IN RE: HOPE V. et al. (2011)

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

In June 2007, Lisa V. (mother) was mother to five children:  G.V. (age 13), daughter J.V. (age 12), Anthony and Andrea (age 10), and Kayla (age 4), who had cerebral palsy, mental retardation, and used an abdominally implanted feeding tube.   Mother was also then in the process of adopting a sixth child, Destiny (age 5), with special needs.

On June 18, 2007, these children were removed from mother's home based upon allegations of abuse to at least two of them.

During the next four years, while trying to comply with the care plans and orders of the juvenile court in order to accomplish reunification with her children, mother gave birth to three additional children—daughter Hope (born in February 2009), and twins Christina and Jasmine (born in January 2010)—each of whom were also removed from her custody and placed in foster care.   In October 2010, the juvenile court concluded that mother's reunification with the youngest three of her children was not reasonably likely within the next six months, and terminated her reunification services with respect to them.

In this appeal mother asks us to overturn the juvenile court's denial of her requests, filed in February and April 2011, that the court change its orders denying reunification services with respect to Christina and Jasmine.   For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the challenged orders.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND THE CASE

The Original Petition

On June 18, 2007 the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) removed mother's five children from her home following J.V.'s disclosure to her therapist that two days earlier mother had subjected her to inappropriate physical discipline, and had on previous occasions subjected Andrea and Anthony to abuse as well.   On June 20, 2007, DCFS filed an original Juvenile Dependency Petition under section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), (g), and (j), of the Welfare and Institutions Code, and detained the children.   The petition set forth the allegations underlying the subdivision (a), (b), (g), and (j) charges.¹

Interviews with the children, their maternal grandmother (with whom mother and the children had been temporarily staying), and various other relatives, confirmed that mother had on a few occasions hit one or more of the children.   (Mother had been taken into custody;  the father's whereabouts were then unknown.) ²  Mother was described as “a very loving mother and puts her children first.”   However there was substantial agreement that J.V. had serious behavioral problems, had been verbally abusive toward mother, and had been diagnosed with a mood disorder for which she was receiving medication and counseling.   It was also reported that mother had been diagnosed with kidney cancer for which she was receiving chemotherapy.   There had been four previous referrals of the family upon allegations of physical abuse or general neglect, beginning in July 2000, all of which had been closed as unfounded or inconclusive.³

Mother denied the petition's allegations.

After reviewing the DCFS presentation of evidence, the court found (in addition to jurisdictional findings):  (1) that a prima facie case was established for detaining the children as persons described by section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), (g), and (j);  (2) that substantial danger existed to the children's physical or emotional health and there was no reasonable means of protecting them without their removal from mother's home;  and (3) that reasonable means had been undertaken to prevent removal.

Assessing the potential risk to the children's future safety, the DCFS found the risk of future abuse to be high, recommending the children's continued detention and placement.   G.V. (at his request) and Kayla (because of her medical needs) remained with their maternal grandmother;  J.V., Anthony, and Andrea were placed together in a licensed foster placement.

The court ordered the children's temporary placement and custody vested with DCFS, appropriate family reunification and family preservation services, specifying parenting and anger management counseling for mother, individual counseling for the children, and joint counseling of the older children together with mother.   Mother was permitted to visit with the children in the maternal grandmother's home.

The DCFS predisposition detention report in early August 2007 noted mother's apparent motivation and cooperative attitude toward working with the court and DCFS, the support she was receiving from family and friends, her history of having provided for the children's needs, and the affection and comfort she showed in her interactions with Kayla.   It nevertheless concluded that a substantial danger remained to the children's health and emotional well-being, and that there was no reasonable means to protect the children without removing them from mother's custody.

On October 16, 2007, mother submitted on certain portions of the petition, including the allegations of her physical discipline or abuse of J.V. and Andrea (§ 300, subd. (a));  her failure to protect J.V., Andrea, and their siblings (§ 300, subds.(b), (j));  and the father's failure to provide for the children's support (§ 300, subds.(b), (g)).  The court sustained the petition consistent with mother's mediation agreement, finding by clear and convincing evidence that substantial danger existed to the children's physical health and emotional well being, that there was no reasonable means to protect them without removal from their parents' physical custody, and that reasonable efforts had been made to prevent the need for removal.   It also found that although “mother has made substantial progress toward alleviating or mitigating the causes necessitating [the children's] placement,” the placements and case plans remained appropriate, reasonable services had been provided by DCFS, and February 13, 2008 was the likely date by which either their reunification or their permanent placement would be possible.   The court declared the children to be dependents of the court under section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), (g), and (j), continued their placements and its other orders.

At ensuing hearings the court found a substantial probability that the children would be returned to the custody of their parents, and that the likely date of their return or permanent placement was July 22, 2008.   It continued their placements and mother's family reunification services for a status review on that date at the 12–month permanency hearing under section 366.21, subdivision (f).

At the 12–month permanency hearing, DCFS reported that mother had completed 20 sessions of parenting class.   Although she had recently stopped attending her individual therapy sessions (apparently due to her work schedule), she had indicated her intention to re-enroll in individual therapy.   Her participation in family counseling sessions with J.V. had resumed after interruption for a few months, but she had not enrolled in family therapy with Anthony and Andrea.⁴  DCFS concluded that the risk to the children remained high if the children were to reunify with mother at that time.   It recommended that the children remain in their current placements, that mother continue to receive six months of further reunification services with respect to J.V., Anthony, and Andrea, but that reunification services end with respect to G.V.

The court found the mother in compliance with the case plan, continued the children's placements and mother's reunification services with respect to all five children, and scheduled the 18–month permanent plan hearing for December 18, 2008.

