THOMAS PALAZZOLO v. CHILDRENS HOSPITAL LOS ANGELES (2010)

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Thomas Palazzolo, on behalf of himself and a class of employees and former employees of Childrens Hospital Los Angeles, sued Childrens Hospital to recover unpaid overtime compensation, premium pay for meal and rest period violations, and damages for non-compliant wage statements.   Palazzolo's time cards, submitted during his 17 months of employment, indicate missed meal periods and overtime for which he has been compensated, and he never complained that he was entitled to additional overtime or premium pay for missed meal or rest periods when he received his wage statements.   Palazzolo also did not bring to Childrens Hospital's attention that he was overpaid more than $18,000 in gross pay and benefits arising from false entries on his time cards.   Based upon this evidence, the trial court granted summary judgment to Childrens Hospital and summarily adjudicated its defense of unclean hands.

Upon our de novo review of the evidence, we affirm the summary judgment motion, and therefore do not address Childrens Hospital's defense to this action.   Palazzolo has not presented any evidence to raise a triable issue of fact that he was not compensated for overtime as required under the Labor Code, and Childrens Hospital's meal and rest period policies, along with its wage statements, comply with the Labor Code.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

1. Facts ¹

Palazzolo was a patient care staff aide at Childrens Hospital from July 2005 to December 2006.   He worked in Unit 4 East, caring for children with leukemia or

lymphoma and other blood disorders.   He was a per-diem employee and worked a 12-hour shift from 7:00 p.m. to 7:30 a.m.

Per-diem employees working a 12-hour shift receive two 30-minute meal periods, but the second meal period is paid and treated as time worked.   These employees also receive “a 15-minute rest break ․ for each four hours worked.”

Per-diem employees working a 12-hour shift are paid straight time for the first eight hours, time and one-half for those hours in excess of eight up to 12 in any work shift or over 40 hours in any workweek, and double time for hours in excess of 12 in any one shift.   Night-shift employees also are paid a shift differential.

These policies are set forth in the employee handbook, policy and procedures manual, and Childrens Hospital's Intranet, which are all available to employees.   Palazzolo received training on these policies and procedures from Debra Reid, the manager for Unit 4 East.

a. Time-Keeping System

Childrens Hospital requires its employees to report their hours worked on time cards.   Employees, including Palazzolo, are responsible for recording the beginning and end of their shifts, and the start and end of their unpaid meal period.   Employees also are required to report sick time, overtime, and any missed meal or rest periods.   The Childrens Hospital policy advised “[l]unch penalty code should be used if an employee does not take lunch.”   Since employees are paid for rest periods and a second meal period, these breaks are not recorded on time cards as “time out,” which indicated unpaid time.

The time cards have the following statement:  “I certify I have been provided with meal and rest periods in accordance with CHLA policy and state regulations.   My signature constitutes a legal statement that all information is true and correct.”   Each time card has a space for the employee's signature.

b. Palazzolo's Time Cards

Palazzolo testified he filled out his time cards accurately and truthfully.   He filled out and signed several, but not all, of his time cards.   Of the time cards he signed, Palazzolo missed two meal periods and was paid the one-hour premium.   Palazzolo also reported and was paid overtime beyond his scheduled shift approximately six or seven times.   He did not report any missed rest periods.

Palazzolo did not sign or fill out the hours on several time cards for which he received wages based upon the reported hours.   When Palazzolo did not complete a time card, the manager or time keeper filled out the time card from the master schedule.   The time keeper did not call employees to verify their schedule, and the time card was submitted without a signature.

Palazzolo was paid for the hours reported on his time cards, with the exception of one pay period containing an error that he never brought to Childrens Hospital's attention.²  Palazzolo reported no payment error, time card error, or wage statement error to a manager or to the payroll department.

Palazzolo's wage statements list the regular hours and overtime hours reflected in his time cards, setting forth the overtime and regular rate of pay, along with the shift differentials.   The pay period is two weeks long and begins on Sunday morning at 12:01 a.m., and ends at midnight on Saturday of the second week.   Paychecks and wage statements are issued on the Friday following the end of the pay period.

