Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CLAUDIA (2010)

Andrea Sheridan Ordin, County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, and O. Raquel Ramirez, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff, Respondent and Real Party in Interest.

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BACKGROUND

I. Jurisdictional and dispositional findings in the juvenile court

Mother is the adoptive parent of four minor children:  Kenneth A. (born June 1993), Christina A. (born July 1993) (also referred to as Tina), Monique A. (born July 1994), and Joseph A. (born November 1997).¹  Mother is separated and lives apart from Raymond A. (“Father”), the adoptive parent of Kenneth, Christina, and Joseph.   Mother and Father adopted Kenneth, Christina, and Joseph through the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS);  Mother's adoption (also through DCFS) of Monique, who has cerebral palsy, was finalized on June 19, 2009.   Monique had been in the home since at least 2003.

On June 25, 2009, DCFS received an immediate response referral alleging that Christina, then 15, was a runaway and had been away from home four days.   Christina told the social worker that she ran away because she was caught lying, and Mother made the other children hold her down while Mother cut off Christina's hair.   Christina said that Mother cursed at her constantly and Mother's boyfriend, Bruce B., who lived in the home, often got drunk and verbally and physically abused her.   Christina had run away before, and Mother had forcibly cut Christina's hair as discipline.   Christina also stated that she and her older sister Claudia took care of 14-year-old Monique, changing her sheets, feeding her through her feeding tube, and dressing her.   Christina stated that Mother also physically abused her brother Kenneth, cursed at all the children, and Christina was afraid to go home because Mother threatened to shave her head.   The social worker conducted an assessment, and concluded that Mother had made a plausible threat to cause harm to Christina as indicated by excessive discipline, and had failed to protect Christina from harm by others, so that Christina's safety in the home with Mother could not be assured.   DCFS placed Christina in foster care, and recommended that the juvenile court take jurisdiction over the other children as well.

A. June 30, 2009 petition and detention hearing

On June 30, 2009, DCFS filed a petition alleging that Christina, Kenneth, Monique, and Joseph were at risk under Welfare and Institutions Code 2 section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), (d), and (j).  The petition alleged that Mother's physical abuse of Christina and Kenneth endangered Christina and Kenneth, and placed Christina, Kenneth, Monique and Joseph at the risk of physical and emotional harm;  that Bruce B.'s physical abuse of Christina and Mother's failure to protect Christina from the abuse endangered Christina and Kenneth, Monique, and Joseph;  that Mother's failure to provide for Monique's medical needs endangered Monique and placed Christina, Kenneth, and Joseph at risk from the medical neglect;  that Father's sexual abuse of Christina, and Mother's failure to protect Christina from the abuse, endangered Christina and placed Christina, Kenneth, and Joseph at risk;  and that Bruce B.'s abuse of alcohol in the home and Mother's failure to protect the children from witnessing that abuse endangered Christina, Kenneth, Monique, and Joseph.

The petition stated that Father lived with maternal grandmother Nadine A. and Mother's and Father's adopted adult son, Emrick A. Father lost physical custody of the couple's other children (Claudia, Christina, Kenneth, and Joseph) in 2006, after he was convicted of sexually abusing Christina.   Between 2002 and 2009, there were 21 child abuse referrals on the family, alleging a variety of physical and emotional abuse and neglect of the children.   Some of the reports were made by Mother regarding abuse of the children by others, including Father's sexual abuse of Christina in 2005 (which Mother reported immediately, and to which Father admitted).³  No dependency petitions were filed as a result of any of the referrals.

The petition reported that Christina told the social worker that she and her siblings lied to DCFS social workers during child abuse investigations “ ‘for protection from being taken,’ ” a strategy that began when the children were little, with the first child interviewed by the social worker telling the story to the next child, and then telling the other children to say the same thing, so that all the children could tell the same story.   Christina stated that she ran away once before in 2008.   Mother became enraged and called Christina a “fucking bitch.”   Mother and Bruce B. would berate Christina verbally, calling her “a ‘Cunt,’ ” and would hit her on the face with open hands and pull her hair.   Bruce B. often got drunk, and would scream at her and be physically abusive.   Christina also told the social worker that Mother did not properly care for Monique, leaving her care and feeding to a caregiver who was there four days and nights, and to Christina and Claudia.   Christina claimed Mother also physically abused Kenneth, but not the other children.   Mother cursed at all the children, and Christina claimed there were many other instances of abuse in the home.

In light of the family's extensive referral history and “multiple witnesses stating that mother coaches the children to lie to DCFS investigators during prior investigations,” the social worker requested that the juvenile court establish jurisdiction over all the children and that Christina remain suitably placed.   The “family can be characterized as being at ‘very high’ risk for future abuse.”

The petition included witness statements from Sharon K., who lived in the home for seven years as a renter, and described intimidating behavior by Bruce B., Mother's forcible cutting of Christina's hair with Christina held down by her siblings, Mother's failure to properly care for Monique, and Mother's staying in bed most of the day.   Sharon K. witnessed Mother pull back Christina's head by her hair and call her a “fucking cunt” a couple times a day, even after Mother learned Father had sexually molested Christina.

Melissa, a family friend, said that the children lied to DCFS during a child abuse investigation, held Christina down so Mother could cut her hair, and were prepped by Mother for DCFS interviews.   Paternal grandmother Nadine A. stated that Mother told her she would cut Christina's hair for running away, the fourth forced haircut.   Mother called Christina a “cunt” and a “whore,” and dragged Christina by the hair.   Bruce B. was always drunk.   Teresa V., Monique's caregiver, denied that Bruce B. disciplined the children and thought Christina was treated fairly.

When Kenneth was interviewed, he denied any abuse, and also denied that Bruce B. ever physically disciplined Christina (although he did drink), that anyone held Christina down for a haircut, or that Mother cursed or called the children names.   Kenneth said that older sister Claudia and Christina took care of Monique when her caregiver was not there.

Joseph denied any abuse, stated that the children took care of Monique and he helped, although Mother did most of the feedings.   He was not afraid of Bruce B., and did not recall if Christina got a haircut.

Claudia (who at the time was still 17) denied any abuse and said the DCFS referrals were because her mother helped people and when Mother stopped, they would call DCFS. Bruce B. did drink alcohol and used curse words, but did not use physical abuse.

Monique was unable to speak because of her disabilities.

Mother stated that she had ongoing problems with Christina and was trying to get her placed in residential treatment in Utah. She never told the children to lie to DCFS. She admitted to saying “pretty bad things” to Christina.   Bruce B. drank and challenged Christina although he was never violent.   She denied any physical abuse toward the children, although she used a paddle when they were little.   When Monique's aide was not there, Mother did most of Monique's hands-on care.

Father stated that adult child Emrick had told him Mother used haircuts as punishment, and Christina and Kenneth had confirmed this.   Mother would tell the children not to tell DCFS anything that raised suspicion, or they would be taken away.   Mother had hit Kenneth with metal or plastic rods as recently as two years ago.   Christina called and told him that Bruce B. hit her, and he had heard of Bruce B. getting drunk.

An addendum report recommended that Christina remain placed away from the home in foster care, and that Kenneth, Monique, and Joseph remain with Mother.

At the section 300 hearing on June 30, 2009, the juvenile court detained Christina from Mother's custody and ordered monitored visitation with Mother.   The court also found that Father was the presumed father of Claudia, Christina, Kenneth, and Joseph, and ordered Bruce B. not to reside in or visit the home.   The court continued the matter to July 30, 2009.

