BAUTISTA ET AL v. JONES ET AL (1942)

The defendants herein are a labor union and its secretary–treasurer. The union membership consists of milk wagon drivers, helpers and workers generally engaged in the milk and dairy business and in the handling of the by–products of milk. The plaintiffs for several years last past have been and at the time of the commencement of this action were engaged together in the business of selling milk and milk products to retail dealers in the county of Los Angeles. Plaintiffs purchased their milk and milk products from brokers and large creameries and dairies. They have invested considerable sums in the purchase of apparatus and transportation facilities with which to carry on their business. Through their efforts and industry, plaintiffs have built up a business yielding them an income approximating $5,000 per year.

Defendant union has entered into union shop contracts with about ninety–five per cent of the wholesale milk distributors in Los Angeles whose business is selling milk and milk products to such persons and dealers as the plaintiffs. In the aforesaid union shop contracts between the union and the wholesale brokers and distributors there is contained a clause, designated paragraph 22, reading as follows:

“Employer agrees that it will not sell dairy products at its platform to any person, firm or corporation licensed by the California Department of Agriculture as a milk distributor unless such distributor observes and causes its employees to observe the same conditions of employment as those observed by employer.”

It further appears that prior to October 23, 1941, defendant union had proposed to plaintiffs that they employ members of said union to drive their delivery trucks, but plaintiffs declined such proposal for the apparent reason that they themselves drove their delivery trucks and consequently did not employ any drivers. However, plaintiffs, when they refused to employ union drivers, immediately made application themselves for admission to and membership in defendant union. These applications were rejected by the union along with the applications of other distributors similarly engaged, on the ground that plaintiffs were not eligible for membership, in that they were not employee–drivers, but were what the union characterized as “independent peddler distributors.” Thereafter, on November 21, 1941, defendant union sent to all of the firms and dealers with whom it had contracts and from whom plaintiffs were likely to purchase milk and milk products the following letter:

“Dear Sir:

“For some time Local Union No. 93 has been confronted with the problem of the independent peddler distributors who have been from time to time taking business from the legitimate wage earners who are members of Local No. 93.

“At a regular meeting of Local No. 93 on October 23rd, there were a number of applications for membership filed by the independent peddler distributors which were discussed at some length by the members present at that meeting, after which they were rejected.

“The officers of Local No. 93 were instructed to see that the employers who held agreements with Local No. 93 comply with Paragraph 22 of our agreement on or before November 30, 1941.

“As these men are not members of the Union and the membership does not see fit to admit them to Union membership, it seems there is only one way left, and that is to discontinue selling to these independent peddler distributors.

“Hoping you will cooperate in cleaning up this matter,

“Very truly yours,

“Paul D. Jones, Sec'y Treas.”

On December 31, 1941, plaintiffs filed their original complaint herein, which was superseded by an amended complaint filed under date of January 2, 1942, through which plaintiffs sought a temporary restraining order and permanent injunction against defendant union and its officers. A preliminary or temporary restraining order was denied, and the matter came on for hearing and trial on the merits, at which time it was determined by the court on the affidavits and pleadings on file. Following trial before the court, sitting without a jury, judgment was rendered against defendant union, its agents, employees and members, and its secretary–treasurer, whereby it was decreed that said defendants “be and they are hereby permanently restrained and enjoined from preventing plaintiffs from obtaining milk or milk products from brokers or those who supply and sell such milk and milk products, and from coercing milk brokers from selling to plaintiffs and supplying plaintiffs with such milk and milk products, in any manner or by any means.” From such judgment and decree defendant union and its secretary–treasurer prosecute this appeal.

The validity of the court's decree in this cause is dependent upon a construction of the contract between the union and the wholesale milk distributors. Under the contract in question the latter agreed not to sell dairy products to any milk distributor unless such distributor “observes and causes its employees to observe the same conditions of employment as those observed” by the wholesale distributors. It is at once apparent that in connection with the activities of the independent distributors there were not present any “conditions of employment,” for these distributors did not employ anyone. They operated their own trucks. As such operators of their own trucks, these distributors cannot be characterized as employees. In fact, the union rejected their applications for membership, because, among other reasons, they were not employees, but were owners of the trucks used in the conduct of their own business.

The only grounds upon which the union and the wholesale distributors seek to justify their actions toward plaintiffs are the terms and provisions of the aforesaid contract. Manifestly, such contract between the union and the wholesale distributors bound the latter not to sell their products to any distributor unless such distributor “observes and causes its employees to observe the same conditions of employment as those observed by” the employer wholesale distributor. Concededly the so–called independent distributors had no employees and consequently there were no “conditions of employment” involved in the conduct of their business, and the contract between the wholesale distributors and the union did not, as written, contemplate a situation such as is presented by the record herein. It therefore follows that what the union demanded of the wholesale distributors through the aforesaid letter of November 21, 1941, was not within the purview or contemplation of the union's contract, and was therefore a demand which the terms of such contract did not authorize, and cannot, therefore, be upheld.

The judgment is affirmed.

PER CURIAM.