Palazzolo voluntarily resigned after receiving his last paycheck on January 5, 2007.   He was paid for all hours recorded in his time card for the pay period that ended December 30, 2006.   Palazzolo testified he was owed no money at the time he tendered his resignation.

c. Palazzolo's Alleged Unpaid Overtime And Missed Meal And Rest Periods

Palazzolo now claims he did not accurately record his overtime.   He testified he stayed late at the end of his shift to report to the day shift but did not record the time because “I felt that was - they made it - from my understanding, the hospital made me believe that that [sic ] was part of - you know, that was part of the shift that was included in part of the 12-hour shift.”   Palazzolo, however, was not instructed to omit his overtime.

Palazzolo testified he did not believe his overtime was properly calculated because the wage statements “were difficult to read” and “didn't make sense.”   Specifically, he believes the shift differential “threw off the overtime.”

Palazzolo also claims the time cards indicating he took meal periods are not accurate.   He stated he was instructed to fill out his time cards to show he took the first meal period even if he did not take one.   If he missed a meal period, he would fill out a missed meal period form.   Palazzolo testified management told staff they would “no longer honor the forms” because employees were abusing the system, and management believed employees were able to take breaks.   Palazzolo did not take a meal period about 85 percent of the time.   When he did take a meal period, he did not always take it when he wanted to because sometimes there was no one to cover for him.   Palazzolo did not know he was entitled to a second meal period, and he did not take one during his employment.

Palazzolo was told not to take rest periods at certain times, and he would later forget to take a break.   He never reported missed rest periods.

d. The Falsified Time Records

After Palazzolo resigned, Childrens Hospital discovered he was paid for 88 shifts that he did not work.   The overpayment totaled $18,562.82, which included gross pay and benefits.   Palazzolo testified to signing several time cards that contained these false entries.   Palazzolo accepted the pay from these false entries and never reported the inaccurate entries to management.

2. Motion for Summary Judgment And Summary Adjudication Of Defenses

Childrens Hospital moved for summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication, of the first amended complaint (complaint).   The complaint asserted the following causes of action on Palazzolo's behalf, and on behalf of the putative class:  (1) violation of Labor Code sections 510, 511, and 1198 ³ for unpaid overtime;  (2) violation of sections 201 and 202 for failure to pay wages upon termination;  (3) violation of section 204 for failure to pay wages;  (4) violation of sections 226.7, subdivision (a) and 512, subdivision (a) for denial of meal periods;  (5) violation of section 226.7, subdivision (a) for denial of rest periods;  (6) violation of section 226, subdivision (a) for improper wage statements;  (7) violation of section 221 seeking repayment of wages to employer;  (8) violation of section 2802 seeking indemnification for employee's expenses;  (9) conversion and theft of labor;  and (10) violation of the Unfair Competition Law (Bus. & Prof.Code, § 17200 et seq.).⁴

Childrens Hospital also moved to adjudicate its affirmative defenses of unclean hands and no willful violation of sections 201 and 202.

The trial court granted summary judgment on the complaint and summarily adjudicated Childrens Hospital's defenses.⁵  Judgment was entered on April 7, 2009.   Palazzolo filed this timely appeal.

DISCUSSION

1. The Standards Of Review

We review the record and the trial court's grant of summary judgment and summary adjudication de novo.  (Kahn v. East Side Union High School Dist. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 990, 1003;  Kendall-Jackson Winery, Ltd. v. Superior Court (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 970, 978.)   A defendant's motion for summary judgment should be granted if no triable issue exists as to any material fact and the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)  We consider all the evidence set forth in the moving and opposition papers, except evidence to which objections were properly made and sustained.  (Johnson v. City of Loma Linda (2000) 24 Cal.4th 61, 65-66.)   The trial court's rulings on evidentiary objections are reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  (Shaw v. County of Santa Cruz (2008) 170 Cal.App.4th 229, 281.)

