VALENTA v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES (1963)

Plaintiffs, husband and wife, appeal from judgments of dismissal entered against them after they elected to stand on the sufficienty of their amended complaint in inverse condemnation following the sustaining of demurrers of defendants County of Los Angeles (hereinafter referred to as ‘County’) and Southern Pacific Company (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Railroad’).

Plaintiffs are the owners of a quarter section of land in the small community of Vincent, an unincorporated area of Los Angeles County located in the Antelope Valley. They allege permanent diminution in the value of their property, due to loss of access, as a result of the closure of a public road at its intersection with the right of way of the Railroad.

The factual picture, as disclosed by the amended complaint, is substantially as follows: Sierra Highway, also known as ‘U.S. 6’, runs roughly parallel to and about 600 feet to the west of the Railroad's easement, or right of way, for its tracks. Both run in a general northerly-southerly direction. Angeles Forest Highway, maintained by the County, has its westerly terminus in the town of Vincent where it intersects, but does not cross, Sierra Highway. From this point Angeles Forest runs easterly and southerly, crossing the Railroad right of way, to Angeles Crest Highway which provides the most direct route for vehicular traffic from Vincent to the system of streets and highways leading to the Pasadena-Los Angeles area. Plaintiffs' land is located between Sierra Highway and the Railroad. It abuts the entire portion of Angeles Forest Highway to the Railroad right of way. No public road or street intersects Angeles Forest between Sierra and the tracks.

In 1957 the County, by resolution of its Board of Supervisors, declared its intention to construct a grade separation at the intersection of Angeles Forest and the Railroad's tracks. A written agreement was entered into between the defendants in 1959 which provided, inter alia, for the following: the construction of a grade separation at some distance from the existing crossing; the physical closure of the present grade crossing at the intersection of Angeles Forest Highway and the Railroad's right of way, subject to approval of the Public Utilities Commission (hereinafter called the ‘Commission’); the Railroad was to physically remove that portion of said highway which crossed its tracks; and the County was to be responsible for the settlement of all property damage claims arising out of the project.

The Commission approved the closing of the existing crossing in 1959, and in 1961 the defendants permanently closed and barricaded Angeles Forest Highway at its intersection with the Railroad right of way. Plaintiffs allege that as a result of the closure all physical access from their property in easterly and southerly directions has been permanently destroyed; that they have been placed in a cul-de-sac and have thereby lost access to the general system of streets, roads and highways which intersect Angeles Forest Highway beyond the Railroad's tracks; that as a result of said closure, the market value of their land has been reduced by $44,900; that their claim for damage has been filed with and denied by the County; and that both defendants have failed and refused to bring an action in eminent domain.

In exploring the legal aspects of this case we must start with the State constitutional provision (Art. 1, sec. 14) that ‘Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation having first been made to, or paid into court for, the owner * * *.’

We next examine the cases to determine what property rights of plaintiffs, if any, the defendants have impaired or damaged by closing the crossing in question.

