GARCIA v. COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA (1991)

After default judgments for reimbursement of welfare benefits were entered against them, Johnny Garcia and James Mastro filed a class action for declaratory relief, challenging Santa Clara County's (County) practice of not specifying an amount of reimbursement in its complaints to establish paternity and child support obligations.  (Code Civ.Proc., §§ 425.10, 580, 585;  Welf. & Inst. Code, § 11350.)   They appeal from the trial court's order denying their motion for class certification, and granting the county's motion for summary judgment (Code Civ.Proc., § 437c).   We affirm the order for the reasons stated below.

Facts

County filed a complaint against appellant Garcia, alleging he was the father of a minor child and that he was separated from the child who was receiving public assistance.   County alleged Garcia had the ability to reimburse county for its expenditures and to pay costs and attorney's fees.   In the prayer for relief, County requested a declaration that Garcia was the father of the child, and an order requiring Garcia to pay a reasonable amount of child support each month and to reimburse County for all expenditures made for the support of Garcia's minor child to the time of trial.   County filed a similar complaint against James Mastro.

On County's request, the superior court clerk entered the defaults of Garcia and Mastro.   The trial court then entered default judgments.   County's judgment against Garcia was for $2,420.65 in reimbursement;  the judgment against Mastro was for $2,200, and the court ordered him to pay ongoing support of $100 per month.   Appellants now urge, as they did to the trial court, that the judgments are void because the complaints did not set out the amount of reimbursement that was sought.  (Code Civ.Proc., §§ 425.10, 580, 585.)

Before appellants filed their class action, their attorneys negotiated with the District Attorney's office, which agreed to modify its form complaint to include an amount in the prayer for relief.   Three of four samples of the modified complaint in the record contain prayers such as $633 per month for the three years prior to the date of the filing of the complaint, and $633 per month from filing.

Discussion

Appellants' primary contention is that County's paternity complaints violated the requirements of sections 425.10, 580, and 585 of the Code of Civil Procedure.   Specifically they complain that the form complaints on their faces do not describe an ascertainable amount of damages, so that entry of the default judgments violated their due process rights.   Appellants further contend that Welfare and Institutions Code, section 11350 does not supersede the cited sections of the Code of Civil Procedure.   Finally, appellants assign as error the trial court's denial of their motion for class certification.

Background

 Congress amended the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. § 301 et seq.) in 1974 because the welfare rolls reflected that a significant number of children participating in the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program were not being supported by their absent parents.  (Cunningham v. Superior Court (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 336, 339, 222 Cal.Rptr. 854.)   Studies showed the main factor explaining the increase in the welfare rolls was illegitimacy.  (Ibid.)  Federal and state legislation was enacted to require absent parents of children receiving aid to reimburse all or a part of the public funds spent on supporting their children.  (Ibid.;  42 U.S.C. § 654;  45 C.F.R. § 302.31;  Welf. & Inst.Code, §§ 11350, 11350.1, 11475 et seq.)   California law requires a custodial parent to assign his or her right to child support to the county as a condition of receiving AFDC benefits.  (Cunningham v. Superior Court, supra, 177 Cal.App.3d at p. 340, 222 Cal.Rptr. 854;  Welf. & Inst.Code, § 11477.)

The County District Attorney is charged with the responsibility of enforcing support orders and recovering from noncustodial parents the aid paid to support their minor children.  (Welf. & Inst.Code, §§ 11350, 11475.1, 11476.)   The county must bring an action against the noncustodial parent for either the amount specified in a support order or the amount of aid paid to a family during separation, limited by the parent's reasonable ability to pay.  (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 11350, subds. (a) and (b).)   Fulfilling this obligation, county sued appellants Garcia and Mastro.

Sufficiency of County's Form Complaint

 In the complaint against Garcia, County alleges the jurisdictional facts that he is separated from his minor child who lives in the county and is receiving welfare benefits.  (County of Los Angeles v. Ferguson (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 549, 555, 156 Cal.Rptr. 565.)   County alleges that Garcia has the reasonable ability to reimburse it for public assistance paid for this child.   In the prayer County asks for a judgment of paternity, for an order of ongoing child support, and for reimbursement for all expenditures made for the child until the time of trial.   Appellants do not challenge the default judgments for ongoing support and paternity, only the order for reimbursement.

