ANGLO CALIFORNIA NAT BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO v. LELAND (1936)

This is an original application for a writ of mandate to compel the respondent officials of San Luis Obispo county to accept the tender of certain sums by way of payment upon delinquent taxes and assessments on real property of petitioner. The sufficiency of the tender made by petitioner is conceded in the event that petitioner was entitled to avail itself of the provisions of section 3817c4 of the Political Code, which was adopted by the Legislature at the special session of 1936.

Said section 3817c4 was adopted to grant relief to property owners by permitting them to pay delinquent taxes and assessments in installments and thereby to extend the period of redemption. It relates to “all taxes and assessments and annual installments of assessments charged on the tax roll.” It covers “all cases where real estate has been sold to the State on or before July 6, 1936 * * * and the State has not disposed of the same. * * * ”

The refusal of respondents to accept the tender of petitioner is based upon the following facts: The property involved is located in what is known as assessment district No. 16. In 1930 and pursuant to the provisions of the County Improvement Act of 1921 (Stats. 1921, c. 872, p. 1658, as amended), which adopts and incorporates the Improvement Bond Act of 1915, as amended (Deering's Gen. Laws 1931, Act 8209), bonds were issued representing unpaid assessments for improvement work done within the district. Thereafter, the portion of the assessments which became due upon the property in question in the fiscal year 1932–1933 became delinquent and said property was sold on August 30, 1933, by operation of law and the declaration of the tax collector to the state of California. After the lapse of more than one year and in 1936, the respondent tax collector executed conveyances of said real property to the state of California, which conveyances were recorded on January 23, 1936. Respondents call attention to the fact that under the provisions of section 12 of said Improvement Bond Act of 1915, as amended, the property was subject to redemption within one year from date of sale only and that it is provided that the state holds the “title acquired at such sale” upon behalf of the county.

There are no headings in the briefs on file herein, but respondents' position is apparently summed up in the following paragraph: “We contend that the owners of the premises mentioned in the petition, not having redeemed within one year after the date of the sale, that year expiring August 30th, 1934, at that time the county acquired its title and had a vested interest in this property, which the State Legislature could not take away from it.” We find no merit in this contention. It is manifestly an attempt by respondents to assert upon behalf of the county, which is merely a political subdivision of the state itself, the same rights which a private person might acquire by purchasing upon a delinquent tax sale and awaiting the expiration of the period of redemption. It is generally held that the law in force at the time of a sale for nonpayment of taxes governs the right of redemption and that such period may not be diminished or extended by subsequent legislation to the prejudice of either the land owner or the purchaser at the tax sale. County of Los Angeles v. Rockhold, 3 Cal. (2d) 192, 44 P.(2d) 340, 100 A.L.R. 149. But this general rule may be said to have an exception where the state or one of its subdivisions is the purchaser. Board of Commissioners of Tippecanoe County v. Lucas, 93 U.S. 108, 23 L.Ed. 822; Essex Public Road Board v. Shinkle, 140 U.S. 334, 11 S.Ct. 790, 35 L.Ed. 446; Walker v. Ferguson, 176 Ark. 625, 3 S.W.(2d) 694, 695; McIver Abstract Co. v. Slaton, 178 Ark. 632, 11 S.W.(2d) 447; Grieb, County Clerk, v. National Bank, 252 Ky. 753, 68 S.W. (2d) 21; State v. Butts, 111 Fla. 630, 149 So. 746, 89 A.L.R. 946; Pace v. Wight, 25 N.M. 276, 181 P. 430; Warner v. Pile, 105 Kan. 724, 185 P. 1041, 1 A.L.R. 143. The distinction is clearly pointed out in Walker v. Ferguson, supra, 176 Ark. 625, 3 S.W. (2d) 694, at page 695, where the court said:

“Where lands are sold at a tax sale and are struck off to a private purchaser, the sale for the delinquent taxes constitutes a contract between the purchaser and the state, or the instrumentality of the state, the obligation of which cannot be impaired by subsequent legislation extending the period of the right to redeem. Hence this court has held that the right to redeem in such cases from a tax sale is governed by the statute in existence at the time the sale is made, and no subsequent statute extending the period of time for the right to redeem is constitutional.

“The title acquired by the state, or an instrumentality thereof, at a tax sale is not the same as that vesting in a private purchaser, since the object of the purchase is not the acquisition of the property, but rather the collection of the taxes. 37 Cyc. 1355, and Commissioners of Tippecanoe County v. Lucas, Treasurer, 93 U.S. 108, 23 L.Ed. 822. Hence the rule that a statute extending the time to redeem from a tax sale is not constitutionally applicable to sales made before its enactment is subject to an exception where the state or one of its instrumental subdivisions was the purchaser.”

We are therefore of the opinion that petitioner was entitled to avail itself of the provisions of section 3817c4 of the Political Code and that it was the duty of respondents to accept the tender made by petitioner. It is ordered that a peremptory writ of mandate issue directing respondents to accept payment for delinquent taxes and assessments upon the property described in the petition on file herein in the manner prescribed in section 3817c4 of the Political Code.

SPENCE, Justice.

We concur: NOURSE, P. J.; STURTEVANT, J.