In Rose v. State of California, 19 Cal.2d 713, 123 P.2d 505, the court discussed the nature of an abutting owner's easement of access and the consequences of unreasonable interference therewith. The court stated (19 Cal.2d pp. 727–728, 123 P.2d p. 514): ‘The abutting owner's easement of access arises as a matter of law [citation], and its nature and extent have been set forth in the numerous decisions which have considered the question. Thus, it is established that the easement of access is as a matter of law peculiar to the individual owner, and an unreasonable interference with such an casement is an injury necessarily different from the injury suffered by the general public. [Citation.] It is an easement in the public highway upon which his land fronts. [Citations.] The right extends to a use of the highway for purposes of ingress and egress to his property by such modes of conveyance and travel as are appropriate to the highway and in such manner as is customary or reasonable.’ The next year this principle was again recognized and applied in Bacich v. Board of Control, 23 Cal.2d 343, 144 P.2d 818; Beals v. City of Los Angeles, 23 Cal.2d 381, 144 P.2d 839; and People v. Ricciardi, 23 Cal.2d 390, 144 P.2d 799. In restating the principle the court in Bacich said (23 Cal.2d pp. 349–350, 144 P.2d p. 823): ‘[A]n owner of property abutting upon a public street has a property right in the nature of an easement in the street which is appurtenant to his abutting property and which is his private right, as distinguished from his right as a member of the public.’ (Emphasis added.) To the same effect is People ex rel. Department of Public Works v. Russell, 48 Cal.2d 189, 195, 309 P.2d 10. In Bacich the court also stated (23 Cal.2d p. 352, 144 P.2d p. 824): ‘The extent of the easement of access may be said to be that which is reasonably required giving consideration to all the purposes to which the property is adapted.’ Pertinent also is the statement of this court in City of Los Angeles v. Geiger, 94 Cal.App.2d 180, 195, 210 P.2d 717, 727, that ‘An easement is property and the taking or impairing of the ‘easement of access' is a direct physical disturbance and an invasion of an existing property right for which compensation must be made just as for the land itself when taken for a public use.’ In Bacich the court pointed out that ‘To be able to get onto the street immediately in front of the property is of little value if that is as far as he [the owner] can go. If he has access to the next intersecting street in both directions and one way is cut off, his easement, if it has any value to him at all, has certainly been impaired.’ (P. 354 of 23 Cal.2d, p. 825 of 144 P.2d.) Thus the rule was developed in Bacich with respect to city lots that ‘the right of access extends in both directions to the next intersecting street.’ (Id.) The court took pains to point out, however, that it was not concerned with what the rule may be for rural property.

We come now to the question as to what property rights an abutting owner in a rural area has in the adjacent road. It is our view that such an owner has substantially the same property rights as an owner of urban property has in the street immediately in front of his lot. In 1 Lewis, Eminent Domain (3rd Ed.) § 120, p. 178, this observation is made: ‘As the country road of the present may become the city street of the future, it seems evident that the same rules must apply to both. * * *’ In the same treatise (§ 205, p. 386) it is stated: ‘Some authorities make a distinction between country highways and city streets as respects the rights of abutting owners. But we believe the true rule to be that the legal rights of the abutter are the same, when the mode of establishment is the same. * * *’ In the recent case of People v. Lipari, 213 A.C.A. 514, 28 Cal.Rptr. 808, the court, in discussing the rights of an owner whose property abuts upon a highway that runs through ranch property, had this to say (213 A.C.A. p. 518, 28 Cal.Rptr. p. 811): ‘The rights of the owner of real property abutting the highway to the use of that highway and to the access thereto and to the view therefrom are rights that are inherent in the title to the property itself. They are a part and parcel of that title and they attach to any highway which abuts or may abut the property.’

This means that the owner of rural property abutting upon a public highway has a property right in the nature of an easement in the highway which is appurtenant to his abutting property and which is his private property right, as distinguished from his right as a member of the public. (See Bacich v. Board of Control, supra, and People v. Russell, supra.) This is known as an easement of access, and such an easement is property and the taking or impairing of the ‘easement of access' is a direct physical invasion of an existing property right for which compensation must be made when taken or substantially impaired for a public use. The extent of such easement of access is that which is reasonably required, taking into account all of the purposes to which the particular property is adapated. (See Bacich v. Board of Control, supra.) But the rule with respect to urban property that the owner has an easement of access to the next intersecting street in both directions does not necessarily apply when dealing with rural property because of the vast difference in the two highway systems. It may be only a few hundred feet or it may be many miles to the next intersecting road in the country, while in an urban area the next intersecting street ordinarily will not be more than a few hundred feet away. Therefore the ultimate test in a cul-de-sac situation, such as this, in a rural area should be whether there has been any substantial impairment of the abutting owner's easement of access taking into account the location of the property, all the purposes to which it is adapted, and the right of reasonable access to the public highway system, for to be able to get on the highway immediately in front of his property is of little value to the owner if he is unable to reach the general highway system.

