BINGER v. PACIFIC GAS ELECTRIC CO (1936)

From a judgment fixing the amount of damages suffered by the plaintiff in a personal injury action, the defendant Pacific Gas & Electric Company has appealed. The facts on which the verdict rests are stated by plaintiff about as follows:

At about 10 a. m. on May 18, 1934––a year and five months before the trial––the plaintiff had just finished taking a bath in her bathroom in her residence at 1728 Tenth Street, Berkeley, Cal. She had dried herself and taken an alcohol rub after finishing her bath. In the bathroom was an electric heater which stood near the foot of the bathtub. The heater cord was inserted in one of the sockets of a double socket attachment. Into the other socket was inserted one end of an extension cord. The other end of the cord was inserted in a wire socket in the kitchen whence the heater was energized. The extension cord ran under the locked door of the bathroom. The plaintiff, while standing on the floor of the bathroom, and after she had dried herself, disconnected the extension cord from the socket, holding the cord in her left hand about two and one–half inches from the end. The end flipped back and one of the prongs struck her thumb and two fingers. She received a shock which was so severe that it precipitated her into the bathtub in which remained two or three inches of water. The prong froze to her thumb and fingers as she lay in the water. From the time the prong hit her finger burning commenced which continued until her mother, hearing her calls, pulled the plug in the kitchen cutting off the current. The plaintiff was then able to release the prong from her hand. As a result of the electrical current, the plaintiff sustained severe burns of the thumb and first and second digits of the left hand and various other contusions and burns. As a result of the burns, the skin and flesh on the hand of plaintiff, and part of the bone in her fingers, sloughed off.

While a point regarding the transmission cord is made and will hereafter be considered, no claim was made that the electrical wiring of plaintiff's house was in any manner defective. However, the house is supplied with 120 volts led from a pole standing in the street adjacent to plaintiff's house. The plaintiff pleaded, and thereafter offered proof, to the effect that the plaintiff's hand was burned by an excess of voltage negligently allowed by defendant to pass into plaintiff's residence over its secondary wires. It was a conceded fact the secondary wires carried a normal 110–220 volt circuit. However, it was the plaintiff's contention that at the time of the accident a much larger voltage was negligently allowed by the defendant to pass over the secondary wire and cause the injuries which the plaintiff suffered.

