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IN RE: ANGEL P., a Person coming under the Juvenile Court Law. The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ANGEL P., Defendant and Appellant.
OPINION
Angel P. appeals a judgment sustaining a Welfare & Institutions Code section 602 petition alleging he had obstructed police officers in the performance of their duties. (Pen.Code, § 148.) 1
I
An undercover narcotics officer, sitting in an unmarked police car, made contact with a drug dealer. After a short conversation, the officer and the dealer exchanged money for drugs. Simultaneously, Angel, standing about 10 to 12 feet away, pointed at the officer and yelled, “Narco, narco.” The dealer ran away from the officer and, after a brief contact with Angel, disappeared into an alley. Angel was detained and arrested, but the dealer was never found.
II
Relying on City of Houston, Texas v. Hill (1987) 482 U.S. 451, 107 S.Ct. 2502, 96 L.Ed.2d 398, Angel argues section 148 is unconstitutionally overbroad. In Houston, the United States Supreme Court examined a Municipal Code ordinance making it unlawful for any person to assault, strike or in any manner oppose, molest, abuse or interrupt any police officer in the execution of an official duty, or any person summoned to aid in the making of an arrest.2
The court first observed most of the ordinance was preempted by state penal statutes.3 What remained as prohibited conduct were verbal interruptions. The court concluded: “The Constitution does not allow such speech to be made a crime. The freedom of individuals verbally to oppose or challenge police action without thereby risking arrest is one of the principal characteristics by which we distinguish a free nation from a police state.” (City of Houston, Texas v. Hill, supra, 482 U.S. 451, 462, 107 S.Ct. 2502, 2510, 96 L.Ed.2d 398, 412–413, fns. omitted.)
The Supreme Court acknowledged not all verbal attacks on a police officer are constitutionally protected. But it noted “[t]he Houston ordinance is much more sweeping․ It is not limited to fighting words nor even to obscene or opprobrious language, but prohibits speech that ‘in any manner ․ interrupt [s]’ an officer.” (Id., at p. 462, 107 S.Ct. 2502, 2510, 96 L.Ed.2d 398, 412 fn. omitted.) 4 The ordinance was declared unconstitutional and Hill's conviction was overturned.
Angel argues section 148 is analogous to the Houston ordinance and is unconstitutional on its face. He points to its language stating section 148 is only applicable when “no other punishment is prescribed ․” 5 , contending what little remains as punishable conduct is constitutionally protected speech.6 We cannot agree.
Several reported California cases reflect section 148 prosecutions for nonverbal obstructions or delays of a police officer. For example, in In re Bacon, supra, 240 Cal.App.2d 34, 49 Cal.Rptr. 322, the court held “a person who goes limp and thereby requires the arresting officer to drag or bodily lift and carry him [or her] in order to effect [an] arrest ․ [has] resist[ed] an officer as defined in section 148.” (Id., at p. 53, 49 Cal.Rptr. 322.) And in People v. Allen (1980) 109 Cal.App.3d 981, 167 Cal.Rptr. 502, the court found “[t]he actions of appellant (running and hiding) [after the officer made it clear he was being detained] caused a delay in the performance of [the officer's] duty.” (Id., at p. 987, 167 Cal.Rptr. 502.) In footnote 1, at p. 987, 167 Cal.Rptr. 502, the court specifically acknowledged “appellant actively impeded an officer [by running and hiding]․ Appellant could refuse to cooperate, but [he] could not run and hide.” 7
Clearly, section 148 is applicable to nonverbal conduct as well as speech. Moreover, Houston did not hold all verbal communications aimed at police officers are constitutionally protected. Houston pronounced as unconstitutional an ordinance which prohibited only verbal interruptions of an officer in his or her official duties.
Two state supreme courts, in construing and upholding statutes similar to section 148, seized on the distinction between conduct which merely interrupts an officer and that which obstructs or delays.8 In State v. Krawsky (Minn.1988) 426 N.W.2d 875, the court “interpret[ed] [their] statute [to be] directed at a particular kind of physical act, namely, physically obstructing or interfering with an officer, whereas under the ordinance in Houston one could be punished for merely ‘interrupting’ an officer in the line of duty. [Citation.] The term ‘interrupts' connotes the breaking of the continuity of some action or discourse, and would include breaking in with a question or remark while another person is doing something; the term does not necessarily suggest that continuation of the interrupted activity is difficult or impossible. [Citation.] ․ On the other hand, physically obstructing or interfering with a police officer involves not merely interrupting an officer but substantially frustrating or hindering the officer in the performance of his duties.” (Id., at p. 877.)
