IN RE: S.V. (2011)

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

INTRODUCTION

X.V. (“Mother”), the mother of minor S.V., appeals from an order of the juvenile court which declared S.V. a dependent of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300,¹ based on Mother's history of mental illness and a particular incident in which S.V. was injured as a result of Mother's mental instability.   Mother also appeals the dispositional order that placed S.V. with her father but permitted him to arrange for the child to live with the maternal grandparents, with monitored visitation for Mother.   Mother argues that the juvenile court's jurisdictional findings and the dispositional order were not supported by substantial evidence.   For the reasons articulated below, we reject her arguments and affirm the order of the juvenile court.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Mother's Mental Health Prior to May 2010

Mother's mental health issues were apparent shortly after S.V.'s birth in October 1999.   According to statements given by S.V.'s father and maternal grandfather, Mother was involuntarily hospitalized for her mental illness in the state of New York when S.V. was approximately 18 months old.   At the time, Mother initially refused treatment and medication for her condition, but eventually began treatment after the hospital brought a petition to mandate treatment under New York's “Kendra's Law.” ² Her condition appeared to stabilize after several months of treatment.   Sometime thereafter, she ceased taking her medication.

After living in New York for several years, Mother moved to Los Angeles with S.V. in July 2009.   The father remained in New York because of his job there, but kept in regular contact with Mother and S.V. by telephone and internet and said they had a very good relationship.   He also stated that during this period, S.V. did not have any unmet needs and that Mother exhibited a stable mental state.

Sometime in early 2010, S.V.'s maternal grandparents came to Los Angeles and moved in with Mother and S.V. Additionally, in February 2010, the father took a three-week vacation to visit and lived with the family.   At this time, he observed Mother speaking to herself.   However, he stated that her condition was only temporary and that she was fine afterward.   Confident that S.V. was safe because of the presence of the maternal grandparents, he returned to New York.

B. May 2010 Incident and S.V.'s Injury

On May 1, 2010, Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (“the Department”) was notified of an incident at the home shared by Mother, S.V., and the maternal grandparents.   The Alhambra Police Department, responding to an allegation of disturbance of the peace, had arrived to find Mother in a state of anxiety and S.V. with a large gash on her forehead.   After calling for medical assistance, the officers on the scene interviewed Mother, S.V., and several of the neighbors to ascertain what had happened.   They learned that Mother had been running throughout the house, slamming doors, and had inadvertently struck S.V. in the process.   The neighbors further reported that Mother had recently been belligerent and confrontational toward them, had been yelling and hitting the walls so hard that the paintings on the neighbors' side of the wall would fall, and that they could sometimes hear S.V. crying through the wall.   They also claimed that on at least one occasion, Mother had S.V. run around the property about five times, even though she appeared to be exhausted.   As a result of their investigation, the responding officers concluded that Mother posed a potential danger to S.V. by reason of mental illness.   They placed Mother under a section 5150 hold ³ and transported both Mother and S.V. to the hospital.

A Department social worker arrived at the hospital shortly thereafter to interview the family.   S.V. was observed to have swelling and a vertical mark across her forehead, consistent with being struck by the edge of a door.   No other marks or injuries were apparent.   S.V. told the social worker that she had been standing behind a door, playing with a marble, when Mother slammed the door on her forehead without realizing she was there.   She believed that it was an accident and that Mother would never intentionally hurt her.   Further, she stated that she was not afraid of Mother, that Mother had never physically or sexually abused her, and that she wanted to go home with her.

Mother, who was being treated as a psychotic with no specific diagnosis, was medicated but able to answer the social worker's questions.   She stated that she loved S.V. and would not harm her.   However, she said that she needed help with the “people to stop following me and my daughter.”   She believed that these “people” were trying to hurt S.V. and take her away, and were the ones who had called the police.   Mother denied any history of psychotropic medication, denied that there was anything wrong with her, and refused further medication at the hospital.   Expressing a desire to return home to care for S.V., she claimed that she just wanted “them to stop talking to me and leave me alone.”

The social worker also interviewed the maternal grandparents, who had not been home at the time of the incident but whom had since arrived at the hospital.   The grandmother stated that everything had been fine when they left the house.   Each recalled that Mother had a psychiatric hospitalization shortly after S.V. was born and that she had been prescribed medication, but was not currently taking any medication.   They expressed their belief that Mother was a very good and loving parent.