B. July 22, 2009 section 385 petition (Monique)

On July 22, 2009, DCFS filed a section 385 petition to modify the order.   Monique had been detained from Mother's care into medical foster care on July 17, 2009.   Monique had serious disabilities, her caregiver Teresa V. was not medically trained or licensed, and the children had reported that they were charged with Monique's care when Teresa V. was not there.   In further interviews some family members described Mother's abuse of Christina and verbal abuse of the other children, although the other children denied that Mother physically abused Christina outside of the forced haircutting.   Christina stated that Mother had hit her with a dog brush, the phone, hangers, and her hand, pulled her hair, and hit Kenneth with a phone, hangers, and “random stuff.”   Kenneth denied that Mother hit him except for spanking, and “ ‘That's old.’ ”   Father stated that Monique did not get proper care, had bed sores, and was not fed appropriately.

At the hearing on the section 385 petition, Monique's attorney agreed that Monique should be detained.   The court detained Monique and ordered unmonitored visits for Mother at Monique's placement.

C. July 30, 2009 amended petition, and pretrial resolution conference

DCFS filed a first amended petition on July 30, 2009, which alleged that the children were at risk under section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), (c), (d), (i), and (j), including the allegations that Mother physically abused Christina and Kenneth, failed to protect Christina from abuse by Bruce B., failed to provide Monique with adequate care, failed to protect Christina from Father's sexual abuse, failed to protect the children from Bruce B.'s alcohol abuse, emotionally abused Christina by calling her degrading names, and emotionally abused the children by threatening them with being sent away if they disclosed any abuse.

At the hearing, also on July 30, 2009, the court dismissed the original petition, at the Department's recommendation dismissed Claudia (who had since turned 18) from the case, and filed the amended petition.   The court ordered that Christina and Monique remained detained, limited Mother's right to make educational decisions for Christina, and ordered a psychological evaluation of the family under Evidence Code section 730.   Both Mother and Father requested a contested hearing, and the court continued the matter to September 22, 2009.

D. Additional reports

The Evidence Code section 730 psychological evaluation, dated August 27, 2009, concluded that Mother had positive attributes-she was able to get resources for her children ⁴ -but she could be manipulative and become aggressively impulsive under stress.   Mother did not think cursing was problematic, and acknowledged calling Christina a “bitch” and a “tart” at times.   Joseph had corroborated that Mother used “bad words” with Christina and (to a lesser extent) with Kenneth.   At least some of the reports of Mother's verbal and physical abusiveness appeared to be credible;  “when under stress, she resorts to name calling, including profanity.   This can border on verbal abuse, as per Christina's report.”   Nevertheless, Mother was also capable of being positive and supportive.

The evaluation noted that Christina had been diagnosed with depression and posttraumatic stress disorder from the sexual abuse.   Christina had been mistreated in Mother's home, and it would be in her best interest to remain in placement, with joint therapy with Mother.   Joseph appeared to be doing well at home, and Kenneth had some issues for therapy.   The psychologist concluded that it was unlikely the children would be physically abused in the home, although Mother might become verbally abusive and should address this in individual psychotherapy.   Further, “whether it was direct or indirect, the children in this case have been aware that if they report abuse or problematic behavior in the home, they may be detained from their mother's home,” with both parents communicating this message.   The report recommended that Kenneth and Joseph be placed with Mother.   The report also recommended that Christina remain in foster care and have joint therapy with Mother, with unmonitored visits after four to six sessions and with Kenneth and Joseph “only if Tina so wishes.”

DCFS submitted a “Medical Training Confirmation,” stating that Mother, Teresa V., and Claudia had received medical training to become proficient in the use of feeding tubes and flushes, along with a letter from Children's Hospital stating that Mother brought Monique in for her appointments as scheduled and followed up appropriately.

E. Contested hearing

At the scheduled hearing on September 22, 2009, the court read and considered a DCFS report regarding Mother's and Teresa V.'s receipt of medical training.   The report included Mother's statement that an agency would be hired to care for Monique when caregiver Teresa V. was not present.   Monique had been returned to Mother's care.   The report also stated that Mother had not enrolled in individual counseling or any other services.   The court continued the hearing to September 24.

At the resumed contested adjudication and disposition hearing on September 24, 2009, the juvenile court dismissed (at DCFS's request) the counts in the amended petition related to Father's sexual abuse of Christina.   Claudia testified on Mother's behalf, stating that Mother was primarily responsible for caring for Monique, and that Claudia and Christina helped out when Teresa V. was not there.   Mother testified that the girls helped her with Monique, but less so after the hiring of Teresa V., and Mother was primarily responsible for Monique's care.   Mother admitted to cutting Christina's hair four times as a “last tool [to try] to get some self-control implemented into this child.”   She did not consider the haircutting punishment, which she achieved by removing privileges and limiting independence.   She admitted yelling at Christina and using inappropriate language, but denied ever using “whore” or “cunt.”   Mother stated she would tell the children to tell the truth to social workers, and not to lie.   She was in the process of getting a divorce from Father.

In further testimony at the continued hearing on October 14, Mother testified that she was a licensed hair stylist and cut hair in her kitchen.   Christina was never held down or held in any manner, and Mother never held Christina down to cut her hair, but Christina understood that if she was caught sneaking out, Mother would cut her hair.   Kenneth and Claudia had held Christina to stop her from running out of the house.   Mother had once cut all the children's hair, when one child had done something and no one would admit to it.

F. Jurisdictional and dispositional findings

On October 16, 2009 the juvenile court summarized its decision, finding the petition true by a preponderance of the evidence as follows:  dismissing the amended petition's allegations regarding Mother's neglect of Monique (counts b-4, b-9 and j-4, j-7);  sustaining the allegations regarding Bruce B.'s alcoholism (count b-6), but dismissing the allegation regarding his physical abuse (counts b-3 and j-3);  dismissing the allegation regarding Mother's physical abuse of Kenneth (counts a-2, b-2, and j-2);  and sustaining the allegation that Mother told the children not to tell authorities about events in the household (count b-8).   The court sustained the allegations that Christina was physically abused (counts a-1, b-1 and j-1) and emotionally abused (b-7, c-1, j-6).⁵

On the record, the court stated that all the family members concurred that Bruce B. drank to excess and was drunk in the family home, and that Mother made every attempt to protect Bruce B. rather than protecting her children from the negative effects of his drunkenness.   The allegations of physical abuse of Kenneth were too remote in time.   The court concluded that “the parents have threatened the children and have instilled fear in the children such that over the years the children have been fearful of disclosing to public authorities any of the abuse that has gone on in the home and even currently some of the children clearly attempt to minimize the abuse.”   Regarding the emotional abuse of Christina, the court stated “how utterly insensitive and shameful to call your daughter bitch, whore, slut, stupid, fucking cunt, fucking idiot, retarded, disturbed, et cetera.   Particularly the reference to the whore and the slut.   This is after [Christina] had been sexually abused and continues to suffer post-traumatic stress disorder.”   Everyone except Kenneth acknowledged that Mother made demeaning and derogatory remarks about Christina, and although Mother acknowledged bad language, she “doesn't take any responsibility for it or the negative affects [sic] it causes to her daughter and her children who reside in that environment.”

Christina's behavior was not always as Mother would like, but Mother had angry outbursts and Christina bore the brunt of it, including physical abuse.   The hair cutting pertained to all the physical and emotional abuse, and “the evidence clearly supports that [Mother] has cut her children's hair, particularly Tina, forcefully as a means of punishment.   It was so punitively done, that it rises to the level of being abusive.   All of the family states that [Mother] cuts the hair of her children and does it for punishment.”   Mother admitted to it, and it was inappropriate punishment.   Mother had stated that there was no hope for Christina, and that she needed to be in a lock-down facility in Utah, although Christina was doing well in her current foster home.

The court concluded that all the children were persons described by section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), (c) and (j).  Counsel for DCFS recommended that all the children, with the exception of Christina, remain with Mother.   Counsel for Mother had no comments, and submitted.

