BAUMANN v. BEDFORD (1940)

From an ex parte order appointing a receiver and directing him to take possession of certain real property in an action for partition of the same, defendants appeal.

The essential facts appearing from the complaint and affidavit accompanying the application for a receiver are:

That plaintiffs and defendants are holders of notes aggregating $500,000 secured by a trust deed on a parcel of land in Los Angeles improved with a thirteen-story building; that the property in question is in the possession of receivers appointed in another action; and that on December 10, 1937, the court in the action just mentioned made an order directing the receivers to surrender the property held by them to certain holders of bonds which were a lien against the property in question.

This is the sole question for us to determine:

Did the trial court exceed its jurisdiction in appointing a receiver in the present action, for the reason that it appears from the record that a receiver had been appointed in another action for the property which is the subject of the present receivership?

This question must be answered in the affirmative. The law is established that a court has no power to appoint a receiver where one has already been appointed by another court of equal coordinate jurisdiction, and such receiver has possession of the property which is the subject of the dispute. Fischer v. Superior Court, 110 Cal. 129, 138, 42 P. 561. In the instant case it appears that in another action a receiver had been appointed for the very property which is here in question, and it does not appear from the record that the prior receivership had been terminated. The order of December 10, 1937, above mentioned did not terminate the receivership but merely directed the prior receivers to surrender the property to designated parties. There is a total absence of any showing in the record that this order had been complied with.

The case of Hibernia Sav. & Loan Soc. v. Belcher, 4 Cal.2d 268, 48 P.2d 681, is not here in point, for the reason that in the case just cited the court had made an order vacating the appointment of the prior receiver. Nor is there any merit in plaintiffs' contention that the present order had the effect of vacating the previous receivership order, for the reason that the orders were made in entirely independent and separate actions.

For the foregoing reasons, the order is reversed.

McCOMB, Justice.

We concur: MOORE, P.J.; WOOD, J.