THE PEOPLE v. ADRIENNE ANN GONZALEZ (2011)

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

O P I N I O NFACTS

On April 1, 2010, an information was filed charging appellant, Adrienne Ann Gonzalez, with possession of methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf.Code, § 11378).   Following a denial of a motion to suppress evidence, appellant pled no contest to the charge.   The court sentenced her to three years probation with one year in county jail.

Appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying her suppression motion because she was detained without reasonable suspicion or probable cause.   We disagree and will affirm.

At 2:45 p.m. on March 10, 2010, Manuel Balderas called 911 and reported to the dispatcher that his sister, Vanessa Balderas, was “causing a problem.”   He requested police assistance.

Kern County Deputy Sheriffs Armando Aparicio and Richard Garcia, along with two other deputies, responded to the “peace disturbance in progress.”   Mr. Balderas informed Deputy Aparicio that his sister and her girlfriend were arguing.   Deputy Aparicio could hear loud yelling coming from inside the residence leading him to suspect domestic violence.   He proceeded into the room where he heard the yelling and observed an older gentleman restraining Ms. Balderas while she and appellant argued.   The deputies were trained to interview the parties in domestic violence situations separately, so Deputy Aparicio asked appellant to step outside.   Deputy Garcia escorted her to the porch and asked a third deputy, Deputy Pierce, to stand with her.

Meanwhile, Ms. Balderas told Deputy Aparicio that she had grabbed appellant and “tried to move her out of the way.”   She said that she did not “ ‘care about the drugs' ” and “ ‘[w]hy don't you search her.’ ”  “ ‘She has the dope and a pipe on her.   I don't care about the dope.   I just want my phone.’ ”

Ms. Balderas' statements induced Deputy Garcia to ask appellant whether she had anything on her possession that he should know about.   Appellant said “no,” and consented to Deputy Garcia's request to search her.   He conducted a search and discovered a pill bottle filled with 11 plastic bindles.   Appellant was subsequently arrested.   The bindles contained methamphetamine.

DISCUSSION

Appellant contends the trial court erroneously denied her motion to suppress evidence.   Specifically, she claims that her consent to the search was tainted because she was illegally detained.   The deputies illegally detained her when they had her move to the porch because there was no evidence she was anything other than the victim of a domestic violence incident.   That illegal detention rendered her consent, and the subsequently discovered incriminating evidence, fruit of the poisonous tree.   We disagree.

The reviewing court defers to the trial court on findings of fact, when supported by substantial evidence, but exercises its independent judgment in determining whether the search or seizure is legal under the Fourth Amendment.  (People v. Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 362 (Glaser ).)

A seizure occurs when an officer, “ ‘ “ ‘by means of physical force or show of authority,’ ” terminates or restrains [a person's] freedom of movement.' ”   (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 341 (Zamudio ).)   An investigative stop, or seizure, is legal if, “the circumstances known or apparent to the officer ․ include specific and articulable facts causing him to suspect that (1) some activity relating to crime has taken place or is occurring or about to occur, and (2) the person he intends to stop or detain is involved in that activity.”  (In re Tony C. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 888, 893.)   The officer's suspicion must be objectionably reasonable, meaning that a reasonable police officer in similar circumstances would suspect similar criminal activity from the detainee.  (Ibid.) The totality of the circumstances should be factored into a determination of reasonableness.  (People v. Dolly (2007) 40 Cal.4th 458, 463.)

Reasonable suspicion, which is necessary for a brief investigative detention, is less demanding than probable cause and can be proven by “ ‘considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence.’ ”  (People v. Souza (1994) 9 Cal.4th 224, 230.)

When testing the reasonableness of a detention under the Fourth Amendment, the court must balance the “extent of the intrusion against the government interests justifying it.”  (Glaser, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 365.)   If a detention is illegal, any subsequent consent to be searched is invalid.   (Zamudio, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 341.)

In Glaser, the detainee was held, on private property, for a brief period.  (Glaser, supra, 11 Cal.4th at pp. 366–367.)   The court found that brief detention, when justified by police interest, was reasonable.  (Ibid.) Moreover, because the detention took place inside of and behind a private residence, the detainee was not in view of the public and suffered none of the stigmatic shaming associated with police detention.  (Id. at p. 367.)

In the instant case, the People do not dispute that appellant was technically detained.   Their justification is that the detention was reasonable and minor in scope.   Appellant was separated for only a matter of minutes before Ms. Balderas revealed that appellant possessed narcotics.   Further, the detention took place in private, thus, any stigma associated with appellant's detention was mitigated.  (See Glaser, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 367.)   Appellant's detention was minimally intrusive and brief.

The deputies' interest in detaining appellant was significant.   Deputy Aparicio had no way to immediately discern what had transpired prior to his arrival, but the situation appeared to involve domestic violence.

Mr. Balderas never specified to the 911 dispatcher nor to the deputies whether it was his sister or her girlfriend who was the aggressor.   He only told the 911 dispatcher that his sister was “causing a problem.”   Further, Mr. Balderas told the deputies that “his sister and her girlfriend were inside of the residence arguing.”   The only parties that were clearly involved in this altercation were appellant and Ms. Balderas.   Deputy Aparicio decided to separate the women based on the information he received from Mr. Balderas and the volatile situation that he observed in the room.   A reasonable police officer would suspect similar criminal activity from appellant.

Substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding that the deputies did not know who the aggressor was when they arrived.   The information possessed by the deputies, combined with their observations, provided specific articulable facts that, when viewed in context of the totality of the circumstances, supported a reasonable suspicion that both women were involved in criminal activity.

When investigating possible domestic violence situations, deputies are trained to separate the parties involved.   Here, the deputies followed police protocol and separated the possible perpetrators for questioning.   Appellant claims, relying on People v. Medina (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 171 (Medina ), that a detention pursuant to police procedure does not make that officer's action de facto legal.  Medina is distinguishable because it involved an officer who detained and pat-searched a citizen, pursuant to “standard procedure,” after pulling him over for a broken tail light.  (Id. at p. 176.)   The court found that there were no specific facts that could support a suspicion of a crime or an inference that the driver was armed.  (Id. at pp. 177–178.)   In contrast, the deputies here reasonably followed police procedure to separate the arguing women.   And, a reasonable suspicion of domestic violence justified the temporary detention of both women.

An illegal detention vitiates the legality of any subsequent consent to a search.  (Zamudio, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 341.)   However, consent given subsequent to a legal detention is not similarly tainted.   Because the deputies reasonably detained appellant, her consent to be searched was not tainted and the trial court properly denied her motion to suppress.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

FOOTNOTE.  

THE COURT 1 FN1. Before Wiseman, Acting P.J., Levy, J., and Detjen, J.