IN RE: A.A. (2010)

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

OPINION

N.A. (mother) appealed from a September 16, 2010, order terminating her parental rights (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 366.26) to her one-year-old daughter.¹  After reviewing the entire record, mother's court-appointed appellate counsel informed this court she had found no arguable issues to raise in this appeal.   Counsel requested, and this court granted, leave for mother to personally file a letter setting forth a good cause showing that an arguable issue of reversible error does exist.  (In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835, 844 (Phoenix H.).)

Mother has since written a letter in which she disputes portions of the juvenile dependency proceedings as summarized in her appellate counsel's Phoenix H. brief.   For the most part, mother complains about events, which occurred prior to the termination hearing and cannot be reviewed on this appeal.  (In re Elizabeth M. (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 553, 563 [An appeal from the most recent order entered in a dependency matter may not challenge prior orders for which the time to seek review has passed].)

Otherwise, she contends her attorney at the termination hearing failed to present evidence, which she claims she provided to him, showing what she had accomplished.   She argues that evidence would have made a difference in this case.   She directs us to an attached letter dated December 13, 2010, which appears to be written by the program director of the Walden House Trauma Informed Substance Abuse Program at Valley State Prison for Women.   The program director explains mother entered Walden House on September 10, 2010, less than a week before the juvenile court terminated her parental rights, and describes the progress she has since made.

On review, we conclude mother's letter does not amount to a good cause showing that an arguable issue of reversible error, arising out of the termination hearing, does exist.

DISCUSSION

An appealed-from judgment or order is presumed correct.  (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.)   It is up to an appellant to raise claims of reversible error or other defect and present argument and authority on each point made.   If an appellant does not do so, the appeal should be dismissed.  (In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, 994.)

While mother claims she gave her attorney evidence of her accomplishments to present to the juvenile court at the September 16, 2010, termination hearing, there is nothing in the appellate record to support her claim.   Mother overlooks her burden to affirmatively show error on the appellate record.   (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.)

To the extent she relies on the recent letter from the Walden House Program Director, there are many procedural hurdles preventing this court from considering that letter.   For example, it is evidence regarding mother's progress which had yet to occur as of the September 16, 2010, termination hearing date.   This means it is evidence of purported events occurring after the termination order.   However, postjudgment evidence is inadmissible in a juvenile dependency appeal from an order terminating parental rights (In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 413, fn. 11.)   Further, an appellate court should not consider postjudgment evidence going to the merits of an appeal and introduced for the purposes of attacking the trial court's judgment (In re Josiah Z. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 664, 676.)   Therefore, we may not consider the contents of this recent letter.

In any event, we add the following.   At the termination hearing, the court's proper focus was on the child to determine whether it was likely she would be adopted and, if so, to order termination of parental rights.   Once reunification services are ordered terminated, the focus shifts to the needs of the children for permanency and stability.  (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309.)   If, as in this case, the child is likely to be adopted, adoption is the norm.   Indeed, the court must order adoption and its necessary consequence, termination of parental rights, unless one of the specified circumstances provides a compelling reason for finding that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child.  (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53.)   Here there was no compelling reason for the juvenile court to select a plan other than adoption.

DISPOSITION

The order terminating parental rights is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated..  FN1. All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.