In State v. Williams (1987) 205 Conn. 456, 534 A.2d 230, the Connecticut Supreme Court observed its statute was constitutional so long as it was limited to physical acts or “verbal conduct intended to interfere with a police officer․” (Id., 534 A.2d at p. 238.) And the court further held the statute covered only “fighting words that ‘ “ ‘by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.’ ” ' [Citations.]” (Id., at p. 239, fn. omitted.) The court observed, “By its own terms, the statute defines ‘interfering’ to include obstruction, resistance, hindrance, or endangerment.” (Id., at p. 238.) This conduct, the court interpreted as “amount[ing] to meddling in or hampering the activities of the police in the performance of their duties.” (Ibid.)
This does not end our discussion. As recognized by the Minnesota Supreme Court, the statute, to survive constitutional scrutiny, “requires the state to prove the defendant acted ‘intentionally’․ [The] intent element is obviously a necessary precondition to a determination that the statute is not facially overbroad.” (State v. Krawsky, supra, at p. 877.) In other words, section 148, to be constitutional on its face, must be a specific intent crime.9 Therefore, in order “[t]o confine the statute within constitutional limits” (Braxton v. Municipal Court (1973) 10 Cal.3d 138, 144, 109 Cal.Rptr. 897, 514 P.2d 697), we hold section 148 is a specific intent crime.
Two other courts have interpreted the statute as a general intent crime. In People v. Roberts (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 182 Cal.Rptr. 757, the court determined section 148 was a general intent crime because the Legislature did not use “language that is either precise or is clearly susceptible of [an] interpretation [of the statute being a specific intent crime].” (Id., 131 Cal.App.3d Supp. at 9, 182 Cal.Rptr. 757.) But our Supreme Court in In re Brown (1973) 9 Cal.3d 612, 620–621, 108 Cal.Rptr. 465, 510 P.2d 1017 held violation of section 415 to be a specific intent crime despite the statute's lack of language requiring such an intent. (See also People v. Superior Court (Commons) (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 812, 816–817, 185 Cal.Rptr. 492.)
Moreover, Roberts misapplies the mandate of People v. Hood (1969) 1 Cal.3d 444, 82 Cal.Rptr. 618, 462 P.2d 370 where the Supreme Court delineated the difference between a specific and general intent crime. “When the definition of a crime consists of only the description of a particular act, without reference to intent to do a further act or achieve a future consequence, we ask whether the defendant intended to do the proscribed act. This intention is deemed to be a general criminal intent. When the definition refers to defendant's intent to do some further act or achieve some additional consequence, the crime is deemed to be one of specific intent.” (Id., at pp. 456–457, 82 Cal.Rptr. 618, 462 P.2d 370.)
And we likewise decline to follow People v. Lopez (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 592, 602, 233 Cal.Rptr. 207 which also determined section 148 was a general intent crime. The court's holding in People v. Lopez was merely dictum, made without discussion or any citation to authority.
We therefore conclude section 148 is not, on its face, unconstitutionally overbroad, if interpreted to require a specific intent. Moreover, we strictly construe it to apply only to verbal and nonverbal conduct which has the effect of physically restricting, delaying, or obstructing a peace officer in the performance of official duties.
III
Angel argues even if the statute is not overbroad, “there is no evidence that [he] actually saw or should have known from the circumstances of the controlled buy, that a purchase of contraband, which is usually done surreptitiously, was or had taken place. Although [he] issued his warning at the time of the purchase, there is no evidence that [he] knew or could have known from his vantage point that a crime had occurred. There is no evidence in the record from which it may be conferred that [he] intended or knew his actions would cause an interruption of the controlled buy and thus hinder an arrest.” We disagree.
