MOORES v. Concerned Residents of Irish Beach, Intervener. (1990)

In this appeal, the Irish Beach Water District and three individual members of the water district's board (collectively appellants) challenge the propriety of a system that allows each landowner to vote in proportion to the assessed value of his or her land holdings in elections to select the district's board of directors.   Appellants claim the trial court incorrectly determined that the statutory prerequisites for changing the district from a landowner voting district to a resident voting district (one person, one vote) were not met.   Alternatively, they claim the perpetuation of landowner voting in the district is unconstitutional.   We affirm.

The Irish Beach Water District is a California water district organized in the 1970's under the California Water Code.  (See Water Code, § 34000 et seq.) ¹  The district was organized to provide water service to an area on the Mendocino Coast, between Manchester and Point Arena, which was in the process of being developed.  (See § 35401.)   The area is generally described as a remote vacation home and retirement community with 59 registered voters residing in the district.   The district's board of directors is charged with managing and conducting the business and affairs of the district.  (§ 34807.)   The right to vote in district elections to select board members is statutorily restricted to landowners whose votes are weighted according to the assessed value of their land.   Specifically, each landowner is granted “one vote for each dollar's worth of land to which he or she holds title.” ²  (§§ 35003, 34026, 34027.)

William and Gordon Moores and their families are the developers and landowners in the district (collectively developers).   At one time, the developers owned all the land in Irish Beach;  and at all times pertinent to this litigation they owned well over 50 percent of the land.   The statutory scheme therefore disenfranchised district residents who owned no land and diluted the votes of everyone but the developers.   The developers' control over district elections at the time of this litigation can be illustrated by a breakdown of the votes within the district—under the landowner voting system the developers controlled 1,739,317 votes in the district and the residents controlled 937,844 votes.   By contrast, under a resident voting system, the 59 registered voters within the district would be equal participants in district elections.

Amendments to the Water Code in 1973 provide a procedure whereby residents living within a California water district can seek to change the district from a landowner voting district to a resident voting district.  (See §§ 35040–35053.)   In early 1987, Irish Beach Water District residents attempted to effectuate such a change.   Section 35041 sets out the statutory prerequisite to initiate the change in a California water district from a landowner voting district to a resident voting district.   That section provides that when the secretary of the district certifies that “at least 50 percent of the assessable area within the district is devoted to and developed for residential, industrial, or nonagricultural commercial use, or any combination thereof,” the registered voters living in the district may petition to change the district from a landowner voting district to a resident voting district.³  On February 6, 1987, Wilfred C. Edelbrock, secretary of the district, certified to its board that “50% of the developable area within the district is devoted to and developed for residential use.”   Thereafter, a petition signed by a group of district voters to change the election procedure to a resident voting system was filed with the Mendocino County Clerk.  (§§ 35041, 35042, 35048.)   On March 14, 1987, the board passed a resolution approving the change from a landowner voting district to a resident voting district and amended the district's bylaws to require that future board members be registered voters of the district at the time of their election.  (§ 35052.)

Developers filed suit against the district's board and its individual members on June 22, 1987, to halt the district from holding elections under the resident voting system.   Developers' challenge to the change in voting procedures was based upon two alleged violations of the technical requirements of section 35041.   First, the developers alleged that the secretary's original certification was defective.   The developers pointed out that the secretary's certification was issued on the basis that “50% of the developable area within the district is devoted to and developed for residential use,” whereas section 35041 required such certification be made on the basis that “at least 50 percent of the assessable area within the district is devoted to and developed for residential, industrial, or nonagricultural commercial use.”   Developers alleged the secretary's certification represented a significant departure from the requirements of section 35041 and invalidated any attempt to change the method of voting.   Developers also took issue with the proposition that at least 50 percent of the assessable area within the district was devoted to “residential, industrial, or nonagricultural commercial use” as required by section 35041.   Developers claimed, at most, only 21.5 percent of the assessable area qualified under this description, rendering section 35041 inapplicable.