The December 18, 2008 DCFS status report indicated that mother was not in full compliance with her case plan.   She had ended her individual counseling attendance, her attendance at family counseling sessions was inconsistent, and she did not have appropriate housing for increased visitation with her children.   DCFS also reported that mother was then seven months pregnant, and that there were indications (denied by mother) that she had in recent months been a victim of domestic violence at the hands of her boyfriend, the father of the yet-unborn child.   DCFS again found a high risk to the children of abuse if they were to be reunified with mother, recommending termination of mother's family reunification services as to G.V., J.V., Anthony and Andrea, and orders for case plans for their adoption.   The court continued the hearing date to February 19, 2009 for a contested permanent plan hearing under section 366.22 with respect to all five children:  G.V., J.V., Anthony, Andrea and Kayla.

In February 2009, mother gave birth to daughter Hope.

After receiving a February 19, 2009 DCFS interim review report, the court continued the contested permanent placement hearing to April 20, 2009.⁵  An April 20, 2009 DCFS interim review report recommended mother's reunification with Anthony and Andrea on certain conditions;  that G.V. be placed in legal guardianship with his maternal grandmother;  and that J.V. continue in long-term foster care,with a possible future guardianship or adoption by a maternal aunt.

At the April 20, 2009, contested section 366.22 hearing, the court maintained its jurisdiction over G.V., J.V., Anthony, Andrea and Kayla.   It ordered Anthony's and Andrea's placement in mother's home, to be finalized at a September 21, 2009 hearing under section 364, subdivision (c), with family preservation services to continue with respect to Anthony and Andrea.   The court terminated mother's family reunification services with respect to G.V., J.V. and Kayla, and continued the section 366.26 permanent plan hearing to August 17, 2009.

The Amended Petition

On May 13, 2009 Anthony, Andrea and Hope were detained and removed from mother's home, upon reports that mother and her boyfriend had a history of domestic violence and violent altercations in the children's presence.   On June 29, 2009, DCFS filed a section 300 petition as to Hope, and an amended petition under section 342 as to Anthony and Andrea.⁶  The petitions alleged a substantial risk of danger to the children's physical or emotional well being resulting from these incidents and mother's failure to protect them.⁷  On August 17, 2009 the court sustained the section 342 petitions as to Anthony and Andrea, and the section 300 petition as to Hope. Family reunification services were ordered as to Hope. The court ordered Anthony's and Andrea's removal from mother's home, and terminated family services with respect to them.   Hope was placed with her paternal grandmother.   With mother's consent, the court ordered a legal guardianship of G.V. with his maternal grandmother and terminated the court's jurisdiction.⁸

The Section 300 Petition as to Christina and Jasmine

In January 2010, mother gave birth to twins Christina & Jasmine.⁹  On February 3, DCFS placed the twins in a foster home.

A DCFS status review a few days later reported mother's desire to reunify with Hope, who reportedly was thriving in her placement with her paternal grandmother and aunt.   It also reported mother's recognition of her own need for further therapy, her realization that she lacked the capacity at that time to care for J.V., and her minimal compliance with court orders (for example, her attendance at only four out of 26 domestic violence classes).   The review's assessment was that mother had not addressed the issues that had resulted in the children's detention, and that the risk of future abuse or neglect would be very high if the children were returned to her care.   DCFS recommended termination of family reunification services with respect to Hope.

At the February 4, 2010 permanent plan review hearing under section 366.26, for J.V. the court ordered a planned permanent living arrangement at a group home facility, with a goal of emancipation;  for Anthony and Andrea it ordered a permanent plan and specific goal of legal guardianship;  and for these three children it fixed August 2, 2010 as the likely date to finalize permanent plans.   For Kayla the court ordered a permanent plan living at a specialty hospital, with a specific goal of placement with a willing relative in a less restrictive setting, to be achieved by May 20, 2010.

On February 8, 2010, DCFS filed a dependency petition for Christina and Jasmine under section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), and (j).  The DCFS detention report indicated that during her pregnancy with the twins mother had been homeless, staying in motels, shelters, and relatives' homes.   She had failed to obtain extended MediCal benefits for prenatal care during the later portion of her pregnancy, and had obtained only sporadic prenatal care.   DCFS requested an order for family reunification services with Christina and Jasmine, based on mother's long-term noncompliance with court-ordered case plans, her unaddressed domestic violence and mental health issues, and her lack of a stable home.

At the February 8, 2010 detention hearing the court ordered the twins detained, finding a substantial danger to their physical or emotional health and no reasonable way to protect them without their removal.   It continued the matter for adjudication on March 12, 2010.

At the March 12, 2010 hearing the court struck certain portions of the allegations of abuse and failure to protect, but sustained the petition with respect to dangers from domestic violence of mother (as well as Hope's and the twins' presumed father), their failure to protect the children, the father's history and criminal convictions for alcohol and substance abuse, and mother's incapacity to provide care and supervision for the children due to her mental and emotional problems.   It found by clear and convincing evidence that these factors substantially endangered the twins' physical and emotional health and safety and placed them at risk of physical and emotional harm and damage, and there was no reasonable means to protect them without their removal from their parents' physical custody.

The court found that mother's compliance with reunification plans had been minimal, although she had made substantial progress toward alleviating the causes that had necessitated the twins' removal from her custody.   It fixed the likely date for the twins' return to mother's custody or placement for adoption to be September 10, 2010.¹⁰

The September 10, 2010 DCFS status review reported that mother remained homeless, staying with friends;  that she had inconsistent visitation with her children and had minimal progress with court orders and the DCFS case plan.   Although she had completed a number of parenting and domestic violence classes, she had failed to enroll in an anger management class.   Moreover, she had continuously procrastinated with respect to obtaining mental health services to which she had been referred, having completed only two sessions in the 16 months since the court had ordered that as part of her reunification plan;  she apparently had not disclosed some of her mental health issues to her therapists;  and she had allowed her psychotropic medication to lapse.   DCFS also reported that mother had cancelled many of her scheduled weekly visits with Hope, without rescheduling to make up for the cancelled visits.   Although her visits generally went well, she had only sporadic visits with Hope, and had never asked Hope's caregiver about Hope's eating habits, doctor visits, or activities.

