PEOPLE v. HEADLEE (1941)

After trial before the court without a jury, from judgments of guilty of (1) kidnapping for the purpose of robbery, (2) robbery in the first degree, and (3) rape, defendant appeals.

He also appeals from orders denying his motions for a new trial.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the people (respondent), the essential facts are:

April 14, 1940, defendant asked the bartender at McDonald's Party House to call a taxi cab. This the bartender did. Defendant entered the cab, which was operated by John Fontana. Sitting in the front seat with the driver were a Miss Cash and Mrs. Goodwin. Defendant stated that he wished to go to Southgate. When the cab reached the intersection of Long Beach Boulevard and Rosecrans Avenue in the city of Compton, defendant put a gun against the driver's neck and ordered him not to slow down for a boulevard stop but to keep going. From this point on defendant dictated the movements of the cab, frequently threatening to do physical harm to the occupants thereof if they disregarded his orders. He finally directed that they stop at an auto court. He forced the driver to precede him to the proprietor's office, where two rooms were rented and, at defendant's direction, the driver turned over to the proprietor of the auto court $2.50 in partial payment for the rooms. During the renting of the rooms the two women remained outside in the cab. Defendant then ordered Mr. Fontana and Mrs. Goodwin to enter one of the cabins, lock the door and stay there. He ordered Miss Cash to enter the other cabin. There he told her to undress, undressed himself, ordered her to lie on the bed, put one of his revolvers under the pillow, and proceeded to have sexual intercourse with her, she testifying that she permitted the act because she thought defendant would kill her if she resisted.

Defendant relies for reversal of the judgments on this proposition:

The evidence is insufficient to sustain the judgment on the charges of (a) kidnapping for the purpose of robbery, (b) robbery, and (c) rape.

The foregoing proposition is untenable.

(a) There can be no question from the facts set forth above that defendant kidnapped Mr. Fontana and his two companions. It is likewise clear that by his acts he took Mr. Fontana's cab from him and into his own immediate possession and control as set forth above, and that he directed the movements of the cab from the time he placed the gun in the driver's back until they arrived at the auto court. Hence, there was a taking of the cab by defendant, which constituted robbery.

(b) The evidence discloses that Mr. Fontana, at defendant's direction and through fear, gave $2.50 to the proprietor of the auto court where they rented cabins. This Mr. Fontana did at the order of defendant and because he feared him. Certainly this falls within section 211 of the Penal Code, providing that robbery is the feloniously taking of personal property in the possession of another from his person or immediate presence and against his will, accompanied by means of force or fear. There is no merit in defendant's contention that he was not guilty of robbery because he at no time had the $2.50 in his own hands. It would be as reasonable to argue that, if defendant had marched his victim at the point of a gun to the end of a pier and then told him to throw his watch into the sea, which the victim did because of fear, defendant would not be guilty of robbery. The gist of this crime is defendant's unlawfully depriving his victim of his personal property feloniously.

(c) Miss Cash testified that she entered the cabin upon the order of defendant, undressed at his order when he pointed a gun at her, and permitted him to have intercourse with her, for the reason that she feared he would harm her if she resisted. Clearly such evidence sustains the conviction on the charge of rape. The arguments which counsel has addressed to this court upon the subject of the inherent improbability of the witness' testimony and the conflicts therein are proper matters to present to a trial jury but cannot be considered by us.

For the foregoing reasons the judgments and orders are and each is affirmed.

McCOMB, Justice.

MOORE, P.J., concurred.