2. The Exclusion Of Evidence Was Not An Abuse Of Discretion

Palazzolo contends the trial court prejudicially erred in several of its evidentiary rulings, sustaining objections to his declaration, and to the admission of documentary evidence.   In reviewing Palazzolo's evidentiary complaints, we note that if any objection raised is proper, the other objections raised are of no consequence, even if the trial court relied on one of the other objections.  (Philip Chang & Sons Associates v. La Casa Novato (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 159, 173.)  “If the exclusion is proper upon any theory of law applicable to the instant case, the exclusion must be sustained regardless of the particular considerations which may have motivated the trial court to its decision.  [Citations.]”  (Ibid.)

a. Palazzolo's Declaration

Palazzolo complains the trial court improperly invoked Evidence Code sections 622 ⁶ and 623 ⁷ and D'Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 21-22, to exclude portions of his declaration.   While Childrens Hospital raised D'Amico, arguing the declaration contradicted Palazzolo's deposition testimony, and the evidentiary presumptions as grounds to object, it also objected to Palazzolo's declaration on the grounds of hearsay, irrelevance, improper lay opinion, and lack of foundation.   The trial court sustained the objections without specifying the grounds.   Since Palazzolo has failed to present argument that all of the grounds for exclusion were improper, he has failed to show an abuse of discretion.   In any event, Palazzolo concedes, “Mr. Palazzolo also had deposition testimony as to these facts but this testimony was not explicitly excluded.”   Thus, any error was not prejudicial.  (Evid.Code, § 354.)

b. Documents

Palazzolo also complains about the trial court's ruling sustaining objections to the admission of a Childrens Hospital memo reflecting the discontinuance of on-duty meal periods, and of an assignment sheet that includes a reference to him.   Childrens Hospital objected on the grounds of hearsay, irrelevance, and lack of foundation.   The trial court sustained the objections without specifying the grounds.

Palazzolo contends the memo established Childrens Hospital's knowledge that on-duty meal periods were illegal, and the assignment sheet was relevant to raise triable issues of fact as to the accuracy of Childrens Hospital's time cards.   Palazzolo has overlooked these documents lack foundation.   Palazzolo has not pointed to any evidence in the record that he is one of the employees referenced in the memo covered under the prior policy, or the prior policy applied to per-diem employees.   Likewise, Palazzolo has not pointed to any evidence that the notation on the assignment sheet was the equivalent of the hours actually worked and recorded on the time card submitted.   Moreover, the testimony regarding the assignment sheet was introduced.   Thus, Palazzolo has not shown an abuse of discretion.

3. The Trial Court Properly Granted Summary Judgment

Palazzolo challenges seven causes of action that were improperly adjudicated.⁸  We can find none - summary judgment was properly granted.

a. Overtime (First Cause Of Action) Was Properly Adjudicated

Palazzolo contends Childrens Hospital violated sections 510,⁹ 1198,¹⁰ and 511,¹¹ governing the payment of overtime compensation.   The complaint alleges Palazzolo and the putative class worked in excess of 12 hours per day for which they were not compensated, and the shift differentials were not properly calculated into the overtime rate of pay.¹²

Palazzolo's opinion that the shift differential threw off the overtime compensation does not raise a triable issue of fact as to the proper overtime rate.   This evidence does not dispute the Childrens Hospital's overtime policy complies with the law.   Likewise, Palazzolo's belief that management did not want him to record his overtime does not raise a triable issue of fact;  he was told to record his overtime, he did so on several occasions, and he never raised this concern to management after receiving his paycheck and wage statement which designated his “overtime pay.”   Palazzolo points to exit records from the parking garage and assignment sheets that he signed before his shift started, but these documents do not raise a triable issue of fact as to the hours he actually worked.   This cause of action was properly adjudicated.

b. Unpaid Wages Upon Termination (Second Cause Of Action) Was Properly Adjudicated

Palazzolo alleged Childrens Hospital violated sections 201 and 202, requiring prompt payment of earned and unpaid wages within 72 hours after cessation of employment.   Only section 202 applies because Palazzolo voluntarily resigned.¹³  If an employer willfully fails to pay, the employee is entitled to waiting time penalties under section 203.¹⁴

Palazzolo testified he timely received his last paycheck.   He further testified he was not owed money when he resigned, and he did not advise Childrens Hospital of any missing regular or overtime wages following his resignation, or at any time prior to his voluntary resignation.   Thus, there was no triable issue of failure to pay wages upon resignation.   The trial court properly adjudicated this cause of action.

c. Failure To Pay Wages Under Section 204 (Third Cause Of Action) Was Properly Adjudicated

Palazzolo alleged Childrens Hospital failed to timely pay regular and overtime wages as required under section 204.   Section 204, subdivision (d) states employers paying employees on a biweekly payroll must pay wages “not more than seven calendar days following the close of the payroll period.”