The juvenile court declared all the children dependents, and found by clear and convincing evidence that substantial danger existed to Christina, removing her from Mother's custody into suitable placement.   The court ordered DCFS to provide family reunification services for Mother and Christina and family maintenance services for Mother and the other children.   The court ordered counseling for Kenneth, Christina and Joseph, and monitored visitation for Mother with Christina.   Mother was ordered to participate in parenting and anger management classes and individual counseling.⁶  Mother was also ordered to be the primary responsible adult for Monique's care.   The court continued the case to April 16, 2010 for a review hearing.

On October 28, 2009 Mother filed a timely notice of appeal from the jurisdictional findings only.

II. Subsequent proceedings in the juvenile court

While Mother's appeal was pending, on March 3, 2010, DCFS filed a request for a protective custody warrant for Christina.   The request stated that Christina had taken ecstasy at school on February 24, after another student in the classroom gave her a pill.   The school suspended Christina for a day.   The next morning, Christina's foster mother reported that Christina was missing.   The juvenile court issued the warrant, but recalled it on March 15, 2010, after DCFS informed the court that on March 4, 2010, Christina was back at school attending her regular classes and had spent the night with a friend.   Christina stated that she ran away after her foster mother threatened to transfer her out of her current school and enroll her in a rehabilitation program.   She admitted that she took ecstasy and that she deserved the one-day suspension.   She was placed in a new foster home, but remained in her current school.

A. Section 388 petition

On March 24, 2010, DCFS filed a section 388, subdivision (c) petition for modification of the court's October 16, 2009 order, requesting that the juvenile court terminate family reunification services for Mother and Christina.   DCFS explained that during the past nine months, Christina had clearly refused to have any form of contact with Mother.   DCFS had attempted to facilitate visitation in a therapeutic setting, but Christina refused and became depressed and anxious when the subject was broached.   Christina stated she did not want to reunify with Mother, because Mother intended to have Christina assessed under AB3632,⁷ and sent away to a boot camp for troubled teenagers.   In Christina's eyes, “this is not reunification but a way to get rid of her,” and if she were sent home she would be shamed for reporting Mother's abuse.   Christina did not believe her mother could change.

The section 388 petition reported that Mother had stated that if Christina returned home, “she will proceed with an AB3632 assessment, with the overall goal of enrolling [Christina] in an out of state residential treatment program.   In addition, [Mother] indicates that in order to begin to think about reunification, the child will need to acknowledge that she made up the allegations and apologize for the harm that [Christina] has inflicted on the family.   Further, [Mother] indicates that Christina suffers from severe mental health disturbances not limited to Reactive Attachment Disorder and Parent Alienation Syndrome.”

DCFS disagreed.  “Although Christina has on a few occasions failed to follow placement rules by disobeying curfew times and on one reported occasion experimented with ecstasy, the behaviors exhibited by the child while in foster care do not reflect mother's account of her child as being out of control, severely disturbed, and unable to attach due to mental health issues.”   From the social worker's observations, “it appears that both mother and child are at polar ends of the spectrum of reunification.   Whereas mother indicates a desire to reunify with the child, she indicates that she is unapologetic for her actions.   Christina indicates that she would rather remain in foster care than to return home to mother.”

The juvenile court ordered a hearing on the request, which was set for May 11, 2010.

B. Six-month status review report (April 16)

DCFS filed the six-month status review report on April 16, 2010.   The report stated that Kenneth, Monique, and Joseph remained in Mother's home. 19-year-old Emrick had moved back in with Mother after having problems with Father.   Mother was not yet formally divorced but remained legally separated from Father, and maintained a relationship with Bruce B., although he no longer lived in the home.

No significant changes had occurred in Christina's medical or psychological well-being.   Christina participated in a regular curriculum at her public high school, where she had been placed by her former foster mother (after the court had limited Mother's right to make educational decisions in July 2009).   There were no major educational concerns, and Christina was achieving at grade level.   Christina continued with weekly therapy with the goal of reducing her anxiety.   She was no longer taking her previously prescribed medications, which were discontinued by her doctor after Christina and her former foster mother reported that Christina no longer had problems with mood, anxiety, or attention.   Christina's current foster mother had not reported any concerns that would require the medications.   Christina was making a steady adjustment to her current foster family.

Mother had enrolled in parenting education classes, was consistent in her attendance, and contributed to group discussions, but because of the group dynamic, Mother was not asked and did not share the specifics of her involvement with DCFS. She also attended anger management classes which focused on personal awareness, triggers, and coping mechanisms, but again the group setting did not lend itself to discussing specific issues.

Mother was fully compliant with participation in individual counseling.   A letter dated April 9, 2010 from her therapist stated that they had discussed alternative approaches to parenting other than anger, belittling, threats, yelling, and forced haircutting.   Counseling had also explored the sources of Mother's anger so she could better manage life with adolescents, some of whom had psychiatric disorders.   Her therapist believed she was making progress in understanding her anger and finding constructive ways to redirect it.   Mother was continuing to recognize when she needed to call upon outside resources.   She reported to her therapist that she no longer was under psychotropic medication.

Mother reported that since the opening of her case she had not cut the children's hair.

The social worker had met privately with Christina in November 2009.   Christina said she was comfortable in her placement.   When asked about visitation with siblings and reunification, Christina responded she did not want to have contact with Mother.   She wanted to see Kenneth and Monique, but not Joseph because she felt Mother would manipulate him.   Mother sent an email to the social worker requesting that she be allowed to correspond with Christina's therapist, so that reunification could be attempted, and to give the therapist “information relative to Christina[']s history with attachment disorder.”   The social worker met with Christina again in January 2010, and Christina again stated she did not want to reunify with Mother.   When the social worker encouraged her to keep an open mind, Christina indicated that she did not believe that mother could change, and if she went back it would lead to being sent to residential placement in another state.   The social worker encouraged Christina to address the matter in therapy.   In February 2010, the social worker discussed visitation, and Christina stated she did not wish to see Mother, citing safety concerns.   Christina repeated her desire not to have visitation with Mother in March 2010.

The social worker had monthly contact with Christina's therapist regarding reunification and the appropriateness of visitation (with the possibility that the first contact would take place in a therapeutic setting).   The therapist told the social worker that while the therapist addressed the topic of visitation, “this was not one of Christina's mental health goals.”   If Christina expressed interest in reestablishing a relationship with either of her parents, the therapist would work on the matter, but until then the goals of therapy “were related to reducing symptoms of anxiety and depression.”

Mother indicated that she wanted Christina to receive appropriate services consistent with her history.   Mother said Christina was a “severely disturbed adolescent that needs a high level of care, and cannot be managed in a typical foster home, as she requires constant supervision.   Mother has stated that if Christina is returned home, she will proceed with the AB3632 assessment, with the overall goal of enrolling her in an out of state residential treatment program.   In addition, [Mother] indicates that in order to begin to think about reunification, the child will need to acknowledge that she made up the allegations and apologize from the harm that Christina has inflicted on the family.”

DCFS had conducted a safety/reunification assessment and concluded that in Mother's household Christina “would be at high risk for future emotional and physical abuse.”   Reasonable efforts to begin a dialogue between Mother and Christina which would lead to reunification had proved fruitless, as Christina “clearly indicates that she does not wish to have contact with mother.”

DCFS's assessment/evaluation pointed out that during the nine months of supervision, Christina had indicated a clear refusal to have contact with Mother.   Although DCFS had attempted to facilitate visitations under the supervision of Christina's therapist, Christina had refused and at times became depressed and anxious when the topic was brought to her attention.   Christina thought that Mother wanted to have her assessed under AB3632 and sent out of state to a boot camp for troubled teens, and Mother had candidly stated that was her goal.   Mother had also stated that before reunification would be possible, Christina would have to admit she lied and apologize for the harm she caused the family.   Mother stated that Christina had severe mental health disturbances.