The officer testified Angel was close by during the transaction. It is reasonable to infer when Angel yelled, “Narco, narco,” he intended his words to result in the identification of the police officer so that the drug dealer would be able to avoid arrest. This conduct certainly qualifies as that which was intended to physically delay and obstruct the peace officer in the performance of his duties.
Judgment affirmed.
Can Penal Code section 148 be applied to mere speech without offending the First Amendment? Yes, but only in the narrowest of circumstances: when the defendant specifically intends to cause a violent response or an immediate and direct physical obstruction of an officer. Because the court almost certainly did not apply that standard, I would reverse.
I
The trial judge captured the essence of the constitutional problem in musing over a line from his childhood: “Cheese it, it's the cops.” He instinctively—and correctly—knew that utterance by itself could not yield a constitutionally supportable criminal conviction. City of Houston v. Hill (1987) 482 U.S. 451, 107 S.Ct. 2502, 96 L.Ed.2d 398 makes it clear such speech is generally protected by the First Amendment even if it is intended to interfere with the performance of an officer's duty. (Id., at p. 462, fn. 11, 469, fn. 18, 107 S.Ct. at pp. 2510, fn. 11, 2513, fn. 18.) But the judge noted important additional features in the present case and his childhood example, and they do exist.
The first difference was not specifically cited by the court. The minor's words could conceivably have prompted a violent response from the drug dealer. Nothing in Hill would afford First Amendment protection to conduct, whether by speech or act, designed to physically frustrate lawful police activity by provoking a violent reaction. “Fighting words” are not entitled to First Amendment protection (id., at p. 462, fn. 10, 107 S.Ct. at p. 2510, fn. 10; Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire (1942) 315 U.S. 568, 62 S.Ct. 766, 86 L.Ed. 1031), and neither are incitations to violence. (See Schenck v. United States (1919) 249 U.S. 47, 39 S.Ct. 247, 63 L.Ed. 470 [no right to cry “fire” in crowded theatre].) In other words, where the revelation of an undercover officer's identity is intended to expose him to an immediate and violent physical response, the First Amendment will not shield the speaker's announcement.
Most probably the minor's shouts were merely meant to warn the dealer or frustrate the officer's mission in the neighborhood. The prosecutor focused on these points, and the evidence supports his contention that both the arrest and the police activity at the location was impeded. And, although the record is unclear, one may infer from the judge's comments that these consequences may have been the basis for his decision. Whether punishment for mere speech intended to accomplish such purposes is constitutionally permissible presents both a troublesome question and the key to resolution of this appeal.
In police “buy programs” arrests are frequently put off for months to avoid compromising the identity of undercover officers. The First Amendment would surely allow a speaker to inform a drug dealer he had sold to an undercover officer six months earlier without fear of prosecution under Penal Code section 148; 1 that would not create an immediate danger of a violent physical response against the officer. And, as I read Hill, speech which accomplishes the mere indirect frustration of an arrest or future ability to purchase contraband, even though it may physically impede police action in a sense, is not subject to prohibition under general statutes of this sort. Speech alone is prosecutable in a number of contexts, e.g., offers to sell drugs, conspiracy, perjury, fraud, extortion, treason, solicitation, and so on. But in the context of a statute regulating the right of citizens to intervene in police activity, words not intended to accomplish a reaction arising to the level of an immediate and direct physical interference may not be punished.2 (Id., 482 U.S. at p. 462, 107 S.Ct. at p. 2510.)
Responding to a concurring and dissenting opinion in Hill, the majority notes, “Justice Powell [ ] observes that ‘contentious and abusive’ speech can interrupt an officer's investigation, and offers as an example a person who ‘run[s] beside [an officer pursuing a felon] in a public street shouting and cursing the officer.’ [Citation.] But what is of concern in that example is not simply contentious speech, but rather the possibility that by shouting and running beside the officer the person may physically obstruct the officer's investigation. Although that person might constitutionally be punished under a tailored statute that forbade individuals from physically obstructing an officer's investigation, he or she may not be punished under a broad statute aimed at speech.” (Id., at p. 462, 107 S.Ct. at p. 2510, fn. 11.) Penal Code section 148 is not such a statute, of course; and the reported decisions involving it deal almost exclusively with conduct beyond mere speech. Thus, the statute is constitutionally sound as written. The problem before us concerns its application in a case involving words alone.
