WILLIAM CARLYLE v. STATE OF CALIFORNIA (2011)

Expert Opinion

Appellant also contends that the trial court erred by excluding the expert

“A trial court's determination that expert testimony is admissible is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  [Citations.]”  (Summers v. A.L. Gilbert Co. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1155, 1168.)  “A police officer with proper training and experience in the investigation of traffic accidents and the submission of reports on the facts and causes of such accidents may give expert testimony as to the point of impact when his opinion derives from an examination of the physical evidence or indicia at the scene.  [Citation.]  But it is error to receive such evidence when the expert's opinion as to the point of impact is founded on statements made to him by other persons.  [Citation.]”  (Kalfus v. Fraze (1955) 136 Cal.App.2d 415, 423.)

Several hours after the November 28, 2007, accident, Guevara went to the police station to the file an accident report.   Caudill spoke with Guevara in the lobby, contacted appellant to obtain his statement, and prepared an accident report.   His report concluded that Guevara caused the collision by backing when it was unsafe to do so.   The trial court questioned Caudill about the basis for his conclusion.   It determined that Caudill did not investigate the accident scene, or take photographs of the vehicles, and that his conclusion was based only on the statements of Guevara and appellant.   In excluding the opinion, the trial court also noted that “because of [Caudill's] position [his opinion] could have more weight than, say, a lay opinion on the subject.”   It further noted that Caudill had taken a “late” report away from the accident scene in the police station lobby and reached his conclusion without having determined matters such as “what the condition of the vehicle was, whether there were warning lights flashing, things like that.”   It also observed that Caudill's opinion “really [went] to ․ the ultimate question that the jury is asked to decide in this case,” and excluded his opinion pursuant to Evidence Code section 352 because its probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger that it would confuse and mislead the jury.

The trial court properly excluded Caudill's opinion which was based solely on the statements of the drivers.  (See Kalfus v. Fraze, supra, 136 Cal.App.2d at pp. 422–423.)   It properly exercised its discretion in ruling that the probative value of the evidence was outweighed by the danger that it would confuse and mislead the jury.  (Evid.Code, § 352.)

The Denial of Appellant's Requests to Add

Major John Oberg as a Defendant During Trial and His Request to Question Oberg

Appellant sought to amend the complaint to add Oberg as a defendant “in place of Doe.” Respondent objected that the State “as a nonperson entity, [was] entitled to be represented by a human being at trial and Mr. Oberg is that person.”   When asked why Oberg had been selected as the State's representative at trial, its counsel explained that he was “in charge of the [Grizzly] Youth Academy,” the outfit that “Guevara works for.”   The trial court explained to appellant that Oberg was “somebody who is named as a client representative,” and asked appellant why he thought Oberg was a new defendant.   Appellant responded that Oberg was on the witness list.   The court declined the motion to amend the complaint because it saw “no reason to allow it” where Oberg was “simply someone who [was] added as a client representative” who “would not be called as a witness” by respondent.   Appellant further asserts that he was not allowed to examine Oberg.

Neither the record references nor the authorities cited by appellant support his contentions that the court erred by denying his request to amend his complaint to name Oberg as a defendant, or to examine him.   We treat appellant's failure to develop those contentions or cite any persuasive authority to support them as “a waiver of the issue on appeal.”  (Berger v. California Ins. Guarantee Assn. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 989, 1007–1008.)

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

COFFEE, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P.J.

PERREN, J.

Charles S. Crandall, Judge

Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo

William J. Carlyle, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Alberto L. Gonzalez, Acting Sr. Assistant Attorney General, Richard Rojo, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, David Adida, Deputy Attorney General for Defendants and Respondents.