OBERLANDER v. CONTRA COSTA COUNTY (1992)

This case comes before us on appeal by both parties from a judgment granting in part and denying in part a petition for a writ of mandate and from a postjudgment order enforcing that writ.   Plaintiffs are a group of individuals who receive general assistance from defendant Contra Costa County.

The three issues before us are:  (1) Does Welfare and Institutions Code section 17000.5 ¹ permit the county to apply to nonrelated individuals living in shared housing the federal poverty line definition of a “family unit” of related individuals who share expenses?  (2) Under section 17000.5 may the county reduce grants for in-kind benefits without a factual finding that the reduced amount provides minimum subsistence?  (3) Does section 17000.5's level of sufficiency for general assistance aid include special needs grants?   These questions are purely ones of statutory construction.

 The duty to relieve and support the indigent and disabled is one imposed by the state upon each county.  (§ 17000.)   To that end the county board of supervisors is directed to adopt standards of aid and care.  (§ 17001.)   Consistent with those standards of aid the county then administers its program of general assistance.   The counties have broad discretion to set eligibility standards for and conditions upon its general assistance aid.  (Clay v. Tryk (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 119, 124, 222 Cal.Rptr. 729.)   However, “ ‘ “[i]n administering general assistance relief the county acts as an agent of the state.  [Citation.]  When a statute confers upon a state agency the authority to adopt regulations to implement, interpret, make specific or otherwise carry out its provisions, the agency's regulations must be consistent, not in conflict with the statute, and reasonably necessary to effectuate its purpose.  [Citation.]” ’ ”  (Robbins v. Superior Court (1985) 38 Cal.3d 199, 211, 211 Cal.Rptr. 398, 695 P.2d 695, quoting Mooney v. Pickett (1971) 4 Cal.3d 669, 679, 94 Cal.Rptr. 279, 483 P.2d 1231.)

In 1991 the Legislature enacted section 17000.5 which took effect June 30 and provides in pertinent part in language only lawyers could love:  “(a) The board of supervisors in any county may adopt a general assistance standard of aid that is 62 percent of a guideline that is equal to the 1991 federal official poverty line and may annually adjust that guideline in an amount equal to any adjustment provided under Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 11200) of Part 3 [Aid to Families with Dependent Children] for establishing a maximum aid level in the county.  [¶] (b) The adoption of a standard of aid pursuant to this section shall constitute a sufficient standard of aid.  [¶] (d) For purposes of this section, ‘federal official poverty line’ means the same as it is defined in subsection (2) of Section 9902 of Title 42 of the United States Code.” ²

The official poverty guideline for 1991 was set at varying dollar amounts based upon the size of the family unit.   Thus for a family of one the figure was set at $6,620, for a family of two $8,880, for a family of three $11,140 and so forth.³  (U.S.Dept. of Health and Human Services Annual Update of the HHS Poverty Income Guidelines (56 Fed.Reg. 6859 (Feb. 20, 1991).)   The federal guidelines note that “[t]here is no single administrative definition of ‘income,’ ‘family,’ ‘family unit,’ or ‘household’ that is valid for all programs that use the poverty guidelines ․ non-Federal organizations which use the poverty guidelines ․ may use administrative definitions that differ from the statistical definitions given below.”  (Id. at pp. 6859–6860.)   A “family unit” is then described as “either an unrelated individual or a family ․ constitutes a family unit.   In other words, a family unit of size one is an unrelated individual, while a family unit of two/three/etc. is the same as a family of two/three/etc.”  (Id. at p. 6860.)

In response to the enactment of section 17000.5, the Contra Costa County Board of Supervisors adopted Resolution No. 91/606 on September 17, 1991, setting “standards of aid that are 62 percent of the 1991 federal official poverty guidelines.”   Paralleling the federal use of scaled aid for a family unit, the county adopted a scale of aid for “budget unit” which it defined “as one or more persons residing in a single housing unit, whether or not all such persons are related and whether or not all such persons are eligible for general assistance.”⁴   “The standard of general assistance aid for each person in a budget unit exceeding 1 shall be an amount equal to the multiple person budget unit standard divided by the number of persons in the budget unit.” ⁵  Thus four unrelated recipients of general assistance living in shared housing would be considered a budget unit of four, and their individual grants would be $173 per person rather than $342 per person if each lived alone.