As to Christina and Jasmine, DCFS reported that mother's attendance at her scheduled one-hour weekly visits had been extremely inconsistent;  mother had attended only 7 out of 21 scheduled visits.   Although she had initially contacted the twins' caregivers weekly, she did not ask them specific questions about the girls, and during recent months her calls had tapered off and ended completely.   Moher reported to DCFS her opposition to the adoption of any of her children.

DCFS recommended termination of mother's family reunification services as to Hope, Christina and Jasmine.¹¹  The court continued to October 29, 2010 the contested judicial review hearing under section 366.21, subdivision (e), and it continued these children's section 366.22 permanent plan reviews for contested hearings on the same date.¹²

The October 29, 2010 Termination of Family Reunification Services

At the October 29, 2010 hearing, mother requested the court to extend her reunification services with respect to Hope, Christina and Jasmine.¹³  The court noted her improved, but still “piecemeal” efforts to comply with the ordered plan, exemplified by her failure to obtain the ordered mental health counseling, her failure to consistently take her psychotropic medications, her failure to follow through with referrals she had been given for therapy, and her record of missed visits with Hope.

After indicating that it had read the file, the court found that the conditions continued to exist justifying the court's jurisdiction, that the children's return to mother's custody at that time would create a substantial risk of detriment to the children's safety, and (by clear and convincing evidence) that the DCFS had complied with the case plan and had made reasonable efforts to finalize the children's permanent placement.   It ordered family reunification services terminated with respect to Hope, Christina and Jasmine.

Finding prima facie evidence that the children's return to mother would be detrimental, it continued the matter to April 14, 2011 for contested section 366.26 permanency hearings as to Hope, Christina and Jasmine.   The court ordered no change in previous orders with respect to monitored visits with Hope. As to the twins, however, it ordered that weekly visits could continue to the extent the children's caregivers could accommodate that schedule, but it granted DCFS discretion to limit mother's visits with Christina and Jasmine to one per month in light of mother's record of cancellations and resulting inconvenience to the caregivers.   And the court also gave mother notice that at the next hearing it “may consider termination of parental rights” as to Hope, Christina and Jasmine;  it found that the children could not be returned to parental custody and that “there exists no substantial probability” they would be returned within six months;  it found that Hope, Christina and Jasmine “can or will be adopted”;  and it ordered them referred for adoptive planning.

Mother's Requests For Change of Orders

On February 10, 2011, mother filed a Request to Change Court Order pursuant to section 388, asking that the court change its October 29, 2010 orders terminating her family reunification services with respect to J.V., Christina and Jasmine.¹⁴  The request alleged that changes in circumstances justified the proposed order changes, specifying mother's compliance with the case plan, her receipt of mental health care, her completion of a parenting program, her completion of a 26–week domestic violence class, and her regular visits with the children.   The request asked that the court reinstate her family reunification services with respect to Christina and Jasmine, and that it permit her visits with J.V. to be unmonitored.

On March 2, 2011, the court summarily denied the change-of-order request.   It found that mother's request failed to state new evidence or change of circumstances, that the proposed change order would not promote the children's best interest, and (as to J.V.) that the “child is fragile, mother's history erratic.”

On April 14, 2011 mother filed a renewed request under section 388 for change of the court's October 29, 2010 orders terminating family reunification services with respect to Christina and Jasmine, seeking an order reinstating those family reunification services with respect to the twins, and home placement of Hope with mother.   Mother's petition alleged that she had maintained contact with the children in accordance with the October 29, 2010 orders, that she had continued to comply with the case plan, and that she “can provide nurturing [and] safe home for the minors.”

The court found that although mother had shown some change in her compliance, it was just a beginning—too soon to establish the changed circumstances required by section 388 to justify changes in the court's orders.   Concluding that the proposed changes would not promote the children's best interests, the court denied the requests to change its October 29, 2010 orders.

The court then proceeded with the contested section 366.26 hearing as to Christina and Jasmine, after denying mother's request for a further continuance.¹⁵  It found that although mother had made “some progress” toward reunification with her children during her long history with the court, she had not successfully reunified with the twins, and had not established that it would be detrimental to the twins to terminate her parental rights.   The court found that return of Christina and Jasmine to mother's control would be detrimental, that their adoption was likely, and that they would not be prejudiced by termination of mother's parental rights.   It ordered permanent placement services with respect to Christina and Jasmine;  it appointed the twins' caretakers as the prospective adoptive parents; ¹⁶  and it terminated mother's parental rights.¹⁷

Mother Appeals

Mother filed two notices of appeal, both on April 22, 2011.   One appeal was taken from the court's March 2, 2011 denial of her February 10, 2011 petition to change the court's October 29, 2010 orders, which had asked the court to reinstate her family reunification services with respect to Christina and Jasmine, and for unmonitored visits with J.V. (The court's written denial was dated March 2, 2011, but it was filed March 9, 2001, the date identified in mother's notice of appeal.)   Mother's second notice of appeal describes the orders challenged by mother's appeal:

“On 4/14/11 Court denied 388 petition (JV–180) filed on 4/14/11.   On 4/14/11 Court terminated parental rights.” 18

In addition to the April 14, 2011 order denying the petition under section 388, the second notice of appeal purported to challenge orders of January 31, 2011 and April 14, 2011, terminating mother's parental rights as to Christina and Jasmine.   The record contains no order of January 31, 2011 terminating mother's parental rights as to the twins;  the order terminating those rights was made on April 14, 2011, not January 31, 2011.

DISCUSSION

The Issues Raised by Mother's Appeals

Despite the recitals in her notices of appeal, no orders pertaining to Hope or to J.V. are raised in this appeal.   The only issues raised by mother's appeals are her challenges to the orders of March 2, 2011 and April 14, 2011, denying her petitions under section 388 with respect to family reunification services with respect to the twins.