DCFS stated that although Christina had disobeyed curfew and once experimented with ecstasy, “the behaviors exhibited by the child while in foster care do not reflect mother's account of her child as being out of control, severely disturbed and unable to attach due to mental health issues.”   Christina did not present as severely disturbed;  her mental health professionals saw no need to continue her on the medication she was taking while with Mother.   Christina was performing at grade level without an individualized education plan (IEP) (which Mother had had in place for Christina when she lived at home).   Christina presented as articulate and socially well adjusted, and her experimentation with ecstasy could be seen as a typical teenage reaction to curiosity and peer pressure.   Given Father's sexual abuse and Mother's sustained physical abuse and neglect, Christina would need therapy to navigate through adolescence, but “this social worker does not see Christina as a candidate for residential treatment of any kind.”   Christina had been adamant about not returning to her mother, and if she ever desired contact, it should be done in a strictly supervised therapeutic environment.   DCFS recommended that the court order no further reunification services for Christina and Mother.

DCFS noted that Monique appeared to be receiving appropriate care, and had daily contact with mandated reporters who could notify DCFS of any suspected abuse or neglect.   Kenneth and Joseph had not disclosed any additional child abuse or neglect, and during the supervision period there were no reports of abuse or neglect warranting intervention.

DCFS recommended that Christina remain a dependent of the court, and that the court select a holder of educational rights for Christina.   DCFS asked the court to find a substantial risk to Christina's safety, terminate family reunification services, provide Christina with permanent placement services, and set a section 366.26 hearing to identify a permanent plan for Christina.

DCFS asked the court to terminate jurisdiction as to Kenneth, Monique, and Joseph.

C. Termination of jurisdiction over Kenneth, Monique and Joseph

At the six-month review hearing on April 16, 2010, the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction over Kenneth, Monique, and Joseph, and gave Mother full legal and physical custody.   The court continued the contested hearing regarding Christina to May 11, 2010.   The court stated “I have ordered monitored visits [between Christina and Mother] and I cannot delegate that to the therapist.   Between now and the next hearing the Department shall insure there's monitored visits between Christina [and] her mother ․ and I want a supplemental report addressing that issue.”

D. May 11 and 13, 2010 contested hearing

In advance of the hearing, DCFS submitted additional last-minute information to the court.   Christina's foster mother reported that Christina was kind, patient, and respectful to her foster sister, and interacted appropriately with the foster mother's husband.   There were no concerns about her emotional adjustment.   Christina had not violated curfew, complied with house rules and assigned chores, had an active social life, and volunteered at a local day care center during a school break.   She participated in family outings and was well liked by her extended family.   The one issue was Christina's excessive texting on her cell phone to her boyfriend, but Christina had been receptive to the foster mother's limits on cell phone use.   The foster mother held Christina's educational rights and had reinstated the use of daily teacher reports to be better informed about Christina's emotional and educational functioning at school.   Christina was compliant with homework assignments.

The social worker testified that she had been assigned to the case since October 2009, although a new social worker had recently been assigned.   She understood that her job, and the juvenile court's order, was to assess Christina's well-being and facilitate visitation as part of family reunification with Mother.   She had written the April 16 six-month review report, and had had monthly contact with Mother since October 2009, during which Mother regularly expressed interest in visitation.   Her supervisor had instructed her that she was to assess if Christina was ready to initiate visitation with Mother, and that if visitation was set up that it would not affect Christina negatively emotionally.   At every visit with Christina, she was to speak to Christina about visitation, and encourage telephone calls.

The social worker told Christina's therapist that reunification was planned, and the therapist was to make it a goal of Christina's therapy to see if she was emotionally ready to meet with Mother.   The therapist later told her visitation was not a goal of therapy, because when the therapist discussed it with Christina, Christina did not want it to be one of the goals:  “if it wasn't Christina's goal, she wasn't going to impose that on her but that she would touch on the subject as the case ran its course.”   The social worker thought it was appropriate for Christina to give input to her own mental health case plan, but “I did not feel that Christina was running the show per se because on the other hand, I too was talking to her about it.   I was also discussing this with her therapist.   It wasn't a topic that was going to be left just for her to say no and never was going to be revisited.”

Over the past nine months, the social worker had made minimal progress with Christina regarding family reunification.   Christina continued to say she did not want to see Mother, because she didn't think Mother could change and she believed Mother wanted to reunify with her to have her assessed and sent out of state to a camp.   Even when the social worker discussed beginning with a monitored telephone call, setting up a visit at the social worker's or therapist's office, or a meeting between the social worker, Christina, and her therapist to discuss safety issues to make her at ease and transition into a visit, Christina had objected to every option.   Christina did not express fear that Mother would harm her.

The social worker testified that Christina no longer had an IEP, but her current public school had a “student success team” system under which each of Christina's teachers had to write a daily assessment which was given to Christina, and then Christina would give it to her foster mother.

The social worker stated:  “I have done everything I can to persuade her to meet with her mother.   To initiate some type of contact with her.   She does not budge.   I cannot force her into my car to get her to come and meet with her mother, and I think short of that, I have done what I can with Christina to convince her.   I have encouraged [Christina] to call her.   I have encouraged her to maybe in therapy write a letter to Mom. Address-if she feels safe that way, address whatever her concerns are and then the therapist can discuss that with Mom and Mother's therapist, but she just does not want anything to do with her mother.”

On cross examination, the social worker testified that Mother told her in December 2009 that Christina would have to acknowledge that she made up the allegations and apologize for harming the family, and “it has been a conversation that remains consistent.”   Mother also wanted an AB 3632 assessment of Christina.   The social worker thought that Mother had benefited from individual therapy.   Mother's therapist did tell the social worker, however, that Mother minimized the hair cutting incidents as “grooming.”

The court stated “the other children are not before the court today․  I did make a finding with regard to the other children that [Mother] had complied.   She had made sufficient progress.   That the other children should be in her custody and they were not at risk and I should close the case.   Those children were not similarly situated to Christina.  [¶] ․ [¶] ․ I should clarify.   They were similarly situated in that they were in the same household, but, for lack of a better term, Christina bore the greater brunt of the conflict within the household and the greater amount of abuse to cause the court to sustain the petition as it did.”

At the continued hearing on May 13, Mother's counsel argued that DCFS had not shown that Mother had not made substantive progress in her court-ordered treatment plan, and that reasonable services had not been provided;  counsel requested a full twelve months of reunification services.   Counsel also argued that allowing Christina to determine whether visitation occurred was an improper delegation of authority.   DCFS argued that it had met its burden to show that it provided reasonable reunification services, and that Mother's continued assertion that Christina would have to admit she lied and apologize to the family was the obstacle to reunification.

The juvenile court granted the department's section 388 petition to terminate family reunification services for Mother and Christina.⁸  The court explained that Mother was complying by attending the court-ordered programs, and that DCFS had made reasonable efforts, maintaining regular contact with Mother and Christina and keeping the court up to date.   The court noted that it never ordered conjoint counseling for Mother and Christina.   As to visitation between Mother and Christina, the court noted that the social worker had regular communication with Mother, who wanted to visit with Christina, and the social worker “constantly and regularly discussed visitation with Christina,” encouraged her by stating that the visits would be monitored, and “had done a great deal to initiate the contact with Mother.   However, she testified that Christina would not budge.   Christina has refused contact with her mother.”