The standard of aid for homeless individuals eligible for general assistance was set at a one-person budget unit.   However, if the homeless person was residing at a public or private shelter, he or she was credited with $10 per day income for the value of the food and shelter received.   A homeless person who refused to stay in a shelter or who was ejected by a shelter because of his or her failure to observe shelter rules was also to be credited with income of $10 per day.

By Resolution No. 91/607 also adopted on September 17, 1991, the board adopted what it characterized as a discretionary program for meeting the special needs of those eligible for general assistance.   Special need allowances were provided for costs incident to a job search or to taking a job (union dues or uniforms), costs caused by health problems (special diets, eyeglasses, etc.), costs for clothing and a supplement for individuals living in board and care homes.

Plaintiffs filed a complaint seeking injunctive and declaratory relief and a writ of mandate.   The court elected to grant relief by writ after concluding that the county had exceeded the authority granted by section 17000.5 by adopting the definition of a budget unit “which will result in drastic cuts where two or more unrelated persons live in the same housing unit.”   Likewise, it found that the reduction of $10 per day for in-kind benefits received by shelter residents, or those who refuse or are ejected from shelter living, was “not facially permitted by the new statute.”   The court concluded that such changes could not be adopted without a study showing that, despite such reductions, general assistance aid would still provide minimum subsistence needs.   Defendants appeal from these portions of the judgment and from the order of enforcement.

The trial court, however, rejected plaintiffs' contention that a standard of aid equivalent to 62 percent of the poverty guideline did not also put a cap on the county's liability for special needs or emergency grants, but only upon the standard monthly allotment.   Thus the court concluded that a standard of aid which met the 62 percent level “caps the County's total responsibility.”   It is from this aspect of the judgment that plaintiffs appeal.

DISCUSSION

1. Appeala. Aid Units Under Section 17000.5

The study to which the trial court alludes in its memorandum of decision is often called a Boehm study after the case which first held that the level of general assistance payments must be set with reference to a factual study of what amount is needed for minimum subsistence.  (Boehm v. County of Merced (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 447, 452, 209 Cal.Rptr. 530.)   In a subsequent decision after remand the appellate court held that a general assistance grant must include monies for basic necessities which it defined as food, clothing, housing (including utilities), transportation and medical care.  (Boehm v. Superior Court (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 494, 502, 223 Cal.Rptr. 716.)   Deleting an allocation for any of those needs is permissible only if the county can show by a study that the need will be met by another program available to recipients of general assistance.  (Ibid.)

In its second opinion the court expressly found that its holding was compelled by both section 10000 which declares the purpose of the statutory scheme to be the provision of “appropriate aid and services to all of [the state's] needy and distressed,” and by sections 17000 and 17001 which impose upon the county the duty to relieve and support the indigent and delegate to the county board of supervisors the duty of adopting “standards of aid and care” for the poor and indigent.  (Boehm v. Superior Court, supra, 178 Cal.App.3d at pp. 500–502, 223 Cal.Rptr. 716.)

Immediately prior to the enactment of section 17000.5 in January of 1991, another panel in this district decided Whitfield v. Board of Supervisors (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 451, 277 Cal.Rptr. 815.  Whitfield found arbitrary and capricious Alameda County's practice of setting general assistance benefits at exactly $1 less than benefits paid under Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) absent any factual support that such a standard of aid met minimum subsistence needs in the county.  (Id. at pp. 460–461, 277 Cal.Rptr. 815.)   Prior to Whitfield other cases had found county standards of aid wanting for lack of factual support.  (Guidotti v. County of Yolo (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 1552, 1566, 271 Cal.Rptr. 858;  Poverty Resistance Center v. Hart (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 295, 307, 271 Cal.Rptr. 214 [reversing judgment sustaining demurrer for failure to state a cause of action under § 17001].)