Taking into account these principles and the physical situation, it is apparent that as a matter of pleading, plaintiffs have shown: (1) that their property abuts on Angeles Forest Highway; (2) that as owners of said property they have an ‘easement of access' which includes reasonable access to the public highway system; (3) that this ‘easement of access' is a property right; (4) that by blockading the Angeles Forest Highway, where it intersects and crosses the Railroad tracks and right of way, thus closing said crossing, defendants have substantially impaired and damaged plaintiffs' property; (5) that neither of the defendants has paid plaintiffs any compensation for their property rights which they have thus assertedly impaired and damaged.

Applying the principles previously stated to the factual picture at hand it is also apparent that plaintiffs have alleged a cause of action. But whether defendants have in fact substantially impaired plaintiffs' easement of access, and, if so, the extent of such damages, are questions of fact, which can only be resolved upon a trial, taking into account the legal principles that are applicable to the facts that are established by the evidence.

The County in effect takes the position that these property owners whose land abutted on Angeles Forest Highway do not have an ‘easement of access' because this is a county road and no property owner has a vested right to have a county road continue to exist adjacent to his property. In support of its position, the County quotes 25 Cal.Jur.2d 33, Highways and Streets, sec. 175. The statement there is based on two rather old cases: Levee Dist. No. 9 v. Farmer (1894), 101 Cal. 178, 35 P. 569, 23 L.R.A. 388 and Swift v. Board of Sup'rs. of Santa Barbara County (1911), 16 Cal.App. 72, 116 P. 317. In each of these cases the plaintiff sought an injunction against the County Board of Supervisors to prevent the proposed abandonment of a county highway. It was held in each case that the board had the power to order the abandonment, and could not be prevented from exercising it. In each case, however, there is dictum to the effect that an abutting owner could not have recovered damages for his loss of access because this was a county, rather than a city, thoroughfare. No question of damages was involved in either of these cases. The third case relied on by the County is Metzger v. Bose, 183 Cal.App.2d 13, 6 Cal.Rptr. 337. It, too, was an injunction matter and involved an abandoned county road. There, one abutting owner had barricaded the old road and thereby cut another such owner off from access in one direction. The court held against the owner cut off and denied him an injunction, giving as its ground for decision the statement that an abutting owner had ‘no power to compel the public to maintain for his use the county road in its existing location.’ (P. 17 of 183 Cal.App.2d p. 339 of 6 Cal.Rptr.) For this statement the court also relied on 25 Cal.Jur.2d 33, referred to supra, which in turn cited the Levee Dist. and Swift cases. The court then reasoned that if the aggrieved abutting owner could not compel the County to keep the road in public use, he could not prevent his neighbor from barricading it. None of these cases reach the question here presented, hence the County's reliance on them is misplaced.

Contrary to the County's position it has long been recognized that ‘[a]n abutting land owner on a public highway has a special right of easement and user in the public road¹ for access purposes and this is a property right which cannot be damaged or taken away from him without due compensation [citations].’ (Strehlow v. Mothorn, 100 Cal.App. 692, 698–699, 280 P. 1021, 1024.) In discussing an abutting owner's right in a country road the court noted (100 Cal.App. p. 698, 280 P. 1024): ‘An abutting owner has two kinds of rights in a highway, a public right, which he enjoys in common with all other citizens, and certain private rights, which arise from his ownership of property contiguous to the highway and which are not common to the public generally; and this regardless of whether the fee of the highway is in him or not.’ The rights of an owner of property that abuts on a road running through ranch property were recognized in People v. Lipari (1963), 213 A.C.A. 514, 518, 28 Cal.Rptr. 808. These principles are particularly apposite to the case at bar.

