ROBERT v. PEOPLE (1992)

SUMMARY AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

By petition for extraordinary writ, Robert S. challenges an order entered in his pending juvenile court delinquency proceeding ¹ which requires him to provide certain discovery to the prosecutor.   As will be seen, we uphold the discovery order and deny the peremptory writ.

In the pending delinquency proceeding, Robert is alleged to have committed murder (Pen.Code, § 187, subd. (a)), and assault with a deadly weapon (Pen.Code, §§ 245, subd. (a)(1)).   Enhancements pursuant to Penal Code sections 12022, subd. (d) (personal use of a knife), 12022.7 (great bodily injury), 1192.7, subdivision (c)(8) (serious felony) and 186.22, subdivision (b)(1) (criminal street gang related) are pleaded as well.   The crimes occurred January 1, 1991, when Robert was 14 years old.

Following the prosecutor's discovery motion and briefing and argument by the parties, respondent juvenile court ordered real party and the minor to provide one another with the names and addresses of witnesses to be called at trial, relevant written or recorded statements of those witnesses, reports of experts to be called at trial, results of physical and mental examinations to be used at trial, and real evidence to be offered at trial.   Respondent relied on its discretionary authority (Joe Z. v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 797, 801–802, 91 Cal.Rptr. 594, 478 P.2d 26) “to permit, upon a proper showing, discovery between the parties.”  (Id. at p. 801, 91 Cal.Rptr. 594, 478 P.2d 26.)

 Robert's petition to this court followed, challenging the order to the extent that it required him to provide discovery to real party.   We summarily denied the petition;  Robert sought review in the California Supreme Court and requested a stay of his then-pending jurisdictional hearing.   Our high court granted review and retransferred the matter to us with directions that we issue our alternative writ.  (Code Civ.Proc., §§ 1087, 1104, 1105.) ²  We complied and granted the pending stay request.

DISCUSSION

Real party contends that the order of the juvenile court is justified because the discovery provisions of Proposition 115 (Cal.Const., art. I, § 30, subd. (c) and Pen.Code § 1054 et seq.) were intended to be and are applicable to delinquency proceedings.   Alternatively, it is argued that the law governing discovery in adult cases should apply at the discretion of the juvenile court.

Petitioner responds that the discovery provisions of Proposition 115 are inapplicable to juvenile delinquency proceedings and that in any case, they are unworkable in the time frames mandated in such cases.   He maintains as well that those provisions and the order at issue here violate the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution and the work product rule.   Last, he argues that the California Rules of Court govern discovery in delinquency proceedings and that the challenged order conflicts with those rules.

1. Applicability of Proposition 115 Discovery Provisions to Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings.

 As the Attorney General concedes, the discovery provisions of Proposition 115, section 30, subdivision (c), article I, of the California Constitution, and Penal Code section 1054 et seq. expressly apply only to “criminal cases” (Pen.Code § 1054.5, subd. (a)), and use terms inapplicable to delinquency proceedings.  (E.g., “defendant,” “prosecuting attorney,” and “jury.”  (Pen.Code §§ 1054.1, 1054.2, 1054.5 and 1054.6))  It is axiomatic that “[w]ords used in a ․ constitutional provision should be given the meaning they bear in ordinary use.  [Citations.]  If the language is clear and unambiguous there is no need for construction, nor is it necessary to resort to indicia of the intent of ․ the voters․  [Citations.]”  (Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727, 735, 248 Cal.Rptr. 115, 755 P.2d 299.)

 Moreover, the electorate is deemed to have been aware of existing laws and judicial constructions at the time an initiative is enacted.   (People v. Weidert (1985) 39 Cal.3d 836, 844, 218 Cal.Rptr. 57, 705 P.2d 380.)   In People v. Weidert, supra, our high court was confronted with a question identical to that before us—whether a constitutional amendment adopted by the voters was applicable to juvenile court proceedings despite its exclusive reference to “criminal” proceedings.   The high court's answer to that question was likewise identical to the conclusion we reach today.   Holding the amendment inapplicable to juvenile proceedings, the court explained that “[f]or over 20 years, California law has provided that ‘[a]n order adjudging a minor to be a ward of the juvenile court shall not be deemed a conviction of a crime for any purpose, nor shall a proceeding in the juvenile court be deemed a criminal proceeding.’  (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 203, italics added.)   The plain fact is that the electorate, deemed aware of section 203, enacted a provision which contains no language applicable to juvenile proceedings.