 Against this background of case law, the county maintains that the provision of section 17000.5 setting 62 percent of the federal poverty level as “a sufficient standard of aid” was the legislative equivalent of a repeal of Boehm.   It argues that after the enactment of section 17000.5, any county which meets the 62 percent requirement has by definition provided minimum subsistence needs, ergo the study requirement need not be met.   We find that reading of the section, as far as it goes, to be compelling.   What remains unclear, however, is whether in enacting section 17000.5 with its reference to the federal poverty line the Legislature was also implicitly adopting the family unit aid ratios, and if it was, whether the county can then simply transfer the federal family unit ratios to budget units of unrelated individuals or must first conduct a Boehm study.

Section 17000.5 clearly states that a sufficient standard of aid is one equal to 62 percent of a guideline equivalent to the 1991 federal official poverty line.   The official poverty line is defined by the Office of Management and Budget using Census Bureau figures.  (42 U.S.C. § 9902(2).)   The poverty guidelines are established for family units, that is a single person or a family, meaning individuals related by birth, marriage or adoption.  (56 Fed.Reg. 6860 (Feb. 20, 1991).)

The federal guidelines do use the concept of “household” for “all persons who occupy a housing unit (house or apartment), whether they are related to each other or not.”  (56 Fed.Reg. 6860 (Feb. 20, 1991).)   That definition—apparently equivalent to the budget unit adopted by the county ⁶ —is not, however, used to establish the poverty guideline figures.   We must conclude therefore that in expressly linking the standard of aid to 62 percent of the poverty guideline figures used by the federal government, the Legislature was intending to also adopt the federal definition of the family unit.

Any other result would render the precise 62 percent figure meaningless.   If the county can define budget unit however it pleases, it could conclude that every resident in a 50–unit single occupancy hotel was part of one budget unit or household.  (For example under our hypothetical applying the county's proposed standard of aid, each person in the 50–unit building would be entitled to $121.48 while an individual living alone in a bungalow next door would receive $342.)   By expanding the budget unit definition, the standard of aid to each unrelated individual could be reduced far below the 62 percent figure set by the statute.

This is not to say that the county might not establish such a standard of aid and, upon an adequate factual showing under Boehm, be able to justify it.   We hold only that to come within the safe harbor of section 17000.5 a county's general assistance standard of aid must adopt the family unit definitions used by the federal poverty guidelines.   That is, a family unit is “either an unrelated individual” or a “group of two or more persons related by birth, marriage, or adoption who live together.”

We conclude that the trial court was correct in finding that the county adopted its budget unit standard of aid as to unrelated individuals in shared housing without making the required showing that such aid levels met the recipients' minimum subsistence needs.   Insofar as the county's budget unit definition coincides with the family unit definition employed by the federal poverty guidelines, it complies with section 17000.5 and does not require a Boehm study.

The county argues that even if its original scheme was infirm, it has complied with section 17000.5 by amending Resolution No. 91/717, passed November 5, 1991.   By that resolution the county permitted an individual in shared housing to demonstrate that he or she was not sharing living expenses or benefitting from economies of scale.  (Res. No. 91/717, adding part 1, § 109.)   Whatever the virtue of that amendment, it does not change the definition of budget unit.⁷  Therefore the changes do not, standing alone, cure the defect we find in the county's budget unit definition.

b. In–Kind Benefits

 By Resolution No. 91/606 the board of supervisors adopted a general assistance standard of aid for homeless individuals equivalent to one budget unit or $342 per month.   They further provided, however, that such a person who was living in either a public or private shelter would be credited with income of $10 per day as an approximation of the value of such food and shelter.   Furthermore, a homeless person who either refused shelter placement or was “disqualified for available shelter on account of his or her willful conduct” would likewise be credited with income of $10 per day for the value of the shelter accommodation.⁸

The trial court found this requirement void on the basis that it was “not facially permitted” by section 17000.5, and was therefore permissible only if a Boehm study confirmed that under the new scheme minimum subsistence needs would be met.

Section 17000.5 says nothing about what form the county's general assistance aid must take.   In the face of its silence, we look to the existing law on in-kind benefits of which the Legislature is presumed to have been aware when it enacted the section.

“The Welfare and Institutions Code does not require that the county grant indigents any specific type of relief․”  (Patten v. County of San Diego (1951) 106 Cal.App.2d 467, 470, 235 P.2d 217 [construing former section 2500 now embodied in section 17000].)   How the county discharges its state-mandated duty to assist the indigent is left to the discretion of its board of supervisors.  (Ibid.)  Nonetheless, in-kind programs have not universally found judicial approval.