Finally, the father, who was still in New York, was interviewed by telephone.   He confirmed that Mother had been hospitalized for psychiatric issues about ten years prior and was prescribed medication at that time.   He said that “I know that my wife is a good mother but she had problem before and now she has problem again.   Recently, he admitted, Mother had not been “quite right.”   She had begun to hear voices that others did not, although he did not believe that the voices instructed her to harm herself or others.   The father confirmed that he had granted power of attorney to the maternal grandparents to care for S.V. in the case of an emergency, and S.V. was released to their custody.   It was arranged that, once released, Mother would stay with relatives until a further determination on custody could be made.

C. Section 300 Petition and Related Proceedings

The Department alleged the above facts in its petition to have S.V. declared a dependent of the juvenile court under section 300, subdivision (b).  On May 5, 2010, the juvenile court held a detention hearing.   Mother was not present because she was not yet fit to appear in court, although she had been medicated, stabilized and was not experiencing any auditory hallucinations.   The juvenile court made prima facie findings to detain the child and formally placed S.V. with the maternal grandparents pending further proceedings on the issue of custody.   Mother was allowed monitored visits once she was released from the hospital, with the grandparents able to serve as the monitor.

The court subsequently appointed counsel for each parent and ordered that S.V. remain with the maternal grandparents.   On June 2, 2010, based on a recommendation from the Department, the court formally placed S.V. with the father, who consented to S.V. remaining in the care of the maternal grandparents.

On May 18, 2010, Mother was released from the hospital and arrangements were made for her to stay with an uncle.   Mother had been diagnosed with “Axis I Schizophrenia Paranoid Type” and prescribed Risperadone (an antipsychotic commonly used to treat schizophrenia).   She was also referred to outpatient treatment for a medication assessment.   However, Mother refused to take her medication and did not participate in outpatient treatment.   Her discharge papers noted a continuing problem of “impaired insight and judgment [,] noncompliant with medications.”   She was allowed to visit S.V. only in the presence of a social worker, who reported that the two interacted affectionately and observed S.V. go to hug Mother without fear or hesitation.

Mother visited S.V. again on or around May 21, 2010, at the maternal grandparents' home.   She wanted to take S.V. home with her, and initially refused to leave without S.V., but was eventually persuaded by the grandparents to do so.   Apparently wary of what Mother might do, the grandfather took S.V. to a relative's home for the night without Mother's knowledge, and the next day changed the locks on the doors.   He also notified S.V.'s school that Mother was not to be allowed to pick S.V. up.

On May 28, 2010, Mother met with the social worker again.   In this conversation, Mother stated that she would not be getting another psychological evaluation, as there was nothing wrong with her.   When asked why she had been hospitalized previously, Mother claimed that it was because she had a problem with headaches.   The social worker also asked why Mother had stopped visiting her daughter.   Mother replied that S.V. cried every night and that she could not bear it.   She blamed the police for “shattering” her family.   She also claimed that the officer who placed her on the 5150 hold had been to her home several weeks earlier after her neighbor falsely accused her of assaulting her, and that she and the neighbors did not get along because she was the only Asian in the complex and had complained to the landlord about their cats.

The social worker also discussed with Mother the option of having voluntary family reunification services.   However, Mother was informed that in order for these services to be rendered, she would need to undergo additional psychological evaluation, which she continued to refuse.   Voluntary services were also discussed with the father, who felt that court action was necessary to force Mother to seek help for her mental disease.

On June 7, 2010, the court held a hearing for which the Department submitted two documents:  a Multidisciplinary Assessment Team (“MAT”) evaluation, and a Jurisdiction/Disposition report.   The MAT evaluation reiterated much of the information contained in the initial report completed by the social worker assigned to the case immediately after the incident.   It also detailed more recent interactions with Mother since the incident.   According to the evaluation, Mother maintained that she did not need to be hospitalized, and that the incident had all been a misunderstanding due to a language barrier (Mother's primary language was Vietnamese).   However, she refused the Department's offer of a re-evaluation from a Vietnamese psychologist.   Mother also continued to refuse medication.   The maternal grandparents said that she was “suspicious” of doctors.   As for S.V., she stated that she loved her parents and that they loved her, appearing “bright and attentive” during her interview.   Her school principal confirmed that S.V. was a well-behaved child and did well in school, having earned the Student of the Month award.   When asked of Mother's hospitalization, though, S.V. became “quiet, and sighed slightly, and lowered her gaze to the table.”   The Jurisdiction/Disposition report included S.V.'s statement that there was “nothing wrong” with Mother and expressed her desire for Mother to return home.   S.V. also reiterated that she believed Mother had not intentionally injured her.