The court continued:  “It's an interesting situation.   I do not find it's reasonable that a social worker should restrain a 16-year-old child, force the child into a vehicle, force the child to sit in a room even if the child needs to be restrained while the mother is in the same room.   In hindsight, then, counsel for any or all of the parties here could have brought this to the court's attention.   Brought this issue to the court's attention for a change of order.   Perhaps the court could have and would have made a finding that by clear and convincing evidence visits between Christina and her mother would pose a threat to Christina's safety, and that is a finding that I make today and I order that there not be any visits between Christina and her mother without ․ further order of this court.”

The court also stated that Mother had been authorized to have visits and had attempted to visit, but “[w]e have a child who has absolutely refused visit [s].  We have a Department of Children and Family Services who has made a reasonable effort to effectuate the visits.”   The court granted the petition under section 388 subdivision (c)(1)(B)(3), found that mother had not made substantive progress in the court ordered treatment program, and found by clear and convincing evidence that DCFS had made reasonable efforts toward family reunification.   The court stated that Mother had now completed parenting classes and anger management and continued to participate regularly in individual therapy.   The court acknowledged that the letter from her therapist indicated that she was making progress.   Nevertheless, “Christina is not similarly situated as to the other children,” as to whom the court had terminated jurisdiction.   The court noted that Christina had borne the brunt of the abuse, and as to the progress that Mother had made, “for Christina it is woefully inadequate and short of being substantial progress.   It is not reasonably likely that with additional family reunification to the 12-month date from the date the child entered foster care which would be-the twelve-month date would be August 30th.   That's a little more than three months.   It is not reasonably likelihood [sic] that family reunification between Christina and her mother will be successful.  [¶] [Mother] is so entrenched in what are her perceptions of Christina and Christina's needs and Christina's wrongdoing and obviously the Court's wrongdoing in making the findings that the Court did make․  [Mother] has advised the social worker that in order for her to even begin to think about family reunification, the child will need to acknowledge that she, the child, made up the allegation and then apologize for the harm that Christina has inflicted on the family.”   The court concluded that Mother's maintenance of that belief through the family reunification period was “further support for the lack of substantial progress addressing the issues which brought your daughter before this court in your own individual therapy.”

The court pointed out that Mother believed that Christina was eligible for services under AB3632, with which the court was familiar, and which provides educational services to a child with significant needs beyond regular schooling.   Christina was achieving at grade level, and despite the one drug incident and the curfew violations, those incidents “pale when they are compared to Mother's description of Christina's behavior while Christina is residing in her home,” when according to Mother Christina was so out of control that she had to be restrained from leaving, and held down to be punished or disciplined.   The court stated that as long as Mother held entrenched perceptions of Christina, what was likely was a complete break in the mother-daughter relationship.

In its May 13, 2010 order, the court found that Christina was suitably placed and ordered that Christina remain a dependent of the court.   The court granted the section 388 petition to terminate reunification services as in the best interest of Christina.   The court further found that visitation with Mother posed a threat to Christina's safety and would be detrimental to Christina, but allowed Mother to submit letters to Christina to Christina's attorney, who had the discretion to share the letters with Christina.   The court terminated reunification services, and found that reasonable services had been provided.   Noting that the section 388 petition had not requested a termination of visitation, the juvenile court granted Mother a hearing on June 29, 2010, to further consider its no visitation order, and set the matter for a permanent plan hearing on August 30, 2010.

Mother filed a timely notice of intent to file a writ petition on May 14, 2010.   Mother's petition for extraordinary writ challenges the findings and orders made by the juvenile court at the contested six-month status review held in May 2010 and requests a stay of the section 366.26 hearing calendared for August 30, 2010.   We consider the appeal and the writ together.⁹

DISCUSSION

I. Mother's Appeal

In her appeal, Mother argues that the juvenile court's findings of jurisdiction were not supported by substantial evidence, and explicitly states that she does not challenge the dispositional orders.   Mother's position is that there was not substantial evidence of any of the following:  that her behavior toward Christina endangered Kenneth, Monique or Joseph;  that Christina was at substantial risk of serious physical harm in the future;  that Bruce B.'s alcoholism threatened Christina, Kenneth, Monique or Joseph with serious physical harm or illness;  that her use of foul language caused serious physical harm or illness to Christina or the other children;  that there was any connection between Mother's and Father's threat (that disclosure of abuse in the home could get the children removed) and any serious physical harm or illness;  that Mother's behavior toward Christina caused serious emotional damage to the other children;  or that Kenneth, Monique, and Joseph were at risk of being abused or neglected because of Mother's behavior toward Christina.

Mother argues in passing that some of the counts do not describe behavior that properly falls under the cited subdivision of section 300.   Mother did not challenge the facial sufficiency of the petition in the juvenile court.   To the extent that Mother's appeal challenges the legal sufficiency of the allegations in the amended petition (rather than the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the allegations), there is a split of authority whether the challenge to the sufficiency of the petition is forfeited if not raised in the trial court.   In In re Christopher C. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 73, Division 4 of this district described the split, and concluded that the better view is that a parent who does not demur to a petition in the trial court forfeits a challenge to the facial sufficiency of the petition.  (Id. at pp.   82-83.)   We need not address that question here.   We conclude below that the appeal is moot as to Kenneth, Monique, and Joseph, and we affirm the court's assertion of dependency jurisdiction over Christina on the basis of the allegations in count a-1, a count to which Mother did not state a facial challenge.   Our resolution of the appeal therefore makes it unnecessary to address whether Mother forfeited her challenges to the facial sufficiency of the petition.

A. Mother's appeal of the jurisdictional findings is moot as to Kenneth, Monique, and Joseph

On April 16, 2010, during the pendency of this appeal, the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction over Kenneth, Monique, and Joseph, giving Mother full legal and physical custody.¹⁰  “As a general rule, an order terminating juvenile court jurisdiction renders an appeal from a previous order in the dependency proceedings moot.”  (In re C.C. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1481, 1488).   Nevertheless, dismissal for mootness is not automatic.   We decide mootness “ ‘on a case-by-case basis,’ ” and “ ‘[a]n issue is not moot if the purported error infects the outcome of subsequent proceedings.’ ”  (Ibid.) At our invitation, the parties submitted supplemental letter briefs addressing the question of mootness.

Mother argues that the jurisdictional findings as to Kenneth, Monique, and Joseph could have adverse effects on any future efforts by her to secure services for them and to promote foster care, and could negatively affect any future challenges to her physical custody.   That concern is merely speculative.   Mother also argues that the jurisdictional findings as to Kenneth, Monique, and Joseph could prejudice her in the “matter that remains open” as to Christina, which is the subject of Mother's appeal and writ petition.   The issues in the dependency proceedings regarding Christina are separable, however.   First, as we explain below, in her appeal Mother has forfeited any challenge to the juvenile court's assertion of jurisdiction over Christina pursuant to section 300, subdivision (a), and we thus do not need to address any of the grounds for dependency jurisdiction over Christina.   Further, the issues presented in the writ petition regarding reunification are unique to Christina and not in any way affected by the court's assertion of jurisdiction over the other children.

This appeal is moot as to Kenneth, Monique, and Joseph.

B. Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's finding of jurisdiction over Christina

To assert dependency jurisdiction, the juvenile court must find by a preponderance of the evidence that the allegations of the petition are true.   (In re Veronica G. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 179, 185;  Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.684(f).)  Well-established rules govern our consideration of Mother's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence:  “If, on the entire record, there is substantial evidence to support the findings of the juvenile court, we uphold those findings.  [Citation.]  We do not pass on the credibility of witnesses, attempt to resolve conflicts in the evidence or evaluate the weight of the evidence.   Rather, we draw all reasonable inferences in support of the findings, view the record most favorably to the juvenile court's order, and affirm the order even if other evidence supports a contrary conclusion.   [Citation.]  The appellant has the burden of showing the finding or order is not supported by substantial evidence.  [Citation.]”  (In re Megan S. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 247, 250-251.)