Hill teaches, “[I]f some constitutionally unprotected speech must go unpunished, that is a price worth paying to preserve the vitality of the First Amendment. ‘ “If absolute assurance of tranquility is required, we may as well forget about free speech. Under such a requirement, the only ‘free’ speech would consist of platitudes. That kind of speech does not need constitutional protection.” ' [Citation.]” (Id., at p. 462, fn. 11, 107 S.Ct. at p. 2510, fn. 11.) Although this language is somewhat opaque because, by definition, “constitutionally unprotected speech” presumably would not be shielded by the First Amendment, its implication for the present case is clear.3
The minor's shouts as the drug transaction was concluding and the officer was still conversing with the dealer are not punishable unless they endangered the officer or directly and physically interfered with his mission. The officer testified he felt the warning added to the peril of his occupation; but his testimony was unclear as to the immediacy of the risk he perceived and focused generally on the effect of the disclosure of his identity, i.e., the termination of his ability to make narcotics purchases in the neighborhood. Under some circumstances an immediate and violent reaction might be expected when a crook is warned at the scene of the crime that he has just dealt to a policeman; whether the trial court drew such a conclusion here is impossible to tell.
The warning could not, however, be considered a physical intrusion on the officer's plans for arrest under the Hill test, despite its potential effect on the suspect. If the officer intended to perform the arrest himself at that moment, which he did not, he would have revealed his identity anyway. Here, the idea was for uniformed officers to arrest the dealer as soon as possible after the undercover officer left the scene. The shouted warning apparently prompted the suspect to walk away. As the officer drove off, he observed Angel converse briefly with the dealer, who then turned and ran. Thus, the minor probably did frustrate the felon's arrest.
But Angel's speech did not physically impede the officers themselves in the sense Hill demands.4 If they only damaged the prospects of arresting this particular miscreant, the communications may not be punished under a police interference statute, notwithstanding the cost in efficient law enforcement. Because it is unclear whether the trial court based its determination on a perceived immediate physical danger or interference to the officer, which would be proper, or on a finding that he spooked the dealer or queered the ongoing buy program, which would not, reversal for retrial is appropriate. (See, e.g., People v. Garewal (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 285, 303, 218 Cal.Rptr. 690.)
II
I agree that in the context of a prosecution constructed upon words alone Penal Code section 148 must be interpreted to require specific intent in order to pass constitutional muster. Intending merely to utter words is not enough; the offender must intend to physically obstruct or endanger the officer as well.
People v. Lopez (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 592, 598, 233 Cal.Rptr. 207 states the correct test in distinguishing general and specific intent crimes: “General intent crimes proscribe particular acts. Reference is not made to the actor's intent to achieve further acts or future consequences as to the restricted action. There must be, however, awareness by the actor that the illegal act is being done within the terms of the statute. This is knowledge, not specific intent. Specific intent is the requirement that the criminal actor intends to do a further act or to achieve an additional consequence beyond the initial culpable act.” Specific intent is precisely what Hill requires: speech designed to do more than interfere with an officer, speech calculated to physically impede as well.
Lopez appeared six months after Hill, but the Court of Appeal did not refer to the decision.5 The issue in Lopez was whether knowledge is an element of Penal Code section 148, not specific versus general intent. In holding proof of knowledge was required, as it clearly is, the court merely determined, quite correctly in my view, that in the usual circumstance of physical interference the prosecution must prove a general criminal intent. The panel did not have occasion to consider whether the First Amendment would compel a specific intent standard in a case involving only speech.
People v. Roberts (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 182 Cal.Rptr. 757 also found that Penal Code section 148 is a general intent crime on the basis of statutory construction, and I agree with that court's interpretation as well. (See Pen.Code, § 7, subd. 1.) But that case did not involve interference by means of pure speech either and did not address the constitutional implications of a prosecution based on words alone. Thus, neither Lopez nor Roberts is a barrier to the conclusion that where only words are involved, Penal Code section 148 must be construed to require proof of specific intent to cause an immediate physical obstruction to the police. (State v. Krawsky (Minn.1988) 426 N.W.2d 875; see also In re Brown (1973) 9 Cal.3d 612, 620–621, 108 Cal.Rptr. 465, 510 P.2d 1017.)
