IN RE: MICHELLE W. (2011)

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

Minor Michelle W. appeals from the order of wardship entered following a finding that she committed a misdemeanor battery upon her father.   Minor contends that the juvenile court improperly excluded evidence and the court's minute orders do not accurately reflect its actual orders.   We reverse for prejudicial evidentiary error.

BACKGROUND

On the morning of March 11, 2011, police responded to the Long Beach apartment where minor was living with her father, Michael W. Minor, who was then 16 years old, had been living there only two or three weeks.   She usually lived with her mother.   According to Michael's testimony, minor became “agitated” and belligerent when he asked her to clean her room.   He testified, “I had my hand on her face and said to her, ‘You have to start cleaning up.’ ”   Minor slapped Michael's hand away and demanded to talk to her mother.   Minor cursed at Michael and threw a pillow at him, but missed.   Michael phoned minor's mother and while they were speaking, minor grabbed the phone away from him.   Minor refused to give the phone back to Michael, and he tried to grab it away from her.   Minor ran into the bathroom and locked the door.   When Michael got the door unlocked, minor was gone.   She had climbed out the bathroom window.   Minor then knocked on the front door, and Michael let her back inside.   About five minutes later, minor kicked and slapped at Michael as she called him names.   He attempted to grab her legs as she kicked.   He suffered a cut on one elbow, and the police told him minor suffered a scratch on her neck.   Michael was shocked because he “never thought [his] own daughter would fight [him] back.”

Michael denied that he had ever hit minor, but he admitted that the Department of Children and Family Services had come out on a prior occasion to investigate an allegation that he had hit her.   He insisted the allegation was false.

Minor's mother, Sharon K., testified that Michael phoned her on the morning of March 11, 2011, and said that minor was acting out and being disrespectful.   Sharon told Michael to put minor on the phone.   Sharon heard yelling in the background, and after about 60 seconds, minor began speaking on the phone.   Sharon and minor spoke for about three minutes, then suddenly Michael was on the phone, leading Sharon to believe that Michael “snatched” the phone from minor.   Sharon asked Michael to let her speak to minor, but the phone disconnected.   Sharon testified she again spoke to Michael and minor about four more times before one of them told her the police had arrived.   Sharon testified that to her knowledge, Michael had never hit minor, but Sharon obtained a restraining order against him when minor was a baby to protect minor from him.

Minor testified that the problems on March 11, 2011, began when she and Michael left a school.   She could sense that Michael was angry, and she wanted to keep her distance from him.   He has a temper and she fears him when he is angry.   But Michael became angrier because minor was not walking beside him.   They argued when they got into the car, and Michael twice slapped her face, causing her pain.   When they got back to Michael's apartment, Michael told minor to clean up.   She began doing so, but complained that she had been working hard cleaning, cooking, and organizing the apartment for two weeks and felt Michael did not appreciate her efforts.   Michael hit her on her arm, and she became angry because he had a history of hitting her and had promised not to hit her again.   He also grabbed at her shirt and chest, causing scratches on her chest, depicted in a photograph introduced by the defense.   At some point, Michael was trying to grab minor when she was on her bed.   Michael is bigger than minor and her bed is low, so minor felt she had to defend herself.   She repeatedly warned him to stay away from her, then kicked him to defend herself.   She denied hitting Michael with her hands.

Minor went into the bathroom to elude Michael, but he followed her in, shut the door, and refused to let her out.   Eventually he left the room, and minor climbed out through the window because she feared he would hit her again.   She went to the side of the building and asked a neighbor who was sitting outside if she could use his phone.   The neighbor said, “ ‘Hold on.’ ”   Michael came outside and minor ran.   Michael chased her and grabbed her by the hair, then walked her back into his apartment while holding onto her hair.   Minor believed the neighbor to whom she spoke phoned the police.

Michael denied hitting minor while they were in the car, following her into the bathroom, chasing her, and grabbing anything other than her legs.

The juvenile court sustained a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition alleging misdemeanor battery, declared minor to be a ward of the court, and ordered her placed home on probation with her mother.   The juvenile court transferred supervision of minor to Orange County, where minor's mother resided.

