PASADENA UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT v. GLENN BECKETT (2011)

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

Glenn F. Beckett, in pro. per., for Objector and Appellant.

Atkinson, Andelson, Loya, Ruud & Romo, Terry T. Tao, Michael J. Rubino and Jennifer D. Cantrell for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Glenn F. Beckett appeals from an order granting an injunction.   We affirm.

BACKGROUND

This appeal arises from a lawsuit brought by the Pasadena Unified School District (PUSD) against various individuals and entities.   On January 28, 2010, the trial court conducted a hearing on a discovery motion brought by a defendant in that litigation.   Jon M. Setoguchi appeared on behalf of PUSD, and Beckett appeared on behalf of the moving defendant.

According to a declaration later filed by Setoguchi, as he “exited the courtroom, Mr. Beckett approached [Setoguchi] and demanded in a loud voice that [Setoguchi] stop sending [Beckett] faxes.”  “As [Setoguchi] began to respond to [Beckett's] statement,” Beckett shoved him.

Setoguchi's declaration further states that “[t]here were several people in the hallway who witnessed the incident.  [Setoguchi] asked if anyone saw Mr. Beckett shove [him].   Several people responded, ‘Yes.’ Mr. Beckett said, ‘No, he [Mr. Setoguchi] pushed me.’   Several people responded, ‘No, you [Mr. Beckett] pushed him [Mr. Setoguchi].’ ”

On the basis of that incident, on February 1, 2010, PUSD filed an ex parte application for a temporary restraining order and an order to show cause concerning issuance of a preliminary injunction “enjoining Mr. Beckett and anyone else acting in concert with” him from engaging in various forms of conduct (e.g., “harassing, attacking, striking, threatening, assaulting, hitting, following, stalking, destroying personal property”) with respect to Setoguchi and several other individuals who are affiliated with PUSD in the underlying litigation.   PUSD supported the application with declarations from Setoguchi and one of the people in the hallway who witnessed the incident, corroborating Setoguchi's account.

On February 3, 2010, Beckett filed opposition to PUSD's application.   On the same day, PUSD filed a supplemental memorandum of points and authorities and additional declarations in support of its application, including declarations from two more people who witnessed the incident and corroborated Setoguchi's account.   Beckett's opposition was supported only by his own declaration, which gave his version of the incident and stated that Beckett had “inadvertently bumped [Setoguchi] with [his] elbow or forearm.”

On February 4, 2010, the trial court heard and partially granted PUSD's ex parte application, ordering Beckett to “stay at least 5 feet away from Jon M. Setoguchi until further order of this Court.”   The court issued an order to show cause why an “[i]njunction re [c]ivil [h]arassment” should not issue, to be heard on February 26.   At the February 4 hearing, Beckett asked that he be given “the addresses and phone numbers of all persons named in the declarations filed by [PUSD] with the court for the purpose of subpoenaing these witnesses into court.”   The court rejected Beckett's request.

On February 22, 2010, Beckett filed objections to PUSD's declarations, written opposition to PUSD's “petition” for a preliminary injunction, a request to dismiss the “petition” on the basis of “lack of standing,” and a motion to quash service of PUSD's application for a preliminary injunction.   The opposition included a new declaration from Beckett, to which was attached an “Incident Report” that was prepared by the sheriff's department at the time of the incident on the basis of interviews with Beckett, Setoguchi, and certain witnesses.   As presented in the report, the witnesses' descriptions of the incident are consistent with Setoguchi's account.

Also on February 22, 2010, PUSD filed a compendium of exhibits in support of its application for an injunction, including declarations from two more people who witnessed the incident and corroborated Setoguchi's account.   Two days later, PUSD filed a combined opposition to Beckett's motion to quash and reply to Beckett's opposition to the request for an injunction.

At the hearing on February 26, 2010, the court denied Beckett's motion to quash, dissolved the temporary restraining order, discharged the order to show cause, and ordered Beckett “to stay at least five feet away from Jon M. Setoguchi for the duration of the instant litigation.”   The order additionally provides that Beckett is “enjoined from harassing, attacking, striking, threatening, assaulting, hitting, following, stalking, destroying personal property, keep[ing] under surveillance, or blocking the movements of Jon M. Setoguchi.”   The court also ordered that “[a]ll depositions in the instant litigation shall take place in the library of the [trial judge].”

Beckett timely appealed from the order granting the injunction.¹

DISCUSSION

Beckett argues on three grounds that the trial court committed reversible error by issuing the injunction.   We disagree.