“The 1976 reenactment of Welfare and Institutions Code section 203 ․ also supports our conclusion.   That reenactment came after a number of court decisions accorded juveniles many of the protections available to adult defendants.   Further, many other statutory provisions giving minors the same rights as adults were passed at the time of the reenactment.   This reaffirmation of the distinction between juvenile and criminal proceedings shows the clear intent of the Legislature․

“․

“Where the language of a statute uses terms that have been judicially construed, ‘ “the presumption is almost irresistible” ’ that the terms have been used ‘ “in the precise and technical sense which had been placed upon them by the courts.” ’  (Citations.)  This principle applies to legislation adopted through the initiative process.  (Citation.)”  People v. Weidert, supra, 39 Cal.3d at pp. 844–846, 218 Cal.Rptr. 57, 705 P.2d 380.  (Fns. omitted.)

 In enacting Proposition 115, the voters are thus deemed to have been aware of the distinction between juvenile and criminal proceedings set forth in Welfare and Institutions Code section 203, yet they failed to specifically include juvenile proceedings in the reciprocal discovery provisions.   Such a failure becomes meaningful in discerning the framers' intent by the fact that elsewhere Proposition 115 amended the very Penal Code section at issue in People v. Weidert, supra, 39 Cal.3d 836, 218 Cal.Rptr. 57, 705 P.2d 380 (Pen.Code § 190.2, subdivision (a)(10)) so that it now expressly includes “juvenile proceedings.” ³

We hold that the voters did not intend to mandate application of the discovery provisions of Proposition 115 to juvenile delinquency proceedings.

2. The Challenged Order.

 We nevertheless agree with the Attorney General that the juvenile court had the discretionary authority to make a discovery order consistent with Penal Code sections 1054 et seq. and, having reviewed the record in this case, we find no abuse of respondent's discretion.⁴

For over 20 years adult criminal discovery practice has been routinely applied in juvenile delinquency proceedings.   Our high court in Joe Z. v. Superior Court, supra, 3 Cal.3d 797, 801, 91 Cal.Rptr. 594, 478 P.2d 26, explained that while juvenile proceedings were neither “civil” nor “criminal,” they were “quasi-criminal” in character “involving as they often do the possibility of a substantial loss of personal freedom” (ibid.), so that “juvenile courts should have the same degree of discretion as a court in an ordinary criminal case to permit, upon a proper showing, discovery between the parties.”  (Ibid.;  see also Kelvin L. v. Superior Court (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 823, 133 Cal.Rptr. 325;  Dell M. v. Superior Court (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 782, 144 Cal.Rptr. 418;  In re Ricky B. (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 106, 146 Cal.Rptr. 828;  In re Benny S. (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 102, 281 Cal.Rptr. 1.)

Petitioner insists, however, that reciprocal discovery is inappropriate in a delinquency proceeding, and urges us to reject the order issued in this case.   He points out that despite the 1984 reenactment of Welfare and Institutions Code section 202, which placed an increased emphasis on punishment ⁵ courts have consistently held that the overall rehabilitative aspect of that law remained unaltered.  (In re Charles C. (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 952, 960, 284 Cal.Rptr. 4).   As the court in In re Charles C., explained, “[i]n fact, the new language only reinforces the different purposes underlying the juvenile and adult procedures:  ․  The state's punishment of minors is a ‘rehabilitative tool’ (In re Lorenza M. (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 49, 57 [260 Cal.Rptr. 258] ), distinguishable from the criminal justice system for adults which has a purely punitive purpose separate from its rehabilitative goals.   (In re Samuel V. (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 511, 517 [277 Cal.Rptr. 14].)”   (Ibid.)

But these aspects of juvenile delinquency proceedings, in our view, reinforce the appropriateness of respondent's discovery order.   The “need for expeditious and informal adjudications in juvenile court” (Joe Z. v. Superior Court, supra, 3 Cal.3d 797, 801, 91 Cal.Rptr. 594, 478 P.2d 26), may often be facilitated by an order paralleling the provisions of Penal Code section 1054, et seq. which have as their purpose the ascertainment of truth, savings in court time, and the avoidance of interruption and postponement.   (Pen.Code § 1054.) ⁶

3. Federal Constitutional and Work Product Challenges.

 Petitioner next contends that compelled prehearing disclosure of his witnesses and their statements violates the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, as well as his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and the work product rule.   We also reject these claims.