Neither of mother's requests for changes of the court's orders asked the juvenile court to reinstate reunification services with respect to Hope. Mother's February 10, 2011 request asked the court to change its October 29, 2010 orders terminating mother's family reunification services with respect to Christina, Jasmine, and J.V.;   it did not mention Hope. Her April 14, 2011 request for change of order asked the court to change Hope's placement to mother's home, as well as to reinstate family reunification services as to Christina and Jasmine;  but it did not ask the court to reinstate reunification services with respect to Hope.

Although mother's notices of appeal were sufficient to raise an appellate challenge to the order denying her request for change of Hope's placement to her home, her opening brief does not mention that issue.   Her opening brief challenges only the court's denials of her petitions “to change the court order and reinstate reunification services” with respect to Hope, Christina and Jasmine.   Because her brief does not challenge the order denying her request for Hope's placement in her home, mother has abandoned any appeal with respect to that issue.  (Tiernan v. Trustees of Cal. State University & Colleges (1982) 33 Cal.3d 211, 216, fn. 4 [failure to raise issue in briefs waives issue on appeal].)

For the same reason—her brief's failure to mention the issue—mother has also abandoned any appeal from the juvenile court's April 14, 2011 order terminating her parental rights as to Christina and Jasmine.   And in addition to abandoning her appeals with respect to the April 14, 2011 order terminating her parental rights and the orders pertaining to Hope, mother's opening brief expressly abandons her appeal with respect to orders pertaining to J.V.

The only issues before us in this appeal therefore arise from her challenges to the juvenile court's March 2, 2011 and April 14, 2011 denials of her requests for reinstatement of her reunification services with respect to Christina and Jasmine.

Timeliness of Appeals

The orders denying mother's requests for change of the court's March 2, 2011 and April 14, 2011 orders denying her change-of-order requests are appealable.  (In re Shirley K. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 65, 71 [denial of section 388 petition for change in order is appealable under section 395].)   And mother's appeals from the denial orders are timely.  (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(a);  John F. v. Superior Court (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 400, 404–405.)

The juvenile court's denial of mother's requests for change of its orders terminating reunification services, and to reinstate reunification services with respect to Christina and Jasmine, are supported by the record and did not abuse the court's discretion.

The juvenile court has authority to change, modify or set aside any order, subject to the procedural requirements set forth in section 388.   Under section 388, mother “may, upon grounds of change of circumstance or new evidence, petition the court ․ for a hearing to change, modify, or set aside any order of court previously made or to terminate the jurisdiction of the court.” (§ 388, subd. (a).)

As the party requesting the change of orders, mother had the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the requested change was justified.  (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.570(h)(1)(D);  In re S.R. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 864, 870.)   In order to meet that burden she had to show the existence either of new evidence or a legitimate change of circumstances since the court's underlying order was made;  and she had to show that undoing the previous order and entering the new order would be in the children's best interest.  (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.570(d)(1), (d)(2);  In re S.J. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 953, 959.)

Not every change in circumstance justifies modification of a previous order.   To justify a change in the order, the petition must show a change in circumstances that relates to the purpose of the order, and the change must be such that it shows that the requested modification of the order is appropriate.  (In re S.R, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 870.)   Unless the requesting party's petition makes a prima facie showing of new evidence or a change of circumstances, and also that the requested change would be in the children's best interest, the court is justified in summarily denying the requested change.  (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.570(d)(1), (d)(2);  In re A.S. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 351, 357.) ¹⁹

Whether the petitioning parent's request actually justifies the requested change is within the juvenile court's sound discretion, the exercise of which we cannot disturb unless an abuse of that discretion is shown.  (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318.)  “ ‘When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court.’ ”  (Id. at p. 319.)   In reviewing the record, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the juvenile court's decision.  (In re A.S., supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 356.)

The record on which the juvenile court based its October, 2010 termination of reunification services.

Christina and Jasmine had been removed from mother's custody soon after their birth;  they had never lived with mother.   When mother's reunification services were terminated with respect to them on October 29, 2010, they were nine months old, and had lived their entire lives with their foster caregivers.

The court's March 12, 2010 order sustained the section 300 petition as to paragraphs (b)(1) as amended, and (b)(2) as written.   In doing so the court found that the twins' father's history of substance abuse had endangered the twins.   And it found that the twins' siblings' status as dependents of the court, due to their mother's physical abuse of J.V. and Andrea, the history of domestic violence between their mother and the twins' father, and mother's failure to regularly participate in court-ordered programs that had led to her failure to reunify with the twins' siblings, had endangered the twins' physical and emotional health and safety and placed them at risk of physical and emotional harm.   The court had found that mother's compliance with reunification plans with respect to the twins' siblings had been minimal, and had scheduled September 2010 as the likely date for the twins to either be returned to mother, or placed for adoption.   Mother did not appeal from or otherwise challenge those determinations and orders.

At the October, 2010 hearing the court had before it evidence that during the months before giving birth to Christina and Jasmine, mother had been living in motels, shelters, and relatives' homes;  during that time she received no prenatal care.   Since before August 2009, she had been ordered to attend domestic violence counseling, parenting, and individual counseling to address issues with respect to her reunification plans for her older children, and at the twins' disposition hearing in March 2010, mother was again ordered to attend parenting classes, domestic violence counseling, mental health counseling, and to take all prescribed medications.

As of September 2010, shortly before the court ordered termination of her reunification services as to Christina and Jasmine, DCFS had reported that mother remained homeless, and “is not prepared to reunify with any of the children due to inconsistent visitation and minimal progress with court orders and DCFS case plan.”   Mother had failed to enroll in anger management classes, she was enrolled in and was attending domestic violence classes (with some unexcused absences), and she was in only partial compliance with her psychotropic medication and her mental health therapy.   Although she had been referred to free and low-cost mental health services, her attempts to enroll had been sporadic;  she had completed only two sessions since the court's May 2009 order, and she had allowed her medication to lapse some months earlier.

