THE PEOPLE v. RAY ADONIS HAMPTON (2010)

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

This appeal involves the statutes authorizing the civil forfeiture of property seized in connection with drug investigations.  (See Health & Saf.Code, § 11469 et seq.) ¹  In a drug-related criminal prosecution, the trial court entered orders placing Ray Hampton in a deferred entry of judgment program.   (See Pen.Code, § 1000 et seq.)   A month later, the trial court entered a separate judgment under the forfeiture statutes ordering the People to return $6,100 which had been seized from Hampton's residence, “plus interest, if any.”   Hampton, in turn and in pro. per., filed a motion to set aside the forfeiture judgment on the ground that he was entitled to a further award of more than $160,000 in compensatory damages allegedly caused by the loss of use of his $6,100 between the date of its seizure to the date of the order for its return.   The trial court denied Hampton's motion to set aside the forfeiture judgment, and Hampton filed the appeal that comes before us today.   We affirm the order denying Hampton's motion to set aside the forfeiture judgment.

FACTS

On March 7, 2006, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department deputies executed a search warrant at Hampton's residence and recovered more than 70 ecstasy pills, along with $6,100 in United States currency.   On March 22, 2006, the People “opened a civil in rem forfeiture case against the $6,100.”   On April 28, 2006, the People served Hampton with notice of administrative proceedings for the forfeiture of the $6,100 seized from his residence.   On June 7, 2006, Hampton filed a claim opposing forfeiture in response to the People's notice of administrative proceedings.²

On October 11, 2006, the People filed an information charging Hampton with one count of transporting ecstasy, a controlled substance (§ 11379, subd. (a)) and two counts of possession of ecstasy, a controlled substance, for sale (§ 11378).

On February 10, 2009, Hampton, in pro. per., agreed to a negotiated plea in his criminal case.   The plea agreement included the following terms:  the information would be amended by interlineation to add a new count 4 alleging possession of a controlled substance (§ 11377, subd. (a)), Hampton would plead no contest to the added count 4, the People would state that he was eligible for a deferred entry of judgment program, and the remaining counts would be dismissed upon completion of the program.   Hampton waived his constitutional trial rights, the trial court suspended imposition of sentence, and placed Hampton on deferred entry of judgment for a period of 18 months.

On February 16, 2009, Hampton delivered a written notice to the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department requesting the return of his $6,100.

On February 20, 2009, a deputy district attorney advised the trial court by letter that the People would “not proceed with the Petition for Forfeiture,” and that the People would be returning Hampton's $6,100.   In the same letter, the People further advised the trial court that they could not return Hampton's $6,100 without a court order because the property “remain[ed] within the jurisdiction of the court.”   The letter enclosed copies of a proposed “Judgment and Order for Return of Seized Property” for the court's signature, for the purpose of authorizing the return of Hampton's $6,100.

On March 5, 2009, the trial court signed and entered a “Judgment and Order” directing the People to return Hampton's $6,100.   The judgment expressly stated that it was entered in a forfeiture action under “section, 11470, et seq.”   The judgment directed the People to return Hampton's $6,100, “plus interest, if any,” and included provisions stating that the parties had agreed the judgment would “conclude all claims between the parties, including all costs and attorney's fees,” and that the parties had “waived the right to appeal the judgment.”

On March 24, 2009, Hampton, in pro. per., filed a “Motion to Set Aside Judgment” in which he asserted under penalty of perjury that the judgment entered by the trial court on March 5, 2009, had been entered without prior notice to him.   Hampton proffered his own proposed judgment in place of the judgment already signed and entered by the court.   Hampton's proposed judgment included language which ordered the People to return his $6,100, plus interest, and which ordered the People to compensate him for “constructive interest pursuant to the ‘Takings Clause’ of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, plus post judgment interest, plus cost and attorney's fees ․ pursuant to [Code of Civil Procedure sections 128.7, subdivision (b)(3), and 685.010, subdivision (a), and the California Constitution, article XV, section 1, subdivision (2) ], and for any additional ․ damages the Court deem[ed] just and proper.”  (Boldface and italics omitted.)   An “accounting” found in the record appears to suggest that Hampton wanted a judgment in the forfeiture action to include provisions ordering the People to return his $6,100, plus interest, and to pay an additional amount of $166,357.66 to compensate him for losses allegedly caused by the three-year deprivation of his $6,100, and to compensate him for his attorney fees in his criminal case.

On April 15, 2009, the district attorney's office mailed a warrant to Hampton in the amount of $6,954.59, which, according to a cover letter, “represent[ed] the amount of the seized property, together with interest.”

At the conclusion of a hearing on May 19, 2009, the trial court denied Hampton's motion to set aside the forfeiture judgment.

Hampton filed a timely notice of appeal from the trial court's order denying his motion to set aside the forfeiture judgment.

DISCUSSION

Hampton contends the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to set aside the forfeiture judgment.   We disagree.

No judgment or order of the trial court shall be reversed on appeal unless, after examination of the record, a reviewing court is of the opinion that an error has occurred, and that the error has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.  (Cal. Const., art.   VI, § 13.)   It is appellant's burden on appeal to show error and prejudice.  (Boeken v. Philip Morris, Inc. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1640, 1678.)   After giving consideration to Hampton's opening brief on appeal, we are not persuaded that a miscarriage of justice occurred in connection with the forfeiture proceeding involving Hampton's $6,100, and, for this reason, we will not reverse the trial court's order denying Hampton's motion to set aside the forfeiture judgment.   Generously construed, Hampton's arguments on appeal are predicated on this fundamental proposition:  in the context of a forfeiture proceeding, he is not limited to a judgment ordering the People to return his property that was seized, i.e., his $6,100, plus interest, and that, to the contrary, he is entitled to a judgment which includes an award of more than $160,000 in compensatory, economic damages for a violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.   We reject Hampton's contentions because the legal authorities which he cites in his opening brief on appeal do not support this fundamental proposition.   Hampton got his money back and an award of the interest actually accrued upon it.   That is all he is entitled to.  (U.S. v. $133,735.30 Seized (9th Cir.1998) 139 F.3d 729.)

DISPOSITION

The trial court's order is affirmed.

We concur:

FOOTNOTES

FN1. All further section references are to the Health and Safety Code, unless otherwise stated..  FN1. All further section references are to the Health and Safety Code, unless otherwise stated.

FN2. In conjunction with his appeal, Hampton filed a request for judicial notice of documents related to the forfeiture proceedings.   We hereby grant the motion..  FN2. In conjunction with his appeal, Hampton filed a request for judicial notice of documents related to the forfeiture proceedings.   We hereby grant the motion.

RUBIN, J. GRIMES, J.