Appellants answered developers' suit by claiming that the secretary's certificate, although technically deficient, nevertheless satisfied the general intent of section 35041.   Appellants also insisted that at least 50 percent of assessable acreage within the district was devoted to “residential, industrial, or nonagricultural commercial use” as required by section 35041.   Appellants also asserted an affirmative defense that the current landowner voting procedure within the district was inequitable and violative of the equal protection clauses of the United States and California Constitutions.  (U.S. Const., 14th Amend.;  Cal. Const., art. I, § 7.)

The court filed its judgment on October 5, 1988, ruling that appellants' attempt to implement resident voting in the district under section 35041 failed because (1) the certification executed by the secretary of the district was fatally flawed and did not meet the requirements of section 35041, and (2) the district did not qualify for an alternative method of conducting elections under section 35041 because less than 50 percent of the assessable area within the district was “devoted to and developed for residential, industrial, or nonagricultural commercial use.” ⁴  Appellants' constitutional challenge to the landowner voting system was summarily rejected.

I

 In setting aside appellants' attempt to change the voting system in the district, the court found that the secretary initially performed his ministerial duty imperfectly by using the term “developable” instead of “assessable” in his certification under section 35041.   We do not view this error to be of decisive significance.   There was no showing anyone was misled or prejudiced by the secretary's error, and the petition and resolution that followed the flawed certification correctly referred to the “assessable” area within the district.   Under these circumstances, it would be unfair to upset appellants' attempt to change the voting system on this ground alone.

II

 Section 35041 requires that “at least 50 percent of the assessable area within the district” must be “devoted to and developed for residential, industrial, or nonagricultural commercial use, or any combination thereof” before the district qualifies for a change from landowner voting to resident voting.   The trial court struck down appellants' attempt to change the voting system in the district partly because it found that less than 50 percent of the assessable area in the district was devoted to “residential, industrial, or nonagricultural commercial use.”   Appellants claim this finding was in error.

There are 1,322 acres within the district.   To meet the statutory requirements of section 35041, 661 acres within the district must be devoted to “residential, industrial, or nonagricultural commercial use.”   The parties agree that 285 acres within the Irish Beach subdivision are devoted to and developed for residential use and may be counted toward this calculation.   Next, there are 403 acres containing approximately three residences known as Nichols Ranch.   The court found these 403 acres to be “clearly undeveloped” and excluded them from its calculations under section 35041, a ruling that is not challenged on appeal.

The subject of dispute is 634 hillside acres within the district, most of which is zoned as a timberland production zone.   This land contains no residences and is statutorily restricted to growing and harvesting timber.   (See Gov.Code, § 51110 et seq.)   Appellants argue that these 634 acres are devoted to and developed for “nonagricultural commercial use,” bringing them within the acreage computed under section 35041.   In making this argument, appellants point out that the activities embraced in cultivating and harvesting timber are so removed from ordinary farming operations that these timberlands may properly be regarded as industrial or commercial in nature rather than agricultural.   Therefore, appellants contend that when these 634 acres are added to the 285 acres conceded to be devoted to residential use, the total exceeds the 661 acres necessary to satisfy the requirements of section 35041.

The trial court disagreed with appellants' interpretation and found the 634 acres of timberland to be “still in its natural state and in the Court's opinion is non developed [sic] agricultural land.”   The court thereby disqualified these 634 acres from the computation under section 35041, which resulted in the assessable area in the district devoted to “residential, industrial, or nonagricultural commercial use” lacking the required 50 percent.