Robbins v. Superior Court, supra, 38 Cal.3d 199, 211 Cal.Rptr. 398, 695 P.2d 695, involved a county program which required single, employable adults who were not homeowners or living with a dependent child to accept in-kind benefits in the form of communal residence at a shelter in lieu of a general assistance cash grant.  (At pp. 203, 224, 211 Cal.Rptr. 398, 695 P.2d 695.)   The court found that the plaintiffs were likely to prevail on their claim that such a program violated their right to privacy under the California Constitution.  (Id. at p. 212, 211 Cal.Rptr. 398, 695 P.2d 695.)   However, Robbins noted expressly that the case before it was not a challenge to all types of in-kind benefits.  (Id. at p. 210, 211 Cal.Rptr. 398, 695 P.2d 695.)

In Poverty Resistance Center v. Hart, supra, 213 Cal.App.3d 295, 271 Cal.Rptr. 214, a group of general assistance recipients successfully challenged the factual support for a county's standard of aid adopted pursuant to section 17001 which relied in part upon expenditures for a soup kitchen and homeless shelters.  (At p. 307, 271 Cal.Rptr. 214.)   The court cautioned:  “homeless shelters, at best, supplant a monthly grant for some recipients, but afford nothing to those recipients who do not and cannot patronize them.”  (Ibid.)

Implicit in both cases is the recognition that in-kind benefits may be offered as a means of discharging the county's section 17000 duty to relieve the indigent.

Moreover, in Poverty Resistance Center the court was concerned precisely with section 17001 which also uses the term “standard of aid.”   When the Legislature amends a statute which has been judicially construed, we presume that the legislative body is aware of that construction.  (Palos Verdes Faculty Assn. v. Palos Verdes Peninsula Unified Sch. Dist. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 650, 659, 147 Cal.Rptr. 359, 580 P.2d 1155.)   From its enactment of section 17000.5 with the same “standard of aid” language used in section 17001, without language limiting that standard to cash grants, we infer the Legislature was intending that the value of both cash grants and in-kind benefits be included in the general assistance standard of aid.

We conclude that the trial court erred insofar as it held that the county must do a Boehm study before it may use the value of in-kind food and shelter benefits provided to the homeless to meet the standard of aid sufficiency requirement established by section 17000.5.⁹

In their pleading, plaintiffs allege that by requiring homeless general assistance recipients to agree either to accept shelter residence or forgo receiving a full cash grant, the county violates their constitutional right of privacy.   The trial court, having ruled that the requirement could not be imposed until a Boehm study had been completed, found the issue moot.

Plaintiffs suggest this court could reach their privacy claim, but given the posture of the case that claim is not yet ripe for decision and we express no opinion as to its merits.   The superior court found the resolution enacting the in-kind benefits rule to be void and issued an order directing the county to refrain from implementing it.   This court granted plaintiffs a writ of supersedeas vacating the stay pending appeal of the superior court's order.   If, once this decision becomes final, the county implements its in-kind shelter rule, petitioners remain free to raise their privacy claim.

2. Plaintiffs' Appeal

Special Needs

In their appeal, plaintiffs contend the trial court erred in concluding that section 17000.5 created a cap at 62 percent of the poverty line on all county liability for general assistance aid, including grants which the county makes for special or emergency needs.   The trial court concluded that section 17000.5 was “unambiguous.   The legislature, which knows how to deal with special needs in welfare matters, did not limit the statute's ambit to ‘basic’ or ‘monthly’ needs, therefore, the legislature meant that if the County opted to enact a standard of aid equal to that set forth in § 17000.5(a), it is done and this caps the County's total responsibility.   It [the County] does not now need to do a study pursuant to case law existing before passage of § 17000.5.”

Plaintiffs urge us to find the trial court's reading of section 17000.5 erroneous.   They argue here, as they did below, that in the statutes governing maximum aid to AFDC recipients, the maximum grant amounts do not include additional amounts which may be paid for special needs.  (See, e.g., § 11450, subd. (e).) ¹⁰  They insist general assistance benefits are meant to be tied to the dollar levels of AFDC benefits.   Since AFDC special needs grants are expressly add-on's to the monthly AFDC grant, plaintiffs maintain the same should be true of general assistance.   Defendants take the opposite position, arguing that since the special needs grants are not expressly exempted by section 17000.5, the county's sufficient standard of aid may include grants for special or emergency needs.