Further, when (as here) a dependency petition alleges multiple grounds for asserting jurisdiction, we may affirm the juvenile court's finding of jurisdiction “if any one of the statutory bases for jurisdiction that are enumerated in the petition is supported by substantial evidence.   In such a case, the reviewing court need not consider whether any or all of the other alleged statutory grounds for jurisdiction are supported by the evidence.   [Citations.]”  (In re Alexis E. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 438, 451.)

Mother does not argue that substantial evidence does not support the court's assertion of jurisdiction over Christina pursuant to section 300, subdivision (a).   Her brief challenges count a-1 (which alleged that Christina had suffered serious physical harm and that Kenneth, Monique and Joseph were therefore put at risk of physical and emotional harm) specifically only as to Kenneth, Monique, and Joseph.   She has therefore forfeited any claim that substantial evidence did not support the juvenile court's finding that count a-1 was true as to Christina.  (Alliance for Children's Rights v. Los Angeles County Dept. of Children and Family Services (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1129, 1139, fn. 4.)

Further, it is abundantly clear that ample evidence supported the court's conclusion that dependency jurisdiction over Christina existed under count a-1.   A child may be found to be a dependent under section 300, subdivision (a) if “[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm inflicted nonaccidentally upon the child by the child's parent or guardian.”   Count a-1 concerned the physical abuse that was the central allegation in the case, and stated:  “On prior occasions, the children [Kenneth, Christina, Monique, and Joseph]'s mother ․ physically abused the child Christina by striking the child's face with the mother's hands and pulling the child's hair.   The mother struck the child with a telephone.   The mother dragged the child by the child's hair.   The mother forcefully cut the child's hair․  Such physical abuse of the child Christina by the mother endangers the child's physical and emotional health, safety and well-being, creates a detrimental home environment and places the child Christina and the child's siblings Kenneth [A.], Monique [A.], and Joseph [A.] at risk of physical and emotional harm, damage, danger and physical abuse.”   As recited above, there was evidence before the juvenile court from multiple witnesses, including Christina herself, that Mother physically abused Christina.   Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's assumption of jurisdiction over Christina pursuant to section 300, subdivision (a).   We therefore do not address Mother's challenges to the other grounds on which the juvenile court found dependency jurisdiction over Christina.

In appeal no.   B219971, we affirm the juvenile court's finding of jurisdiction over Christina.

II. Mother's petition for extraordinary writ

“ ‘When the child is removed from the home, the court first attempts, for a specified period of time, to reunify the family.’  [Citation.]  If, after the specified time period has expired, the efforts to reunify the family have failed, ‘ “the court must terminate reunification efforts and set the matter for a hearing pursuant to section 366.26 for the selection and implementation of a permanent plan. (§ 366.21, subd. (g).)” ’  [Citation.]   The hearing under section 366.26 is called a permanency planning hearing.  [Citation.]”  (Sara M. v. Superior Court (2005) 36 Cal.4th 998, 1008-1009.)  “The permanency planning hearing does not necessarily result in a loss of parental rights, but it very often does.”  (Id. at p. 1009.)

Mother's petition for extraordinary writ argues that (1) substantial evidence did not support the juvenile court's conclusion that DCFS made reasonable efforts to facilitate Mother's reunification with Christina, (2) the juvenile court abused its discretion in terminating reunification services at the contested hearing on May 13, 2010, and (3) substantial evidence did not support the juvenile court's conclusion that Mother posed a threat to Christina's safety and that visitation would not occur without further order of the court.   Mother also asks for a temporary stay of the permanency planning hearing scheduled for August 30, 2010.

A. Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's finding that DCFS made reasonable reunification efforts

We review for substantial evidence the juvenile court's conclusion that DCFS provided reasonable reunification services.  (Angela S. v. Superior Court (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 758, 762.)  “[O]ur sole task on review is to determine whether the record discloses substantial evidence which supports the juvenile court's finding that reasonable services were provided or offered.”  (Ibid.) We “ ‘construe[ ] all reasonable inferences in favor of the juvenile court's findings regarding the adequacy of reunification plans and the reasonableness of [the social services department's] efforts.’ ”  (Sara M. v. Superior Court, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 1018.)

Mother argues that DCFS did not make sufficient efforts to facilitate visitation between Mother and Christina.¹¹  The record shows, however, reasonable efforts by DCFS. As we described above, there was evidence that the DCFS social worker met regularly with Christina and encouraged Christina to consider visitation with Mother.   When Christina stated that she did not want contact with Mother, the social worker continued to encourage her to keep an open mind and to address the issue in therapy.   The social worker also had monthly contact with Christina's individual therapist, and urged the therapist to make visitation a goal of Christina's therapy.   The therapist told the social worker that she discussed visitation with Christina, but because Christina did not want to make visitation a goal of therapy, the therapist would not insist on it but would continue to bring it up.   The social worker explained that in spite of Christina's opposition to visitation, she continued to talk to Christina about it and continued to discuss it with Christina's therapist.   The social worker also suggested to Christina ways in which Christina could visit with Mother (at DCFS offices, at the therapist's office) and explained that the social worker and therapist could meet with Christina to discuss any safety issues.   This is substantial evidence that DCFS made determined efforts to facilitate visitation, continuing in the face of Christina's continued refusals.

Mother argues that not addressing visitation in Christina's therapy was not “reasonable services.”   The evidence shows, however, that DCFS-in the person of the social worker-urged the therapist to make visitation a goal, and that the therapist told the social worker that she continued to bring it up in therapy, even if it was not the “goal.”   Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the juvenile court's finding, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the conclusion that DCFS made reasonable efforts to ensure that visitation was discussed in Christina's individual therapy, and that those efforts resulted in discussion of visitation during Christina's sessions with the therapist.  “The standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might have been provided, but whether they were reasonable under the circumstances.  [Citation.]”  (Elijah R. v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 965, 969.)

Further, Mother is incorrect that the juvenile court delegated its authority by giving Christina the power to determine visitation.   A juvenile court abuses its discretion by improperly delegating its authority, if it gives children or DCFS absolute discretion to determine whether visitation will occur.  (In re Julie M. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 41, 48.)   In this case, however, the court did not impermissibly delegate its power.   The court's dispositional order consistently provided for monitored visitation.   At the initial six-month review hearing on April 16, 2010, the court reiterated that it had ordered monitored visits and had not delegated its authority to the therapist, and asked for a report on the issue.

B. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in terminating reunification services.

Section 361.5, subdivision (a)(1)(A), provides that a parent of a child over the age of three at the time of initial detention is to be provided with reunification services running from the time of the dispositional hearing (or 60 days after the date of initial removal, as provided in section 361.49) to the date of the permanency hearing, which under section 366.21, subdivision (f) is to be set within twelve months.   Section 361.5, subdivision (a)(2) provides that a petition to end court-ordered reunification services prior to the twelve-month hearing shall be made under section 388.   In turn, section 388, subdivision (c)(1)(B) allows a petition to terminate reunification services early when “[t]he action or inaction of the parent or guardian creates a substantial likelihood that reunification will not occur, including, but not limited to, the parent['s] failure to visit the child, or the failure of the parent ․ to participate regularly and make substantive progress in a court-ordered treatment plan.”   The petitioner requesting modification has the burden of proof, and the court must find by clear and convincing evidence that “action or inaction by the parent or guardian creates a substantial likelihood that reunification will not occur,” based on factors including “failure to participate regularly and make substantive progress in a court-ordered treatment program.”  (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.570(e)(4).)

