PEOPLE v. HINTON (1991)

We hold that when the police stop an automobile for the sole reason of arresting a passenger on outstanding warrants they may not require either the driver or a passenger to produce a driver's license or other identification.   We reverse the judgment entered after plea of guilty.

All of the issues arise from the stop, detentions, searches and seizures of appellants and their property challenged by them under Penal Code section 1538.5.   After the denial of appellants' motions to suppress, each pled guilty to a violation of Health and Safety Code section 11351.5, possession for sale of rock cocaine.   The facts viewed most favorably to the court's denial of the motions to suppress are as follows:

Members of the Ventura Police Department were conducting a surveillance on the home of Ms. Ralph based on anonymous reports she was selling drugs there.   The police knew she had seven outstanding warrants for her arrest.   Early in the afternoon appellants Hinton and Walton arrived at the house in a truck driven by Walton.   About a half hour later Hinton, Walton and Ralph left the house and got in the truck.   They were observed and followed for over a mile to and onto a freeway.   The supervisor of the surveillance team, Sergeant Bowman, then stopped the vehicle in order to arrest Ms. Ralph on the outstanding warrants.

Upon approaching the vehicle all three persons were told to get out of the car.   Walton, the driver was told to produce his driver's license.   He produced a class four license which entitles him to drive a motorcycle but not a passenger vehicle.

Upon seeing Walton's name on his driver's license, Bowman recognized it as a person recently convicted of a drug offense.   Bowman asked him if he was on parole or probation.   Soon thereafter another officer arrived at the scene who recognized Walton and knew he was on probation and subject to search as a condition thereof.   He then searched his person, personal effects and the auto.   The officer seized a hotel key from Walton's wallet.

Bowman then asked Hinton for identification.   He stated he had none.   He was asked for his name and address and date of birth.   He responded truthfully.   Ms. Ralph was arrested.

Bowman wished to more thoroughly search the vehicle than was possible at the side of the freeway.   He told an officer to drive it to the police station since neither of the appellants had a valid driver's license.   He also decided it was dangerous to leave Walton and Hinton on the freeway and requested another officer to place them in a police car and transport them to the police station.   Unknown to appellants Bowman had a hidden tape recorder activated in the police car where appellants were placed alone while other administrative details were arranged.

At the police station appellants were placed in an interrogation room alone while Bowman listened to the tape of the conversation between appellants as they waited in the police car.   During the conversation they referred to being “hung,” to the key and to razor blades and scales.   Hinton said if he could get free he would disappear.

A search of Ms. Ralph's belongings on booking revealed a key like the one found on Walton.   Information from other officers made Bowman suspect that Hinton had not given his correct name and address to him.

Based on the foregoing Sergeant Bowman believed all three persons were involved in narcotics, that Hinton would be unavailable if released and decided to locate and search the hotel room to which the key belonged prior to releasing them.

Locating the hotel room, searching it and two other locations and the truck Walton had been driving consumed two to three hours.   During all this time Walton and Hinton were detained in the police station.   The hotel room search revealed cocaine and drug paraphernalia.

Hinton sought the suppression of the tape recording claiming the police conduct in asking him for identification and placing him in the police vehicle as well as his subsequent detention was unlawful.   Walton makes the same argument regarding the demand for his identification, the surreptitious recording of his conversation and his prolonged detention.   We find merit in their contentions regarding the demand for licenses and identification.

Because of our decision in In re William J. (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 72, 217 Cal.Rptr. 163, both appellants concede the police could lawfully detain them momentarily to effect the arrest of Ms. Ralph.   However, the requests for a driver's license or identification prolonged the detention and exceeded Fourth Amendment boundaries on lawful police activity.

The United States Supreme Court has defined and limited investigative detentions.   Any restraint of a person for purposes of checking identification, asking questions or detaining him or her briefly while obtaining information is such a detention;  it comports with the Fourth Amendment only when based on articulable facts supporting a reasonable suspicion that the person has committed a criminal offense.  (United States v. Hensley (1985) 469 U.S. 221, 105 S.Ct. 675, 83 L.Ed.2d 604.)   Mere presence with someone who has outstanding arrest warrants is not sufficient.