On June 17, 2010, the court held the adjudication and disposition hearing, receiving the Department's June 7 reports into evidence without objection.   S.V.'s appointed counsel informed the court of S.V.'s desire to return to Mother's care, but joined with the Department in stating that there was enough evidence to demonstrate the “emotional issues that put S.V. at risk in her mother's care.”   The court ultimately sustained the Department's petition, declaring S.V. a dependent of the court under section 300, subsection (b), citing Mother's diagnosis of schizophrenia, her refusal to take medication, and her earlier behavior in refusing to take medication for her previous hospitalization.

After declaring its jurisdiction over S.V., the court considered the disposition.   Mother asked that S.V. be placed with her;  or, alternatively, that she be allowed to reside with the maternal grandparents while they cared for S.V. The court declined to do so, instead removing custody from Mother and placing S.V. with the father, who was permitted to make arrangements for S.V. to live with the maternal grandparents.   As before, Mother was allowed monitored visits.   The court ordered family maintenance and reunification services for the parents, including individual counseling and psychological evaluation for Mother.   The Department was given the discretion to liberalize Mother's visitation privileges.

Mother filed this timely appeal.

DISCUSSION

Mother appeals both from the juvenile court's jurisdictional finding under section 300, as well as its dispositional order which removed S.V. from her custody.   We review both for “any substantial evidence, whether or not contradicted, which will support the conclusion of the trier of fact.”  (In re Katrina C. (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 540, 547;  In re David M. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 822, 828 [jurisdictional findings];  Angela S.V. Superior Court (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 758, 762 [dispositional orders].)  “Under the substantial evidence rule, we have no power to pass on the credibility of witnesses, attempt to resolve conflicts in the evidence or determine where the weight of the evidence lies.”  (In re Diamond H. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1135, disapproved on another ground in Renee J. v. Superior Court (2001) 26 Cal.4th 735, 748–49, fn. 6.) “Where there is more than one inference which can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the appellate court is without power to substitute its decisions for those of the trier of fact.”  (In re Katrina C., supra, 201 Cal.App.3d at p. 547.)   Applying this deferential standard, we review the evidentiary record in the light most favorable to the order.  (In re Diamond H., supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at p. 1135.)

A. Jurisdictional Finding

At issue here is the juvenile court's assumption of jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b).⁴  To warrant jurisdiction under that subdivision, there must be evidence of “three elements:  (1) neglectful conduct by the parent in one of the specified forms;  (2) causation;  and (3) ‘serious physical harm or illness' to the minor, or a ‘substantial risk of such harm or illness.’ ”  (In re Rocco M. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 814, 820.)

Section 300 explicitly contemplates neglectful care as a result of a parent's mental illness as one of the specified forms of conduct which may give rise to a jurisdictional finding under that section. (§ 300, subd. (b).)  Here, the juvenile court found that Mother was running around the house and slamming doors on the day in question, a clear example of mental instability.   Further, this conduct directly caused physical injury to S.V. when she was struck by one of the doors slammed by Mother, requiring a visit to the hospital.   Although Mother struck S.V. accidentally, there is no requirement that the conduct in question be intentional, as evidenced by the use of the word “neglectful.”   The juvenile court's conclusion that Mother had a recurring and chronic mental illness which had been left untreated and had caused her to injure her daughter was thus supported by substantial evidence.

Mother argues that the holding in In re J.N. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1010 (“J.N.”) required the juvenile court to have found that she posed a substantial current and continuing risk of harm to S.V., and that evidence of any prior harm or risk was insufficient to support such a conclusion.⁵  The J.N. court stated that “[w]hile past harmful conduct is relevant to the current risk of future physical harm to a child [citations], the evidence as a whole must be considered.  ‘[P]revious acts of neglect, standing alone, do not establish a substantial risk of harm;  there must be some reason beyond mere speculation to believe they will reoccur.’  [Citations.]”  (Id. at p. 1025.)