Mother's weekly monitored visits with Hope, and separately with Christina and Jasmine, generally went well, and her interactions with the children were loving and appropriate.   But her visitation was sporadic and inconsistent.   After the twins' initial detention a schedule of weekly one-hour visits had been established, with the expectation that longer and more frequent visits would be arranged if mother's visits were regular and consistent.   But mother instead had often cancelled visits without seeking arrangements to reschedule them.   As of September 2010, she had attended only seven of the 21 scheduled visits with the twins.   And she never asked the children's caregivers about their daily activities or doctor visits.   Her calls to the twins' caregivers, which had initially come about once a week, had tapered off and ended months earlier.   Due to her sporadic and inconsistent visitation, as of September 2010 the twins had developed no attachment with mother.²⁰

DCFS's September 2010 safety assessment indicated that mother had not demonstrably addressed the issues that resulted in her children's detention, and that “there is a ‘high’ risk of future abuse or neglect should the children be returned to her care.”   DCFS recommended termination of mother's family reunification services with respect to Hope, Christina and Jasmine.

Mother's presentation to the court conceded that she had not yet fully complied with the court's plan.   She argued that “[i]t does appear that she is at least in substantial compliance [with the court-ordered reunification program] at this point,” although she admitted that she had serious mental health issues requiring psychotropic medications, and that she was in only partial compliance with the court's previous orders with respect to court-ordered parenting and anger management programs with respect to the twins.   On that basis she argued that “[i]t certainly would be of no detriment to the children to extend [reunification services] another six months and allow the mother to complete these programs and get stabilized and see if the children can be transitioned back into her care.”

The court explained its concerns, in light of “all of the efforts that mother has made to comply with the children.”   Consistent with its findings at earlier hearings with respect to both the twins and mother's older children, the court noted that mother continued to be in need of mental health counseling, that she had not gotten that counseling despite referrals, and that she had not been consistent in taking her medications.   Although mother had been provided with bus passes and low-cost referrals, “it seems that she keeps putting off getting the care that she needs the most.”  “[W]e don't have and have not had for 18 months regular attendance in the kind of intense therapy that you need.”   Having her older children in detention for 18 months “and then having the new children born has not created the urgency I would want to see in a mother” to get and stay in therapy, and to find the appropriate medications.   With respect to mother's visits with the twins and with Hope, the court found that mother had demonstrated both inconsistency in her attendance at planned visits, and lack of concern about the children between visits.

The court found that although mother had participated in some of the ordered programs, “there has been absolutely no progress” with respect to her individual therapy and taking her psychotropic medications, and her visits with the children had been inconsistent and “sporadic.”   Despite her efforts and impediments, the court found, mother's “failure to participate in and make substantive progress in court ordered programs constitutes prima facie evidence that return would be detrimental.”

The court found that the DCFS had complied with the case plan and had made reasonable efforts to finalize the children's reunification.   It found that continued jurisdiction over the twins (and Hope) was necessary “because conditions continue to exist that justify the court taking jurisdiction.”   It found that the children's current placement was needed and appropriate, because their return to mother's custody would create a substantial risk of detriment to their safety.

At the October 29, 2010 hearing the court also gave mother notice that the court “may consider termination of parental rights” as to Hope, Christina and Jasmine at the scheduled section 366.26 hearing;  it found that the children could not be returned to parental custody and that “there exists no substantial probability” they would be returned within six months;  it found that Hope, Christina and Jasmine “can or will be adopted”;  and it ordered the children referred for adoptive planning.

Mother did not file any challenge, by way of appeal or extraordinary writ, from the court's October 29, 2010 order terminating reunification services and referring the twins for adoptive planning, or from the order setting the hearing under section 366.26 with respect to mother's parental rights.

Mother's requests for change of the order terminating reunification services, and for reinstatement of reunification services with respect to Christina and Jasmine.

Mother's two requests for change in the court's October 29, 2010 order, and for reinstatement of reunification services with respect to Christina and Jasmine, both alleged the existence of new evidence and changed circumstances.

Mother's February 10, 2011 change-of-order request alleged mother's compliance with her case plan, her completion of a parenting program and a 26–week domestic violence class, and her regular visits with the children.   But her supporting evidence did not fully live up to those claims.   It showed her participation in parenting classes (until almost a year earlier) and her successful completion of a domestic violence support-group program;  but it also showed that her compliance with court-ordered anger management classes, individual mental health therapy, and medication orders had not even begun until August 2010.   And it showed that while she had four visits with the twins in September 2010, her visits had decreased to two in October, one in November, none in December, and one visit in January 2011.²¹  The court found that that there was no change in circumstances justifying a change in its order terminating reunification services as to Christina and Jasmine.

Mother's April 14, 2011 change-of-order request was based on similar claims of changed circumstances:  “Mother continued complying & reenrolled in another [domestic violence program and] completed parenting [classes] again.   Mother visits [Christina and Jasmine] every month monitored by [their caregiver].”   She also alleged that “[Mother] maintained contact in accordance with court orders of 10/29/10.  [Mother] has continued to demonstrate compliance with previous case plan.”   In support of the change-of-order request mother submitted documents showing her active participation, since late 2010, in domestic violence programs, and her completion of a parenting class in March 2010.   On the issue of the twins' best interest, mother contended—without further support—that reinstatement of her reunification services would “be better for” the twins because “[Mother] can provide nurturing & safe home for the minors.”

On this record, and the entire record of the twins' and mother's involvement with the juvenile dependency system, the court found that the second change-of-order request “does not state new evidence or a change in circumstance and the proposed order would not be in the best interest of the children.”

The juvenile court properly exercised its discretion to deny mother's requests to reinstate reunification services.