Except for an action for personal injury or wrongful death brought in superior court, a complaint which demands monetary recovery must specify the amount sought.  (Code Civ.Proc., § 425.10.)  “The relief granted to the plaintiff, if there be no answer, cannot exceed that which he shall have demanded in his complaint;  but in any other case, the Court may grant him any relief consistent with the case made by the complaint and embraced within the issue.”  (Code Civ.Proc., § 580.)   When defendant defaults, the court hears plaintiff's evidence and renders judgment for plaintiff for the relief demanded in the complaint.  (Code Civ.Proc., § 585.)

The county argues that if the language of the prayer of the complaint puts a defendant on notice of the amount prayed for, the purpose of Code of Civil Procedure section 580 is met.   It relies for this proposition on Greenup v. Rodman (1986) 42 Cal.3d 822, 231 Cal.Rptr. 220, 726 P.2d 1295.   In that case a majority stockholder had his answer stricken as a discovery sanction in the minority stockholder's suit for fraud.  (Id. at p. 824, 231 Cal.Rptr. 220, 726 P.2d 1295.)   In the body of the complaint plaintiff claimed damages “ ‘in a sum that exceeds the jurisdictional requirements of this [superior] court,’ ” and in the prayer plaintiff asked merely for damages “ ‘subject to proof at the time of trial.’ ”  (Id. at p. 825, 231 Cal.Rptr. 220, 726 P.2d 1295.)   The trial court awarded compensatory damages of $338,000, and the Supreme Court reversed.  (Id. at pp. 826, 831, 231 Cal.Rptr. 220, 726 P.2d 1295.)   The Court held, however, that the award was valid for $15,000, then the minimum amount in controversy for superior court, because defendant, when he defaulted by obstructing discovery, was on notice that his exposure to liability would be at least $15,000.  (Id. at p. 830, 231 Cal.Rptr. 220, 726 P.2d 1295.)

The county also relies on Brown v. McAdoo (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d Supp. 20, 242 Cal.Rptr. 473, a similar case.   In suit by a tenant against his landlord, plaintiff waived all amounts in excess of the jurisdictional limits of the municipal court.  (Id. at Supp. 22, 242 Cal.Rptr. 473.)   Plaintiff obtained a default judgment.  (Ibid.)  The appellate court held that defendant was on notice his exposure could reach $25,000, the maximum amount in controversy for municipal court, so the judgment for that amount was affirmed.  (Id. at Supp. 23–24, 242 Cal.Rptr. 473.)

County's proposition is sound, but we fail to see the analogy between the minimum or maximum amounts in controversy in Greenup and Brown and the pleadings under scrutiny here.   County's prayer for relief seeks reimbursement for all expenditures made to support defendant's minor child to the time of trial.   No specific amount of reimbursement is designated.   The cited statutes in the Welfare and Institutions Code do not specify a jurisdictional minimum or maximum amount.

We see a parallel between County's paternity complaints requesting reimbursement and petitions for dissolution which request child support.   Since a formerly-married custodial parent assigns his or her right to support under a divorce decree to the County as a condition of receiving AFDC benefits (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 11477), County is in the same position as a formerly married parent enforcing a support order against an ex-spouse.  (Civ.Code, § 248.)   Thus, County's action for reimbursement is similar to a parent's action to enforce support orders against the supporting parent.

We granted rehearing in this case to consider the effect of the California Supreme Court's recent decision in In re Marriage of Lippel (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1160, 276 Cal.Rptr. 290, 801 P.2d 1041, on the instant case.   The trial court in that dissolution action awarded child support of $100 per month to petitioner-wife, although she had not checked the box requesting child support on the Judicial-Council-approved form complaint.  (Id. at p. 1163, 276 Cal.Rptr. 290, 801 P.2d 1041.)   Husband defaulted and received only a notice that the judgment had been entered.  (Id. at pp. 1163–1164, 276 Cal.Rptr. 290, 801 P.2d 1041.)   Wife applied for and received AFDC benefits, and assigned her right to sue husband for the court-ordered support to the City and County of San Francisco.  (Id. at p. 1164, 276 Cal.Rptr. 290, 801 P.2d 1041.)   Sixteen years later the County sought an assignment of Husband's wages, alleging more than $18,000 was due as reimbursement for AFDC benefits paid out to support the daughter.  (Ibid.)  Husband moved to vacate the child support order, but following California Supreme Court precedent the trial court denied the motion.  (Id. at p. 1165, 276 Cal.Rptr. 290, 801 P.2d 1041.)