However, in Mother's case, there was substantial evidence for the juvenile court to conclude that she not only had committed previous acts of neglect, but that there was reason to believe that such acts would reoccur and that she posed a current and continuing risk of harm to S.V. Mother had exhibited signs of mental illness in the past, and had chosen to stop medicating herself for that mental illness.   Although she may have stabilized temporarily, her untreated illness had returned at least by February 2010 when the father, on a visit to Los Angeles, noticed her speaking to herself.   Likely, it had returned far earlier, yet simply had not been documented because the father was living in New York. Moreover, the neighbors consistently reported possible signs of mental illness prior to the incident, when she acted with belligerence toward them, would yell and hit the walls (so hard that paintings would fall on their side of the wall), and forced S.V. to run around the property when she was clearly exhausted.   In our view, the juvenile court's determination that Mother showed symptoms of mental illness which caused her to engage in neglectful conduct, and that such conduct eventually caused physical injury to S.V. when she slammed the door on her head, is a reasonable inference based on the evidence.

Further, there are legitimate inferences to be drawn from the evidence which suggest that injury to S.V. would reoccur if she were to remain in the custody of her mother.   Mother refused to undergo treatment or medication for her apparently deteriorating mental condition.   Even after the incident in which S.V. was injured, Mother professed her belief that “people” were following her and her daughter, and were trying to take S.V. away from her.   She reported that these “people” talked to her and were the ones who had called the police on her.   When released from the hospital, Mother was diagnosed with Axis I Schizophrenia Paranoid Type and recommended to begin treatment with an antipsychotic medication.   She nevertheless remained adamant that there was nothing wrong with her and blamed the diagnosis on her difficulty with the English language, but then refused a follow-up evaluation with a Vietnamese psychologist.   She also refused to take her prescribed medication.   Because Mother refused treatment, her paranoia and other symptoms persisted.   She told the social worker that she blamed the police for “shattering” her family and believed that both the police and neighbors were out to get her because she was the only Asian in the complex and had complained about the landlord's cats.   Mother was also reportedly “suspicious” of her doctors.   The juvenile court was in the best position to assess the credibility of this evidence and determine whether Mother suffered from a continuing mental illness.   Its conclusion that Mother's chronic mental illness – which caused her to injure S.V. at least once prior – would likely cause further injury to S.V. in the future will not be disturbed in light of the evidence in the record before this court.

The cases cited by Mother in support of her appeal are distinguishable and of no aid to her argument.   Mother cites invariably to case law in which the appellate court found the lower court to have erred in exercising dependency jurisdiction.   In each cited case, the appellate court determined that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of current risk either because there was no evidence of a history or abuse of the children by their mental illness or because the parents were complying with medical treatments to address their mental illness.  (See In re David M., supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at p. 830 [no evidence that mentally ill parents ever harmed their children];  In re Matthew S. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1311, 1319 [no evidence that mother's delusion caused harm to her son;  mother voluntarily underwent therapy for her condition after the incident in question];  In re James R., Jr. (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 129, 132–134 [mentally ill mother voluntarily initiated treatment services and had participated in therapy and substance abuse treatment for three months at the time of the hearing].)   In contrast, here the record contains substantial evidence that Mother had inflicted a prior injury upon S.V. while in a delusional state, that Mother denied that she currently suffered from mental illness, and that Mother refused to participate in doctor-recommended treatments.

For the foregoing reasons, Mother's argument that there was not substantial evidence to support the juvenile court's jurisdictional finding fails.

B. Dispositional Order

Mother also argues that even if the juvenile court's jurisdictional finding under section 300, subdivision (b) is upheld, the evidence before it was insufficient to support its dispositional order removing S.V. from her custody.

To support an order removing a child from parental custody, the juvenile court must find clear and convincing evidence that “[t]here is or would be a substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the minor if the minor were returned home, and there are no reasonable means by which the minor's physical health can be protected without removing the minor from the minor's parent's or guardian's physical custody.” (§ 361, subd. (c)(1);  see also In re Heather A. (1996) 52 Cal.App.4th 183, 193.)   The court must also “make a determination as to whether reasonable efforts were made to prevent or to eliminate the need for removal of the minor” and “state the facts on which the decision to remove the minor is based.” (§ 361, subd. (d).)