The juvenile dependency law “favors reunification whenever possible.”  (In re Aryanna C. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1234, 1242.)   Reunification services are intended to implement the law's strong preference for maintaining family relationships if at all possible, after child dependency proceedings have been initiated.  (In re G.W. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1428, 1435.)   To achieve this purpose parents ordinarily are allowed 12 months of reunification services.   But for children who were less than three years old when they were detained, “court-ordered services shall not exceed a period of six months,” which can be extended up to 18 months only if the court finds that the children's reunification with their parent is likely within the extended period (or that appropriate services had not been earlier provided). (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(1)(B)(3);  In re Jesse W. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 49, 59.)   And when, as in this case, the court sets a permanent planning hearing under section 366.26 at the six-month review hearing, it must at that time “order the termination of reunification services to the parent ․“ (§ 366.21, subd. (h);  In re Jesse W., supra, 157 Cal.App.4th at p. 62.)

The shortened period of reunification services to parents of very young detained children is meant to give juvenile courts greater flexibility in meeting the needs of young children when the court concludes that the likelihood of reunification any time soon is poor.  (Daria D. v. Superior Court (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 606, 611.)   It represents a legislative determination that extending the period of continued reunification services beyond six months is not ordinarily in the children's best interest.  (In re Jesse W., supra, 157 Cal.App.4th at p. 59.)

At the twins' six-month hearing after their detention the court was required to determine both whether DCFS had made reasonable efforts to make reunification possible, and whether mother had successfully availed herself of those efforts.  (In re T.M. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1166, 1172.)   On the record before it in October 2010, the court was justified in concluding that DCFS had acted reasonably in offering reunification services to mother, but that mother nevertheless had not fully availed herself of the offered services, and had not resolved the issues that led to her children's detention.   As noted above, mother has never contended otherwise.

Once the court terminated mother's reunification services, its focus necessarily shifted away from reunification, and instead is directed to providing the children with a permanent, stable placement.  (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 304, 305.)

In determining when it is appropriate to end reunification services in any particular case, the touchstone always must remain the children's best interest.  (In re Jasmon O. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 398, 415 [at hearing on motion under section 388, juvenile court's task is to determine whether moving party “had demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that there was new evidence or a change of circumstances” that it was in the child's “best interests” to change the previous order].)   Here, when mother filed her requests for reinstatement of her reunification services as to Christina and Jasmine, mother was unable to show a record of consistent compliance with the court-ordered reunification plan, such that her reunification with the twins would be any more likely within the next six months than it had been in the previous period.   And nothing showed that continuing her reunification services for another six-month period would be in the twins' best interest.

When the court denied mother's second change-of-order request on April 14, 2011, the twins were less than 15 months old.   They had never lived with mother;  they had been in her presence for hardly more than a dozen hours of their lives.   The record indicates that she had appropriate and loving interactions with them during her infrequent visits (as one would hope of even a babysitter).   The record indicates no more than that, and that is not enough.  (See In re Jasmon O., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 418 [natural parent's emotional attachment with child must be that of parent and child, not merely friendly visitor];  In re Jackson W. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 247, 260 [fact that mother consistently visited children and related to them in a parental and loving way does not show existence of significant bond between mother and children];  In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1527 [parent must show more than frequent and loving contact;  must show that she occupies parental role in children's life].)   Nothing in the record in this case indicates that her relationship with the twins was in any way comparable to that of a parent.

In contrast to the absence from the record of the critical elements required to justify a change in the court's order, the evidence is uncontradicted that the twins had fully bonded with their caregivers—their prospective adoptive parents—since birth.   Mother's relatively recent effort to comply with her longstanding case plan does not require the court to find a change in circumstances.   Nor do mother's obvious handicaps in developing a close parent-child bond with the twins during their detention justify subordinating the twins' best interest to mother's problems.   While the statutory dependency scheme is designed to ensure due process and fairness to the parents, it is the children's best interest that must remain the court's focus.   Under section 388 “[i]t is not enough for a parent to show just a genuine change of circumstances under the statute.   The parent must show that the undoing of the prior order would be in the best interests of the child.”  (In re Kimberly F. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 519, 529.)

Even if the fact that the twins had developed a close bond with their life-long caregivers were not alone enough to establish that they would suffer serious emotional damage if they were to be placed in mother's custody, the record here shows more.   The affirmative evidence that severing the twins' bond with their lifelong caregivers would be detrimental to the children's emotional well-being, considered in conjunction with the total absence from the record of any showing by mother that her parental bond with the twins is “strong enough that it would be detrimental to terminate [her] parental rights,” provides sufficient basis to support the court's evaluation and conclusion that further delaying the twins' permanent placement would not be in their best interest.   (In re Kimberly F., supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 531, fn. 10 [in considering section 388 motion, court must consider strength of children's bond to natural parent].)

When it weighed the children's best interest under section 388, the court was entitled to place great weight on the absence of evidence that the twins would suffer any substantial detriment from a loss of their parental relationship to mother, and from the substantial contrary evidence that, after spending their entire lives with their foster caregivers, severing the children's bond with those caregivers would be likely to cause them substantial long-term emotional damage.  (In re Jasmon O., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 418.).  “[W]hen a child has been placed in foster care because of parental neglect or incapacity, after an extended period of foster care, it is within the court's discretion to decide that a child's interest in stability has come to outweigh the natural parent's interest in the care, custody and companionship of the child.”   (Id. at p. 419;  In re Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th at pp. 307–309.)

The propriety of the court's exercise of discretion in denying mother's requests for changes in the order terminating reunification services is not vitiated by its comment during the April 14, 2011 hearing indicating its recollection that “mother has made some progress from the years that the court first met mother some 15, 16 years [ago],” When mother interrupted to advise the court that she had only been before the court for two years, the court responded that “I am on volume 12.   It's been back and forth a lot of times.   I know I have known you since before 2007, quite frankly.”   The issue, of course, is not whether mother's history with the dependency court had extended over a period of two years, four years, or 15 years;  it was undisputedly a long time, during which mother had been unable to overcome the issues that had resulted in the unchallenged need to remove all eight of her children from her custody.   About that, the court did not abuse its discretion.

