IN RE: MARRIAGE OF FLORES. (1988)

OPINION

Respondent (Mary) filed a petition for dissolution of her purported marriage to appellant (Daniel), seeking not only a termination of her relationship with Daniel but also permanent spousal support and the award of legal costs and attorney fees.   Daniel's response to the petition sought a judgment of nullity of the marriage (on the ground that the marriage had been void from the outset) and resisted any award of support, costs or fees.   On October 14, 1986, the trial court entered a judgment of nullity and an “Order Following Judgment of Nullity” (the Order).   The Order obligated Daniel to pay Mary permanent spousal support as well as a fixed sum to be applied to Mary's legal costs and attorney fees.

Daniel appeals from the Order.

FACTS1

 Mary and Daniel are first cousins, their respective mothers being sisters.   At all times relevant to this case, both Mary and Daniel knew of their relationship to each other.

In 1964, Mary was a resident of Arizona and Daniel was stationed there on active military duty.   On September 16, 1964, Mary and Daniel went to Bisbee, Arizona, to be married.   At the time, Arizona law expressly prohibited marriages between first cousins and declared such marriages to be void.   In completing the application for a marriage license, Mary and Daniel were informed by the court personnel of the prohibition against first-cousin marriages.   Both Mary and Daniel executed affidavits to the effect that they were only second cousins.   The two thereupon received their marriage license and participated in a civil marriage ceremony conducted during the lunch hour by a local judge.

Mary and Daniel then proceeded to hold themselves out to the world as wife and husband for almost twenty-one years.   During this time, the two of them raised the five children born to Mary prior to her marriage to Daniel and conceived a child of their own.   To all appearances, the Floreses were a traditional “family unit” with both spouses contributing finances, care and support to the raising of a family.   This relationship continued until July 27, 1985, when Mary and Daniel separated.

The parties were able to agree on a division of the couple's property and debts.   They could not agree, however, on whether Mary had any legally cognizable right to receive permanent spousal support or an award of legal costs and attorney fees.   Following a two-day trial tried to the court without a jury, the trial court determined that:  (a) the marriage was, and always had been, void;  (b) Mary did not meet the statutory definition of a “putative spouse” and, thus, did not statutorily qualify to receive permanent spousal support or an award of costs and fees;  and (c) Daniel was nevertheless estopped to deny the validity of the marriage and would be obligated to pay permanent spousal support and to contribute to the payment of Mary's legal costs and attorney fees just as if the two of them were dissolving a fully valid marriage.

On appeal, Daniel makes two basic contentions:  (1) a party cannot be estopped to deny the validity of a marriage which is found to have been void from the outset;  and (2) the trial court had no authority to award support payments and a payment of costs and fees to Mary in light of the court's ruling that she was not a putative spouse.

DISCUSSION

I THE ESTOPPEL OF DANIEL TO DENY THE VALIDITY OF THE VOID MARRIAGE

 Daniel correctly points out that the general rule with respect to marriages which are void, and not merely voidable, is that such marriages “may be collaterally attacked and declared void in any proceeding wherein the question may arise.”  (Estate of Karau (1938) 26 Cal.App.2d 606, 607, 80 P.2d 108.)   He then goes on to argue, however, that this “general rule” somehow prevents his being equitably estopped to deny the validity of his marriage to Mary.   This is incorrect.   Even if the general rule noted by the Karau opinion is understood as giving Daniel a “right” to deny the validity of his marriage to Mary, “estoppel applies to prevent a person from asserting a right where his conduct or silence makes it unconscionable for him to assert it.”  (In re Marriage of Recknor (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 539, 546, 187 Cal.Rptr. 887, citing Brown v. Brown (1969) 274 Cal.App.2d 178, 188, 82 Cal.Rptr. 238;  emphasis added.)   Indeed, “ ‘Equity or chancery law has its origin in the necessity for exceptions to the application of rules of law ․’ [Citations].”  (Estate of Vargas (1974) 36 Cal.App.3d 714, 718, 111 Cal.Rptr. 779;  emphasis added.)

In short, the existence of the general rule of law rendering void marriages subject to collateral attack at any time did not bar the trial court from equitably estopping Daniel to deny the validity of the marriage.

