WALKER v. ADAMSON (1936)

Action to recover damages for personal injuries received in an automobile accident. The complaint contained two causes of action. The first charged willful misconduct; the second, negligence. Each cause of action alleged plaintiff to be a passenger in the automobile at the time of the accident. The answer was a general denial with a special defense of contributory negligence. The first cause of action was withdrawn by plaintiff. The case was not tried on the theory of defendant's willful misconduct and no proof was offered on this issue, it being conceded that there is no evidence of willful misconduct. The case proceeded to trial on the second cause of action which charged negligence, it being alleged that plaintiff was riding as a passenger and not as a guest in defendant's automobile at the time of the accident. Plaintiff recovered judgment in the sum of $25,000 and costs. Motion for a new trial was made and denied. This is an appeal from the judgment and order.

Appellant relies upon five points for a reversal. She first claims plaintiff was a guest and the judgment lacks evidentiary support for the reason that no willful misconduct was involved. She also claims the record fails to show that any negligence of defendant proximately caused the accident. The further claim is made that the evidence establishes the fact that plaintiff assumed the risks of the ride. Complaint is also made of certain instructions and that the verdict is excessive.

It appears from the evidence that plaintiff and defendant had been friends for years and had become business associates in acquiring real estate. One of their holdings consisted of property at Lake Tahoe, which was improved with two houses and appurtenant guest houses, which they rented, and shared equally the income derived therefrom. The management and supervision of the property required the parties to make occasional trips to Lake Tahoe. Each was the owner of an automobile and they were both experienced drivers and their automobiles were used alternately on the trips which they had occasion to make. Defendant usually drove from Oakland, whichever automobile was used, as far as Sacramento, and plaintiff would then drive over the mountain roads to Tahoe. Expenses of the trip were borne equally by each party. In May, 1934, the parties were completing a guest cottage on their property and they left to take material to the carpenters who were working there. Defendant's automobile was used on this occasion. So far as the record shows it was in good mechanical condition, but the rear tires had worn smooth. The trip was commenced in the early morning with defendant driving and plaintiff seated alongside of her in the front seat. A drizzling rain prevailed as the trip commenced, and the parties desiring to get to the lake as soon as possible defendant it would seem was driving rapidly, but plaintiff made no protest, she testifying that defendant at all times drove in a careful manner. As they progressed on their journey they concluded, as the road was in better condition, they could safely increase their speed, which they did. Shortly thereafter the machine skidded, crashed into a telephone pole, and overturned in a ditch; plaintiff receiving the injuries of which she complains.

The only evidence in the record as to the rate of speed the parties were traveling at the time of the accident is found in the testimony of defendant which shows it to have been from thirty to thirty–five miles an hour. Plaintiff testified that defendant was driving in a careful and conscientious manner. Under these facts defendant claims she is in no manner liable for plaintiff's injuries.

The question as to whether or not plaintiff occupied the status of a guest is one of law as there is no factual conflict. The parties were on a business trip in which they were mutually interested, and they shared the expenses equally between them. It is apparent, therefore, that the determining factor in the case is plaintiff's status at the time of the accident. It seems clear to us that the evidence establishes without conflict that plaintiff was a guest of defendant, and as it is conceded that there was no willful misconduct on defendant's part, plaintiff has no right of recovery even assuming there was negligence on the part of defendant. Our courts have uniformly held that where compensation is not given for a ride, the person accepting the ride is a guest, and a cause of action sounding in negligence is not maintainable by such person against the operator of the automobile. The evidence shows without dispute that plaintiff paid one–half the expenses of the business trip which was made for the benefit of both. She did not, therefore, confer any benefit upon the defendant. Had the defendant made the trip alone, under the arrangement of the parties, plaintiff would have been required to pay her one–half of the expenses. They were engaged in a joint venture and each was looking after her own interest.

In Crawford v. Herzog, 3 Cal.App.(2d) 705, 40 P.(2d) 954, the facts show that plaintiff was riding in defendant's automobile for the common purpose of inspecting a mine. Because the excursion bore the indicia of a joint venture, plaintiff was held to be a guest and denied recovery for the negligence of defendant. So, also, in Crawford v. Foster, 110 Cal.App. 81, 293 P. 841, a guest is described to be one who is invited, either directly or by implication, to enjoy the hospitality of a driver of a car, who accepts such hospitality and who takes a ride either for his own pleasure or his own business without conferring any benefit upon the driver of the car. The guest status exists where the ride is accepted for the business or pleasure of the acceptor [Redwing v. Moncravie, 131 Cal. App. 569, 21 P.(2d) 986], and it also exists where the ride is accepted on a joint venture to which the acceptor is a party. Crawford v. Herzog, supra; Wessling v. Southern Pacific Co., 116 Cal.App. 455, 3 P.(2d) 25. In the recent case of Rogers v. Vreeland (Cal.App.) 60 P.(2d) 585, it was definitely held that sharing of expenses did not constitute compensation for a ride. In this case there is a general review of the cases upon the subject. Olefsky v. Ludwig, 242 App.Div. 637, 272 N.Y.S. 158; Morgan v. Tourangeau, 259 Mich. 598, 244 N.W. 173; Clendenning v. Simerman, 220 Iowa, 739, 263 N.W. 248.

Clearly the instant case comes within the rule declared in these cases that the law places business associates in the guest category. The purpose and object of the guest law (St.1923, p. 517 § 141 3/4 as added by St.1929, p. 1580, as amended by St.1931, p. 1693), as stated by appellant, is to rid courts of litigation arising out of automobile accidents in which close relatives and associates sue others and engage in what is in reality a collusive suit for the ultimate spoliation of an insurance company. Plaintiff having given no reward or compensation for the ride she accepted, was a guest within the meaning of the statute, and it being conceded there was no wilful misconduct on the part of defendant, no liability attached to defendant for her alleged negligence. This conclusion renders unnecessary a discussion of the other questions raised by appellant.

The judgment and order are reversed.

TYLER, Presiding Justice.

We concur: CASHIN, J.; KNIGHT, J.