Our review is for substantial evidence even where the trial court must make its findings based on clear and convincing evidence:  “The ‘clear and convincing’ standard is for the edification and guidance of the juvenile court.   It is not a standard for appellate review.  [Citation.]”  (In re J.I. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 903, 911.)   We determine whether there is substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could find, by clear and convincing evidence, a factual basis for the findings made.  (In re Marina S. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 158, 165.)   As the petitioner, Mother bears the burden of showing there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court's findings.  (In re Geoffrey G. (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 412, 420.)   Once we have determined that substantial evidence supported the trial court's factual finding that clear and convincing evidence showed that Mother had failed to make progress in court-ordered treatment, we review the decision to terminate family reunification services for an abuse of discretion.  (In re Aryanna C. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1234, 1242.)

Here, substantial evidence supported the juvenile court's conclusion that clear and convincing evidence showed that Mother had failed to make progress in her court-ordered treatment.   DCFS does not dispute that Mother participated in parenting and anger management classes and that she attended individual therapy.   The court concluded, however, that despite her regular participation mother had made insufficient progress.   Christina had borne the brunt of abuse in the home, and Mother was “entrenched” in her perception of Christina, asserting “in order for [Mother] to even begin to think about family reunification, the child will need to acknowledge that she, the child, made up the allegation and then apologize for the harm that Christina has inflicted on the family.”   Further, Mother still believed that her daughter was eligible for services under AB3632, in spite of the evidence that Christina was achieving at grade level in school, and showing none of the serious behavioral issues that Mother had described Christina displayed while she was living in Mother's home.   Underpinning these findings were the social worker's testimony that Mother's therapist told her that Mother minimized the haircutting as “grooming” rather than punishment, Mother's statement that Christina would have to admit she lied and apologize for the harm she had caused before reunification could occur, Mother's intent to have Christina assessed under AB3632 with the goal of enrolling her in an out-of-state residential treatment program, and Mother's continued belief that Christina had severe mental health issues.   The social worker testified that Mother had remained consistent on these issues during their regular conversations.

We conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in terminating reunification services.   Substantial evidence supported the court's conclusion that Mother, in spite of her participation in court-ordered treatment, continued to minimize her abuse of Christina, intended to require that Christina admit she lied when she reported the abuse and that she apologize, believed that Christina needed to be assessed for out-of-state residential treatment, and believed that Christina had serious mental health issues.   Mother's beliefs were in sharp contrast with the evidence before the court that Christina had not lied in reporting the abuse, did not have educational issues requiring out-of-state residential treatment or even an IEP, and did not have mental health issues beyond depression and anxiety, for which she continued in individual therapy.   The court did not act beyond its discretion in deciding that given the circumstances, it was not reasonably likely that further reunification services to the date of the August 30, 2010 permanency hearing (at the time of the court's ruling, the permanency hearing was approximately three and a half months away) would result in successful reunification.

We note that the juvenile court concluded that terminating reunification services was in Christina's best interests.  “The statutes governing reunification services and review hearings must be considered in light of the juvenile dependency system as a whole․  The general purpose of dependency law is to safeguard the welfare and best interests of children.   [Citations.]”  (In re Aryanna C., supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 1241.)

C. Substantial evidence supported the court's finding of detriment to Christina as a basis for ending visitation.

Mother argues in her writ petition that substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court's no visitation order on the basis that visits with Mother would threaten Christina's safety.   DCFS does not respond to Mother's argument, pointing out (as the court acknowledged) that DCFS did not recommend that visits be terminated.

At the May 13, 2010 hearing on terminating reunification services, the juvenile court set a hearing for June 29, 2010 for further argument on its no visitation order.   Mother's counsel asked the court to allow Mother to write letters to Christina that Christina's counsel and DCFS could review before giving them to Christina.   The court authorized Mother to write letters to Christina that would go directly to Christina's counsel, giving counsel the discretion to discuss the letters with and provide copies to the social worker.

After Mother filed her writ petition, the hearing was continued to July 15, 2010 pursuant to stipulation by the parties.   At the hearing, Mother's counsel withdrew her contest to the visitation order.   The order stated “No visits with Mother remains in full force and effect.   Mother may send correspondence to minor Christina through counsel.   Mother to provide to her counsel and then Mother's counsel to provide to Minor's counsel to review.”

DCFS argues that this renders the visitation issue moot.   Mother responds that she stated on the record that her withdrawal of the contest was not a waiver of issues raised in the appeal or in the writ petition.   We have not been provided with a transcript of the July 15, 2010 hearing.   In any event, we accept Mother's statement that she did not withdraw her appellate challenge to the conclusion that visitation with Mother threatened Christina's safety.

Mother argues that the juvenile court erred in concluding that she posed a threat to Christina's safety and ending visitation on that basis.   We agree that there is not substantial evidence in the record to support that monitored visitation would threaten Christina's safety.   Christina did not express fear that Mother would harm her.   DCFS did not argue that monitored visitation would be unsafe for Christina.   Our review of the record does not show evidence of a threat to Christina's safety if monitored visitation were to proceed.   We note that a threat to “safety” is required to terminate visitation when reunification services remain in place:  “when reunification services have been ordered and are still being provided, ․ some visitation is mandatory unless the court specifically finds any visitation with the parent would pose a threat to the child's safety.”  (In re C.C., supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 1491.)

The court, however, at the request of DCFS, made the additional finding that “any visits between Christina and her Mother would be detrimental.”   The order reflected both the finding regarding Christina's safety and the finding of detriment to Christina.   Detriment to the child, rather than a threat to the child's safety, is the standard for ending visitation when, as in this case, reunification services have been terminated.   When the juvenile court terminates reunification services and sets a permanency planning hearing, then the court “shall continue to permit the parent ․ to visit the child pending the hearing unless it finds that visitation would be detrimental to the child.” (§ 366.21, subd. (h).)  “Although the legislative preference remains for continued parent-child visitation until the [section 366.26] hearing ․, such visitation may be terminated” if the court finds detriment.  (In re C.C., supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 1491.)  “Detriment is a familiar standard in child welfare determinations;  but ․ the notion of detriment is at best a nebulous standard that depends on the context of the inquiry․  ‘It cannot mean merely that the parent in question is less than ideal, did not benefit from the reunification services as much as we might have hoped, or seems less capable than an available foster parent or other family member.’   Rather, the risk of detriment must be substantial, such that returning a child to parental custody represents some danger to the child's physical or emotional well-being.”  (Id. at p. 1490.)

Nevertheless, “the parents' interest in the care, custody and companionship of their children is not to be maintained at the child's expense;  the child's input and refusal and the possible adverse consequences if a visit is forced against the child's will are factors to be considered in administering visitation.”  (In re S.H. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 310, 317.)  “[T]he court must focus on the best interests of the child[ ] ‘and on the elimination of conditions which led to the juvenile court's finding that the child has suffered, or is at risk of suffering, harm specified in section 300.’   [Citation.]”  (In re Julie M., supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at pp.   50-51.)

We review for substantial evidence the juvenile court's finding that visitation would be detrimental to Christina.  (In re Mark L. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 573, 581, fn. 5.) The evidence discussed above constitutes such substantial evidence that Christina's emotional well-being would suffer if visitation continued.   Christina steadfastly refused to have contact with Mother, and at times became depressed and anxious when visitation was brought up.   Christina believed-and Mother maintained-that Mother's intent was to have Christina assessed for an out-of-state residential program, in spite of Christina's well-adjusted behavior in foster care, which did not show any severe disturbance or mental health issues.   Mother, despite all indications to the contrary, continued to assert that Christina had attachment disorder, a diagnosis without support in the record, and minimized the forced haircutting as “grooming.”   Mother intransigently demanded that before reunification could occur, Christina would have to admit she lied about Mother's abuse, and apologize to the family for the harm she had caused by reporting Mother's abuse.   Given Christina's reaction to proposed visitation and Mother's intransigence, the juvenile court acted within its authority to deny visitation once reunification services were terminated.

