April 30, 1982, the seamen's widows and children filed a complaint for wrongful death against Southwest, Western and Commercial.   On September 1, 1982, Commercial filed a first amended cross-complaint in which it named Allied as a cross-defendant.   Commercial asked for equitable indemnity and an apportionment of liability from Allied and the previously named defendants.

Trial in the case commenced on November 19, 1984.   A jury was selected and then excused until December 5, 1984.   On November 28, 1984, Allied offered to pay the plaintiffs $50,000 on condition the superior court determine its settlement was made in good faith.   On November 29, 1984, plaintiffs accepted Allied's offer.

A hearing on the good faith of Allied's settlement was scheduled for December 4, 1984.   On that day prior to the hearing on the Allied settlement, Commercial's attorney appeared in the superior court along with counsel for Southwest, Western and the plaintiffs.   Counsel for the plaintiffs stated that the remaining parties had reached a settlement.   The settlement required Commercial pay the plaintiffs $1,036,000.   Western was required to pay the plaintiffs $315,000.   In addition Western was required to pay Southwest $36,000 on an express indemnity agreement.   A document embodying the terms of this settlement was executed in open court and at the plaintiffs' request the superior court approved it as being made in good faith.

Later on December 4, 1984, the same superior court judge heard and granted Allied's good faith motion.   In extraordinary proceedings in this court, the trial court's good faith determination was upheld.

On remand, Allied moved to dismiss Commercial's cross-complaint.   The trial court heard argument on December 17, 1986, and after further briefing by the parties, entered a judgment of dismissal on February 9, 1987.   Commercial filed a timely notice of appeal.

ISSUE ON APPEAL

On appeal Commercial assumes Allied's settlement with the plaintiffs was in “good faith” within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6.²  As it did below, Commercial asks us to determine whether it may nonetheless pursue Allied for claims of contribution and indemnity under admiralty law.³

DISCUSSION

IMaritime Jurisdiction

 The parties do not dispute Fields and Durr were injured on navigable waters while engaged in a traditional maritime activity.   This case is therefore within the federal admiralty jurisdiction.  (Nelson v. United States (9th Cir.1980) 639 F.2d 469, 473.)   Although admiralty cases which fall within the Savings to Suitors Clause (Tit. 28, U.S.C., § 1333(1)) may proceed in state courts:

“State law is inapplicable to a maritime cause of action if it works material prejudice to the characteristic features of the general maritime law or interferes with the proper harmony and uniformity of that law in its international and interstate relations.”  (Fahey v. Gledhill (1983) 33 Cal.3d 884, 887, 191 Cal.Rptr. 639, 663 P.2d 197.)

Thus, in this case we must determine whether dismissal of Allied's cross-complaint is consistent with principles of general maritime law.  (See Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique (1959) 358 U.S. 625, 628–630, 79 S.Ct. 406, 408–409, 3 L.Ed.2d 550;  Intagliata v. Shipowners & Mer. etc. Co. (1945) 26 Cal.2d 365, 372, 159 P.2d 1.)

II

Contribution and Indemnity Under Maritime Law

Unlike land based law, maritime law has long recognized the principle that liability for damages should be distributed equitably among wrongdoers.   In Cooper Stevedoring Co. Inc. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc. (1974) 417 U.S. 106, 110–111, 94 S.Ct. 2174, 2177, 40 L.Ed.2d 694  (Cooper ), the court explained the history of this aspect of maritime law:

“Where two vessels collide due to the fault of each, an admiralty doctrine of ancient lineage provides that the mutual wrongdoers shall share equally the damages sustained by each.  In The North Star, 106 U.S. 17, 1 S.Ct. 41, 27 L.Ed. 91 (1882), Mr. Justice Bradley traced the doctrine back to the Laws of Oleron which date from the 12th Century, and its roots no doubt go much deeper.   Even though the common law of torts rejected a right of contribution among joint tortfeasors, the principle of division of damages in admiralty has, over the years, been liberally extended by this Court in directions deemed just and proper.   In one line of cases, for example, the Court expanded the doctrine to encompass not only damage to the vessels involved in a collision, but personal injuries and property damage caused innocent third parties as well.   See, e.g., The Washington, 9 Wall, 513, 19 L.Ed. 787 (1870);  The Alabama, 92 U.S. 695, 23 L.Ed. 763 (1876);  The Atlas, 93 U.S. 302, 23 L.Ed. 863 (1876);  The Chattahoochee, 173 U.S. 540, 19 S.Ct. 491, 43 L.Ed. 801 (1899).   See generally The Max Morris, 137 U.S. 1, 8–11, 11 S.Ct. 29, 30–32, 34 L.Ed. 586 (1890).   In other cases, the Court has recognized the application of the rule of divided damages in circumstances not involving a collision between two vessels, as where a ship strikes a pier due to the fault of both the shipowner and the pier owner, see Atlee v. Packet Co., 21 Wall. 389, 22 L.Ed. 619 (1875), or where a vessel goes aground in a canal due to the negligence of both the shipowner and the canal company, see White Oak Transp. Co. v. Boston, Cape Code & New York Canal Co., 258 U.S. 341, 42 S.Ct. 338, 66 L.Ed. 649 (1922).   See also The Max Morris, supra, 137 U.S. at 13–14, 11 S.Ct. at 32–33.   Indeed, it is fair to say that application of the rule of division of damages between joint tortfeasors in admiralty cases has been as broad as its underlying rationales.   The interests of safety dictate that where two parties ‘are both in fault, they should bear the damage equally, to make them more careful.’  The Alabama, supra, 92 U.S. at 697.   And a ‘more equal distribution of justice’ can best be achieved by ameliorating the common-law rule against contribution which permits a plaintiff to force one or two wrongdoers to bear the entire loss, though the other may have been equally or more to blame.   See The Max Morris, supra, 137 U.S. at 14, 11 S.Ct. at 32.”

The court in Cooper distinguished an earlier case, Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp. (1952) 342 U.S. 282, 72 S.Ct. 277, 96 L.Ed. 318, which had denied relief to a shipowner who sought contribution from a tort victim's employer.   The Cooper court explained that contribution was unavailable in Halcyon because the employer was immune from common law liability to its employee under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 United States Code sections 901–950, and any liability for contribution would be inconsistent with the compensation scheme enacted by Congress.  (417 U.S. at pp. 112–113, 94 S.Ct. at pp. 2177–2178.)   In Cooper, however, neither tortfeasor had been the plaintiff's employer.   Thus in Cooper the court concluded:  “On the facts of this case, then, no countervailing considerations detract from the well-established maritime rule allowing contribution between joint tortfeasors.”  (Id. at p. 113, 94 S.Ct. at p. 2178.)

 As the Cooper court's discussion of Halcyon indicates, the necessity for an equitable distribution of liability among maritime tortfeasors is not absolute.   Indeed in Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique (1979) 443 U.S. 256, 262–267, 99 S.Ct. 2753, 2759, 61 L.Ed.2d 521 (Edmonds ), the court refused to diminish a vessel owner's liability to an injured harbor worker by the percentage of fault a jury had attributed to the worker's employer.   The court found that in enacting amendments to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act Congress had not meant to alter the pre-existing judge-made rule which allowed injured harbor workers to recover all of their damages from a vessel even though the worker's employer was more at fault than the vessel.  (Ibid.)  The court acknowledged:

“Under this arrangement, it is true that the ship will be liable for all of the damages found by the judge or jury;  yet its negligence may have been only a minor cause of the injury.   The stevedore-employer may have been predominantly responsible yet its liability is limited by the Act, and if it has lien rights on the longshoreman's recovery it may be out-of-pocket even less.”  (Id. at p. 269, 99 S.Ct. at p. 2760–2761.)

