JOHNSON v. CITY OF SANTA MONICA (1936)

The plaintiffs, husband and wife, recovered judgment against defendants McEntee and the city of Santa Monica and certain officials of the city for damages sustained when a truck driven by McEntee collided with a horse ridden by plaintiff Mrs. Johnson. In their answer defendants deny negligence on the part of Mr. McEntee and allege negligence on the part of Mrs. Johnson. The trial court found in favor of plaintiffs on both issues. The only contention presented by defendants on this appeal is that the evidence does not sustain the findings of the court on these issues.

In passing upon the question whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain the findings, we need only consider that portion of the evidence most favorable to plaintiffs, under the familiar rule that if there is any substantial evidence in the record to support the findings the judgment will not be reversed because of other evidence upon which the trial court might have made findings in favor of the losing party. Coats v. Hathorn, 121 Cal.App. 257, 8 P.(2d) 1038. In accordance with this rule the record discloses the following facts: On May 25, 1935, plaintiff Mrs. Johnson was riding her horse easterly on Westminster avenue toward the intersection of Centinella boulevard. The horse, which was about 12 years old, had been purchased by plaintiffs about three weeks before the accident. There was nothing about the animal to cause them to believe it was unruly. Both plaintiffs were familiar with horses and were experienced riders. On the day of the accident the horse was saddled by plaintiffs, and it appeared to be gentle and quiet. While Mrs. Johnson was riding along Westminster avenue the horse became unmanageable, and when she was at a distance of 150 to 200 feet from Centinella boulevard it “ran away” towards the intersection of the two streets. As Mrs. Johnson approached the intersection defendant McEntee was driving a truck in a northerly direction on Centinella boulevard towards the intersection of Westminster avenue at a speed of about 17 or 18 miles per hour. Directly behind McEntee's truck there was another truck, and behind this truck there was a Nash sedan. When he was approximately 80 to 100 feet from the intersection McEntee observed Mrs. Johnson riding the horse on Westminster towards Centinella and directly into the path of his truck. When he first observed her she was 100 to 125 feet west of Centinella boulevard. Some of the witnesses stated that the horse was out of control and running away at that point and that Mrs. Johnson appeared to be trying to stop the horse, “appearing to be sawing back and forth on its mouth” and standing in the stirrups. Defendant McEntee admitted that as he entered the intersection Mrs. Johnson was “pulling back real hard on the reins” and “half way standing”; that he then knew that she could not stop the horse. At this time Mrs. Johnson was approximately 20 feet west of the paved portion of Centinella boulevard and approximately 60 to 70 feet from the point of collision. McEntee did not stop his truck or change its speed. The horse violently struck the truck causing Mrs. Johnson to be thrown over the top of the cab. The horse was killed.

It was the function of the trial court to determine whether Mrs. Johnson exercised due care and whether the driver of the truck exercised ordinary care to avoid the accident. It was the duty of both parties to use reasonable care to avoid the collision. In Eddy v. Stowe, 43 Cal.App. 789, 185 P. 1024, 1026, the court, in considering a case in which the rider of a horse had obtained a judgment against the driver of an automobile, stated: “Both Eddy and Stowe had an equal right to the use of the road, but if defendant was in the better position to avoid the collision it was his duty to take all necessary steps to to do so, one of them being his duty to slow down and even to stop his car, if necessary, to avoid running against plaintiff's horse. Furtado v. Bird, 26 Cal.App. 152–158, 146 P. 58. With the knowledge that plaintiff's horse was frightened, it was appellant Stowe's duty to keep a lookout ahead, and as he approached the horse and rider, to note the movements of the horse, and when he saw, or by the exercise of reasonable caution, could have seen, that the horse was under excitement, bucking and manifesting unmistakable fright, ordinary care required him to slow up, stop his machine, or do whatever was reasonably required to relieve respondent of his perilous position. McIntyre v. Orner, 166 Ind. 57, 63, 76 N.E. 750, 4 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1136, 117 Am.St.Rep. 359, 8 Ann.Cas. 1087; Ward v. Meredith, 220 Ill. 66, 77 N.E. 118; Huddy on Automobiles (4th Ed.) sec. 128a, 129. * * * While he may have been proceeding along the highway in full compliance with the provisions of the Motor Vehicle Act, he was not thereby relieved of all obligations in the premises. He was approaching a person whom he admits he saw to be riding a frightened horse. He saw the horse and rider at a distance sufficiently great to enable him to have stopped, if need be, in order to avoid an accident. We cannot but feel that the jury was correct in finding that he was guilty of negligence in proceeding as he did, and that such negligence was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries.” See, also, Townsend v. Butterfield, 168 Cal. 564, 143 P. 760.

The trial court in weighing the evidence could draw reasonable inferences therefrom. We are satisfied that there is ample evidence to sustain the findings.

The judgment is affirmed.

WOOD, Justice.

We concur: CRAIL, P. J.; GOULD, Justice pro tem.