Palazzolo does not dispute that he received a paycheck in compliance with the timing set forth in section 204.   He disputes the amount in his paychecks because he now claims he did not receive all the overtime pay and premium pay for missed meal periods.   This is a derivative claim and was properly adjudicated.

d. Failure To Provide Meal Periods (Fourth Cause Of Action) Was Properly Adjudicated

Palazzolo alleges he was not provided a 30-minute meal period every five hours in

violation of sections 226.7 ¹⁵ and 512.¹⁶  Palazzolo's cause of action is based upon alleged violations in connection with both the first and second meal periods provided under the Childrens Hospital policy for 12-hour employees.   He seeks to recover an additional hour of pay at his regular hourly rate for each missed meal period.

We find no triable issue of fact to support Palazzolo's claim to recover premium pay (and overtime) for either meal period.   Palazzolo incorrectly asserts a violation because Childrens Hospital did not always provide him with a meal period during the first five hours of his shift.   Nothing in the applicable statutes or wage orders supports his position that a meal period must occur within the first five hours of a shift.  (See § 512, subd. (a);  Cal.Code Regs., tit. 8, § 11050, subd.   11(A).)

Palazzolo also claims he indiscriminately recorded the first meal period and actually did not take the first meal period about 85 percent of the time.   This evidence shows Palazzolo did not take meal periods;  it does not dispute that Childrens Hospital provided meal periods.   Palazzolo does not state he was prohibited from taking meal periods.   Rather, he testified he could not always take his meal period at the time he wanted to take it because of scheduling concerns.

Cicairos v. Summit Logistics, Inc. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 949, upon which Palazzolo relies, is based upon scheduling concerns that effectively denied meal periods, which precluded summary judgment.   In that case, the evidence showed the employer managed and scheduled drivers in such a way that prevented the drivers from taking their meal periods.  (Id. at p. 962.)   Thus, the employer had “ ‘an affirmative obligation to ensure that workers are actually relieved of all duty [,]’ “ so that it was possible for the drivers to have a meal.  (Ibid.) The Cicairos court did not find that the employer had to ensure employees actually took the meal period.

Cicairos v. Summit Logistics, Inc., supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at page 962, illustrates why summary judgment is appropriate here.   Childrens Hospital has a meal period policy, and there is no evidence that Childrens Hospital's scheduling policies interfered with the employee's meal period.   Palazzolo was aware of the Childrens Hospital policy, he actually received premium pay for missed meal periods, and he admits he took meal periods.   Palazzolo's own testimony demonstrates that management intended for employees to take meal periods, not to skip them.

Palazzolo also does not dispute that Childrens Hospital provided him a second meal period - only that he was unaware of the second meal period, despite a published policy accessible to employees and posted at several locations at Childrens Hospital.   This evidence does not raise an issue of fact that Childrens Hospital failed to provide a second meal period or acted in an affirmative manner to deny meal periods.   Thus, this cause of action was properly adjudicated.

e. Failure To Provide Rest Periods (Fifth Cause of Action) Was Properly Adjudicated

Palazzolo alleges Childrens Hospital failed to provide rest periods pursuant to section 226.7, subdivision (a).   Under the applicable wage order, employees are entitled to a 10-minute break every four hours of work.  (Cal.Code Regs., tit. 8, § 11050, subd.   12(A).)   An employer must make the rest periods available.  (Ibid.)

Childrens Hospital presented evidence of a written policy providing three, 15-minute rest periods, and Palazzolo was informed of the policy.   Palazzolo did not report missed rest periods or that he was not provided rest periods - he simply forgot to take breaks.   This evidence does not raise a triable issue of fact.   Thus, this cause of action was properly adjudicated.

f. Non-Compliant Wage Statements (Sixth Cause Of Action) Was Properly Adjudicated

Palazzolo alleges his wage statements violated section 226, subdivision (a)(2) ¹⁷ because there was no sum total of the hours he worked, instead the wage statements listed the total hours at the regular rate of pay and the total hours at the overtime rate of pay.   Section 226 does not require the employer to list total regular hours and the total overtime hours worked during the pay period, and then add those two figures together in a separate line listing the sum of all hours worked.   The Childrens Hospital's wage statements comply with section 226.  (See Morgan v. United Retail, Inc. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1136, 1144-1147.)