Nonetheless the court concluded:

“Some inequity appears inevitable in the present statutory scheme, but we find nothing to indicate and should not presume that Congress intended to place the burden of the inequity on the longshoreman whom the Act seeks to protect.”  (Id. at p. 270, 99 S.Ct. at p. 2761, fn. omitted.)

III

Effect of Settlement on Claims Between Tortfeasors

 Cooper and Edmonds are significant in this case because they demonstrate that although liability for maritime torts should be distributed proportionate to a party's fault, the preference for equitable distribution must, in certain circumstances, be balanced against other considerations.   However, neither the Supreme Court nor Congress ⁴ have decided whether such considerations include the value of encouraging settlement of maritime tort claims.  (See Sherrill v. Brinkerhoff Maritime Drilling (D.C.N.D.Cal.1985) 615 F.Supp. 1021, 1036 (Sherill ).)   Thus, unlike California law, maritime law has not definitively adopted any mechanism which harmonizes the desire for equitable apportionment with a policy of encouraging settlement of tort claims.  (Compare Sherrill, supra, 615 F.Supp. at pp. 1036–1037, and Tech–Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward–Clyde & Associates (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488, 498–500, 213 Cal.Rptr. 256, 698 P.2d 159.)   The difficulty courts and commentators have had in resolving these issues is amply demonstrated in the Restatement of the Law, Second, Torts, section 886A, and those federal maritime cases which have discussed the effect a settlement by one tortfeasor has on a nonsettling defendant's rights and liabilities.

A. Restatement Alternatives

 The Restatement itself takes no position on the effect of a settlement which one tortfeasor has upon the rights of other tortfeasors.  (Caveat to Rest. of Torts 2d, § 886A.)   Rather comment m to section 886A outlines the problems posed in developing a rule which accommodates the competing interests which arise when one of multiple tortfeasors is willing to compensate a victim:

“There are three possible solutions for the situation in which one tortfeasor pays a sum to the injured party and takes a release or covenant not to sue that does not purport to be a full satisfaction of the claim.   Each has its drawbacks and no one is satisfactory.

“(1) The money paid extinguishes any claim that the injured party has against the party released and the amount of his remaining claim against the other tortfeasor is reached by crediting the amount received;  but the transaction does not affect a claim for contribution by another tortfeasor who has paid more than his equitable share of the obligation.   This has been called the fairest solution, but it has proved to be very discouraging to settlements.   A tortfeasor (and his insurance company) has no incentive to make an individual settlement if he is not at all sure that it will extinguish his liability and allow him to close his books on the subject.   This works most decidedly to the detriment of the settling tortfeasor, and the insurance companies have been strongly opposed to it.

“(2) The money paid extinguishes both any claims on the part of the injured party and any claim for contribution by another tortfeasor who has paid more than his equitable share of the obligation and seeks contribution.   This solution favors the settling tortfeasor and his insurance company and is supported by them.   But it can be very unfair to the other tortfeasors and provides a clear incentive to collusion between the settling parties.   To avert this it may be necessary to impose a requirement of ‘good faith.’   But once there is an attempt to provide objective criteria for determining whether a transaction is in good faith, the finality of the release comes into question, books cannot be closed and the major advantage of the solution is dissipated.

“(3) The money paid extinguishes any claim that the injured party has against the released tortfeasor and also diminishes the claim that the injured party has against the other tortfeasors by the amount of the equitable share of the obligation of the released tortfeasor.   This solution works most strongly against the interest of the injured party and may have the effect of discouraging him from entering into a settlement.   It may, for example, make it not desirable for him to accept the full amount of coverage in a minimum insurance policy if the equitable share of the obligation of the tortfeasor is likely to be substantially larger.”

As the drafters of the Restatement noted:

“Important policy reasons therefore weigh against each of the three solutions.   Case authorities and statutes are also divided and there is no semblance of a consensus.   The experience in drafting the uniform laws depicts the difficulties of the problem.   The 1939 [Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act] adopted the first solution;  the 1955 act supplanting it adopted the second solution;  and the 1977 [Uniform Comparative Fault Act] supplanting it adopted the third solution.”  (Com. m to § 886A, Rest.2d Torts.)