II THE COURT'S AUTHORITY TO AWARD PERMANENT SPOUSAL SUPPORT AND THE PAYMENT OF COSTS AND FEES

 Daniel correctly notes that only good faith “putative spouses” are statutorily entitled to support payments and an award of legal costs and attorney fees when a marriage is adjudged a nullity.  (Civ.Code, §§ 4455, 4456.)   From this, and from the fact that the trial court in this instance entered a judgment of nullity and specifically found that Mary was not a good faith “putative spouse,” Daniel argues that the trial court lacked authority for its order awarding support and the payment of costs and fees.   Again, Daniel has misperceived the legal principles which are applicable to the case.   While it is true that the trial court had no statutory authority for the award it made, the trial court did not base its award on a statute.   Rather, the trial court based its award on non-statutory principles of equity and, as we discuss at length below, there was substantial justification for the trial court's use of equity in this instance.

 Inasmuch as the trial court found, on substantial evidence, that both Mary and Daniel knew from the outset that their marriage was invalid, what we are presented with is a situation in which there has never been a valid marriage, or even a good faith belief by the parties that such a marriage existed—that is, we are presented with a nonmarital relationship.   As noted by our Supreme Court, “․;  such a relationship remains subject solely to judicial decision.”  (Marvin v. Marvin (1976) 18 Cal.3d 660, 665, 134 Cal.Rptr. 815, 557 P.2d 106;  hereafter, Marvin I.)   Indeed, inasmuch as nonmarital relationships are governed by judicially crafted rules of law, the statutory provisions of the Family Law Act (Civ.Code, § 4000 et seq.) have no application in resolving disputes arising from such relationships.   (Elden v. Sheldon (1988) 46 Cal.3d 267, 279, (mod. of dissenting opinion at 46 Cal.3d 1003a, 250 Cal.Rptr. 254, 758 P.2d 582) [as modified] citing Marvin I.)²

Although the Marvin I opinion primarily dealt with an issue not presented in this case (the enforceability of personal contracts arising from a nonmarital relationship), that opinion did contain two statements that have a direct bearing on this case:  (1) The Supreme Court noted that its “․ opinion does not preclude the evolution of additional equitable remedies to protect the expectations of the parties to a nonmarital relationship in cases in which existing remedies prove inadequate;  ․” (Fn. 25, 18 Cal.3d at p. 684, 134 Cal.Rptr. 815, 557 P.2d 106);  and (2) the Supreme Court expressly declined to “․ pass upon the question whether, in the absence of an express or implied contractual obligation, a party to a nonmarital relationship is entitled to support payments from the other party after the relationship terminates.”  (Fn. 26, at p. 685, 134 Cal.Rptr. 815, 557 P.2d 106.)   Of course, this question of entitlement to support is precisely the issue we must pass upon in this case.³

 In awarding Mary permanent “spousal support” as well as a partial recovery of legal costs and attorney fees, the trial court apparently felt that the case of In re Marriage of Recknor (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 539, 187 Cal.Rptr. 887 was “controlling.”   In that case, the appellate court upheld an award of spousal support, costs and fees pendente lite in a situation very similar to the one at hand.   Given the different equitable considerations underlying an award of spousal support pendente lite as opposed to an award of permanent spousal support, we do not view Recknor as controlling authority in this case.⁴  We do, however, find Recknor's reasoning persuasive with respect to the equitable principles the court applied in the circumstances of that case.   In Recknor, the parties had (for all practical purposes) known from the outset that their marriage was a nullity.   They nevertheless participated in a wedding ceremony, held themselves out to the world as husband and wife for 15 years, conceived a child, raised a family, and in all other respects acted as though their marriage was valid.   The court in that case found that the facts justified equitably estopping the husband to deny the validity of the marriage, and held him responsible for the payment of support, costs and fees pendente lite just as though the marriage had been valid.⁵

 We hold that this same remedy, equitable estoppel, is equally available to compel the payment of permanent “spousal support,” as well as costs and fees, in this case.   The facts are certainly as compelling as those in Recknor:  Mary and Daniel obtained a marriage license and went through a formal marriage ceremony;  they conceived a child;  they raised a family;  they moved from Arizona to California as a “family unit;”  they held themselves out to the world as wife and husband.   After almost 21 years of such conduct, Mary certainly had a reasonable expectation that she and Daniel would conduct all of their dealings as though they were validly married.   Indeed, even Mary's act in terminating the relationship is consistent with this “reasonable expectation”—she petitioned the court for a dissolution of her “marriage,” not for a judgment of nullity.