The trial court based its determination upon statutory interpretation applied to an undisputed description of the 634 acres in question.   The interpretation and application of a statutory scheme to an undisputed set of facts is a question of law, which is subject to de novo review on appeal.  (Sutco Construction Co. v. Modesto High School Dist. (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 1220, 1228, 256 Cal.Rptr. 671;  Goddard v. South Bay Union High School Dist. (1978) 79 Cal.App.3d 98, 105, 144 Cal.Rptr. 701.)   Accordingly, we are not bound by the trial court's interpretation.  (Goddard, supra, at p. 105, 144 Cal.Rptr. 701.)   The general principles which guide interpretation of a statutory scheme are equally settled.   Our function is to ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law.  (California Teachers Assn. v. San Diego Community College Dist. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 692, 698, 170 Cal.Rptr. 817, 621 P.2d 856.)   We must evaluate whether the 634 acres of land within the district devoted to growing and harvesting timber qualified for computation under section 35041 as being devoted to a “nonagricultural commercial use.”

The parties have supplied us with citations to state statutes, county ordinances, and county codes dealing with agricultural uses, timberlands, and commercial and industrial uses.   However, it is of no value to analyze this issue in the framework of how the terms “agricultural,” “nonagricultural,” “commercial,” and “industrial” have been dealt with in other legislation.   These terms do not have uniform meaning, and they are routinely ascribed flexible, workable definitions depending upon the context in which they are used.   We therefore interpret section 35041 within the context of what the Legislature was attempting to achieve.

Although there is no legislative history or case law to guide our interpretation of section 35041, this section appears to have been enacted to identify California water districts that have gradually changed from agricultural areas to residential, commercial, and industrial uses.   The statutory formula requiring that “at least 50 percent of the assessable area within the district [be] devoted to and developed for residential, industrial, or nonagricultural commercial use” signals the point at which the Legislature believes restricting the vote to landowners may no longer be desirable and residents of the district can seek a transfer of control.   This method of identifying water districts that would likely be benefited by resident participation in local government suggests that the less urban and developed a water district is, the less likely the Legislature would be willing to interfere with its voting scheme.

Because the statutory criteria of section 35041 were designed by the Legislature to identify water districts that had undergone some degree of urbanization, we believe it is unreasonable to classify 634 acres of uninhabited land devoted to growing and harvesting timber as a “nonagricultural commercial use.”   Appellants' principal argument for including the 634 acres of timberland in the district within section 35041's “nonagricultural commercial use” designation focuses on the services performed on this land.   Appellants emphasize that the cultivating, harvesting, and marketing commonly conducted in agricultural enterprises differ vastly from the activities involved in growing and harvesting commercial timber.   This argument misses the point.   More vital to the pertinent inquiry is the character of the land in question.   It is undisputed there are no residences or uses other than timber growing and harvesting within the 634 acres at issue.   Therefore, we believe the purpose of section 35041 is best served by the interpretation given it by the trial court, and we hold the trial court was correct in excluding these 634 acres from the total assessable area in the district “devoted to and developed for residential, industrial, or nonagricultural commercial use.”   Consequently, we agree with the court's conclusion that the statutory prerequisites for changing to a resident voting system were not met.

III

 We must determine if the California statutory scheme allowing only landowners to vote in district elections and apportioning the votes according to the assessed valuation of land runs counter to the equal protection clauses of the United States and California Constitutions.  (U.S. Const., 14th Amend.;  Cal. Const., art. I, § 7.) ⁵  The constitutionality of laws restricting the right to vote in various special purpose elections has been the subject of considerable judicial scrutiny.   In Reynolds v. Sims (1964) 377 U.S. 533, 561–568, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 1381–1385, 12 L.Ed.2d 506, the United States Supreme Court held that the equal protection clause requires adherence to the principle of one person, one vote in elections of state legislators.   The Reynolds rule was later extended to the election of county government officials (Avery v. Midland County (1968) 390 U.S. 474, 88 S.Ct. 1114, 20 L.Ed.2d 45), school district officials (Kramer v. Union School District (1969) 395 U.S. 621, 89 S.Ct. 1886, 23 L.Ed.2d 583), and trustees of a community college district (Hadley v. Junior College District (1970) 397 U.S. 50, 90 S.Ct. 791, 25 L.Ed.2d 45).   In Burrey v. Embarcadero Mun. Improvement Dist. (1971) 5 Cal.3d 671, 97 Cal.Rptr. 203, 488 P.2d 395, the California Supreme Court struck down a voting scheme that restricted the franchise to landowners in a special district created by the Legislature in 1960 to foster municipal improvements and serve as a catalyst in the development of a small craft harbor.   The overriding principle applied to reviewing these various voter classifications was that any classification restricting the franchise, except those involving age, residence or citizenship, is unconstitutional unless “necessary to promote a compelling state interest.”  (Kramer, supra, 395 U.S. at p. 627, 89 S.Ct. at p. 1890.)

In Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Water District (1973) 410 U.S. 719, 93 S.Ct. 1224, 35 L.Ed.2d 659, the Supreme Court found no constitutional impediment in California legislation, parallel to the legislation at issue herein, permitting only landowners to vote for directors of a California water storage district and also providing that the votes be weighted according to the assessed valuation of the voter's land.  (§§ 41000, 41001;  see generally, California Water Storage District Act, § 39000 et seq.)   The California water storage district involved in Salyer consisted of 193,000 acres of farmland with a population of 77 persons, including 18 children.   Most of the population were employees of four corporations that farmed 85 percent of the land in the district.   Under California law, the district was authorized to engage in projects for the acquisition, storage and distribution of water.   The district also provided flood protection for all residents of the district.   The cost of the district's projects was assessed against district land in accordance with the benefit accruing to each tract.   In upholding the franchise restriction, the court emphasized that the district had relatively limited governmental powers, its primary purpose being “to provide for the acquisition, storage, and distribution of water for farming in the Tulare Lake Basin.   It provides no other general public services such as schools, housing, transportation, utilities, roads, or anything else of the type ordinarily financed by a municipal body.”  (Salyer, supra, at pp. 728–729, 93 S.Ct. at p. 1230, fn. omitted.)   The court also noted that the district's decisions “disproportionately affect landowners,” who alone bear the cost of the district's projects and services in the form of assessments which can become liens against the property in cases of nonpayment.  (Id., at p. 729, 93 S.Ct. at p. 1230.)   Because the district served a limited purpose and because of the disproportionate effect of its activities on landowners as a group, the court concluded the state need not show a compelling interest to justify the voting scheme but that a rational basis justification would suffice.   The court reasoned that because landowners as a class were to bear the entire burden of the district's costs, the Legislature could quite rationally conclude that landowners, to the exclusion of nonlandowning residents, should be charged with the responsibility for the district's operations.  (Id., at p. 731, 93 S.Ct. at p. 1231.)   The court also summarily rejected an argument, advanced by appellants herein, that equality of voting, even among different landowners, was being evaded by using the assessed value of the voter's land as the measure to weigh the strength of the landowner's vote.   The court reasoned that “ ‘the benefits and burdens to each landowner ․ are in proportion to the assessed value of the land.’  [Citation.]  We cannot say that the California legislative decision to permit voting in the same proportion is not rationally based.”  (Id., at p. 734, 93 S.Ct. at p. 1233.)

Subsequently, in Choudhry v. Free (1976) 17 Cal.3d 660, 131 Cal.Rptr. 654, 552 P.2d 438, the California Supreme Court held the Salyer exception inapplicable to a California irrigation district.  (See Irrigation District Law, § 20500 et seq.)  Choudhry involved the Imperial Irrigation District—a very large and diverse operation providing water and electrical power to over 100,000 urban residents of several counties.   The district was the second largest employer in Imperial County with a workforce of almost 1,000 full-time employees and an annual payroll of $13 million.   At issue was a statutory requirement that directors of the district be landowners.  (§ 21100.)   The court struck down the property qualification, noting the size and nature of the district's projects and the effect of its operations on district residents were far more extensive than that of the water district in Salyer.   Furthermore, unlike Salyer, the financial burden of operating the district did not fall entirely on landowners because assessments against the land were not the sole means by which the district's expenses were paid—the district charged landowners and residents alike for water, electrical power, and sewage disposal services.   In short, the court found the operations of the district were so substantial in scope that it could not be considered a special limited purpose district whose operations had a disproportionate effect on landowners as a class.   Therefore, the facts provided no rationale for departing from the strict scrutiny usually given restrictions upon the right to be a candidate.