B. Federal Maritime Cases

1. The First Solution

In this case Commercial would prefer that we adopt the first solution suggested by the Restatement and hold that under maritime law Allied's settlement had no impact on Commercial's rights against Allied.   However Commercial has not been able to cite any maritime case which has squarely adopted this approach.   In In re Seaboard Shipping Corporation (2d Cir.1971) 449 F.2d 132, 133, fn. 1 (Seaboard ), upon which Commercial relies, two defendants reached a settlement with the plaintiffs which expressly preserved their rights of indemnity and contribution against each other.   Thus the Seaboard court was not asked to determine the effect the settlement had on the defendants' claims against each other, but whether their conduct would give rise to such claims.  (Id. at pp. 136–139.)   In Seal Offshore, Inc. v. American Standard, Inc., (5th Cir.1985) 777 F.2d 1042 (Seal Offshore ), a tortfeasor who had paid the plaintiff the entire amount of its damages was allowed to pursue a third party for contribution.   The third party, however, had not paid the plaintiff any portion of its damages;  accordingly, like Seaboard, Seal Offshore does not discuss the immunity a settling defendant may obtain from further liability.

The only maritime case which approaches the Restatement's first solution is Sea–Land Service, Inc. v. American Logging Tool Corp. (D.C.W.D.Wash.1985) 637 F.Supp. 240, 241 (Sea–Land ).⁵  In Sea–Land two tortfeasors had each settled with the tort victim in a prior action;  in a second action one of the tortfeasors sought indemnity and contribution from the other tortfeasor.   In the second action the defendant tortfeasor moved to dismiss, arguing that under either state law or admiralty law the prior settlements precluded any further claim between the tortfeasors.   The district court denied the motion holding that state law was not applicable, that a settling defendant does not waive his rights against other tortfeasors and that none of the admiralty cases cited to the court defeated the plaintiff's claims for indemnity and contribution.

We are unwilling to rely upon Sea–Land for the proposition that a settling defendant receives no immunity from further claims by other tortfeasors.   While the opinion discusses the affirmative rights a settling defendant obtains, it does not discuss any immunity a defendant may obtain by way of a settlement.   Thus it is not clear the district court's holding in Sea–Land goes any further than preserving a settling defendant's rights of contribution and indemnity against other tortfeasors.

More importantly, were we to adopt the first solution suggested by the Restatement, we would, in the interest of achieving a precise distribution of liability between tortfeasors, discourage the settlement of maritime tort claims and the prompt compensation such settlements bring to maritime tort victims.   As the drafters of the Restatement noted, without some assurance they will no longer face liability, tortfeasors will have little incentive to enter into settlements with claimants.   In this case such a system could have prevented the Fields and Durr families from receiving any compensation until the intramural contentions of the defendants had run the gamut of available legal processes.   Such a scheme would be inconsistent with Edmonds, which suggests the preference for equitable apportionment of liability among tortfeasors should not unduly diminish or delay the compensation available to maritime tort victims.  (See also Self v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. (11th Cir.1987) 832 F.2d 1540, 1548, fn. 5) (Self ).)

2. The Second Solution

The leading maritime case adopting the second alternative is Self (832 F.2d 1540;  see also Ebanks v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., (11th Cir.1982) 688 F.2d 716;  Drake Towing Co., Inc. v. Meisner Marine Constr. Co. (11th Cir.1985) 765 F.2d 1060.)   In Self a seaman was killed when his barge was struck by a vessel owned by Chevron Transport Corporation (Chevron).   Chevron paid the seaman's widow $315,000 and obtained a release of her claims against it.   At trial the district court found the widow had suffered $661,354 in damages.   The district court also found Chevron 70 percent responsible for the accident.   Following cases which had adopted the Restatement's third alternative, the district court then reduced the damages the widow could collect from the barge owner by 70 percent.   On appeal the 11th Circuit reversed and held the widow's recovery from the barge owner could be reduced only by the amount she had actually received from Chevron.