 Equitable remedies, of course, must be applied only to enforce recognized rights or to support the execution of underlying obligations which exist in law or equity—not simply to “do equity” in some broad and undefined way.  (Schafer v. Superior Court (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 305, 310, 225 Cal.Rptr. 513;  Marvin II, 122 Cal.App.3d at p. 876, 176 Cal.Rptr. 555.)   Here, the right being enforced is Mary's right to justifiably rely on Daniel's continuing representation, by conduct if by nothing else, that the two of them would always deal with each other as though they were validly married.   Indeed, the very essence of this right is set forth in our statutes in terms of estoppel:  “Whenever a party has, by his own statement or conduct, intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true and to act upon such belief, he is not in any litigation arising out of such statement or conduct, permitted to contradict it.”  (Evid.Code, § 623.)

 In upholding Mary's right to rely on Daniel's representation, we are not working at cross-purposes to our state's strong policy in favor of formal marriage, as “expressed in the abolition of common law marriage.”  (Elden v. Shelden, supra, 46 Cal.3d 267, 275, 250 Cal.Rptr. 254, 758 P.2d 582.)⁶  Our use of equitable estoppel in this case does not validate the “marriage” of Mary and Daniel (Spellens v. Spellens (1957) 49 Cal.2d 210, 219, 317 P.2d 613)—it merely places Daniel in a position where he must meet certain obligations which are identical in kind (although arising from a different source) to those he would have had to have met had the marriage been valid.

 We find that the trial court was within its authority in compelling Daniel to make the payments here in issue.   We emphatically do not wish to be understood, however, as generally approving the award of such support payments in all disputes arising from nonmarital relationships.   The facts of each case will determine the extent, if any, to which asserted expectations of support are found to be “reasonable.”   We leave the primary factual determination as to whether an equitable estoppel has been created where it has always been—in the hands of the trier of fact.  (Albers v. County of Los Angeles (1965) 62 Cal.2d 250, 266, 42 Cal.Rptr. 89, 398 P.2d 129.)

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   In stating the facts, we view the record in the light most favorable to the judgment.  (Gyerman v. United States Lines Co. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 488, 492, fn. 1, 102 Cal.Rptr. 795, 498 P.2d 1043.)

2.   The fact that this matter was originally brought before the trial court by way of a petition filed pursuant to the Family Law Act did not, as a jurisdictional matter, preclude the court's use of general equitable principles in resolving the issue of Mary's entitlement to support payments.   It was permissible for the trial court to resolve the issue equitably inasmuch as both Mary and Daniel “ ‘voluntarily submitted the matter to a court having general jurisdiction to pass upon the question ․ under pleadings which properly raise [ ] [the] issue.’ ”   (In re Marriage of Saslow (1985) 40 Cal.3d 848, 865–866, 221 Cal.Rptr. 546, 710 P.2d 346, citing Porter v. Superior Court (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 793, 805, 141 Cal.Rptr. 59.)

3.   An appellate decision rendered in the Marvin case subsequent to Marvin I observed of Marvin I's footnote 26:  “There is no doubt that footnote 26 opens the door to a support award in appropriate circumstances.”  (Marvin v. Marvin (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 871, 876, 176 Cal.Rptr. 555;  hereafter, Marvin II.)

4.   Support pendente lite is intended to maintain the status quo of a party's standard of living during the court's efforts to determine what the parties' respective rights, duties and responsibilities are.  (In re Marriage of McNaughton (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 845, 849, 194 Cal.Rptr. 176.)   Permanent spousal support, on the other hand, is intended to provide needed financial support to a party after the relationship is terminated.  (In re Marriage of Burlini (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 65, 69, 191 Cal.Rptr. 541.)   The equities underlying the two situations are oftentimes apt to be quite different in cases, such as this one, where the trial court ultimately determines that both parties knew their “marriage” was a nullity.

5.   We aware that the Recknor decision was recently criticized:  “It appears Recknor failed to give due consideration to an essential element of estoppel, namely, the party asserting it must have been ignorant of the true state of facts.”  (In re Marriage of Vryonis (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 712, 722, at fn. 5, 248 Cal.Rptr. 807.)   This criticism of Recknor misses the point.   It is not a belief in a valid marriage which is being equitably upheld—rather, it is a justifiable belief that one will always be treated by one's nonmarital partner as if validly married which is being equitably upheld.

6.   The strong language in Elden v. Sheldon, supra, 46 Cal.3d 267, 250 Cal.Rptr. 254, 758 P.2d 582, in favor of formal marriages and against the recognition of a full panoply of marital rights in a nonmarital relationship, does not compel a different result in this case.   The Elden decision is focused on the rights of nonmarital partners as against third parties.   Here, our focus is on the rights of nonmarital partners as against each other.

HEWS, Associate Justice.

CAMPBELL, P.J., and DABNEY, J., concur.