The majority goes too far, yet not far enough. The determination that proof of specific intent is required in all cases prosecuted under Penal Code section 148 is too broad and unnecessary to the resolution of this case. Nothing in Hill compels that interpretation when the prosecution is centered on physical interference, as opposed to mere speech which might lead to that result.
Worse, however, in affirming, the majority assumes the trial court must have found a specific intent to commit an immediate and direct physical interference without explaining how or why the judge would have had occasion to do so. Binding California appellate authority told him Penal Code section 148 was a general intent crime.6 In effect, Angel P. has been tried and convicted on appeal.
I would reverse.
FOOTNOTES
1. Penal Code section 148 provides: “Every person who willfully resists, delays, or obstructs any public officer, peace officer, or an emergency medical technician, as defined in Division 2.5 (commencing with Section 1797) of the Health and Safety Code, in the discharge or attempt to discharge any duty of his or her office or employment, when no other punishment is prescribed, is punishable by a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year, or by both such fine and imprisonment.”All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.
2. Houston's underlying facts were irrelevant to the court's determination. We recount them here merely to satisfy the reader's curiosity. A friend of the defendant was in the street interfering with traffic. While the police were speaking to the friend, the defendant shouted, “Pick on someone your own size.” The officer, turning his attention to the defendant, asked, “Are you interrupting me in my official capacity?” The defendant answered, “Yes.”
3. For example, the Texas Penal Code makes it illegal to use “abusive, indecent, profane or vulgar language [when] its very utterance tends to incite an immediate breach of the peace.” Also, all types of physical assaults on peace officers are proscribed.
4. Indeed, the court determined “ ‘the enactment reach[ed] a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct.’ [However, it] may be held facially invalid even if [it] also [has] legitimate application. [Citation.]” (Id., at p. 458–459, 107 S.Ct. 2502, 2508, 96 L.Ed.2d 398, 410.)
5. This phrase has been interpreted to mean “where no other punishment is otherwise provided for by statute for conduct which amounts to willfully resisting, delaying, or obstructing a public officer in the discharge of his [or her] duties․” (In re Bacon (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 34, 53, 49 Cal.Rptr. 322, disapproved on other grounds in In re Brown (1973) 9 Cal.3d 612, 624, 108 Cal.Rptr. 465, 510 P.2d 1017.)
6. In support of his argument, he cites California Penal Code sections prohibiting assaults on a police officer (§§ 241; 243) and the deterrence or prevention by force or threat of an officer from any duty imposed upon such officer by law. (§ 69.) Moreover, section 834a prohibits an arrestee with knowledge of the arrest from using force or weapons to resist, even if the arrest is unlawful. And constitutionally unprotected fighting words are proscribed by section 415, subdivision (3).
7. And our Supreme Court has recognized conduct which cannot be prosecuted pursuant to section 148. In People v. Wetzel (1974) 11 Cal.3d 104, 113 Cal.Rptr. 32, 520 P.2d 416, the court noted the “critical issue ․ is whether the officers were in fact obstructed in carrying out their right to enter without a warrant.” (Id., at p. 108, 113 Cal.Rptr. 32, 520 P.2d 416.) It concluded the defendant's “entire course of conduct was directed to refusal of consent, and nothing more․ [A]s a matter of law, ․ defendant's total conduct cannot be characterized other than a refusal to consent to a request to enter her apartment. Such conduct cannot constitute grounds for a lawful arrest․” (Id., 11 Cal.3d at p. 109, 113 Cal.Rptr. 32, 520 P.2d 416.)
8. “Delay,” as defined in Webster's New World Dictionary, Second College Edition, “implies the interference of something that causes a detainment or postponement” and lists as synonymous “slacken,” “impede” and “hinder.” Thus, “delay” is more akin to “obstruct.”