The Self court rejected any proportionate reduction in the plaintiff's recovery as inconsistent with the principles of joint and several liability discussed by the Supreme Court in Edmonds.

“Although not directly related to the holding in the case, the Court's opinion in Edmonds strongly and repeatedly reaffirmed the right of a plaintiff to recover from any single tortfeasor the full compensation for damages incurred․

“․ The philosophy governing Edmonds is clear:  any inequity which results from the implementation of a seaman's damage award should be borne by the tortfeasors rather than the seaman himself.”  (Self, supra, 832 F.2d at p. 1546.)

More importantly from our perspective, the Self court accepted as its own a rule barring contribution from settling defendants and the inequity such a rule might engender.  (Id. at p. 1547.)⁶

“We acknowledge that the rule that we adopt today may cause disparity in the percentage of payment as between the settling and nonsettling tortfeasors in maritime personal injury actions.   We note, however, that his court is not unique in adopting such a rule.   Among those states that have incorporated comparative fault principles into their tort systems, but have retained the rule that there is no contribution from settling tortfeasors, there is a split of authority as to how a nonsettling tortfeasor's share of damages should be calculated.   Some states adopted the rule that Leger employed [proportionate reduction], while others require that the nonsettling tortfeasor's share be reduced only by the amount paid by a settling tortfeasor.  [Citation.]

“As we are bound by the Supreme Court's guidance and the rule in Edmonds, we adopt the latter of these approaches.”  (Id. at pp. 1547–1548, fn. omitted, italics added.)

The pro tanto reduction rule adopted in Self has been accepted by the 1st Circuit in Joia v. Jo–Ja Service Corp. (1st Cir.1987) 817 F.2d 908 (Joia ).   Unlike Self, in Joia there was no pretrial settlement with either of the two tortfeasors.   Thus the Joia court did not have occasion to discuss a settling tortfeasor's continuing liability for contribution.   However one of the tortfeasors was a vessel owner who tried to limit its liability under the provisions of 46 United States Code section 183, which, in certain circumstances reduces a vessel's liability to an amount based upon its salvage value.   In discussing the effect a pro tanto reduction rule would have in conjunction with the limitation of liability statute the court said, “Admittedly, assuming again that Jo–Ja successfully limited liability, under the joint and several rule, Niagara would bear a larger, disproportionate share of the damages.   But the Supreme Court made clear in Edmonds that the seamen should not suffer this inequity.”  (Joia, supra, 817 F.2d at p. 917.)   This statement suggests to us that, like the 11th Circuit, the 1st Circuit would be willing to endure inequity between joint tortfeasors in order to promote compensation of tort victims.

3. The Third Solution

The leading case adopting the Restatement's third alternative is Leger v. Drilling Well Control, Inc. (5th Cir.1979) 592 F.2d 1246 (Leger ).  (See also Kizer v. Peter Kiewit Sons' Co., supra, 489 F.Supp. 835, 840–841;  Doyle v. United States (D.S.C.1977) 441 F.Supp. 701, 710–713, fn. 5.)   In Leger an injured plaintiff accepted $182,331.05 in settlement from two of three defendants.   A jury found the plaintiff had suffered $284,090 in damages.   A second jury found the settling defendants were 20 percent responsible for Leger's injuries and the district court reduced his recovery against the nonsettling defendant by that percentage.   On appeal the nonsettling defendants asked the 5th Circuit to reduce the judgment against it by the actual amount paid by the settling defendant rather than its proportion of fault.   The court rejected the nonsettling defendant's arguments and affirmed.⁷

Because under the apportionment scheme adopted in Leger a nonsettling defendant never pays a claimant more than its proportionate share of the claimant's damages, implicit in Leger is a rule which bars further contribution from settling defendants.  (See Sherrill v. Brinkerhoff Maritime Drilling, supra, 615 F.Supp. at p. 1037.)   That rule is made explicit in the 1977 Uniform Comparative Fault Act.   As we have seen, the 1977 act replaced the 1939 and 1955 versions of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act with the system of apportionment adopted in Leger.   Section 6 of the 1977 act provides:

“A release, covenant not to sue, or similar agreement entered into by a claimant and a person liable discharges that person from all liability for contribution, but it does not discharge any other persons liable upon the same claim unless it so provides.   However, the claim of the releasing person against other persons is reduced by the amount of the released person's equitable share of the obligation, determined in accordance with the provisions of Section 2.” 8

IV

The Effect of Allied's Settlement

In our view the foregoing cases suggest that general maritime law will eventually accept either the second or third alternatives discussed in the Restatement.   As our discussion indicates, under either of those apportionment systems settlement is encouraged by releasing settling tortfeasors from any further liability for contribution.   Moreover since the maritime cases which have considered the issue have treated claims for contribution and indemnity identically (see e.g. Jovovich, supra, 809 F.2d at p. 1532;  Loose v. Offshore Navigation, Inc. (5th Cir.1982) 670 F.2d 493, 500–501), we believe immunity extends to claims for partial and total equitable indemnity.⁹  Having reached these conclusions, we need go no further in resolving this case.   Like the second system, California's Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6 discharges a settling tortfeasor from further liability so long as its settlement is in “good faith.”   As interpreted by our Supreme Court and applied in this case, section 877.6 protects nonsettling defendants by requiring that trial courts carefully compare the amount a settling defendant is paying with its likely exposure before finding “good faith.”  (Tech–Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward–Clyde & Associates, supra, 38 Cal.3d at pp. 498–500, 213 Cal.Rptr. 256, 698 P.2d 159.)   It is difficult to imagine a maritime case applying the second system in a manner which would afford a nonsettling defendant greater substantive protection than is required by Tech–Bilt.¹⁰  Thus Commercial cannot argue that dismissal of its claims interfered with the second apportionment system.¹¹

Moreover Commercial was not deprived of any rights under the third system.   As the text of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act makes clear, under that scheme a settling defendant is relieved of liability for contribution and the nonsettling defendant's only recourse is a proportionate reduction in the claimant's recovery.   In this case under the third system Commercial had no substantive rights against Allied following Allied's settlement;  rather under the uniform act Commercial would be left with the opportunity to diminish its liability to the Fields and Durr families by the proportion of fault a jury might attribute to Allied.   Thus dismissal of Commercial's cross-complaint against Allied did not infringe on any substantive rights under the third system.   Admittedly, had Commercial decided to go to trial against the widows and their children, a conflict between Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6's pro tanto reduction of settlement amounts and the uniform act's proportionate reduction would occur.   However Commercial settled with the families and hence no conflict between section 877.6 and the uniform act arose.

Because dismissal of Commercial's claims against Allied is consistent with principles of general maritime law, the judgment dismissing its cross-complaint must be affirmed.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   We refer to Allied Chemical Company in the caption to our opinion because the parties have consistently done so.   We note, however, the clerk's transcript indicates the true name of the company is Allied Corporation.

2.   Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6, subdivision (c), provides:  “A determination by the court that the settlement was made in good faith shall bar any other joint tortfeasor or co-obligor from any further claims against the settling tortfeasor or co-obligor for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or comparative indemnity, based on comparative negligence or comparative fault.”

3.   In its briefs Commercial also asked us to determine whether it may pursue claims for total equitable indemnity under the law of California.   Its briefs were filed before the Supreme Court's decision in Far West Financial Corp. v. D & S Co. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 796, 251 Cal.Rptr. 202, 760 P.2d 399.)   In Far West the court held that claims against a tortfeasor for total equitable indemnity are barred by a good faith settlement.   Because Commercial is not claiming implied or express contractual indemnity, Far West disposes of its claims under California law.