Of course, neither party was able to produce a witness who saw electricity either in small voltage or excessive voltage enter the plaintiff's house. However, each party depended upon the testimony given by experts. To prove her case the plaintiff introduced evidence to the effect that the burns she suffered could not be produced by a normal 120 volts. She also introduced evidence to the effect that the insulators on the poles in the street supported wires carrying 4,000 volts; that the primary distribution system was by the transformers reduced to 110–220 volts; and that the insulators in use were of limited capacity. She produced the catalogue of the manufacturer showing that the particular insulators under consideration were not of sufficient capacity when the climate in the neighborhood in which they were used was “severe––salt fouling or metallic dust––seasonal rains––ocean fog––smoke.” She also introduced evidence that on the morning of the accident it was foggy in the immediate neighborhood of her house. Mr. Crozier, an electrical engineer of much experience, was called and testified that under such weather conditions the current being conducted by the large volt circuit could and would leak and pass over the wet metal and wood and in and across the minor circuit entering the house. On the other hand, the defendant introduced evidence to the effect that there was not a particle of fog in the neighborhood of the plaintiff's house on the day of the accident; that the humidity was low; and that all of its equipment was and remained dry during the whole of day. It also introduced evidence to the effect that its insulators were abundantly large enough to support its wires and that the current did not leak. Furthermore, it introduced evidence to the effect that a current of 120 volts will, under certain conditions, produce burns such as the plaintiff suffered. Thereupon the defendant argues that the burns suffered by the plaintiff were caused by the normal voltage led into her house and not otherwise, and that the defendant was in no respect negligent. In making these points the defendant makes numerous attacks on the evidence. The plaintiff replies that the position of the defendant is to ask a court of review to reweigh and reconsider the evidence on which was based the implied findings of the jury where the evidence was conflicting. The defendant disclaims that it is attempting to do so. However, we think the legal effect of its attacks is subject to the charge made by the plaintiff. As shown above, the plaintiff's case and the defendant's reply rest wholly on testimony given by experts. The vice in the reasoning of the defendant rests in the contentions which it makes as to the power of court or jury in weighing expert testimony. In that regard we think the defendant confuses two well–established rules applicable to two different lines of cases in which there is a well–defined boundary. In Spencer v. Collins, 156 Cal. 298, 104 P. 320, 324, 20 Ann.Cas. 49, experts were not called to testify regarding the value of the services of an attorney. The court held such expert testimony was not necessary, saying: “The value of attorney's services is a matter with which a judge must necessarily be familiar. When the court is informed of the extent and nature of such services, its own experience furnishes it with every element necessary to fix their value.” In Linforth v. S. F. Gas & Electric Co., 156 Cal. 58, 103 P. 320, 19 Ann.Cas. 1230, the amount of damage by an explosion to a building was involved. Experts on value were called. At page 63 of 156 Cal., 103 P. 320, 322, 19 Ann.Cas. 1230, the court quoted with approval as follows: “Sutherland on Damages (3d Ed.) § 456, says: ‘So far as the amount of the verdict depends upon opinion, the jurors are to determine it upon their own judgment. They should proceed upon the description of the subject as they find it from the testimony, and avail themselves of such aid as is afforded to be given them. They are not obliged, however, to yield their own judgment, and should not conform their verdict to such opinions. Their findings may be more or less in amount than that stated by any witness.”’ (Italics ours.) In Ehlers v. Wannack Brothers, 118 Cal. 310, 50 P. 433, the value of the services of an architect was involved. At page 312 of 118 Cal., 50 P. 433, the court quoted with approval an instruction which had been given regarding the opinions of experts: “The purpose of their introduction is to supplement the general knowledge and experience of the jury in relation to the matters before them, and thereby to aid them in the exercise of their own judgment, to the end that a more just and accurate conclusion as to the value may be drawn from the evidence.” And in In re Redfield's Estate 116 Cal. 637, at page 655, 48 P. 794, 799, the court quoted with approval as follows: “The opinion of a witness must be brought to the test of facts, that the court may judge what estimate the opinion is entitled to. It is proper and legal to ask a witness his opinion as to the mental capacity of the individual to discharge the duty in question. The court will judge of * * * the proper weight to be given to his opinion from the facts and circumstances upon which he founds his opinion.” All of the foregoing cases, it will be noted, involved questions on which the opinions of experts were introduced to supplement the general knowledge of the jury. But there are, as in the instant case, situations involving a subject–matter of special technical science on which the members of the jury, or the trial court sitting without a jury, are not presumed to be specially informed. Such cases can be established only by the testimony of experts. 10 Cal.Jur. 993. If in such a case expert opinion evidence on a material issue of the science involved is absent, then the plaintiff has failed to make out a case. Callahan v. Hahnemann Hospital, 1 Cal.(2d) 447, 35 P.(2d) 536. Again, if in the same supposititious case such expert evidence is produced, the trier of the facts is not at liberty to disregard it arbitrarily but must “hear and weigh the expert testimony, however conflicting it may be, with the same feeling of duty and responsibility as rests upon them in hearing and considering the other testimony, to the end that they may get from it all the aid it can give them in coming to a right decision of the very case in hand.” Sheldon v. Wright, 80 Vt. 298, 67 A. 807, 814.

The defendant asserts that the insulators in question were adequate, even though they supported a 4,000–volt circuit and the severe climatic conditions existed. Mr. Crozier testified to the contrary. Again, the defendant contends that its primary circuit was a single phase 2,400–volt circuit and the insulator was adequate in any weather, however severe. Mr. Crozier testified to the contrary. Again, the defendant contends that severe climatic conditions referred to in the catalogue do not prevail in Berkeley and did not prevail on May 18, 1934. There was evidence that Berkeley is subject to ocean fogs. The catalogue, in designating the use of such insulators, makes an exception of places where ocean fogs prevail. The plaintiff and her husband both testified that fog prevailed at their house on the morning of May 18, 1934. Finally, the defendant contends that Mr. Crozier was in error in stating that the burns could not have been caused by 120 volts. There was evidence they could have been, depending on the circumstances, including, among others, whether the plaintiff was in contact with a good conductor or nonconductor. Much expert evidence was introduced. The most that can be said is that it was conflicting.

As stated above, the defendant makes an attack on the extension cord which the plaintiff used. The defendant contends that she used it in violation of the provisions of one of the ordinances of the city of Berkeley. The plaintiff replied that, even though she did, such fact was in no manner a proximate cause of her injury. The reply seems to be entirely sufficient, as the evidence was to the effect that the cord was found to be in good condition. But, the defendant asserts, if the cord had been reinforced, it would not have bent, allowing the prong to bend back on the plaintiff's fingers. That subject was, no doubt, argued before the jury. Furthermore, all questions regarding the cord came in under the defense of contributory negligence which, under appropriate instructions, was submitted to the jury, and it found against the defendant and in favor of the plaintiff.

The judgment is affirmed.

STURTEVANT, Justice.

We concur: NOURSE, P. J.; SPENCE, J.