DISCUSSION

Minor's defense theory was self-defense.   On cross-examination, counsel for minor asked Michael, “Have you ever hit your ex-wife?”   The prosecutor objected on the ground of relevance.   Upon inquiry from the court, minor's attorney explained, “He has a pattern and a habit of hitting his family, his wife, and his daughter.   And this would give me an opportunity to impeach him also.”   The court sustained the objection.

Minor's attorney then asked Michael, “Did your wife ever file a restraining order against you?”   The prosecutor again objected on the ground of relevance.   Minor's attorney explained, “I believe that the relevance is that [Michael] not only abuses his daughter, but he also abuses his wife, and this would give me an opportunity to impeach him with his wife's testimony who I'm going to call to the stand next.”   The court sustained the objection, stating, “Very broad and character assassination.”   Minor's attorney referred the court to Evidence Code section 1109, and the court replied, “I'm looking more at 1103, counsel.”

Minor contends that the trial court erred in sustaining these objections and that the error violated due process because it infringed upon her right to present a defense.

Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact of consequence to the determination of an action.  (Evid.Code, § 210.)   Minor was relying upon a theory of self-defense, which required that she have an honest and reasonable belief that she needed to defend against an imminent danger of bodily injury.  (People v. Humphrey (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1073, 1082;  People v. Jefferson (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 508, 518.)   Evidence of Michael's history of violence against Sharon was relevant because it would undermine the credibility of Michael's testimony that minor was the aggressor and show his propensity for violence, thereby tending to corroborate minor's testimony regarding his acts of violence against her on March 11, 2011, as well as his history of violence against her.   Thus, the juvenile court erred by sustaining the prosecution's relevance objections.

The admission of character evidence is subject to limitations, but Evidence Code section 1103—at which the juvenile court was “looking”—expressly permits a defendant in a criminal case to introduce evidence of the victim's character or a trait of character to prove the victim's conduct in conformity with that character or trait.  (Evid.Code, § 1103, subd. (a)(1).)  “[I]n a prosecution for a homicide or an assaultive crime where self-defense is raised, evidence of the violent character of the victim is admissible to show that the victim was the aggressor.”  (People v. Shoemaker (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 442, 446, fn. omitted.)   Evidence of specific instances of conduct, opinion, or reputation may be introduced for this purpose.  (Evid.Code, § 1103, subd. (a).)  Thus, the evidence minor sought to introduce was not inadmissible character evidence.

Although most evidentiary errors do not rise to the level of a due process violation, the juvenile court's error in this case significantly restricted minor's ability to establish that she acted in self-defense.   Although the court did not prevent minor from so testifying, it precluded her from introducing evidence that, according to minor's offer of proof, would have corroborated her testimony regarding Michael's violent propensities and undermined Michael's credibility.   The excluded evidence was thus critical to minor's defense, and the juvenile court's erroneous ruling rendered her adjudication fundamentally unfair.   Accordingly, we conclude the ruling violated minor's right to due process.

The exclusion of evidence that is highly probative of the defendant's innocence is subject to review under the standard of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [87 S.Ct. 824], that is, the Attorney General has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the exclusion of the evidence did not contribute to the juvenile court's order.  (People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 996.)   The Attorney General has not attempted to meet this burden, but simply argues that Chapman is inapplicable.

We cannot conclude that the exclusion of the evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.   Had minor established, as stated in her offer of proof, that Michael had a history of domestic violence against Sharon, this evidence would have provided valuable corroboration of minor's own testimony regarding Michael's history of violence against her and his acts of violence against her on March 11, 2011.   In addition, evidence of Michael's history of domestic violence may well have reversed the juvenile court's credibility determination in favor of Michael and against minor.   And, for the same reasons, reversal would be required as well under the standard of People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836, in that, on this record, there is at least a reasonable probability that minor would have obtained a more favorable result had the trial court not barred her from introducing the evidence stated in her offer of proof.

In light of our reversal of the order of wardship, we need not address minor's contentions regarding errors in the juvenile court's minor orders.

DISPOSITION

The order under review is reversed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, J. CHANEY, J.