4.   General maritime law is determined by the Supreme Court and Congress.  (Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, supra, 358 U.S. at p. 630, 79 S.Ct. at p. 409;  Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, supra, 443 U.S. at p. 273, 99 S.Ct. at p. 2762–2763.)

5.   Recently in Daughtry v. Diamond (CD Cal.1988) 693 F.Supp. 856, the district court refused to apply section 877.6 in a maritime personal injury case.   However the district court's holding is quite limited:  “This possible conflict, then, prevents application of the state rule.  [¶]That is not to suggest that any federal maritime settlement rule may not have the content of the California rule․  The parties did not address the legal and policy considerations that apply to settlement of multidefendant maritime actions.   The Court, therefore, was not required to rule on whether maritime law should include a settlement bar rule and, if so, what form such a rule should take.”  (Id. at p. 863.)   Because we are a reviewing court the approach adopted in Daughtry is not available to us.   Even if the reasoning of the trial court was erroneous, we must affirm the judgment entered below if it was correct in law.   (Smith v. Walter E. Heller & Co. (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 259, 267, 147 Cal.Rptr. 1;  6 Witkin, Cal.Procedure (1971 2d ed.) Appeal § 259, p. 266.)   Thus, unlike the district court in Daughtry, we cannot leave to another day the propriety of a “settlement-bar” rule in maritime cases.We also note that in Donovan v. Robbins (7th Cir.1985) 752 F.2d 1170, 1180, the 7th Circuit refused to adopt a “settlement-bar” rule in an ERISA (29 U.S.C.A. § 1001 et seq.) case.   However there the settling defendants were not seeking immunity from contribution claims;  they were requesting permission to enter into a settlement.

6.   In reaching this conclusion the Self court cited Luke v. Signal Oil & Gas Co. (5th Cir.1975) 523 F.2d 1190, 1191 (Luke ), in which the 5th Circuit, applying Louisiana law in a maritime personal injury action, held that a settling tortfeasor was no longer obligated to nonsettling tortfeasors.   Such reliance upon nonmaritime law is appropriate when it does not interfere with maritime rights.  (See Kizer v. Peter Kiewit Sons' Co. (D.C.N.D.Cal.1980) 489 F.Supp. 835, 841.)   We interpret the reliance upon state law in Luke and Self to mean those courts have found the settlement-bar rule does not interfere with a maritime tortfeasor's rights under admiralty law.

7.   In a case where the parties had agreed they were bound by Leger, a panel of the 11th Circuit held that under Leger a settling defendant may not recover any excess it paid over its proportion of liability from a nonsettling defendants.  (Jovovich v. Desco Marine, Inc. (11th Cir.1987) 809 F.2d 1529 (Jovovich ).)   Since the parties in Jovovich had agreed they were bound by Leger and because Jovovich preceded Self, to the extent Jovovich and Self are inconsistent, Self probably represents the controlling view in the 11th Circuit.We also note that although the 5th Circuit followed Leger in In Re Incident Aboard D/B Ocean King, (5th Cir.1987) 813 F.2d 679, 689, the continuing validity of Leger in the 5th Circuit itself is now subject to question.   In Hernandez v. M/V Rajaan (5th Cir.1988) 841 F.2d 582, 591, a panel of the 5th Circuit acknowledged Leger but accepted the 11th Circuit's reasoning in Self.

8.   Section 2 of the uniform act requires a jury to apportion the fault of the claimant and all tortfeasors.

9.   As we noted at footnote 3, supra, Commercial has no claim for express or implied contractual indemnity.

10.   Indeed when this issue is eventually resolved, in order to maximize compensation to tort victims, maritime law may well adopt the second system without the good faith standards articulated in Tech–Bilt.

11.   Although the procedure for determining “good faith” outlined in section 877.6 may be unavailable in other maritime forums, general maritime jurisdiction does not supplant such matters of practice and procedure.  (See Bohme v. Southern Pac. Co. (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 291, 297, 87 Cal.Rptr. 286.)

BENKE, Associate Justice.

KREMER, P.J., and WIENER, J., concur.