IN RE: T.B. (2011)

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

INTRODUCTION

Angeline S. (Mother) and Alexander S. (Father) appeal from the January 7, 2011 order continuing juvenile court jurisdiction over their son T.B. (Josh).¹  Their sole contention on appeal is that substantial evidence does not support the court's decision to retain jurisdiction over Josh. We dismiss the appeals as moot.

BACKGROUND

In May 2009, the juvenile court declared Josh a dependent of the juvenile court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a), (b) and (g), after finding that Father physically abused Josh and Mother failed to protect him and that Josh's alleged father, Robert H., whose whereabouts were unknown, failed to provide for Josh.² The court removed Josh from the custody of Mother and Father and ordered the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) to provide the family with reunification services.   Mother alone appealed.

On August 23, 2010, the court terminated its suitable placement order, returned Josh to the home of Mother and ordered DCFS to provide family maintenance services.   In addition, the court ordered monitored visits for Father in a therapeutic setting.³  The court ordered Josh to remain in individual counseling with his current therapist unless his attorney expressly consented to a different therapist.

At a review hearing (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 364) held on January 7, 2011, the parents asked the court to terminate its jurisdiction over Josh and to close the case.   The juvenile court refused to do so, in that its order regarding individual counseling for Josh had not been followed.   In no uncertain terms the court stated:  “Josh, I'm not going to close this case.   I know you know I am the judge, and I expect your father, mother and you to follow my orders.   You do not have a choice.   I've ordered you to go to therapy and you shall.   [¶] If the parents want me to close this case, you'll ensure that my orders are followed, and you will not make excuses․”

The court reiterated to the parents that “if you want me to consider closing this case at the next hearing, you will ensure that your son goes to therapy and that's with the therapist he had when he was placed in his mother's custody.   Any other therapist requires expressed consent of his attorney.”   The court then concluded that Josh's current placement with Mother was appropriate but that continued jurisdiction was justified.   Again the court emphasized:  “Josh, I'm expecting you to go to therapy on a weekly basis to comply with my order.   Your mother will make the appointments, and she will ensure that you get to your appointments and get back home.   No one can force you to talk to the therapist.   If you want to sit there for 45 minutes, you can, but it's unlikely that I can close this case.  [¶] And I am advising the parents it's unlikely I will terminate this case until Josh is able to establish a rapport with the therapist and address the issues that brought him before this court.”   Parents thereafter filed timely notices of appeal.

Via correspondence dated November 4, 2011, Father's counsel supplied this court with a copy of the juvenile court's minute order for September 22, 2011, which we judicially notice.  (Evid.Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459.)   This minute order reflects that at a further review hearing, which was held during the pendency of these appeals, the juvenile court terminated its jurisdiction over Josh. It also issued a family law order, granting Mother full legal and physical custody of Josh and granting Father monitored visitation.

In his November 4, 2011 letter, Father's counsel stated that Father “has no objection to the dismissal of this appeal as moot.”   On November 10, 2011, we invited Mother to submit a supplemental letter brief, addressing the question whether her appeal should be dismissed as moot.   She has failed to do so, and the deadline for filing such brief has passed.

DISCUSSION

Generally, an order terminating juvenile court jurisdiction renders a pending appeal in the dependency proceedings moot.  (In re C.C. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1481, 1488.)   A dismissal for mootness is not automatic, however.   (Ibid.) Such a determination must be made on a case-by-case basis.   (Ibid.;  In re Kristin B. (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 596, 605.)   An appeal will not be dismissed as moot if the purported error or errors will have a deleterious effect in subsequent proceedings (In re C.C., supra, at p. 1488;  In re Dylan T. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 765, 769) or if the question to be decided is one of continuing public importance capable of repetition but evading review (Laurie S. v. Superior Court (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 195, 199).

In this case, the sole error raised by the parents on appeal is the juvenile court's retention of jurisdiction over Josh at the review hearing held on January 7, 2011.   We believe that the juvenile court's September 22, 2011 order terminating its jurisdiction over Josh has rendered the parents' appeals moot.   There is no effective relief that we can grant (In re Anna S. (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1489, 1498;  In re Jessica K. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1313, 1315–1316), and our decision will not have any future adverse consequences (In re Dani R. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 402, 404–405;  In re Yvonne W. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1404).   Moreover, the question presented for resolution is not one of continuing public importance and is unlikely to recur.  (Laurie S. v. Superior Court, supra, 26 Cal.App.4th at p. 199.)   Consequently, dismissal of the parents' appeals is warranted.

DISPOSITION

The appeals are dismissed as moot.

We concur:

FOOTNOTES

FN1. Father is Josh's stepfather and presumed father..  FN1. Father is Josh's stepfather and presumed father.

FN2. The juvenile court also found Josh's younger half-brother, Ezekiel S., to be a dependent under subdivisions (a) and (b) of section 300 of the Welfare and Institutions Code as a result of Father's physical abuse of Josh and Mother's failure to protect him.   The juvenile court returned Ezekiel to Mother's care on January 19, 2010 and terminated its jurisdiction over Ezekiel on July 20, 2010.   Ezekiel is not a subject of this appeal..  FN2. The juvenile court also found Josh's younger half-brother, Ezekiel S., to be a dependent under subdivisions (a) and (b) of section 300 of the Welfare and Institutions Code as a result of Father's physical abuse of Josh and Mother's failure to protect him.   The juvenile court returned Ezekiel to Mother's care on January 19, 2010 and terminated its jurisdiction over Ezekiel on July 20, 2010.   Ezekiel is not a subject of this appeal.

FN3. Mother and Father had separate residences..  FN3. Mother and Father had separate residences.

PERLUSS, P. J. WOODS, J.