The Childrens Hospital's wage statements are similar to the exemplar on the website of the California Department of Industrial Relations, Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (DLSE) website at http://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/dlse.html.¹⁸ Although not binding on a court, the DLSE's construction of a statute, whether embodied in a formal rule or less formal representation, is entitled to consideration and respect.  (Murphy v. Kenneth Cole Productions, Inc. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1094, 1105, fn. 7.)

The DLSE exemplar and Childrens Hospital's wage statements do not require an employee to reconstruct time and pay records as was the case in Cicairos v. Summit Logistics, Inc., supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at pages 960, 961, or add up the daily hours on time cards (DLSE Opn. Letter No.2002.05.17 (May 17, 2002) at p. 6).¹⁹  The total hours worked is reported on the Childrens Hospital's wage statements.   Moreover, the DLSE letter upon which Palazzolo relies does not address the issue of whether a wage statement that lists the total regular and overtime hours worked without providing a sum of these hours would comply with section 226.   The wage statements do not violate the Labor Code. Thus, the trial court properly adjudicated this cause of action.

Since Palazzolo cannot proceed under the Labor Code, his UCL cause of action also fails as a matter of law.  (See Cortez v. Purolator Air Filtration Products Co. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 163, 178.)   Summary judgment was properly granted.   In light of this conclusion, we need not address the summary adjudication of Childrens Hospital's defense to this complaint.

DISPOSITION

The trial court's order granting summary judgment is affirmed.   Childrens Hospital is awarded costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

We concur:

FOOTNOTES

FN1. The recited facts are not disputed, or not effectively disputed, for purposes of summary judgment.   Palazzolo's 180-page response to the separate statement miscomprehends the nature and purpose of a separate statement.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (b)(1).)  “The parties' separate statements ‘are intended to permit the judge to determine quickly whether the motion is supported by sufficient undisputed facts.   If the opposing statement disputes an essential fact alleged in support of the motion, the judge merely has to review the evidence cited in support of that fact.   This saves the judge from having to review all the evidentiary materials filed in support of and in opposition to the motion.’   [Citation.]”  (St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Frontier Pacific Ins. Co. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1234, 1248-1249.)   Palazzolo's repetitive arguments to dispute “facts” as straightforward as the hospital's written policy (not its implementation) does not promote this goal, nor does it facilitate appellate review..  FN1. The recited facts are not disputed, or not effectively disputed, for purposes of summary judgment.   Palazzolo's 180-page response to the separate statement miscomprehends the nature and purpose of a separate statement.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (b)(1).)  “The parties' separate statements ‘are intended to permit the judge to determine quickly whether the motion is supported by sufficient undisputed facts.   If the opposing statement disputes an essential fact alleged in support of the motion, the judge merely has to review the evidence cited in support of that fact.   This saves the judge from having to review all the evidentiary materials filed in support of and in opposition to the motion.’   [Citation.]”  (St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Frontier Pacific Ins. Co. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1234, 1248-1249.)   Palazzolo's repetitive arguments to dispute “facts” as straightforward as the hospital's written policy (not its implementation) does not promote this goal, nor does it facilitate appellate review.

FN2. While the time card reflects an underpayment of four hours for one shift, Childrens Hospital later discovered two false entries during the pay period for a total of 24 hours, thus the underpayment turned out to be an overpayment of 20 hours..  FN2. While the time card reflects an underpayment of four hours for one shift, Childrens Hospital later discovered two false entries during the pay period for a total of 24 hours, thus the underpayment turned out to be an overpayment of 20 hours.

FN3. Unless otherwise stated, all further statutory references are to the Labor Code..  FN3. Unless otherwise stated, all further statutory references are to the Labor Code.

FN4. Childrens Hospital also moved for summary judgment on its cross-complaint seeking to recover the overpayment of wages.   That motion was denied on procedural grounds, and the cross-complaint was later dismissed..  FN4. Childrens Hospital also moved for summary judgment on its cross-complaint seeking to recover the overpayment of wages.   That motion was denied on procedural grounds, and the cross-complaint was later dismissed.