Respondent's order parallels the disclosure provisions of Penal Code section 1054 et seq.   In Izazaga v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 356, 285 Cal.Rptr. 231, 815 P.2d 304, our high court analyzed identical challenges to these provisions and held them not violative of the self-incrimination clause.  (Id., at pp. 365–369, 285 Cal.Rptr. 231, 815 P.2d 304.)   Petitioner's Sixth Amendment and work product rule challenges to compelled disclosure were likewise rejected by Izazaga, supra, at pp. 379–382, 285 Cal.Rptr. 231, 815 P.2d 304), and we find that case controlling.

4. Conflict with California Rules of Court.

 Last, petitioner urges that the challenged order conflicts with California Rules of Court, rule 1420 (hereafter rule 1420) which sets forth the procedure for discovery in juvenile court proceedings and makes no provision for reciprocal discovery.   It is petitioner's view that the rule therefore prohibits the reciprocity required by respondent.

Petitioner's reliance on the rule is misplaced.  Rule 1420 is one of the Juvenile Court Rules promulgated by the Judicial Council whose authority is limited by our California Constitution.   The council may only “adopt rules for court administration, practice and procedure, not inconsistent with statute, and perform other functions prescribed by statute.”  (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 6;  People v. Wright (1982) 30 Cal.3d 705, 712, 180 Cal.Rptr. 196, 639 P.2d 267.)   In Welfare and Institutions Code section 265 the legislature delegated limited rule making power to the Council by requiring it to “establish rules governing practice and procedure in the juvenile court not inconsistent with law.”  (Emphasis added.)

As we have seen, a juvenile court in a delinquency proceeding possesses the same degree of discretion as a criminal court to permit discovery, including reciprocal discovery.  (Joe Z. v. Superior Court, supra, 3 Cal.3d 797, 801, 91 Cal.Rptr. 594, 478 P.2d 26.)   To the extent that rule 1420 impedes the exercise of that discretion, it must yield.

CONCLUSION

The alternative writ is discharged and the petition filed herein is denied.   The stay order previously imposed by this court shall remain in effect until issuance of the remittitur.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The petition against Robert was filed pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602.   Hereafter, we shall use the phrase delinquency proceeding to refer to juvenile court proceedings on criminal causes.  (Welf. & Inst.Code, §§ 602, 777, 707.)   Nothing in this opinion is intended to apply to proceedings commenced pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300.

2.   Such an order constitutes a determination that petitioner is without an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law (Omaha Indemnity Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1266, 1274–1275, 258 Cal.Rptr. 66), but not that he is necessarily correct in his arguments on the merits.

3.   Proposition 115 also amended article I, section 24 of the California Constitution and in doing so made specific reference to “minors in juvenile proceedings on criminal causes.”   That amendment, however, was declared an invalid constitutional revision in Raven v. Deukmejian (1990) 52 Cal.3d 336, 355, 276 Cal.Rptr. 326, 801 P.2d 1077.)

4.   We need not address petitioner's concern that the time frames mandated §§ 1054, subd. (e);  1054.5, subd. (a) for discovery in adult criminal cases (Pen.Code, §§ 1054.7, 1054.5, subd. (b)) are unworkable in delinquency proceedings;  a juvenile court necessarily has the discretion to adapt these provisions to the case before it.   (Welf. & Inst.Code, §§ 636, 657.)

5.   The section provides in relevant part:  “․ Minors under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court as a consequence of delinquent conduct shall, in conformity with the interest of public safety and protection, receive care, treatment and guidance which is consistent with their best interest, which holds them accountable for their behavior, and which is appropriate for their circumstances.   This guidance may include punishment that is consistent with the rehabilitative objectives of this chapter․”

6.   The Attorney General asks us to go further and hold that the failure of a juvenile court to order reciprocal discovery when requested must invariably be deemed an abuse of discretion.   We decline to do so.   The issue is not before us, respondent having ordered reciprocal discovery.

DOSSEE, Associate Justice.

STRANKMAN, P.J., and STEIN, J., concur.