The Railroad argues that plaintiffs had no property right in the Angeles Forest Highway crossing. Hence they fail to state a cause of action on the theory of inverse condemnation. In making this argument the Railroad fails to recognize that plaintiffs, as abutting property owners on Angeles Forest Highway, have a private property right (as distinguished from their rights as members of the public) in the nature of an easement in the highway which is appurtenant to the land they own and which they allege has been substantially impaired by defendants' closure of the crossing causing them great damage. Thus they have adequately pleaded a cause of action in inverse condemnation.

In support of its position the Railroad relies on City of San Mateo v. Railroad Commission, 9 Cal.2d 1, 68 P.2d 713. This decision affirms, inter alia, the exclusive power of the Commission to abolish grade crossings by ordering that they be physically closed under the police power. But it does not follow from this decision that property rights may be destroyed or damaged without compensation. Bacich makes this point quite clear in its discussion of the San Mateo case. First, in Bacich (23 Cal.2d p. 354, 144 P.2d p. 825) the court noted: ‘In City of San Mateo v. Railroad Commission, 9 Cal.2d 1, 68 P.2d 713, 718, it does not appear that the closing of the street placed the property owners on a cul-de-sac.’ Second, the court further noted (Id.): ‘While that case [City of San Mateo] may hold that grade crossings may be eliminated pursuant to the police power, we do not interpret it as holding that property may be placed in a cul-de-sac by the construction of a public improvement without the payment of compensation.’ Pertinent, then, it this connection, is the proposition that in ordering or authorizing the closing of a crossing the Commission may not determine whether property owners have suffered any damage due to such closing, nor may it undertake to fix the amount of damage therefor. These are matters which fall within the jurisdiction of the courts. Both the Commission and the courts agree upon this principle. (So, Pac. Co. & Western Pac. Co., 49 P.U.C. 735, 741–742; S. H. Chase Lumber Co. v. Railroad Commission, 212 Cal. 691, 706, 300 p. 12.)

Finally, counsel for the Railroad, relying on Constantine v. City of Sunnyvale, 91 Cal.App.2d 278, 204 P.2d 922, assert that the remedy of plaintiffs, if they have any, is against the County, not against the Railroad. Counsel's reliance on Constantine in the context of the allegations of the amended complaint in the instant case is misplaced. Plaintiffs allege, inter alia, that the County and Railroad entered into a written agreement ‘for the physical closure of Angeles Forest Highway’ at its intersection with the Railroad; that the ‘cost thereof should be shared by said two defendants'; that the Railroad ‘was to physically remove the existing crossing of Angeles Forest Highway across its said tracks'; and that the County as part of said ‘joint County and Railroad improvement project closed and barricaded * * * said Angeles Forest Highway at its intersection with said tracks * * *.’ It is apparent from this agreement between the defendants that they were both active joint participants in closing the crossing and thus impairing whatever rights, if any, plaintiffs had therein. The Railroad cannot evade, or shift to the County, its legal responsibility for any damage it may have done to plaintiffs' property rights. Under the allegations of the amended complaint, the asserted damages are due to the concurrent acts of both defendants. This is sufficient to charge the Railroad with liability. (Talbott v. Turlock Irr. Dist., 217 Cal. 504, 506, 19 P.2d 980; Martin & Shaffer v. City of Martinsburg, 102 W.Va. 138, 134 S.E. 745, 747.)

The judgments are reversed with instructions to overrule the demurrers, and to give the defendants a reasonable time in which to answer.

FOOTNOTES

1.  The court described the road in this fashion: ‘The road involved is a public road, used since 1880, and even before. It was a generally used road at a time before the railroad entered Sonoma county, and has since been maintained as such by the county, though the travel thereover has been much lessened. It is one of that class of country roads, apart and separate from the main highways, which serve the needs of a back country, and have not yet attained the dignity of concrete.’ Id. 100 Cal.App. p. 694, 280 P. 1022.

FOX, Presiding Justice.

ASHBURN and HERNDON, JJ., concur.