The record thus fully supports the court's determination that it was not in the twins' best interest to reinstate mother's reunification services, further postponing their permanent placement.  (In re Zachary G. (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 799, 808 [record supports denial of petition for change of order, where mother failed to establish that it was in child's best interest to postpone a permanency decision in the hope of future reunification].)   We therefore affirm the juvenile court's denial of mother's requests that the court change its order terminating her reunification services as to Christina and Jasmine, and that it enter an order reinstating those services to mother.

DISPOSITION

The orders of March 2, 2010 and April 14, 2010 are affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

We concur:

FOOTNOTES

FN1. Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise specified.   Section 300, subdivision (a) deals with children who have suffered or are likely to suffer serious physical harm at the hands of a parent.   Subdivision (b) deals with children who have suffered or are likely to suffer serious physical harm resulting from a parent's inability to care for them or to protect them from the conduct of others in the household.   Subdivision (g) deals with children who have been left without parental support.   And subdivision (j) deals with children whose siblings have been abused, and are themselves at substantial risk of abuse..  FN1. Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise specified.   Section 300, subdivision (a) deals with children who have suffered or are likely to suffer serious physical harm at the hands of a parent.   Subdivision (b) deals with children who have suffered or are likely to suffer serious physical harm resulting from a parent's inability to care for them or to protect them from the conduct of others in the household.   Subdivision (g) deals with children who have been left without parental support.   And subdivision (j) deals with children whose siblings have been abused, and are themselves at substantial risk of abuse.

FN2. Because no fathers are involved in this appeal, we omit most references to facts relating to them..  FN2. Because no fathers are involved in this appeal, we omit most references to facts relating to them.

FN3. Mother was later reported to have had four previous arrests since 2000, three for drug-related charges and one for attempted murder..  FN3. Mother was later reported to have had four previous arrests since 2000, three for drug-related charges and one for attempted murder.

FN4. At that time J.V., Anthony, and Andrea each indicated that they wanted to go home with mother;  G.V. consistently expressed his desire to remain with his maternal grandmother..  FN4. At that time J.V., Anthony, and Andrea each indicated that they wanted to go home with mother;  G.V. consistently expressed his desire to remain with his maternal grandmother.

FN5. The February 19, 2009 interim report concluded that Kayla (who remained placed in a sub-acute medical care facility) could not be returned to mother's custody without substantial risk.   A DCFS last-minute information report described some promise of improvement in mother's living situation, deterioration in J.V.'s behavior and placement circumstances, and J.V.'s desire not to return to mother's home..  FN5. The February 19, 2009 interim report concluded that Kayla (who remained placed in a sub-acute medical care facility) could not be returned to mother's custody without substantial risk.   A DCFS last-minute information report described some promise of improvement in mother's living situation, deterioration in J.V.'s behavior and placement circumstances, and J.V.'s desire not to return to mother's home.

FN6. Section 342 provides for a petition to be filed with respect to children who have previously been detained under section 300, alleging new facts or circumstances that also would be sufficient to justify their detention under section 300..  FN6. Section 342 provides for a petition to be filed with respect to children who have previously been detained under section 300, alleging new facts or circumstances that also would be sufficient to justify their detention under section 300.

FN7. A July 30, 2009 DCFS protective custody warrant reported further deterioration in J.V.'s behavior, and her runaway from her group-home residence with a stated intention to go to New York. On August 25, 2009, J.V. was arrested by South Pasadena police, and the protective custody warrant was recalled..  FN7. A July 30, 2009 DCFS protective custody warrant reported further deterioration in J.V.'s behavior, and her runaway from her group-home residence with a stated intention to go to New York. On August 25, 2009, J.V. was arrested by South Pasadena police, and the protective custody warrant was recalled.

FN8. As to J.V., Anthony and Andrea, the court continued the permanent plan review for hearing on September 21, 2009.   It continued the section 366.26 hearing for Anthony, Andrea, and Kayla to November 19, 2009.   As to Hope, the review under section 366.21, subdivision (e), was set for February 4, 2010, and was later continued to March 12, 2010 for contested hearing..  FN8. As to J.V., Anthony and Andrea, the court continued the permanent plan review for hearing on September 21, 2009.   It continued the section 366.26 hearing for Anthony, Andrea, and Kayla to November 19, 2009.   As to Hope, the review under section 366.21, subdivision (e), was set for February 4, 2010, and was later continued to March 12, 2010 for contested hearing.

FN9. Our references in this opinion to twins refer to Christina and Jasmine (notwithstanding that Anthony and Andrea are also twins)..  FN9. Our references in this opinion to twins refer to Christina and Jasmine (notwithstanding that Anthony and Andrea are also twins).

FN10. At the August 2, 2010 permanent plan review hearing the court found by clear and convincing evidence that mother's progress toward alleviating or mitigating the causes that had necessitated J.V.'s and Andrea's placement had been minimal, and that her failure to participate and to make substantial progress in court-ordered treatment constituted prima facie evidence that the children's return to her would be detrimental to them.   For Anthony and Kayla, it continued the permanent plan review to September 10, 2010.   For J.V. and Andrea, it continued the review to January 31, 2011..  FN10. At the August 2, 2010 permanent plan review hearing the court found by clear and convincing evidence that mother's progress toward alleviating or mitigating the causes that had necessitated J.V.'s and Andrea's placement had been minimal, and that her failure to participate and to make substantial progress in court-ordered treatment constituted prima facie evidence that the children's return to her would be detrimental to them.   For Anthony and Kayla, it continued the permanent plan review to September 10, 2010.   For J.V. and Andrea, it continued the review to January 31, 2011.