FN5. After summary judgment was granted, Palazzolo brought an ex parte application to amend the complaint to add non-party Lisa Aguilar as a class representative, and Aguilar filed an ex parte application to intervene.   The trial court denied Aguilar's ex parte and did not rule on Palazzolo's motion.   We dismissed Palazzolo's appeal of these matters..  FN5. After summary judgment was granted, Palazzolo brought an ex parte application to amend the complaint to add non-party Lisa Aguilar as a class representative, and Aguilar filed an ex parte application to intervene.   The trial court denied Aguilar's ex parte and did not rule on Palazzolo's motion.   We dismissed Palazzolo's appeal of these matters.

FN6. Evidence Code section 622 states:  “The facts recited in a written instrument are conclusively presumed to be true as between the parties thereto, or their successors in interest;  but this rule does not apply to the recital of a consideration.”.  FN6. Evidence Code section 622 states:  “The facts recited in a written instrument are conclusively presumed to be true as between the parties thereto, or their successors in interest;  but this rule does not apply to the recital of a consideration.”

FN7. Evidence Code section 623 states:  “Whenever a party has, by his own statement or conduct, intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true and to act upon such belief, he is not, in any litigation arising out of such statement or conduct, permitted to contradict it.”.  FN7. Evidence Code section 623 states:  “Whenever a party has, by his own statement or conduct, intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true and to act upon such belief, he is not, in any litigation arising out of such statement or conduct, permitted to contradict it.”

FN8. Palazzolo does not present argument addressing the summary adjudication of the seventh cause of action for repayment of wages to employer, the eighth cause of action for reimbursement of business expenses, and the ninth cause of action for conversion.   Therefore, he has abandoned any claim of error.  (Landry v. Berryessa Union School Dist. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 691, 699-700.).  FN8. Palazzolo does not present argument addressing the summary adjudication of the seventh cause of action for repayment of wages to employer, the eighth cause of action for reimbursement of business expenses, and the ninth cause of action for conversion.   Therefore, he has abandoned any claim of error.  (Landry v. Berryessa Union School Dist. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 691, 699-700.)

FN9. Subdivision (a) of section 510 states in pertinent part:  “Any work in excess of eight hours in one workday and any work in excess of 40 hours in any one workweek ․ shall be compensated at the rate of no less than one and one-half times the regular rate of pay for an employee.   Any work in excess of 12 hours in one day shall be compensated at the rate of no less than twice the regular rate of pay for an employee.”.  FN9. Subdivision (a) of section 510 states in pertinent part:  “Any work in excess of eight hours in one workday and any work in excess of 40 hours in any one workweek ․ shall be compensated at the rate of no less than one and one-half times the regular rate of pay for an employee.   Any work in excess of 12 hours in one day shall be compensated at the rate of no less than twice the regular rate of pay for an employee.”

FN10. Section 1198 states:  “The maximum hours of work and the standard conditions of labor fixed by the commission shall be the maximum hours of work and the standard conditions of labor for employees.   The employment of any employee for longer hours than those fixed by the order or under conditions of labor prohibited by the order is unlawful.”.  FN10. Section 1198 states:  “The maximum hours of work and the standard conditions of labor fixed by the commission shall be the maximum hours of work and the standard conditions of labor for employees.   The employment of any employee for longer hours than those fixed by the order or under conditions of labor prohibited by the order is unlawful.”

FN11. Section 511 applies to alternative workweek schedules..  FN11. Section 511 applies to alternative workweek schedules.

FN12. On appeal, Palazzolo challenges Childrens Hospital's practice of “rounding-off work hours, up to six minutes,” which denied him up to 12 minutes of overtime per shift.   This was not alleged as part of the overtime claim, and Palazzolo has presented no evidence to establish a triable issue of fact that he was docked 12 minutes of pay each shift based on the Childrens Hospital policy..  FN12. On appeal, Palazzolo challenges Childrens Hospital's practice of “rounding-off work hours, up to six minutes,” which denied him up to 12 minutes of overtime per shift.   This was not alleged as part of the overtime claim, and Palazzolo has presented no evidence to establish a triable issue of fact that he was docked 12 minutes of pay each shift based on the Childrens Hospital policy.