9. Our dissenting colleague opines “the majority assumes the trial court must have found a specific intent to commit an immediate and direct physical interference without explaining how or why the judge would have had occasion to do so. Binding California appellate authority told him Penal Code section 148 was a general intent crime.” (See p. 845, dis. opn., fn. omitted.) But Hill was the authority which was binding on the court, and Hill mandates that the statute, if it is to be constitutional, must be a specific intent crime. The trial court found the allegations against Angel P. to be true. He could not have done so without finding the statute to be constitutional. “ ‘A judgment or order of the lower court is presumed correct. All intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which the record is silent․’ (Orig. italics.) (See 6 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Appeal, § 235, p. 4225.)” (Rossiter v. Benoit (1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 706, 712, 152 Cal.Rptr. 65.)Moreover, “ ‘The fact that the action of the court may have been based upon an erroneous theory of the case, or upon an improper or unsound course of reasoning, cannot determine the question of its propriety. No rule of decision is better or more firmly established by authority, nor one resting upon a sounder basis of reason and propriety, than that a ruling or decision, itself correct in law, will not be disturbed on appeal merely because given for a wrong reason. If right upon any theory of the law applicable to the case, it must be sustained regardless of the considerations which may have moved the trial court to its conclusion.’ [Citation.]” (D'Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 18–19, 112 Cal.Rptr. 786, 520 P.2d 10.)
1. He might commit some other offense by that act, e.g., become an accessory after the fact if he intended to aid the criminal in escaping apprehension. (Pen.Code, § 32.)
2. For example, giving an officer false directions to frustrate a manhunt could support a prosecution, but accomplishing the same result by warning the suspect probably could not. The only principled explanation for this is the need to reconcile the criminal law with the First Amendment. A line must be drawn somewhere, and anomalies often do arise when that is the case.
3. The court perhaps meant to say “protected” rather than “unprotected.”
4. Additional examples of words alone that might be sufficient to physically interfere with the police would be bomb threats to officers investigating a crime scene or signals to a cement truck driver to pull into a street given for the purpose of blocking an oncoming police car. (See fn. 1, above.) In other words, vocal encouragement of an arrestee's escape or resistance may be constitutionally punished, provided it can be proved to have contributed to the desired effect by causing some physical impediment to the officers personally beyond moving the tiny bones in the ears of the listeners. (City of Houston v. Hill, supra, 482 U.S. at p. 462, fn. 11, 107 S.Ct. at p. 2510, fn. 11.)
5. Part of the Lopez analysis involved a comparison of Penal Code sections 148 and 834a. (Id., 188 Cal.App.3d at p. 596, 233 Cal.Rptr. 207.) The latter provides, “If a person has knowledge, or by the exercise of reasonable care, should have knowledge, that he is being arrested by a peace officer, it is the duty of such person to refrain from using force or any weapon to resist such arrest.” Section 834a is not itself a crime, however, as Lopez appears to assume. (People v. Curtis (1969) 70 Cal.2d 347, 354–355, 74 Cal.Rptr. 713, 450 P.2d 33.)
6. Contrary to the majority, I am not persuaded the trial court applied Hill correctly merely because the decision was cited and described by defense counsel. The court started out during its colloquy with counsel with this remark: “․ I went through the annotations [to Penal Code section 148] and there is no requirement for any knowledge on [the defendant's] part that the individual is a police officer.” A few minutes later, the deputy district attorney asked the right question: “The thing that troubled me is when they start out with ‘willfully.’ Do we have a specific-intent crime here?” He then correctly pointed out that case law in this state says Penal Code section 148 requires only proof of general intent. Notwithstanding, the court returned to the theme a few transcript pages later: “Does [Angel] know, first of all, that [the officer] is in the performance of his duty? Is that a requirement? I don't think it is a requirement.” In other words, it is far from certain that the court even required proof of knowledge, much less specific intent to physically obstruct.It is also clear the court did not read Hill. The judge took no recess to research the matter between closing argument and announcement of the verdict. And as the proceedings droned to a close, the prosecutor admitted, “Again I am not familiar with [Hill ].” The judge replied, “I'm not either.” The record simply does not support a reasonable inference that the court applied the correct standard in this very problematical area of the law.
SONENSHINE, Associate Justice.
SCOVILLE, P.J., concurs.
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Docket No: No. G006310.
Decided: June 23, 1989
Court: Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 3, California.
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