PILLSBURY v. SUPERIOR COURT IN AND FOR ORANGE COUNTY (1936)

On August 3, 1933, Laura Belle Resh conveyed three parcels of real estate to William H. Pillsbury. On the same day these parties executed a written agreement in which, after referring to their previous business dealings, it was agreed that the conveyance of these properties was made as full compensation for all services rendered by Pillsbury, in full settlement of any claims he had against her other properties, and in full and complete settlement of all matters and transactions between them. On November 16, 1933, the same parties entered into an agreement purporting to provide for the surrender and mutilation of the three deeds. On the same day these deeds were mutilated by drawing lines through the signatures thereto, and Mrs. Resh made a will, naming William H. Pillsbury as her sole beneficiary.

In the meantime the petitioner herein had brought an action for divorce against William H. Pillsbury, making Mrs. Resh a party to the action and seeking to have it determined that the real property described in the three deeds, with the income therefrom after August 3, 1933, was the community property of herself and William H. Pillsbury. Mrs. Resh filed an answer in that action alleging that she was the sole owner of the three properties and setting forth in detail her version of what took place on August 3, 1933, in connection with the three deeds and the contract of settlement. Mrs. Resh also filed another action seeking to quiet her title to these properties, naming this petitioner and William H. Pillsbury as defendants. William H. Pillsbury did not contest this action, but this petitioner filed an answer and the two actions were consolidated for trial, in so far as the title to these properties was concerned. The court made findings of fact and as conclusions of law found that the fee simple title to the three parcels of realty in question passed to and vested, on August 3, 1933, in the marriage community of William H. Pillsbury and Louise Pillsbury, subject to a life estate in Mrs. Resh; and that Mrs. Resh was entitled to the income of said real estate since August 3, 1933. Judgment was entered decreeing that the fee–simple title to the three pieces of real property is and, since August 3, 1933, has been vested in William H. Pillsbury and Louise Pillsbury as their community property, subject to a life estate in Laura Belle Resh, and that the Pillsburys had no interest in the rents and profits accruing from said real property after August 3, 1933.

This petitioner alone appealed from those portions of this judgment which awarded a life estate in said real property to Mrs. Resh and which had the effect of depriving the Pillsburys of the rents and profits of said property from August 3, 1933. On that appeal the findings of the court were not attacked, but the appellant contended that the conclusions of law with reference to the life estate and the income from the property were erroneously drawn. This court reversed those portions of the judgment which had been appealed from, remanding the cause for further proceeding not inconsistent with the views expressed in the opinion. Resh v. Pillsbury (Cal.App.) 55 P.(2d) 264.

After the remittitur went down this petitioner made a motion to have the judgment modified by eliminating therefrom the provision for a life estate in Mrs. Resh and by awarding to the marriage community the rents and profits from the lands from August 3, 1933, to the date of trial. Thereupon Mrs. Resh sought and obtained leave from the trial court to file an amended complaint. In effect this amended complaint alleges that she made the three deeds to William H. Pillsbury under their mutual agreement that the deeds should not be recorded until her death, that she was to have the rents and profits during her life, and that the parties to the deeds acted under mutual mistake of law and fact in believing that what they did reserved a life interest in the properties in Mrs. Resh. The prayer is: (1) That the deeds may be interpreted as reserving a life estate in the plaintiff; (2) that in the alternative said deeds may be reformed so as to reserve in the plaintiff a life estate in the properties; (3) that in the alternative the defendants be adjudged and decreed to be trustees of said properties for the use and benefit of the plaintiff during her lifetime; (4) that in the alternative the defendants be required to pay to the plaintiff for the remainder of her life all of the income from these properties; (5) that in the alternative the court make a declaration as to the rights of the plaintiff and adjudge that the plaintiff have a life estate in said properties; and (6) that the defendants be required to set forth the nature of their claims, that all adverse claims of the defendants may be determined, and that by the decree it may be adjudged that the plaintiff is the owner of a life estate in said premises.

Thereupon this petitioner made this application for a writ of prohibition setting forth the material facts, alleging that the trial court would, if not restrained, receive evidence in support of the allegations of the amended complaint and asking that said court be restrained from taking any further proceedings upon or making any further orders based on said amended complaint. In its return the respondent admits that it intends to take evidence in support of the allegations of the amended complaint.

In behalf of respondent it is urged that the issue on the original trial was as to whether these deeds had been delivered and that the amended complaint tenders new and different equitable issues not before considered. These new issue are said to be the question of reformation of the deeds and the claim that Mrs. Resh is the equitable owner of a life estate in these properties. The respondent relies on Campanella v. Campanella, 204 Cal. 515, 269 P. 433; Lang v. Lang, 182 Cal. 765, 190 P. 181, and Linforth v. Montgomery, 195 Cal. 49, 231 P. 735. While the general rule is conceded to be that a judgment is conclusive as between the parties, not only as to the subject–matter in controversy but also as to every other matter that was or might have been litigated, it is argued that these cases establish an exception to that rule and that this case comes within such exception because new equitable issues were raised by the amended complaint.

While it may be freely conceded that the general rule referred to is subject to certain exceptions and that in a proper case a former judgment will not be a bar, such exceptions do not go to the extent here claimed. As pointed out in the cases just referred to, the general rule means that a judgment is conclusive upon the issues tendered by the plaintiff's complaint and the extent of the exception is that matters not tendered as issues in the action are not affected by the judgment therein.

The issue in the trial of the action was not merely as to the delivery of the deeds, or any of the other contentions set up, but was as to the title to the properties involved, including any and all estates or interests therein which the parties to the action claimed. The action involved more than the mere legal title, and the full rights and all of the claims of the parties were in issue and were involved in the decision. This included the claim that Mrs. Resh was entitled to a life estate in the properties which was particularly passed upon. She had her day in court and the full opportunity, as well as the duty, of presenting each and every claim she had to any interest in those properties. The court made findings of fact which have never been attacked. An appeal was taken solely from those portions of the judgment which awarded Mrs. Resh a life estate in the properties and the income therefrom. Those particular portions of the judgment were reversed, as not supported by the findings, leaving the remainder of the judgment in full force and effect and the same has become final. The cause was not remanded for a new trial but for further proceedings consistent with the decision reversing a part of the judgment. Certainly proceedings attacking the parts of the judgment which were not appealed from, and which had become final, were not authorized by the order of this court. The effect of our decision was that Mrs. Resh was not entitled to a life estate in the property. The only proceeding which might be taken in consistence with the opinion was to strike out those portions of the conclusions of law and the judgment which had been reversed.

Under these circumstances the trial court was without jurisdiction to permit amended pleadings and is without jurisdiction to proceed with a new trial on additional claims set up by Mrs. Resh. The very purpose of a quiet title action is to determine all the rights and claims of the parties thereto. When the claims set up have been submitted to the court and the judgment has become final, the stability and security of titles to real property demand that the judgment be final in fact as well as in name. To permit a party to such an action to rest on one reason why he claims an interest in real property and, if he eventually loses, to successively set up other reasons, each in turn, with possible appeals at each step, would result in interminable litigation and would end the usefulness of quiet title actions. In our opinion, this judgment, as amended through the reversal of certain portions thereof, is a final determination of all claims of any rights, estates or interests in said properties in so far as the parties to the action are concerned.

It is ordered that a writ of prohibition issue peremptorily prohibiting the respondent from taking any evidence or taking any further proceedings upon or making any further orders based on said amended complaint.

BARNARD, Presiding Justice.

We concur: MARKS, J.; JENNINGS, J.