Each side finds support in letters from legislators involved in passage of a bill which enacted section 17000.5.¹¹  The flatly contradictory versions of legislative intent expressed in these letters vividly demonstrate why appellate courts reject statements of intent as understood by individual members of the Legislature.  (In re Marriage of Bouquet, 16 Cal.3d 583, 589–590, 128 Cal.Rptr. 427, 546 P.2d 1371;  Commodore Home Systems, Inc. v. Superior Court (1982) 32 Cal.3d 211, 221–222, 185 Cal.Rptr. 270, 649 P.2d 912 (dis.opn. of Mosk, J.).)

 On its face, section 17000.5 speaks only of “a general assistance standard of aid” without distinguishing between flat monthly grant payments made to everyone eligible for general assistance and those supplemental grants made to cover recurring or nonrecurring special expenses peculiar to some recipients.   The Legislature can and has distinguished between the two types of grants in statutes governing the AFDC program.  (See §§ 11450, 11452, subd. (b).)

Plaintiffs insist that special needs, like health care provided through county hospitals, have traditionally been met not by the flat monthly general assistance grant.   Thus, they argue special needs grants were not intended to be encompassed by the “standard of aid” language used in section 17000.5.   They cite language in Poverty Resistance Center v. Hart, supra, 213 Cal.App.3d at pages 309–310, 271 Cal.Rptr. 214, to the effect that a county is not free to average out-of-existence needs common to only some recipients.   The case is inapposite.   It involved a challenge to the factual support for general assistance grant levels set by Sacramento County.  (Id. at p. 302, 271 Cal.Rptr. 214.)   The issue before us is not what needs a county must consider in setting grant levels, but whether the Legislature may eliminate the requirement of county need studies so long as the county sets a standard of aid equal to 62 percent of the official poverty guidelines.

There is nothing in the plain language of section 17000.5, subdivision (a) excluding special needs grants from the “general assistance standard of aid.”   Therefore we conclude, as the trial court did, that a county standard of aid which includes monthly flat grants and special needs grants equivalent to 62 percent of the 1991 federal official poverty line is “sufficient” within the meaning of section 17000.5, subdivision (b).

DISPOSITION

We affirm the judgment of the superior court insofar as it requires a Boehm study before the county may apply its budget unit standard of aid to unrelated individuals in shared housing.   We affirm that portion of the judgment which holds that the county may include special needs grants in its standard of aid used to satisfy section 17000.5, subdivision (b) without conducting a Boehm study.   We reverse that portion of the judgment voiding the county's in-kind benefits rule for homeless individuals eligible for general assistance.

In the interests of justice, each party shall bear its own costs on appeal.

I agree that the majority has reached the correct conclusion as to all matters before us and, therefore I concur in the judgment.   However, I recognize that this area of the law is not without its pitfalls.   Neither the Legislature nor boards of supervisors write on clean slates, but are often constrained by federal laws and regulations.   Thus it is that the court, in resolving issues like those before us today, enters a three dimensional thicket in which federal, state, and local action must be reconciled.   I sympathize with state and local law makers in their attempts to regulate welfare payments consistent with complex federal dictates and still balance their budgets—the latter, a feat not required of their federal counterparts.   That their work product is not always easy to comprehend is understandable;  however, I cannot join in criticizing them for their ingenuity, innovation, and commitment.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Unless otherwise indicated all further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

2.   “The term ‘poverty line’ means the official poverty line defined by the Office of Management and Budget based on Bureau of the Census data.”  (42 U.S.C. § 9902(2).)

3.   The complete chart applicable to California is as follows:“Size of family unitPoverty guideline1$ 6,6202  8,8803 11,1404 13,4005 15,6606 17,9207 20,1808 22,440For family units with more than 8 members, add $2,260 for each additional member.”