Walton had not been observed committing any infraction while driving the vehicle before it was stopped.   The sole basis of any lawful detention was to affect the arrest of Ms. Ralph.

The demand to produce a driver's license to a police officer is only permitted in California when the officer is enforcing the provisions of the Vehicle Code.  (Veh.Code, § 12951(b).)

 A person driving an automobile cannot be stopped to see if he or she is licensed to drive unless there is reasonable suspicion the person has engaged in criminal conduct.  (Delaware v. Prouse (1979) 440 U.S. 648, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660.)   Since the reason for the stop was unrelated to Walton's conduct as a driver, the demand to see Walton's driver's license was therefore unlawful.   A fortiori the same applies to Hinton, who was only a passenger.

A demand for the driver's license of a passenger in a lawfully detained vehicle has been held to be an unlawful detention.   In People v. Spicer (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 213, 203 Cal.Rptr. 599, the court held that the police officer's demand to know whether the passenger had a license so the car could be released to her if the driver was arrested amounted to an unlawful detention where the passenger was not told she did not have to show her license unless she wanted the car to be released to her.   Nothing in the record here indicates Hinton was offered any such choice.

 A demand for identification is an intrusion on interests prohibited by the Fourth Amendment and requires a reasonable, suspicion based on articulable facts relating to the person or his or her conduct, in order to be lawful.  (Brown v. Texas (1979) 443 U.S. 47, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 61 L.Ed.2d 357.)   No justification was offered here.   Therefore the request for identification from Hinton and all subsequent activity relating to him was unlawful and the tape recording and all fruits thereof should have been suppressed.

 The suppression of evidence required by the unlawful conduct toward Walton is a more difficult issue.   The demand to see his license resulted in his being placed in the patrol car because he was not properly licensed.   Since this demand was unlawful, any fruits thereof must also be suppressed.

 However, it appears, independent of Bowman's recognition of the name on his license, an officer other than Bowman recognized him on sight shortly after the stop as a person on probation with search conditions.   Walton's probation conditions would permit a search of his “person, vehicle, residence and any other property.”   Therefore, the searches of his person and vehicle are permissible if the identification of him as a probationer was made within a reasonable time to permit the arrest of Ms. Ralph.   This determination was not made since the trial court found the demand for identification was permissible.

We need not determine whether the length or place of Walton's detention was unreasonable (see United States v. Place (1983) 462 U.S. 696, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 77 L.Ed.2d 110;  Dunaway v. New York (1979) 442 U.S. 200, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824) since the detention bears no causal relation to the discovery of drugs and other evidence in the hotel room.  (See United States v. Sharpe (1985) 470 U.S. 675, 682, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 1573, 84 L.Ed.2d 605, 612.)   Assuming arguendo the police could conduct a search of the hotel room under the terms of Walton's probation, an assumption not challenged below, it is this condition—not his transportation or detention—of which the search is the fruit.   Nothing in the record suggests the decision to locate and search the hotel room is the product of appellant's lengthy detention;  it was the reason for it.  (See Wong Sun v. United States (1963) 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441.)

If the visual identification of Walton as a person on probation occurred within a reasonable time for the police to affect the arrest of Ms. Ralph, the search of appellant's person which produced the key to the hotel room and the search of the hotel room are lawful.   If the police failed to use due diligence and unreasonably delayed the detention of Walton prior to his identification as a probationer other than by his driver's license these searches are the product thereof and must be suppressed.

We therefore reverse the judgment against Walton, order his plea to be vacated and remand to the trial court for a hearing to determine whether Walton was entitled to the suppression of evidence in addition to that ordered herein.

We reverse the judgment against Hinton.   He was entitled to suppression of the tape recording and any other evidence resulting from his unlawful detention.   His plea should be vacated and his motion to suppress granted.

FOOTNOTES

FOOTNOTE.  

KING and HANING, JJ., concur.