THE PEOPLE v. JOSE MARTIN VEGA (2010)

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

A jury convicted appellant Jose M. Vega of assault with a deadly weapon.   Vega then admitted that he had suffered a prior strike conviction and the trial court sentenced Vega to a midterm of three years, doubled to six years for the strike.   Vega claims that the trial court committed reversible error when it denied his motion for mistrial.   We reject Vega's claim and affirm the judgment.

FACTS

On June 27, 2009, at about 7:15 p.m., B.V. was walking out of a store when Vega approached him and asked why did B.V. “throw rat” at him.   B.V. understood Vega to be asking B.V. why he “told on” Vega.¹ B.V. left and told his mother what had happened after he got home.   In the meantime, Vega and “two guys” followed B.V. to his apartment building.   Five minutes after B.V. arrived home, he and his mother and sister went outside.   When the family got outside, Vega pulled out a seven-inch “shank” or knife and tried to stab B.V. multiple times.   These attempts were blocked by B.V.'s mother.   After B.V. went back inside, he heard someone say that the police were coming.   Thereafter, Vega and his companions fled.

Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) Officer Daniel Chi and other LAPD officers responded to the scene.   Approximately two blocks from where the reported attack occurred, officers detained Vega and two males.   While at the scene, Officer Chi heard Vega make statements to the effect, “I take blame for that shit.   I'm responsible for all that shit.   They have nothing to do with it.   Let them go.”   Officer Harris Cho heard Vega make statements to the effect, “I'm the ringleader.   Everything that happened down there is on me.   These other guys had nothing to do with it.   They were just getting my back.”   Officer Oscar Morales conducted a field show-up, and B.V.'s sister, Y.V., identified Vega as the person who had threatened her brother.   At the time of the attack, J.G., Y.V.'s husband, had been working on his car nearby.   J.G. told officers that he (J.G.) had heard a commotion and had helped separate Vega and B.V. J.G testified that Vega had punched him, knocked him down, and then pointed a knife at him (J.G.).   It was at that point that someone yelled the police were coming.   After that statement, Vega and his two companions ran away.

In July 2009, the People filed an information charging Vega with two counts of assault with a deadly weapon.   Count one listed B.V. as the victim;  count two listed J.G. as the victim.   The information alleged that Vega had a prior strike conviction or juvenile adjudication for robbery in 2007.   At a jury trial in November 2009, the People presented evidence establishing the facts summarized above.   The witnesses at trial included B.V., Y.V., J.G., and Officers Chi and Cho. Vega did not present any evidence.   In his closing argument, Vega's trial counsel argued that the People had failed to prove the charges against Vega beyond a reasonable doubt because the civilian witnesses were not credible.

On November 10, 2009, the jury found Vega guilty of assault with a deadly weapon on B.V, and found Vega not guilty of assault with a deadly weapon on J.G. After the jury's verdicts, Vega admitted that he had suffered a prior strike conviction.   On November 30, 2009, the trial court sentenced Vega as noted above.

Vega filed a timely notice of appeal.

DISCUSSION

Vega contends his conviction must be reversed because the trial court erred by denying his motion for a mistrial based on the claimed disclosure of his prior criminal history.   We disagree.

A. The Trial Event Precipitating the Motion for Mistrial

B.V.'s sister, Y.V., testified through a Spanish interpreter.   During her testimony on direct examination, Vega's counsel interposed an objection and asked to approach the bench.   At a sidebar conference, Vega's counsel advised the court that he had heard Y.V. say the Spanish word, “carcel,” which counsel understood to mean “jail.”   Vega's counsel explained that he was raising the issue as a precautionary measure, not wanting Y.V. to testify regarding Vega's prior conviction.   At that point, the court asked the prosecutor whether she had discussed the issue with Y.V., and the prosecutor advised that she had told Y.V. not to discuss Vega's prior case.   The court then indicated that it would take a break and directed the prosecutor to talk to Y.V. again during the break.

At the conclusion of the break, Vega's counsel moved for a mistrial (outside the presence of the jury).   Vega's counsel claimed he was entitled to a mistrial because in Los Angeles County, some of the jurors might speak Spanish and understand that Y.V. had referred to jail.   Counsel conceded that the interpreter had not translated the Spanish word into English.   Vega's counsel did not identify any specific juror who might have comprehended the Spanish word “carcel.”   The trial court denied the motion for mistrial, stating that the interpreter had not translated the Spanish word into English and as a result Vega had not suffered any prejudice.

B. Analysis of the Denial of the Mistrial Motion

A mistrial should be granted when a trial court determines that a trial incident caused incurable prejudice.  (People v. Hines (1997) 15 Cal.4th 997, 1038.)   A trial court to whom a motion for a mistrial is directed is vested with “considerable discretion” in addressing the motion.   Its ruling will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a showing of an abuse of discretion.  (Ibid.) The trial court abuses its judicial discretion when it makes a ruling which is arbitrary or capricious or exceeds the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances being considered.  (People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1121.)   We find no such abuse of discretion in Vega's current case.   The trial court did not act unreasonably when it denied Vega's motion for a mistrial.

First, the record demonstrates -- without any dispute -- that:  (1) the Spanish interpreter had not yet translated the Spanish word “carcel” when Vega's counsel objected;  and that, (2) the Spanish interpreter never translated the Spanish word “carcel” at any time for the jury.   In short, the jurors never heard through the interpreter that Vega had at some time been in jail.   Second, the record before us does not disclose that any juror both heard and understood the English meaning of the Spanish word “carcel.”   It is speculation to assume that any juror knew the English meaning of the Spanish word “carcel,” simply because Vega's trial took place in Los Angeles County.   Finally, even assuming one or more jurors heard and understood the single use of the word “carcel,” we are satisfied that this did not prejudicially affect Vega's trial.   In our view, the evidence showing Vega's guilt for an assault on B.V. was strong.   Vega's argument that the acquittal on the count charging him with an assault on J.G. shows prejudice is not convincing.   On the contrary, we view the acquittal to show an absence of prejudice.   The concern underpinning the exclusion of evidence of a defendant's prior criminal conduct is that jurors may disregard the evidence presented and convict a defendant based solely upon his prior criminal history.   Assuming the jury understood Vega had a prior record, acquitting Vega on the count charging him with an assault on J.G., the jury showed that it would not convict Vega simply because he had a criminal history.   Rather, the jury required proof of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to convict as to each count.   Thus, even assuming that the jury heard and understood the word “carcel,” we are satisfied that the jury did not in any measure decide to convict Vega as a result.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

O'CONNELL, J.1

We concur:

RUBIN, Acting P. J.

GRIMES, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. B.V. knew Vega as neighbor before the encounter involved in this case..  FN1. B.V. knew Vega as neighbor before the encounter involved in this case.

FN1. Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution..  FN1. Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.