In B224441, we deny the petition for extraordinary writ.

DISPOSITION

In B219971, the juvenile court's disposition order is affirmed.   In B224441, the writ petition is denied.   The stay of the permanency planning hearing is hereby vacated.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

JOHNSON, J

We concur:

MALLANO, P. J.

CHANEY, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. Two other children, Emrick A. (adopted by Mother and Father) and Claudia A. (biological daughter of Mother and Father), are each over 18 years old and are not subjects of this appeal (although Claudia, who was 17 at the time the petition was filed, was mentioned in the allegations)..  FN1. Two other children, Emrick A. (adopted by Mother and Father) and Claudia A. (biological daughter of Mother and Father), are each over 18 years old and are not subjects of this appeal (although Claudia, who was 17 at the time the petition was filed, was mentioned in the allegations).

FN2. Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code..  FN2. Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

FN3. Mother demanded that Father leave the home when she learned of the abuse, and he complied.   Father was later convicted of lewd and lascivious behavior with a child under 14 years of age, and a permanent restraining order was put in place, with Christina and Mother as the persons protected..  FN3. Mother demanded that Father leave the home when she learned of the abuse, and he complied.   Father was later convicted of lewd and lascivious behavior with a child under 14 years of age, and a permanent restraining order was put in place, with Christina and Mother as the persons protected.

FN4. Mother stated that she had a bachelor's degree in psychological and child development, and had finished course work for a master's in public administration.   She began taking in foster infants in 1990.   Her mission was to help families get back together and if that was not possible, she would keep the foster children because “ ‘I have very strong opinions regarding multiple placements.’ ”.  FN4. Mother stated that she had a bachelor's degree in psychological and child development, and had finished course work for a master's in public administration.   She began taking in foster infants in 1990.   Her mission was to help families get back together and if that was not possible, she would keep the foster children because “ ‘I have very strong opinions regarding multiple placements.’ ”

FN5. The court dismissed count i-1, which alleged that Mother's emotional abuse subjected Christina to an act of cruelty..  FN5. The court dismissed count i-1, which alleged that Mother's emotional abuse subjected Christina to an act of cruelty.

FN6. Father was ordered to participate in psychiatric treatment, sex abuse counseling, 12-step meetings, and to remain compliant with his prescribed medication.   As Father is not a party to the appeal or to the writ petition, we will hereinafter describe the court's orders as to Mother only..  FN6. Father was ordered to participate in psychiatric treatment, sex abuse counseling, 12-step meetings, and to remain compliant with his prescribed medication.   As Father is not a party to the appeal or to the writ petition, we will hereinafter describe the court's orders as to Mother only.

FN7. Referring to Assembly Bill No. 3632, “ ‘AB3632’ is the name commonly used for the program setting forth interagency responsibilities for providing services to handicapped children.  [Citation.]”  (In re R.W. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1268, 1273, fn. 2.) Under Government Code section 7572, mental health services will be provided as part of a child's individualized education program (IEP) to ensure that a child benefits from her education.   The mental health agency and the local educational agency are to work together to determine a “mutually satisfactory placement that is acceptable to the parent and addresses the educational and mental health treatment needs of the pupil in a manner that is cost effective for both public agencies ․ including the requirement that the placement be appropriate and in the least restrictive environment.”  (Gov.Code § 7576, subd. (a).).  FN7. Referring to Assembly Bill No. 3632, “ ‘AB3632’ is the name commonly used for the program setting forth interagency responsibilities for providing services to handicapped children.  [Citation.]”  (In re R.W. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1268, 1273, fn. 2.) Under Government Code section 7572, mental health services will be provided as part of a child's individualized education program (IEP) to ensure that a child benefits from her education.   The mental health agency and the local educational agency are to work together to determine a “mutually satisfactory placement that is acceptable to the parent and addresses the educational and mental health treatment needs of the pupil in a manner that is cost effective for both public agencies ․ including the requirement that the placement be appropriate and in the least restrictive environment.”  (Gov.Code § 7576, subd. (a).)

FN8. Section 388, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(3) provides that any party may petition the court prior to the six-month review hearing for termination of reunification services if “(B) The action or inaction of the parent or guardian creates a substantial likelihood that reunification will not occur, including, but not limited to, the parent or guardian's failure to visit the child, or the failure of the parent or guardian to participate regularly and make substantive progress in a court-ordered treatment plan.  [¶] ․ [¶] (3) The court shall terminate reunification services ․ only upon a finding by a preponderance of the evidence that reasonable services have been offered or provided, and upon a finding of clear and convincing evidence that one of the conditions in subparagraph ․ (B) exists.”.  FN8. Section 388, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(3) provides that any party may petition the court prior to the six-month review hearing for termination of reunification services if “(B) The action or inaction of the parent or guardian creates a substantial likelihood that reunification will not occur, including, but not limited to, the parent or guardian's failure to visit the child, or the failure of the parent or guardian to participate regularly and make substantive progress in a court-ordered treatment plan.  [¶] ․ [¶] (3) The court shall terminate reunification services ․ only upon a finding by a preponderance of the evidence that reasonable services have been offered or provided, and upon a finding of clear and convincing evidence that one of the conditions in subparagraph ․ (B) exists.”

FN9. We grant DCFS's requests in the writ proceeding for judicial notice of (1) the prior appellate record and (2) postjudgment events..  FN9. We grant DCFS's requests in the writ proceeding for judicial notice of (1) the prior appellate record and (2) postjudgment events.

FN10. “During the pendency of an appeal from an order that awards, changes or otherwise affects the custody of a dependent child, the trial court retains jurisdiction to make subsequent findings and orders in the dependency proceeding.”  (In re Anna S. (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1489, 1493;  Code Civ. Proc., § 917.7.).  FN10. “During the pendency of an appeal from an order that awards, changes or otherwise affects the custody of a dependent child, the trial court retains jurisdiction to make subsequent findings and orders in the dependency proceeding.”  (In re Anna S. (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1489, 1493;  Code Civ. Proc., § 917.7.)

FN11. Mother has forfeited her argument that the juvenile court should have ordered joint counseling for Christina and Mother, pursuant to the recommendation in the Evidence Code section 730 psychological report that joint therapy be considered.   The disposition order did not include joint counseling, and Mother did not request joint counseling at the jurisdiction/disposition hearing in October 2009.   She cannot argue in this writ proceeding an issue that she did not raise in the juvenile court.   (Phelan v. Superior Court (1950) 35 Cal.2d 363, 372 [“Before seeking a mandate in an appellate court to compel action by a trial court, a party should first request the lower court to act.   If such a request has not been made the writ ordinarily will not issue unless it appears that the demand would have been futile.”].) Further, Mother did not raise this issue in her appeal, and “an unappealed disposition ․ order is final and binding and may not be attacked on appeal from a later appealable order.”   (In re Meranda P. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1143, 1150.).  FN11. Mother has forfeited her argument that the juvenile court should have ordered joint counseling for Christina and Mother, pursuant to the recommendation in the Evidence Code section 730 psychological report that joint therapy be considered.   The disposition order did not include joint counseling, and Mother did not request joint counseling at the jurisdiction/disposition hearing in October 2009.   She cannot argue in this writ proceeding an issue that she did not raise in the juvenile court.   (Phelan v. Superior Court (1950) 35 Cal.2d 363, 372 [“Before seeking a mandate in an appellate court to compel action by a trial court, a party should first request the lower court to act.   If such a request has not been made the writ ordinarily will not issue unless it appears that the demand would have been futile.”].) Further, Mother did not raise this issue in her appeal, and “an unappealed disposition ․ order is final and binding and may not be attacked on appeal from a later appealable order.”   (In re Meranda P. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1143, 1150.)