The United States Supreme Court's latest decision in this area now indicates that the exception recognized in Salyer is considerably broader than it was perceived to be when the Choudhry case was decided.   In Ball v. James (1981) 451 U.S. 355, 101 S.Ct. 1811, 68 L.Ed.2d 150, a case involving a large water reclamation district serving 236,000 acres in Arizona, the court again found no equal protection violation in a statutory scheme which limited voter eligibility to landowners in a director's election and apportioned voting power according to the amount of land a voter owned.   The stipulated facts in Ball disclosed that the water district had vast governmental powers, including the right to condemn land, to sell tax-exempt bonds, to exercise influence on flood control and environmental management, and to levy taxes on real property.   The district also provided electricity for roughly half the population of Arizona, including a large part of metropolitan Phoenix, and financed all of its $290 million general obligation bonds with its electricity revenues.   Forty percent of the water delivered by the district went to urban areas of the state for nonagricultural purposes.   For the 1980 fiscal year, the district had a total operating revenue of approximately $450 million, 98 percent of which was derived from the generation of electricity and its sale to approximately 240,000 consumers.   The court found the differences between the extensive and diverse water district in Ball and the sparsely populated and largely agricultural water district in Salyer to be constitutionally insignificant.   The relevant factor was that each district's primary function was to simply store water, to conserve it from loss, and to deliver it according to land ownership, and that it had no control over the use to which the water was put by the landowner.  (Ball, supra, at pp. 367–368, 101 S.Ct. at pp. 1819–1820.)   The existence and size of the district's huge electric business were found to be inconsequential because they were incidental to the district's primary water function.   The court in Ball held that even though the district's activities undeniably affected all residents of the district, its primary function was so narrow that the district's voting scheme was not subject to the strict mandate of one person, one vote.   The court reasoned that the voting scheme was constitutional because it bore a reasonable relationship to its statutory objective of assuring that those who had a disproportionately greater stake in the district's operations would have a special voice in the conduct of the district's business.

We turn now to the critical inquiry in this appeal:  Is the purpose of the water district herein sufficiently specialized and narrow and does its activities bear on landowners so disproportionately as to distinguish the district from public entities whose more general governmental functions demand application of the one person, one vote rule?  (Ball, supra, 451 U.S. at p. 362, 101 S.Ct. at p. 1816.)   It is undisputed the primary function of the district is to collect, treat and distribute water for residential use.  (§ 35401.)   The district also provides sewage treatment for the people of the district.  (§ 35500.)   By special statutory enactment, the district has agreed to provide fire protection services because “[t]here is no other local governmental entity willing to provide this service to the people of the district.”  (§ 35412.)   In connection with its fire prevention duties, the district may exercise the powers of a fire protection district, including the power of eminent domain to carry out its functions, the power to hire employees, to enter into contracts, to adopt ordinances and enforce rules, to acquire equipment, to issue general obligation bonds, to levy taxes to pay for such bonds, to establish service zones, and to provide any other services relating to the protection of lives and property.  (Health & Saf.Code, §§ 13861, 13862, 13925, 13950.)