FN13. Subdivision (a) of section 202 states in pertinent part:  “If an employee not having a written contract for a definite period quits his or her employment, his or her wages shall become due and payable not later than 72 hours thereafter, unless the employee has given 72 hours previous notice of his or her intention to quit, in which case the employee is entitled to his or her wages at the time of quitting.”.  FN13. Subdivision (a) of section 202 states in pertinent part:  “If an employee not having a written contract for a definite period quits his or her employment, his or her wages shall become due and payable not later than 72 hours thereafter, unless the employee has given 72 hours previous notice of his or her intention to quit, in which case the employee is entitled to his or her wages at the time of quitting.”

FN14. Subdivision (a) of section 203 states in pertinent part:  “If an employer willfully fails to pay, without abatement or reduction, in accordance with Sections 201, 201.3, 201.5, 202, and 202.5, any wages of an employee who is discharged or who quits, the wages of the employee shall continue as a penalty from the due date thereof at the same rate until paid or until an action therefor is commenced;  but the wages shall not continue for more than 30 days.”.  FN14. Subdivision (a) of section 203 states in pertinent part:  “If an employer willfully fails to pay, without abatement or reduction, in accordance with Sections 201, 201.3, 201.5, 202, and 202.5, any wages of an employee who is discharged or who quits, the wages of the employee shall continue as a penalty from the due date thereof at the same rate until paid or until an action therefor is commenced;  but the wages shall not continue for more than 30 days.”

FN15. Section 226.7 states:  “(a) No employer shall require any employee to work during any meal or rest period mandated by an applicable order of the Industrial Welfare Commission. [¶] (b) If an employer fails to provide an employee a meal period or rest period in accordance with an applicable order of the Industrial Welfare Commission, the employer shall pay the employee one additional hour of pay at the employee's regular rate of compensation for each work day that the meal or rest period is not provided.”.  FN15. Section 226.7 states:  “(a) No employer shall require any employee to work during any meal or rest period mandated by an applicable order of the Industrial Welfare Commission. [¶] (b) If an employer fails to provide an employee a meal period or rest period in accordance with an applicable order of the Industrial Welfare Commission, the employer shall pay the employee one additional hour of pay at the employee's regular rate of compensation for each work day that the meal or rest period is not provided.”

FN16. Subdivision (a) of section 512 states in pertinent part:  “An employer may not employ an employee for a work period of more than five hours per day without providing the employee with a meal period of not less than 30 minutes․”.  FN16. Subdivision (a) of section 512 states in pertinent part:  “An employer may not employ an employee for a work period of more than five hours per day without providing the employee with a meal period of not less than 30 minutes․”

FN17. Section 226, subdivision (a) sets forth nine requirements for an itemized statement when wages are paid by personal check or cash.   Subdivision (a)(2) states in pertinent part the itemized statement must show “total hours worked by the employee[.]”.  FN17. Section 226, subdivision (a) sets forth nine requirements for an itemized statement when wages are paid by personal check or cash.   Subdivision (a)(2) states in pertinent part the itemized statement must show “total hours worked by the employee[.]”

FN18. The DLSE is the state agency authorized to interpret and enforce California wage and hour laws.  (Gattuso v. Harte-Hanks Shoppers, Inc. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 554, 563.)   At Childrens Hospital's unopposed request, we grant judicial notice of documents obtained from the DLSE website, which included a printout of the exemplar.  (Evid.Code, § 452, subd. (c).).  FN18. The DLSE is the state agency authorized to interpret and enforce California wage and hour laws.  (Gattuso v. Harte-Hanks Shoppers, Inc. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 554, 563.)   At Childrens Hospital's unopposed request, we grant judicial notice of documents obtained from the DLSE website, which included a printout of the exemplar.  (Evid.Code, § 452, subd. (c).)

FN19. We granted Palazzolo's request for judicial notice of the legislative counsel's digest of a prior version of section 226, and a DLSE opinion letter addressing section 226 (DLSE Opn. Letter No.2002.05.17 (May 17, 2002)).  (Evid.Code, § 452, subd. (c).).  FN19. We granted Palazzolo's request for judicial notice of the legislative counsel's digest of a prior version of section 226, and a DLSE opinion letter addressing section 226 (DLSE Opn. Letter No.2002.05.17 (May 17, 2002)).  (Evid.Code, § 452, subd. (c).)

CROSKEY, ACTING P. J. KITCHING, J.