IN RE: T.B. (2012)

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

The juvenile court sustained a petition alleging that appellant T.B. committed second degree robbery in violation of Penal Code 1 section 211, a felony.   The court found that appellant was a person described by Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, adjudged appellant to be a ward of the court, and placed appellant home on probation.

Appellant appeals from the orders sustaining the petition and adjudging him to be a ward of the court, contending that there is insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court's finding that he committed a robbery.   We affirm the trial court's orders.

Facts 2

Appellant and Raymond G. did not like each other, and had “problems” with each other.   On December 2, 2010, appellant and a group of friends approached Raymond as he walked home from school.   Appellant stood in front of Raymond in a fighting stance, with his fists clenched.   Raymond feared that appellant was about to attack him, and so took off his backpack.   Appellant punched Raymond in the upper body.   Raymond fell to the ground.   Appellant punched Raymond some more.   He then stopped punching Raymond, took Raymond's backpack and walked away.

Sheriff's deputies detained appellant near the scene of the crime.   Appellant had a pair of eyeglasses in his pocket.   Raymond identified the glasses as his.

Appellant was taken to the sheriff's station.   There, after being Mirandized, appellant stated that he could not stand “the fool” and that he had fought with Raymond several times in the past.   He said:  “I beat the fool up and took his backpack.”   He added:  “He deserved it for what he had done to me in the past.”

On December 20, 2010, appellant's sister, R.L., told sheriff's deputies that she found a backpack and cell phone in her mailbox.   She believed that one of appellant's friends might have placed the items there.

Discussion

Appellant contends that there is insufficient evidence to show that he formed the intent to steal until after he finished the assault, and so insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court's finding that he committed robbery.

“ ‘In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we do not determine the facts ourselves.   Rather, we “examine the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”  [Citations.]  We presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.  [Citation.]  [¶] The same standard of review applies to cases in which the prosecution relies primarily on circumstantial evidence and to special circumstance allegations.  [Citation.]  “[I]f the circumstances reasonably justify the jury's findings, the judgment may not be reversed simply because the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding.”  [Citation.]  We do not reweigh evidence or reevaluate a witness's credibility.  [Citations.]’ ”  (People v. Nelson (2011) 51 Cal.4th 198, 210.)

“Robbery is the felonious taking of personal property in the possession of another, from his person or immediate presence, and against his will, accomplished by means of fear or force.” (§ 211.)   The intent to steal must arise “either before or during the commission of the act of force.”  (People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 34.)   If the intent to steal arose after the victim was assaulted, the robbery element of stealing by force or fear is absent.  (People v. Huggins (2006) 38 Cal.4th 175, 214.)

“Direct evidence of the mental state of the accused is rarely available except through his or her testimony.”  (People v. Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547, 558–559.)   Thus, an intent to steal is generally manifested by the circumstances surrounding the crime.  (People v. Gilbert (1963) 214 Cal.App.2d 566, 567–568.)

Here, the circumstances supported a reasonable inference that appellant formed the intent to take the backpack during the assault.   Appellant took the backpack immediately after he stopped punching Raymond, which strongly suggests that the intent to steal was formed while still punching Raymond.

To the extent that appellant contends that the history of problems between him and Raymond meant that his only possible motive in punching Raymond was to assault him, we do not agree.   A defendant may have more than one intent in committing a criminal act, and thus it is perfectly possible that appellant intended both to beat up Raymond and to take his property.   Stealing a victim's property can be a way of punishing and humiliating the victim.   Appellant's statement to sheriff's deputies supports this motive.   Appellant said:  “I beat the fool up and took his backpack.”   He continued, adding, “He deserved it for what he has done to me in the past.”

It would also be possible to infer that appellant did not form the intent to steal until after he stopped punching Raymond.   Such an inference would not require reversal of the trial court's findings.   Since the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact's findings, “the judgment may not be reversed simply because the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding.”  (People v. Nelson, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 210.)

Disposition

The juvenile court's orders are affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

We concur:

FOOTNOTES

FN1. All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated..  FN1. All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.

FN2. Appellant waived his right to an adjudication hearing and agreed to have the court make a determination of the truth of the allegations based on the police report and argument of counsel.   We granted appellant's motion to augment the record on appeal with the police reports.   The facts in this opinion are taken from those reports..  FN2. Appellant waived his right to an adjudication hearing and agreed to have the court make a determination of the truth of the allegations based on the police report and argument of counsel.   We granted appellant's motion to augment the record on appeal with the police reports.   The facts in this opinion are taken from those reports.

TURNER, P.J. MOSK, J.