 The California Supreme Court reversed.  (Id. at p. 1173, 276 Cal.Rptr. 290, 801 P.2d 1041.)   The issue confronting the Supreme Court was whether the award of child support, without any notice to Husband, could stand in light of due process and section 580 of the Code of Civil Procedure.   (Id. at p. 1165, 276 Cal.Rptr. 290, 801 P.2d 1041.)   The court noted that due process requires proper notice and an opportunity to defend before a judgment can be entered against a defendant.  (Id. at p. 1166, 276 Cal.Rptr. 290, 801 P.2d 1041.)   In California, due process in default actions is assured by Code of Civil Procedure section 580 which requires that the relief awarded not exceed that demanded in the complaint.  (Ibid.)  The court found the statute means what it says.  (Ibid.)  For instance, where a wife in a dissolution action neglected to request in the prayer of her complaint that the family home be awarded to her, such an award was invalid.  (Id. at pp. 1166–1167, 276 Cal.Rptr. 290, 801 P.2d 1041, citing Burtnett v. King (1949) 33 Cal.2d 805, 807, 811, 205 P.2d 657.)   Also, an award of spousal support exceeds the court's jurisdiction where there is no request for it in the prayer of the complaint.  (Id. 51 Cal.3d at p. 1167, 276 Cal.Rptr. 290, 801 P.2d 1041;  In re Marriage of Wells (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 1434, 1437–1438, 254 Cal.Rptr. 185.)

The court overruled Cohen v. Cohen (1906) 150 Cal. 99, 88 P. 267, which had held that an award of child support or spousal support was so germane to the cause of action for divorce that it could be awarded in a default case, even upon a failure to request it in the prayer for relief.  (Id. 51 Cal.3d at p. 1168, 276 Cal.Rptr. 290, 801 P.2d 1041.)   Whatever its wisdom when decided, Cohen could no longer stand in view of the 1970 Family Law Act (Civ. Code, § 4000 et seq.) and its provision for Judicial-Council-approved form complaints.  (Id. at p. 1169, 276 Cal.Rptr. 290, 801 P.2d 1041.)   The Family Law Act abolished the traditional complaint with its general prayer for relief (like that used in Cohen ), and substituted the Judicial-Council-approved form, which has boxes to check next to the specific types of relief being requested.  (Ibid.)  Petitioner-wife did not check the box for requesting an award of child support, so Husband was not on notice it could be awarded.  (Id. at p. 1170, 276 Cal.Rptr. 290, 801 P.2d 1041.)   Thus, the order awarding child support, sought to be enforced by County against Husband, was void as in excess of the trial court's jurisdiction.  (Id. at pp. 1170–1171, 276 Cal.Rptr. 290, 801 P.2d 1041.)

Lippel teaches us that there must be a request for child support or the court exceeds its jurisdiction in awarding it against a defaulting spouse.   In the instant case, the complaints contain requests for reimbursement for past child support.   The Judicial Council form complaint with the box for child support checked off still does not identify the exact amount of child support that is requested.   This is so, we think, because it is recognized that a number of variables enter into such a determination—the custodial parent's ability to support himself/herself and the child, the noncustodial parent's ability to pay, and the like.   The equation in a paternity action also has many variables:  the time between the filing of the complaint and the time of trial, the amount of AFDC benefits awarded (which is reduced when the family has other sources of income), the standard benefit which is adjusted from time to time, the absent father's ability to pay, and the like.   While County's present form complaints admirably approximate the amount that may be due, its earlier complaints requesting past child support but neglecting to say exactly how much are not defective.   They are not defective because they impart as much information as the Judicial-Council-approved form complaint in a standard dissolution action.  (In re Marriage of Lippel, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 1170, 276 Cal.Rptr. 290, 801 P.2d 1041.)

The order granting County's motion for summary judgment and denying plaintiffs' motion for class certification is affirmed.   Each party shall bear its own costs on appeal.

ELIA, Associate Justice.

CAPACCIOLI, Acting P.J., and PREMO, J., concur.