FN11. At the September 10, 2010 hearing as to Kayla, mother concurred with the DCFS recommendation for an adoption plan.   The court scheduled a section 366.26 hearing with respect to that plan for January 31, 2011..  FN11. At the September 10, 2010 hearing as to Kayla, mother concurred with the DCFS recommendation for an adoption plan.   The court scheduled a section 366.26 hearing with respect to that plan for January 31, 2011.

FN12. At the September 10, 2010 hearing the court also terminated its jurisdiction as to Anthony, who remained placed with his maternal grandmother as his legal guardian.   And it granted a pending section 388 petition as to Andrea, terminating her maternal aunt's guardianship and ordering a permanent plan for a foster home placement with a specific goal of emancipation..  FN12. At the September 10, 2010 hearing the court also terminated its jurisdiction as to Anthony, who remained placed with his maternal grandmother as his legal guardian.   And it granted a pending section 388 petition as to Andrea, terminating her maternal aunt's guardianship and ordering a permanent plan for a foster home placement with a specific goal of emancipation.

FN13. Although the court's minute order of the October 29, 2010 hearing was missing from the clerk's transcript in this appeal, we have obtained a copy of the order from the Superior Court record, and we gave counsel notice of its inclusion in the record on November 8, 2011.  (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.155(a)(1)(A).)   Because mother's appeal does not challenge any orders made at the October 29, 2010 hearing, we have found it unnecessary to review or to augment the record with the pre-hearing DCFS reports..  FN13. Although the court's minute order of the October 29, 2010 hearing was missing from the clerk's transcript in this appeal, we have obtained a copy of the order from the Superior Court record, and we gave counsel notice of its inclusion in the record on November 8, 2011.  (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.155(a)(1)(A).)   Because mother's appeal does not challenge any orders made at the October 29, 2010 hearing, we have found it unnecessary to review or to augment the record with the pre-hearing DCFS reports.

FN14. Section 388 provides that a parent may file a verified request that the court change an order it has made with respect to a detained child, upon grounds of new evidence or changed circumstances..  FN14. Section 388 provides that a parent may file a verified request that the court change an order it has made with respect to a detained child, upon grounds of new evidence or changed circumstances.

FN15. At mother's request the court continued the section 366.26 hearing as to Hope to July 26, 2011..  FN15. At mother's request the court continued the section 366.26 hearing as to Hope to July 26, 2011.

FN16. The DCFS had reported as of January 31, 2011 that the twins' foster parents, who had cared for them since their birth, were very committed to adopting them..  FN16. The DCFS had reported as of January 31, 2011 that the twins' foster parents, who had cared for them since their birth, were very committed to adopting them.

FN17. Consistent with the transcript of the April 14, 2011 hearing, the minute order of that date recites that as to Christina and Jasmine “parental rights are terminated,” and that the twins “are declared free from the custody and control of [their] mother․”  Inexplicably, however, the minute order also states that, as to Jasmine, “Parental rights are NOT TERMINATED pursuant to WIC 366.26.”   Because the hearing transcript discloses no such order, but instead reflects a contrary order terminating parental rights as to Jasmine as well as Christina;  because nothing in the record reflects a recommendation or intention to enter different dispositions for Jasmine and Christina;  and because neither party has mentioned this anomaly in the record, we disregard it..  FN17. Consistent with the transcript of the April 14, 2011 hearing, the minute order of that date recites that as to Christina and Jasmine “parental rights are terminated,” and that the twins “are declared free from the custody and control of [their] mother․”  Inexplicably, however, the minute order also states that, as to Jasmine, “Parental rights are NOT TERMINATED pursuant to WIC 366.26.”   Because the hearing transcript discloses no such order, but instead reflects a contrary order terminating parental rights as to Jasmine as well as Christina;  because nothing in the record reflects a recommendation or intention to enter different dispositions for Jasmine and Christina;  and because neither party has mentioned this anomaly in the record, we disregard it.

FN18. The “388 petition (JV–180)” is mother's change-of-order request under section 388, filed on Form JV–180..  FN18. The “388 petition (JV–180)” is mother's change-of-order request under section 388, filed on Form JV–180.

FN19. Mother did not request a hearing on her change-of-order requests, and her appeal does not contend that the trial court erred by failing to hold any such hearing..  FN19. Mother did not request a hearing on her change-of-order requests, and her appeal does not contend that the trial court erred by failing to hold any such hearing.

FN20. At that time, in addition, Anthony and Andrea had been briefly returned to mother's custody, but had again been removed to foster-home placement three weeks later due to reports of domestic violence in the home.   The court had terminated reunification services, appointed guardians, and terminated its jurisdiction as to G.V. and Anthony, and mother had consented to an adoption plan for Kayla..  FN20. At that time, in addition, Anthony and Andrea had been briefly returned to mother's custody, but had again been removed to foster-home placement three weeks later due to reports of domestic violence in the home.   The court had terminated reunification services, appointed guardians, and terminated its jurisdiction as to G.V. and Anthony, and mother had consented to an adoption plan for Kayla.

FN21. Mother noted her declining visitation resulted in part from the court's October 2010 order granting DCFS discretion to limit her visits with the twins to one per month if necessary to accommodate the needs of the twins' caretakers.   However the court was justified in discounting that excuse;  it had been mother's frequent failure to show up for scheduled visits, inconveniencing the twins' caretakers, that had led the DCFS to request that discretion..  FN21. Mother noted her declining visitation resulted in part from the court's October 2010 order granting DCFS discretion to limit her visits with the twins to one per month if necessary to accommodate the needs of the twins' caretakers.   However the court was justified in discounting that excuse;  it had been mother's frequent failure to show up for scheduled visits, inconveniencing the twins' caretakers, that had led the DCFS to request that discretion.

MALLANO, P. J. JOHNSON, J.