Although the juvenile court must find “clear and convincing evidence” of danger to the child under section 361, subdivision (c)(1), we review its removal findings under the same “substantial evidence” test as set forth above.  (In re Heather A., supra, 52 Cal.App.4th at p. 193.)   Also, evidence of past conduct is likewise probative of current conditions, especially where there is reason to believe that the conduct will continue in the future.   (In re Rocco M., supra, 1 Cal.App.4th at p. 824.)   As discussed above, there was substantial evidence for the juvenile court to conclude that S.V. would remain in physical and/or emotional danger were she to remain in the custody of her mentally ill mother, especially because Mother refused to undergo treatment for her chronic and deteriorating condition.   This evidence was uncontroverted at the trial level and thus satisfied the “clear and convincing” standard.

Mother argues, however, that the juvenile court failed to consider less drastic means than removal.   The record reflects otherwise.   On several occasions after the May 2010 incident, the court considered the possibility of returning S.V. to Mother's custody because she lived with the maternal grandparents, who were assumed capable of protecting S.V. However, noting that S.V.'s injury occurred in the maternal grandparents' home while they were away, the court concluded that it was necessary for Mother's visits to be monitored by the grandparents, and that leaving S.V. in Mother's custody would be improper.   The court's dispositional order placed S.V. in her father's custody, but allowed S.V. to live with the maternal grandparents as long as Mother did not reside in the same household.   Thus, Mother moved in with a relative but was permitted to visit S.V. frequently.   Further, the Department was given discretion to liberalize the custody order in the future without needing to consult the court.   We find that the juvenile court carefully considered the situation before ultimately removing Mother from formal custody, and that it complied fully with the requirements of section 361, subdivision (d).

DISPOSITION

The order of the juvenile court is affirmed.

We concur:

FOOTNOTES

FN1. All further code references, unless indicated otherwise, are to the Welfare and Institutions Code..  FN1. All further code references, unless indicated otherwise, are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

FN2. See New York Mental Hygiene Law, section 9.60, et. seq..  FN2. See New York Mental Hygiene Law, section 9.60, et. seq.

FN3. Section 5150 allows a qualified officer or clinician to involuntarily confine, for up to 72 hours, any person who is deemed a danger to herself and/or others, and/or whom is deemed gravely disabled. (§ 5150.).  FN3. Section 5150 allows a qualified officer or clinician to involuntarily confine, for up to 72 hours, any person who is deemed a danger to herself and/or others, and/or whom is deemed gravely disabled. (§ 5150.)

FN4. That provision reads in pertinent part as follows:  “Any child who comes within any of the following descriptions is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court which may adjudge that person to be a dependent child of the court:  [¶] ․ [¶] (b) The child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of ․ the inability of the parent or guardian to provide regular care for the child due to the parent's or guardian's mental illness, developmental disability, or substance abuse․  The child shall continue to be a dependent child pursuant to this subdivision only so long as is necessary to protect the child from risk of suffering serious physical harm or illness. (§ 300, subd. (b).).  FN4. That provision reads in pertinent part as follows:  “Any child who comes within any of the following descriptions is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court which may adjudge that person to be a dependent child of the court:  [¶] ․ [¶] (b) The child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of ․ the inability of the parent or guardian to provide regular care for the child due to the parent's or guardian's mental illness, developmental disability, or substance abuse․  The child shall continue to be a dependent child pursuant to this subdivision only so long as is necessary to protect the child from risk of suffering serious physical harm or illness. (§ 300, subd. (b).)

FN5. Mother asks us to confirm the holding in J.N. and reject an allegedly inconsistent holding in In re J.K. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1426, which she reads as holding that a prior harm or risk of harm to the child at issue, in and of itself, is sufficient for an order for the juvenile court to assume jurisdiction.   However, as we conclude that S.V. was also at a current and continuing risk of harm at the time of the court's dispositional order, we need not decide this issue..  FN5. Mother asks us to confirm the holding in J.N. and reject an allegedly inconsistent holding in In re J.K. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1426, which she reads as holding that a prior harm or risk of harm to the child at issue, in and of itself, is sufficient for an order for the juvenile court to assume jurisdiction.   However, as we conclude that S.V. was also at a current and continuing risk of harm at the time of the court's dispositional order, we need not decide this issue.

ZELON, J. JACKSON, J.