In summary, the role of the water district in the case before us is primarily water storage and distribution.   The district's sewage treatment and fire prevention services are incidental to that task and have been undertaken to provide necessary services to a sparsely populated, largely rural area.   There is no doubt that in providing these services the water district possesses some attributes of a governmental entity;  but certainly it possesses no greater governmental powers than the water district profiled in Ball.   And while both landowners and nonlandowning residents alike share an interest in water quality, proper sewage disposal, and fire prevention services, the Supreme Court's decision in Ball indicates that the question is not whether those entitled to vote are the only ones affected by the district's operations, but whether the effect on them is disproportionately greater than on those claiming an equal right to vote.  (Ball, supra, 451 U.S. at p. 371, 101 S.Ct. at p. 1821.)   Under California law, the costs of the district's formation and operations can be assessed against landowners whose property is subject to assessments and charges for the benefits conferred (§ 36550 et seq., see also §§ 35410, 35410.1) and also is subject to liens for delinquencies (§ 36825).   This special burden was found to demonstrate a disproportionate burden on landowners in Salyer and Ball, and must be given the same weight in the present case.  (Ball, supra, at p. 370, 101 S.Ct. at p. 1820;  Salyer, supra, 410 U.S. at p. 729, 93 S.Ct. at p. 1230.)

We therefore conclude that the principle of one person, one vote is inapplicable to the district herein.   Having reached that decision, we hold that there is a rational basis for the restricted franchise here imposed because “[t]he California Legislature could quite reasonably have concluded that the number of landowners and owners of sufficient amounts of acreage whose consent was necessary to organize the district would not have subjected their land to the lien of its possibly very substantial assessments unless they had a dominant voice in its control.”  (Salyer, supra, 410 U.S. at p. 731, 93 S.Ct. at p. 1231.)   Our decision must also take into account the fact that the California Legislature has provided a method for the residents living within the district to petition to change the district to a resident voting district once the district has undergone further urbanization and population growth.  (See §§ 35040–35053.)   If the number of residents increase and there are new industries or commercial uses covering 50 percent of the assessable areas, a new petition for a resident voting district may be filed with the Mendocino County Clerk.

IV

 Lastly, appellants claim the voting scheme scrutinized herein violates California's constitutional prohibition against property ownership as a voter qualification.  California Constitution, article I, section 22 provides:  “The right to vote or hold office may not be conditioned by a property qualification.”   A number of cases decided by California's Supreme Court have held that this provision refers to the qualifications of electors in ordinary elections and is not violated by a statute permitting only landowners to participate in special district elections.  (See, e.g., Barber v. Galloway (1924) 195 Cal. 1, 11–12, 231 P. 34;  Tarpey v. McClure (1923) 190 Cal. 593, 606, 213 P. 983;  People v. Sacramento Drainage Dist. (1909) 155 Cal. 373, 389, 103 P. 207;  People v. Reclamation Dist. No. 551 (1897) 117 Cal. 114, 123–124, 48 P. 1016.)

The judgment is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory references are to the Water Code.

2.   California water storage districts also tie voter eligibility to property ownership.  (§§ 41000, 41001.)   The pervasiveness of these landowner voting districts in California is clear.  (See Henley, The Evolution of Forms of Water Users Organizations in California (1957) 45 Cal.L.Rev. 665.)   The Department of Water Resources documented some years ago the existence of no less than 158 water districts and 8 water storage districts in California.

3.   Section 35041, set out in full, reads:  “Between January 1 and March 30 of each year, the secretary of the district shall inspect the assessable area within the district.   At such time as at least 50 percent of the assessable area within the district is devoted to and developed for residential, industrial, or nonagricultural commercial use, or any combination thereof, such fact shall be certified to the board of directors by the secretary of the district.   Any time after such certification the registered voters residing within the district may petition for a change in the voting procedure from a landowner voting district to a resident voting district.”

4.   Appellants' assertion that the hearing was unduly rushed and that the parties did not intend to try the declaratory relief action finds no support in the record.

5.   The language employed by the state's equal protection clause is comparable to that found in the federal Constitution and has been interpreted so that one clause grants no greater voting rights than does the other.  (See Citizens Against Forced Annexation v. Local Agency Formation Com. (1982) 32 Cal.3d 816, 822, 187 Cal.Rptr. 423, 654 P.2d 193.)   In this respect, the instant voting restriction may be judged by a uniform constitutional standard.

LOW, Presiding Justice.

KING and HANING, JJ., concur.