4.   The county had previously defined budget unit as “the GA applicant or recipient and those household members who are legally or financially responsible for him or her.”  (Res. No. 89/598.)Because the method of computing benefits changed so dramatically comparisons present major apples and oranges problems, but a sense of the change can be had by comparing the 1991 grant to two general assistance recipients living together to the changed standard of aid proposed for November 1, 1991.   After February 1, 1991, two persons “mutually responsible”—that is legally or financially responsible for one another—were eligible for a maximum grant of $566.  (Res. No. 89/598;  action Jan. 22, 1991.)   Under the November 1, 1991, proposed standard of aid, two persons, sharing housing and regardless of their legal or financial responsibility for one another, would be eligible for a grant of $460.   (Res. No. 91/606.)

5.   “The monthly standards of general assistance aid per budget unit are:Size of Budget UnitL2–4Standard of AidL3Budget UnitC4Person1L3 $342C4$3422L3 $460C4$2303L3 $575C4$1924L3 $693C4$1735L3 $809C4$1626L3 $926C4$1547L3 $1043C4$1498L3 $1159C4$145Each additional person add:L3 $117C4 $117”

6.   By Resolution No. 91/717 of November 5, 1991, the county defined budget unit “as persons eligible for general assistance residing in a single housing unit alone, or with other persons eligible for general assistance, family members, or other persons with whom the eligible person(s) share living expenses.”

7.   Somewhat belatedly, the county seems to have concluded that the justification for their budget unit category would be bolstered by talking about it as if it were like the household unit used in the federal official poverty guidelines.  (Res. No. 91/717 amending part 1, § 102, subds. (b), (f).)

8.   On November 5, 1991, Resolution No. 91/717 was adopted amending Resolution No. 91/606.   It added the following section to the portion of the earlier resolution dealing with in-kind benefits to the homeless.“Based on the reports and studies of the Social Service Department, the Board of Supervisors finds that the actual cost of food and housing at a county shelter is $22 per day, and that $10 per day should be treated as income to homeless General Assistance eligibles who are sheltered or who refused or are disqualified for shelter calculated at $3 per day for food ․ and $7 per day for housing․  The Board of Supervisors further finds that $10 per day is less than a pro-rata allocation of the monthly General Assistance allowance for a 1 person budget unit.”The administrative regulations (Dept. Mem. No. 192 dated Nov. 14, 1991) adopted by the Social Services Department provides that the $10 per day be calculated on the basis of a 30–day month, leaving a cash grant of $42.   Those regulations further provide that no deduction from the grant of an applicant willing to accept shelter is made unless shelter space is actually available.

9.   Plaintiffs raise other objections to the county's resolution permitting it to credit residents $10 for each day spent in a shelter.   They hypothesize that deducting the value of half a month's shelter residence would leave a general assistance recipient with insufficient funds to live on for the rest of the month.   They may or may not be correct, but their scenario has no factual support in this record.

10.   That section provides:  “In addition to the amounts payable under subdivision (a) and Section 11453.1, a family shall be entitled to receive an allowance for recurring special needs not common to a majority of recipients.   These recurring special needs shall include, but not be limited to, special diets upon the recommendation of a physician for circumstances other than pregnancy, and unusual costs of transportation, laundry, housekeeping service, telephone, and utilities.   The recurring special needs allowance for each family per month shall not exceed that amount resulting from multiplying the sum of ten dollars ($10) by the number of recipients in the family who are eligible for assistance.”

11.   The bill which was emergency legislation took effect on June 30, 1991.  (Stats.1991, ch. 91, § 34, No. 3 West's Cal.Legis.Service, p. 410.)   On August 22, 1991, Assemblyman Bates received unanimous consent to publish a letter in the Assembly Journal to the effect that “[t]he standard set forth in that section was meant to apply to the maximum monthly benefit level and not to any emergency or special needs payments for which an applicant or recipient of general assistance might otherwise be eligible.”  (Assem.J. (1991 Reg.Sess.) p. 3740.)   By declaration of October 24, 1991, Senator Marian Bergeson took issue with the Bates view, insisting that his letter “does not, insofar as it purports to express an intention to limit the General Assistance cap provision of Welfare and Institutions Code section 17000.5 to monthly payments, correctly express the tenor of the proceedings before the Task Force and Conference Committee on Realignment or the Legislature when AB 948 was adopted.”

POCHÉ, Associate Justice.

REARDON, J., concurs.