First, Beckett argues that the court prejudicially erred by rejecting his request for the addresses and phone numbers of the witnesses who executed declarations in support of PUSD's application for an injunction.   According to Beckett, the court's rejection of his request violated his due process rights by preventing him from cross-examining those witnesses.   We are not persuaded.   As support for his argument, Beckett relies on Schraer v. Berkeley Property Owners' Assn. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 719 (Schraer ).   In that case, the Court of Appeal determined that the trial court had erred by refusing to hear live testimony in a proceeding for an injunction under “the harassment statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6.” ²  (Id. at p. 729;  see generally id. at pp. 729–733.)   That statute provides that “[a]t the hearing, the judge shall receive any testimony that is relevant.” (§ 527.6, subd. (d).)  Schraer held that the trial court in that case erred, but the holding was expressly qualified as follows:  “We do not hold, nor do we mean to imply, that every proceeding for an injunction under Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6, subdivision (d), must in all instances proceed with oral testimony instead of upon affidavits or declarations, regardless of the circumstances.”  (Schraer, supra, 207 Cal.App.3d at p. 733, fn. 6.)

We find Beckett's argument based on Schraer unconvincing.   PUSD's application for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction was expressly based not only on section 527.6 but also on section 527, as well as the court's “inherent power to control its own proceedings.”   Section 527 expressly provides that a preliminary injunction may issue “upon affidavits.” (§ 527, subd. (a).)  Moreover, PUSD's application was supported by the declarations of five disinterested witnesses, all of whom corroborated Setoguchi's account of the incident.   Given that Schraer does not require the trial court to receive oral testimony in every injunction proceeding under section 527.6 even though that statute expressly requires the court to receive any testimony that is relevant, we conclude that Schraer cannot be read as requiring the trial court, under the circumstances of this case, to receive oral testimony in an injunction proceeding under section 527, which expressly provides that affidavits may be sufficient.

Second, Beckett argues that it was error for the trial court to issue the injunction under section 527.8 because Setoguchi is not PUSD's employee.   We disagree, because neither PUSD nor the trial court relied upon section 527.8, so its requirements are irrelevant.

Third, Beckett argues that neither section 527 nor section 527.6 “applied in this case,” so the trial court's order cannot be affirmed on the basis of either of those statutes.   Beckett's only argument that the injunction cannot be upheld under section 527 is that “there was no complaint upon which a preliminary injunction could have issued.”   In particular, Beckett argues that PUSD's complaint in the underlying litigation is not sufficient for purposes of section 527 because Beckett “is not a party to that case” (rather, he is counsel for a party).   Beckett does not explain why that fact should be dispositive or cite any authority in support of his argument, however, so we reject it.  (See Dabney v. Dabney (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 379, 384.)

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed.   Beckett's motion for sanctions is denied.   Respondent shall recover its costs of appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

We concur:

FOOTNOTES

FN1. On the eve of oral argument, we received notice that PUSD has dismissed the underlying action against Beckett's client.   PUSD contended that the dismissal rendered the appeal moot because the challenged injunction, by its terms, is limited to “the duration of the instant litigation.”   On that basis, PUSD asked that we dismiss the appeal, but PUSD conceded that we have discretion to decline that request.   At oral argument, Beckett opposed dismissal of the appeal and asked that the court issue an opinion.   We conclude that because of the reputational harm that Beckett could potentially suffer from the mere existence of the trial court's order, the dismissal of the underlying litigation does not make it impossible for us to grant him any effective relief.   The appeal therefore is not moot.  (See, e.g., Vernon v. State of California (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 114, 120.).  FN1. On the eve of oral argument, we received notice that PUSD has dismissed the underlying action against Beckett's client.   PUSD contended that the dismissal rendered the appeal moot because the challenged injunction, by its terms, is limited to “the duration of the instant litigation.”   On that basis, PUSD asked that we dismiss the appeal, but PUSD conceded that we have discretion to decline that request.   At oral argument, Beckett opposed dismissal of the appeal and asked that the court issue an opinion.   We conclude that because of the reputational harm that Beckett could potentially suffer from the mere existence of the trial court's order, the dismissal of the underlying litigation does not make it impossible for us to grant him any effective relief.   The appeal therefore is not moot.  (See, e.g., Vernon v. State of California (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 114, 120.)

FN2. All subsequent statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure..  FN2. All subsequent statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.

CHANEY, J. JOHNSON, J.